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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the cultural politics and economics o f  the ownership, exchange 
and consumption o f  cattle in Peddie District in the Eastern Cape Province o f  South Africa. 
Specifically, the question for which I sought an explanation is why- given a long history o f  
government attempts to limit and channel cattle ownership by rural Xhosa people, as well as 
what appeared to be entrenched processes o f  de-agrarianisation, economic decline and 
considerble circular migration between town and country - did many o f  the people living in 
the communal areas o f  the Eastern Cape (i.e. the former bantustans o f  Ciskei and Transkei) 
express a keen interest to own cattle?
Drawing on nine years o f  research engagement in Peddie District, and thirteen months o f  
fieldwork in two villages, this dissertation explores how cattle were practically and 
discursively enmeshed in people’s everyday livelihoods, accumulation strategies and 
domestic -  including gender and generational -  struggles o f  rural homesteads in Peddie 
District. It was clear that cattle enjoyed considerable appeal as some o f  the ‘big notes’ in a 
rural economy that was dominated by social welfare transfers and casualised employment.
I found that one way to gain a fuller understanding o f  people's investments in cattle was to 
analyse their variable social and structural positions within the village milieu, their economic 
trajectories and their broader cultural projects over time. I attempt to do this by presenting a 
number o f  biographical sketches o f  people pursuing two broad economic, cultural and ritual 
projects, i.e. that o f  ukwakh'umzi [to build the homestead] and masincedisane [let us help each 
other], I employ case-studies to illustrate the range o f  differentiated interpretations, strategies 
and manipulations o f  specifically local bovine resources that variously situated people, as 
members o f  different households, employed in pursuit o f  these projects.
For rural people in Peddie District, especially men and some widows, holding cattle meant 
trying to maximise their use o f  available physical (i.e. ‘free’ grazing and water resources on 
the commons), economic (the use o f  state-subsidised dipping and inoculation programmes 
and o f  household labour) and cultural resources (patriarchal values, bridewealth, norms o f  
accumulation and sharing, and ritual practices) to advance their particular social projects, 
within the limited range o f  options open to them.
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Glossary of Xhosa words, South African English (SAE) terms and 
acronyms used frequently in the dissertation
inkazana (pi. amankazana)
ikhay'enkhulu
intloko yekhaya
intsika yekhaya
isahlulo
isirhoxo
isiko (pi. amasiko)
masihlalisane
masincedisane
masingcwabane
mqombothi
ubudoda
ubuqaba
ujongekhaya 
ufcuhlonipa 
ukuncedisana 
ukuvula ’mzi
ukwakh 'umzi 
umgalelo (pi. imigalelo)
umanyano 
umkhonto wekhaya
umnini wendlu 
umntu omkhulu 
umsebenzi (pi. imisebenzi)
umthetho (pi. imithetho) 
umzi (pi. imizi)
bakkie (SAE) 
kraal (SAE)
RDP
GEAR
Reserves/bantustan/homelands/
shebeen
unmarried mother/s
lit. the big home, the natal homestead
the head of the household [home]
lit. the pillar o f the home, the main bread-winner and authority figure 
share-cropping
small shop in the village that sells food and
domestic goods, often in small quantities
traditional custom, cultural practice
lit. let us live together, cohabitation.
lit. let us help each other, idiom of mutual assistance
lit. let us bury each other, burial society
home-brewed sorghum beer
manhood, the values and behaviour that go with being a (Xhosa) man 
the complex o f traditionalist and conservative 
cultural (and moral) values 
one who looks after the home
to use the language & behaviour of avoidance and respect
to help each other (infinitive o f masincedisane)
a ritual to open the home, i.e. to inform the
ancestors that one has a new home
to build the homestead
rotating credit association or bulking buying
club based on regular contributions from members
women's prayer group
lit the spear o f the home, the spear used to
slaughter animals during rituals
the head of the household
old, more senior person
lit. work, a ritual event, particularly one
invoking the ancestors
social rules of behaviour, norms,
homestead
light delivery van, pick-up 
cattle byre
Reconstruction and Development Programme 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme 
various names for the areas designated for exclusive 
occupation by African (black) people in 
colonial and apartheid South Africa, 
drinking house in the village
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Map 1: The former homelands and independent states of apartheid South Africa
THE FORMER HOMELANDS AND INDEPENDENT STATES 
OF APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA
Venda  c '
Gazankulu
KwaNdebele
Kangwane'
Boputhatswana
Durban
Cape Town,
KILOMETRES
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction
Background
Nearly ten years1 after making a ‘miraculous’ political transition to democracy, post­
apartheid South Africa remains characterised by jarring contradictions and 
‘staggering [socio-economic] disparities’ (Auslander 2003). A sophisticated modem 
economy exists amidst a veritable sea of poverty. While many of the haves 
periodically contemplate an upgrade to the latest marque of luxury German sedan, 
social exclusion and a daily struggle for survival are the lot of millions of ‘the poors’ 
(Desai 2002; Marais 1998). For many local observers, these two worlds seem to 
remain stubbornly unconnected.
Recently, President Thabo Mbeki launched a ‘new debate’ about the nature of the 
South African economy and, by extension, of South African society. Moving away 
from his earlier, controversial (and increasingly inaccurate) ‘two-nations -  one white 
and rich, the other black and poor’ -  formulation, he pointed to the existence of two 
economies, which exist side by side in South Africa. The ‘first’ economy is 
characterised by its relative wealth, world-class infrastructure, banking systems and 
integration into the global economy. The ‘second’ economy is defined by poverty, 
poor educational opportunities, unemployment and social marginalisation. The 
challenge, chief government spokesman Joel Netshitenzhe said, was to ‘destroy [the 
second economy] so that we are left with one first-class developed economy that will 
benefit everyone’ (Hlope 2003).
The persistence of dualisms
What is remarkable about Mbeki’s ‘new’ formulation is that this dualist 
conceptualisation has survived -  virtually intact -  the transition from the colonial and 
apartheid era, to resurface in the post-apartheid South Africa of the new millennium.
1 The ‘ethnographic present’ for this dissertation is 2001, the year in which I conducted the bulk of my 
fieldwork.
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It is forty years ago now that the then influential South African economist, Houghton, 
re-affirmed the by-then long-accepted binary distinction, namely the existence of a 
clear dichotomy between the economic backwardness of African reserves in the rural 
hinterland of South Africa and the modem, efficient and market-driven ‘white’ 
farming and industrial economy of the country. He stated that
In South Africa, there is a .. .fundamental line o f  cleavage.. .o f  such 
importance that there may be said to be two different types o f  rural 
economies existing side by side in the same country. One is the 
essentially market-oriented farming, as practised by white farmers, and 
the other is the largely subsistence-oriented farming o f  African peasants 
in the reserves. The difference between the two is deep-seated and 
manifests itself in a variety o f  ways reflecting cultural differences and 
fundamental attitudes to the exploitation o f  the natural 
environment...The differences between market-oriented farming and 
subsistence farming are so great that they cannot conveniently be treated 
together (Houghton 1973 [1964]: 46-48).
In making these assertions, Hobart Houghton epitomised the liberal white position of 
the time, with its associated narrative stressing the urgent need for African 
adaptation and modernisation, principally through Western education (MacMillan 
1991: 85; Bundy 1988).2 Many anthropologists endorsed this view, as Sansom 
demonstrated with his model of ‘the stages of development of the dual economy’ in 
South Africa (Sansom 1974; cf. Ferguson 1999: 86-91; MacMillan 1991: 90-92).
Indeed, in the ‘serious fictions of the South African social imagination’ (Coplan 
1998: 140), the deeply-ingrained habit of binary thought, encapsulated in such 
classic dualisms as black-white, masculine-feminine, African-Western, rural-urban, 
rich-poor, modem-traditional, domination-resistance and sophisticated-backward, 
lives on (see Mamdani 1996; Vink & Kirsten 2003: 3). This is true even when long­
standing dualisms are roundly rejected by academic commentators, yet creep back 
into the public discourse, smoothed out into ‘continuums’, that merely position the 
original binaries at opposite ends of the scale (as in Tapson 1997; Ferguson 1999).
2
As Martin Murray (1996: 22) points out, however, ‘peasant’ practices such as share-cropping and 
‘other non-capitalist forms of production cannot be treated as inert and static categories... external and 
inimical to capitalist development, with their own linear histories, temporalities, and spatial integrities. 
They must be understood instead as part and parcel of the wider historical process of combined and 
uneven capitalist development whereby the countryside is subjugated, or “ruralised”.’ (See also Long 
1992b: 29-31; James 2001). This section owes a great deal to Ferguson’s (2001 [1990]: 135-138) 
penetrating analysis of dualism in development planning and in the livestock sector in particular.
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Analysing cattle production in the reserves of the Eastern Cape Province
One of my objectives here is to explore the economic dualisms that are said to 
characterise agricultural production in different pockets of the South African 
countryside (cf. Gupta 1998).3 For both intellectual and practical reasons, I have 
chosen to analyse the cattle production sector of the former reserve areas of the 
Eastern Cape. My overall research endeavour is to understand the interrelationships 
between regional patterns of economic organisation and opportunity, and more 
localised processes of accumulation, in which cattle feature as one possible arena of 
social and economic investment (cf. Long 1992b: 29). More specifically, I address 
the question why, if investments in cattle supposedly represent a ‘traditional mode of 
economy5 that is destined to fade away over time, cattle are currently so numerous 
and sought after by many people in the reserve areas of the Eastern Cape.
On a practical note, I have been employed since 1997 as a researcher by the Range 
and Forage Institute (RFI), one of a number of institutes that make up the South 
African parastatal Agricultural Research Council. Established in 1992, the RFI is 
mandated to conduct research into the condition and management of grazing 
resources across South Africa, in collaboration with other government departments 
and the users of rangelands.
As a social anthropologist with an interest in applied research, I was prompted by 
my colleagues in the RFI to seek answers to the ecological ‘problem5 apparently 
posed by vast numbers of cattle (and goats and sheep) that are held, purportedly for 
‘cultural5 reasons, by the residents in the former bantustan areas of the country. As I 
delved into the literature that dealt with the various aspects of cattle production in 
the reserve areas, it became apparent that remarkably little empirical research had 
actually been conducted directly on cattle ownership and production in the reserve 
areas of the Eastern Cape. The available literature was characterised by a good deal 
of speculative argument, cross-referencing and extrapolation from the handful of 
earlier agricultural studies (Steyn 1982, 1988; Bembridge 1984; Van Rooyen et al.
1981; Fraser 1991; cf. Duvel & Afful 1996).
2
Of course, the sector is characterised by stark differences in respect of racial access to land and types 
of land tenure.
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Upon querying this state of affairs, it was suggested to me that research into these 
issues was hampered partly because rural Africans were acutely distrustful of 
outsiders seeking to make detailed enquiries into their livestock holdings and 
practices. It occurred to me, however, that the sentiments of rural people might not 
be the only issue at stake here. Rather, much of the work dealing with cattle 
production under communal tenure systems, certainly that published before 1990, 
seemed to serve primarily as ammunition in wider ideological struggles around 
issues of land tenure (see, for example, the collections edited by De Wet & 
McAllister [1987] and Cross & Haines [1988]; cf. Berry 1994: vii). Free marketeers 
campaigned vigorously against the perceived woes of communal tenure and pointed 
to cattle production as the quintessence of what was wrong in these systems. By 
relying uncritically on Hardin’s (1968) ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ thesis, these 
observers made much of the environmentally destructive and economically 
inefficient nature of cattle production under communal tenure, but without long-term 
empirical evidence to substantiate their claims (Lyne & Nieuwoudt 1991; Vink 
1987; cf. Shackleton 1993; Anim & Lyne 1992).
In January 1999,1 commenced a preliminary study of the cattle production sector in 
the former bantustans, to map out the terrain (see Ainslie [ed] 2002). For this study, I 
returned to Peddie District where I had previously conducted detailed fieldwork during 
1995-1997 (see Ainslie 1998). For my doctoral thesis, I undertook fieldwork in two 
villages in rural Peddie District during the period October 2000 to November 2001.
My interest in the ‘cultural economy’ of cattle production in the former reserve areas 
of South Africa was stimulated by two texts in particular. One was Murray’s 
Families Divided (1981a) and the other was Ferguson’s The Anti-Politics Machine 
(2001 [1990]). Both authors were at pains to point out how much more complex and 
nuanced the Basotho cultural practice of cattle ownership was than mere survival. In 
setting out both the broader, structural constraints and exploring the micro-political, 
economic, social and cultural dynamics of cattle ownership at the household level, 
these authors challenged the stubborn divide between cultural and economic 
analyses (cf. MacMillan 1991; Turkon 2003). These two ethnographies also served 
as my introduction to the vast ethnographic literature which spans much of the 
twentieth century, and which explores virtually every aspect of pastoralist and agro-
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pastoralist cultures and economies in Southern and East Africa (see, for example, 
Herskovits 1926; Evans-Pritchard 1940; Fielder 1973; Comaroff & Comaroff 1991; 
Homewood 1995; Hutchinson 1996; MacKinnon 1999; Hodgson 2000).
As will become evident, by emphasising cattle ownership I do not wish to suggest 
that cattle ownership is the (or even a) key index of some essentialised set of 
‘Xhosa’ cultural practices or value systems in the Eastern Cape. Quite clearly there 
are a number of other, overlapping structural and contingent factors that inform the 
changes and the continuities evident in what is obviously a wide (and growing) 
range of practices and cultural values extant in the province. These include, in no 
particular order, the resurgent traditional authorities (see Ntsebeza 2002; Wotshela 
2001), the uneven effects of urbanisation (Bank 2002a), agrarian changes and 
adaptations (McAllister 2001; Kepe 2002a; Fay 2003), issues around household 
identity and changing gender politics (Ngwane 2001, 2003; Mager 1989; Mann 
2000) and the effects of livelihood alternatives or the lack thereof (Monde 2003). 
Instead, I have focussed on cattle because the cattle owned and used by people who 
have their homes in the former bantustan areas of the province are strategic in at 
least two senses.
In the first sense, I consider that the characterisation of what rural people purportedly 
do or fail to do with these cattle is a paradigmatic case of the dualism which remains 
a feature of current conceptualisation and policy development in the agriculture 
sector in South Africa (Ainslie 2002b; Vink & Kirsten 2003; cf. Gupta 1998: 31).4 
The second sense in which I think it is strategic to focus on cattle ownership has to 
do with the reality that cattle, which serve as markers of particular cultural spaces 
which are increasingly contested in the countryside, can provide us with valuable 
insights into changes and continuities in Xhosa cultural practices.
4 It could be asked whether it matters that a fundamental dualism of backward/ modem or 
traditional/commercial continues to pervade popular portrayals, academic analyses and government 
policy making and programme implementation in the cattle production sector. A cursory review of 
the history of pastoralist development interventions across sub-Saharan Africa suggests that it does 
(Kerven 1992; Hodgson 1999: 221; Anderson 1993; Scoones [ed.] 1995; Peters 1994).
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Cattle ownership: The view from ahove
If, as Sansom argued cogently, the duality that ‘pervaded economics’ in the reserve 
areas of South Africa was artificially prolonged through ‘peculiar [and gendered] 
restrictions’ on African employment, mobility and ability of Africans to own 
property, then the question arises as to why the progressive lifting of these 
restrictions since at least 1986 has apparently not led to ‘final economic 
interpenetration’ and the collapse of the ‘traditional [cattle-centred] economy’. 
(Sansom 1974: 135,176; MacMillan 1991). Indeed, Sansom’s prediction of the 
‘collapse’ of the cattle economy echoed similar dire predictions that have been put 
forward by natural scientists and administrators in South Africa and elsewhere in the 
region since the 1930s, that have also not come about (see Beinart 1984). What this 
linear model of inevitable decline fails to do, as MacKinnon (1999: 98-99) points out 
for Zululand, is to take full account of the ‘shrewd and efficacious means [employed 
by Africans] of adapting aspects of a pre-colonial economy to the capitalist context’.
The Comaroffs have, in their work among the Tshidi Barolong, provided important 
insights into why this ‘collapse’ has not occurred, or at least not in the dramatic 
fashion that was predicted earlier. The significance of cattle for many rural Africans, 
they asserted, is that cattle have long had ‘economic, utility value and are also 
signifiers par excellence of a particular social and cultural landscape’ (Comaroff & 
Comaroff 1992: 195; cf. Coertze 1986; Mayer 1980b; Switzer 1993: 304). I argue 
that an analysis of cattle ownership among rural Xhosa-speaking people can throw 
light on the cultural continuities in their current practices and point to the economic 
and social fault-lines that present-day investment in cattle exposes among them.
It is my contention that much of the recent work that stresses the economic value of 
livestock in communal areas strengthens the hands of the agricultural economists 
who now seem to dominate mainstream debates on agrarian transformation in South 
Africa (Shackleton et al. 2001; Vink & Kirsten 2003; cf. Bernstein 1997). I suggest 
that this is because analyses that hinge on measures of economic ‘efficiency’, and 
which do not give due and equal consideration to the historical, cultural, social and 
symbolic values of these herds, ultimately only provide a partial account of the
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practices and meanings that animate the ownership and uses that people make of 
cattle in the former bantustan areas.5
Cattle ownership: The view from below
As suggested above, the second sense in which I think it is strategic to focus on 
cattle ownership relates to the role of cattle as markers of a particular cultural 
politics of value. I argue that the situated ownership and contemporary uses that 
Xhosa-speaking rural people qua social actors make of cattle present us with a 
fascinating opportunity to explore how ordinary people ‘practise their culture’ as 
they attempt to deal with everyday experiences, whether it be in securing their 
livelihoods or celebrating a ritual (Long 1992a).
Theoretically, I approach the study of cattle holding in rural Peddie District as a 
dynamic component of a larger ‘cultural topography of wealth’ (Ferguson 1992; 
Appadurai 1986). As earlier, socially embedded uses that cattle served for Xhosa- 
speakers have been eclipsed, new modes and meanings for the utilisation of cattle 
have come about. These new meanings need to be carved out of earlier meanings 
and defended by social actors against alternative representations and against 
contested notions of commoditisation engendered by the economic realities of 
everyday life. The politics of commodities, Ferguson (1992: 70) has pointed out,
‘.. .are always twofold. [IJnterested categories of people enter into contestation not 
only over who will have the goods, but equally how the terrain of goods itself will be 
structured’. The years of post-apartheid democracy in South Africa have spawned 
new and competing ‘regimes of value’, but ones in which once-dominant and the 
new cultural paths of wealth, status and hierarchy are arguably less hegemonic and 
more fragmented and thus possibly more contested now than at any time in the past 
(Niehaus 1994; Comaroff & Comaroff 1999).
The political overthrow of apartheid lifted the lid on the searing, often violent, 
struggles being waged in villages, peri-urban settlements and townships across the 
country (Ramphele 2000; Wood & Jewkes 2001). ‘There is a war between men and
5 On this point, see Gudeman (2001: 81) who argues that ‘anthropologists are caught in a dialectic with 
Western economists. Both offer essentialist or modernist views: one is relational, the other atomistic. 
One side emphasizes altruism, the other egoism.’
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women’, one of my (male) informants told me quite matter-of-factly, reflecting on 
the endless, unnerving stream of press reports about often brutal domestic violence, 
including rape and child abuse, around the country. This is the ‘epidemic of violence’ 
that characterises everyday situations among men and between men and women, often 
within the household, in which gendered and generational control of the whole gamut 
of symbolic and material resources is at stake (Mager 1989: 57; Morrell 2001).
The objective of this study
Taking my cue from the exemplary studies of Shipton (1989), Hutchinson (1996) 
and Ferguson (2001 [1990]), my objective is to provide a detailed ethnography of the 
contemporary meanings and place(s) of cattle in the cultural constructs, social 
practices and livelihood strategies of Xhosa-speaking people in Peddie District of the 
Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. This has not been undertaken in this way 
before (but see Beinart 1982). My analysis includes a review of the major political 
economic changes that have had an impact on the cattle sector over the period 1930- 
2001 .
My main intention is here to unpack the situated perspectives of my informants, to 
explore how the meanings and practices associated with cattle husbandry help or 
hinder people in making sense of the contemporary struggles over space, labour and 
identity in the decentred ‘rural-urban’ economy that characterises the Eastern Cape 
Province.
Given the close association between cattle and rural patriarchy, my aim is also to 
investigate whether the uses to which rural people put cattle helps to smooth over 
existing social tensions between different people or, alternatively, to mark particular 
gendered and other boundaries and to reinforce the struggles between differently 
situated people. My hope is that this analysis will feed into wider debates about land 
reform and agrarian change, market-driven economic development and 
environmental sustainability that are at times far removed from the things that seem 
important to rural people as they piece together their livelihoods in places like 
Peddie District (Hart, G. 2002; Gupta 1998).
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Doing ethnographic fieldwork in post-apartheid South Africa
The political and moral dilemmas of conducting anthropological research in South 
Africa under apartheid have been discussed and analysed at considerable length (see, 
for example, Gluckman 1975; Kuper 1986,1988; Gordon & Spiegel 1993; Van der 
Waal 1992; Kieman 1997). As Coplan illustrates, conducting ethnographic 
fieldwork research in post-apartheid South Africa and southern Africa has its own 
trials and tribulations (Coplan 1998; Gordon 2003: 136; De Wet 2001).
One of the challenges is that village residents view the researcher essentially as an 
educated and well-resourced intermediary who can, and indeed should, intercede on 
their behalf in their unequal interactions with government agencies in the pursuit of 
infrastructure and service improvements for their village. This can be a difficult 
process to manage since the young graduate researcher seldom has official contacts 
within government departments. In my case, my employment at the parastatal RFI, 
my prior research association with some middle-range local government officials 
and the fact that our Institute had been involved in promoting natural resource 
management-related development projects in a few villages in Peddie District, meant 
that some village residents felt that I should be able to ‘deliver’ to them on a more 
substantial scale. I was constantly conscious of having to play down my ability to 
‘deliver’ anything to them.
People in both villages required an explanation of why I had chosen their village and 
how my chosen research topic would affect local people. This is the slippery terrain 
of negotiations over access to research sites and of securing the co-operation of 
research subjects. It is also about the politics of the production of knowledge, its 
relevance and its subsequent uses, that most would-be social researchers, certainly in 
rural South Africa, are confronted with nowadays (Coplan 1998: 136). To assist me 
in presenting my case, I called on an old confidant, who was a local African National 
Congress (ANC) political leader, to officially introduce me to the two communities 
of Hamburg and Loverstwist.6 This way, I reasoned, at least the local political 
leadership, and the residents in both villages, could get a sense of my political 
sentiments and I knew it would be helpful if local people were reassured about my
6 More than 98% of the voters in Peddie District voted for the ANC in the first two post-apartheid 
general elections, i.e. 1994 and 1999.
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status as someone who supported the ANC government’s transformative and 
‘people-centred’ political-economic agenda (Hart, G. 2002; cf. Murphy’s [1992] 
paper on his similar experiences in an Andalusian village).
One reason for selecting these two ‘eastern’ villages was that I had previously 
conducted most of my research in the drier, western side of Peddie District, an area 
known as Tyefii Location (Ainslie 1998).7 I had been interested to discover why 
rural villagers seemed unable to take collective responsibility for the management of 
the local natural resources which many people were utilising and dependent on for at 
least part of their livelihoods. I found that the western side of the district appeared to 
be in the grip of a longer-term process, what other observers at the time were calling 
‘de-agrarianisation’, and I went on to characterise Gwabeni village in particular as 
an example of a ‘post-agrarian rural’ settlement (Ainslie 1998). After completing 
this study, I was concerned that my analysis of one particularly economically 
depressed area (i.e. Tyefii Location), could be taken as representative of the whole 
Peddie District.8 My unease was prompted by discussions with officials and 
residents of other parts of Peddie District, who more astutely foresaw that my 
analysis of conditions in Tyefu Location might result in the whole district being 
overlooked by government’s development programmes. With their assertions of a 
more vibrant agrarian economy in the higher-rainfall, eastern side of the district, they 
encouraged me to look afresh at agrarian production in this area. It quickly emerged 
that the livestock, specifically cattle, economy continued to flourish along the coastal 
belt, and needed to be accounted for in the light of my earlier, more pessimistic 
account of a ‘post-agrarian rural’ economy.
In selecting fieldwork sites, I opted for what I took to be two contrasting villages, in 
the hope that this would give me a sense of the local variation in settlement types, 
cattle ownership and production practices in the area. Loverstwist is a small, recently 
established settlement, inhabited mostly by poorly educated former farmworkers (see 
below). Hamburg has a longer history as a settlement which dates back to the 1850s, 
and many of the local residents have long put a premium on education. From cursory
7 In early 1999, with the assistance of Welile Mzozoyana, I had conducted interviews and administered 
questionnaires to 12 cattle-owners in Loverstwist as part of a preparatory study (see Ainslie 2002e).
8 This is partly the issue of just how representative one’s research findings are and partly about the 
‘crisis of representation’ that has befallen social research more generally (see Ortner 1995: 190).
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visits to both villages, I was aware that cattle ownership constituted a substantial 
component of local accumulation strategies.9
With regard to conducting fieldwork, I was committed to actively seeking out local 
people’s voices to incorporate into my ethnographic material. On the other hand, I 
recognised the considerable structural power I wielded as an educated and (in 
relative terms) monied mlungu [white man] and there is no doubt that this had an 
impact on my myriad relationships with people in the villages. It seemed impossible, 
both during the fieldwork encounter itself and later, while analysing my data, 
selecting what data to include in the dissertation and what to leave out, and finally in 
writing up this dissertation, to escape the ‘structural violence’ that permeates the 
ethnographic enterprise, only far more so, given the political and racial history of 
South Africa (Hastrup 1992: 122; Scheper-Hughes 1995: 437).
The fears of people in the two villages were real as the topic of my research, cattle 
ownership, was and remains a symbolically potent, and thus jealously guarded, 
element of rural Xhosa cultural identity and economic accumulation in places like 
Peddie District. This was where the intervention of my ANC comrade (and, I 
presume, my prior track record) was most valuable in assuaging people’s fears 
regarding my ‘real’ (almost certainly, from their perspective, more nefarious) 
intentions in wanting to study their patterns of cattle ownership and use. Moreover, I 
indicated that I could be reached in nearby Grahamstown, where I was employed and 
would continue to work after my fieldwork was completed.
My request for permission to live with a host family in each of the two villages also 
did much to convince people of my bona fides and to build their trust in me and my 
research endeavour. However, a handful of the senior men in both villages remained 
sceptical about my research, and only reluctantly agreed to be interviewed. Even
o
It is necessary to point out that neither Loverstwist nor Hamburg is a ‘traditional’ village in the 
context o f the reserve areas of the former Ciskei, in the sense that neither o f them have, for instance, 
been under modified forms of communal tenure for the past 150 years. Nevertheless, I am confident 
that both Loverstwist and Hamburg are sufficiently similar, on the one hand, to the conditions that 
pertain in other reserve area villages and, on the other hand, capture enough of the wide range o f  
differences in settlement and tenure histories experienced by people in Peddie District, to illuminate 
the key aspects o f cattle ownership, rural livelihoods and cultural practices that I have foregrounded in 
my analysis.
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then, they were guarded about what details they disclosed about their herds.10 Only 
one man, the owner of the biggest herd of cattle in Loverstwist, consistently avoided 
me and refused to disclose any information about his household or his cattle, which 
he kept on a neighbouring farm.
Since the chronic lack of employment is what distresses rural people a great deal, I 
made it known that I would be able to employ one person on a regular basis, and two 
or three others for much shorter periods, to assist with elements of my research.
I thus engaged a number of research assistants in Hamburg and Loverstwist. I 
employed a young man, Fezile Zibi, to teach me isiXhosa during my first three 
months of fieldwork. I was adamant that after living and conducting research in the 
Eastern Cape for eight years, it was time to become proficient in isiXhosa.n
We worked on this language training for four hours each day and then engaged in 
participant observation around the village, meeting people, attending rituals and public 
meetings and drawing a detailed map of the village. My isiXhosa improved rapidly and 
I was subsequently able to conduct simple interviews in the vernacular. But I was 
always aware that what I had been taught was, for the most part and despite my 
attempts to the contrary, grammatically correct, ‘shallow’ isiXhosa, not the ‘deep’, 
idiomatically rich language in use around me that I could hear but not grasp clearly. 
This remained a frustration throughout my fieldwork, despite my attempts to 
constantly learn new words and phrases. I conducted interviews with key informants 
either in English where this was practicable, or asked Zibi, and later Patrick Gusha, to 
accompany me and to assist me with translation.
I found that the post-interview debriefing sessions I held, especially with the 
disarmingly candid Patrick Gusha, could at times be nearly as enlightening as the
10 During the course of my fieldwork, an old rumour from the Ciskei bantustan days resurfaced in the 
province. This was that the government planned to cut off the old-age pension of anyone who held 
more than ten cattle, as they were considered to be ‘rich’. This rumour was quickly debunked by 
officials in the Department o f Agriculture, but it caused enough distress that President Mbeki saw fit to 
dismiss it while attending a political rally in the former Transkei (Daily Dispatch 27 November 2000). 
The incident demonstrated just how sensitive rural people remain about outside interference in their 
cattle holding practices.
111 grew up in the Orange Free State and had some exposure to Sesotho in my youth, but none to 
isiXhosa. Upon arrival at Rhodes University in 1991,1 studied Xhosa I  and passed it easily but I lacked 
the confidence to engage in conversation with Xhosa-speakers beyond the usual pleasantries. After 
these intensive lessons in Hamburg, my proficiency and confidence improved markedly
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interview itself, because of the context and the connections to earlier events that we 
could tease out for why the informant had said something or perhaps withheld 
certain information (cf. Gudeman & Rivera 1990). I resolved to be far more probing 
and less self-consciously polite, while staying within the bounds of local social 
etiquette, in my attempts to understand what people were saying, doing and thinking, 
than I had been previously. I think this approach has paid off both in my 
understanding of the context and in the ethnographic material I have collected.
I employed two other people in Hamburg. A young woman, Nonzukiso Yekani, 
assisted me with interviews of individuals from all the households that had 
conducted rituals in the period November 2000 to October 2001. Xolani Manjezi 
assisted me by administering a limited number of ‘herd-survey’ questionnaires to 
cattle-owners in Hamburg. The bulk of the herd surveys were administered to cattle 
owners by Patrick Gusha. Fezile Zibi and Patrick Gusha also assisted me in 
administering a ‘household livelihood’ questionnaire survey to a random sample of 
60 occupied households in Hamburg village.
The same tasks in the smaller village of Loverstwist were ably undertaken by 
Sonwabo Mase, where he and I administered the ‘herd-survey’ questionnaire to all 
(but one) cattle-holding homesteads and the ‘household livelihood’ questionnaire to 
a random sample of 30 households in Loverstwist.12 Sakhumzi Skina assisted me by 
administering a brief interview schedule to people to record the details of all the 
rituals conducted in Loverstwist between April 2001 and November 2001. The life- 
history interviews which I conducted in Loverstwist were all done with the 
assistance of Sonwabo Mase, either in translating directly during the interviews, or 
in filling in the gaps during post-interview debriefings. In some cases, Sonwabo 
Mase conducted the interviews himself (see Bibliography for the list of interviews).
In Hamburg, I resided with the Mkhaya13 family, who were gracious if initially 
intrigued to be playing host to a young white researcher. A well-respected, 
teetotalling Methodist who attended church every Sunday practically without fail,
12 Because o f his fine disposition and work ethic, I have subsequently managed to have Sonwabo Mase 
employed by the RFI on an annual contract basis.
13 This is a pseudonym to protect their identity as I refer to the household in subsequent chapters.
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Mr. Mkhaya had been employed as a forest ranger under the Ciskei bantustan 
regime. It was widely known that he had kept his govemment-issue handgun after 
his retirement. This was why, the local leadership in the village informed me, I 
would be safe from possible rogue elements if I resided at his homestead.
I was immediately made to feel part of the Mkhaya homestead and, as a fictive adult 
son, was given my own room directly adjacent to the main house. One drawback of 
this otherwise rather favourable situation was that my meals were initially served to 
me in my room by one of the teenage granddaughters of the family. I realised right 
away that this meant that I was unlikely to get to know the family soon nor would I 
hear them talking about village news and daily goings-on. I realised that, over time, I 
would become more of a boarder (not unlike several young teachers from outside the 
village who rented rooms with local families), and would be cut off from a 
potentially rewarding social interaction with the family and their wider networks.
The intervention of an acquaintance, Mncebisi Dingela, greatly assisted me here, 
because within a week of my taking up residence, he arrived to check up on how I 
was doing. Having conducted rural research himself, he was sensitive to my needs 
and impressed on the Mkhaya family the necessity of me eating with them at all 
times and of my being drawn into their family, both for my own safety and so that I 
could begin to learn about people and issues in the village.
My stay at the Mkhaya homestead was not without problems, however, as the 
elderly Mrs. Mkhaya was very ill and died two months after I started living with the 
family. There was a suspicion that witchcraft was involved. An illegitimate daughter 
of Mr. Mkhaya, who had been living with the family to nurse Mrs. Mkhaya and to 
cook for the family, was summarily banished from the homestead by Mr. Mkhaya’s 
daughter (who worked as a nurse in Whittlesea, a town about two hours’ drive from 
Hamburg). This daughter then proceeded to employ a domestic worker-cum-cook 
from a neighbouring village to cook and clean for Mr. Mkhaya, his school-going 
grandchildren who lived in the homestead, and for me. Throughout my ten-month 
stay in Hamburg with the family, from October 2000 to the end of July 2001,1 paid 
Mr. Mkhaya both a (by local standards, generous) monthly rent and a similarly 
generous contribution towards my subsistence costs.
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Although Hamburg is only 1 !4 hours drive from my home in Grahamstown where 
my wife and daughter resided, I spent little time at home during this period. I was 
determined to conduct ‘proper’ anthropological fieldwork, which for me meant ‘total 
immersion’ in the research field with few distractions. My wife and daughter visited 
me in the village on a few occasions and met the Mkhaya family, as did my parents 
on one occasion when they passed Hamburg en route to Grahamstown. These visits 
helped to situate me within local social categories as a young married man with my 
own home and family, who was required to live in the village for a defined period so 
as to study my chosen topic of interest at first hand.
Before moving to Loverstwist, I enquired about a place to stay in the village. I was 
directed to the homestead of Mr. Kholisile Mgaba, his wife MaRadebe and their 
children, who very graciously accommodated me in their home. I resided there for 
the three months (beginning September to the end of November 2001) that I 
conducted fieldwork in Loverstwist. I was given my own room in their house and 
was regarded as an older brother to the children. I grew to be close to this devoutly 
Christian family in the short period I stayed with them.
I remain permanently indebted to all the people I have mentioned for their many 
kindnesses and amazing generosity of spirit. Needless to say, my understanding of 
both of these villages was mediated by what the young people who assisted me, my 
hosts and the wider circle of key and occasional informants I came into contact with, 
chose to reveal to me about themselves, their own lives and those of their fellow- 
villagers. The ethnography I have subsequently assembled constitutes an attempt to 
‘construct understanding from the constructed native’s constructed point of view’ 
(Crapanzano 1986: 74; Gudeman 2001: 5). I recognise that my understanding of 
everyday life in rural Peddie District remains a partial one and I concur with 
Schumaker’s (2001: 50) observation that ‘one of the few certainties... [is] that social 
facts are constructed out of fragile human observations and that truth is always 
contested and contestable’ (see Walker 1990a: 6-7).
This sense of a partial perspective is accentuated in my case, as I chose, after 
identifing high mobility as a feature of the lives of many of the people in Peddie 
District, nevertheless not to ‘follow’ any of my informants, or their relatives, to the
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urban places where many of them lived and sought employment at various times in 
their adult lives. Ferguson (1999: 64) points out that this is what ‘village-level 
studies’ miss and inevitably suffer from as a result (see Englund 2002).
Precisely what challenges people face in towns and cities in the region and how 
these affect the decisions they make regarding their homes in the countryside, are 
things that therefore remain speculative here (cf. Murray’s [2002] ‘dispersed 
intensive’ method of studying spatially dispersed social networks and people’s 
geographically ‘stretched’ livelihoods). However, in defence of this decision, I was 
aware that many of the people from the area in which I conducted my fieldwork had 
strong links with East London (some 80 kilometres away) and I was fortunate to be 
able to tap into the stimulating anthropological research conducted by Leslie Bank 
and his colleagues in East London (see Bank 1997b, 2001, 2002a; Bank & Qambata 
1999). In many ways, Bank’s ethnographic output, which has built on the rich legacy 
of the Mayers, Pauw and Reader (authors of the highly regarded ‘Xhosa in Town’ 
trilogy), complements my work by offering an alternative ‘view from the city’ on 
many of the same issues.
The fieldwork context: Peddie District ca. 2001
Peddie District, known locally as Ngqushwa, is situated in the central part of the 
Eastern Cape Province. The district comprised an area of 1,760 km2 and is situated 
between the Great Fish and Keiskamma Rivers. It is flanked in the south and east by 
the Indian Ocean (see Map 2). It is significant for my analysis that prior to South 
Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, Peddie was one of eight districts that 
comprised the nominally ‘independent’ Ciskei bantustan (Switzer 1993).
Peddie District is a semi-arid area with a dominant summer rainfall. It is, however, 
prone to severe periodic droughts. Rainfall tends to be erratic in quantity and 
distribution, which greatly increases the inherent risks to low-input dryland crop 
farming. Rainfall increases from west to east and the coastal parts of the district 
receive up to 700 mm of rainfall per annum. The drier interior receives 500 mm per 
annum, while as little as 400 mm per annum of rainfall occurs in the Great Fish River 
valley (De Lange et al. 1994: 5). The eight-year period from 1994 to 2002 (excluding
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1999), was one of above average annual rainfall across the district -  the so-called 
‘Mandela rains’ -  which, while they had little impact on arable production, gave 
renewed impetus to livestock-farming {Daily Dispatch 12 July 2003).14 Mean 
monthly maximum temperatures range from 22°C in June to 30°C in February.
Winter temperatures are generally mild and seldom fall below 0°C. The coastal areas 
are frost-free while inland areas of the district experience between 15 and 30 days of 
frost per year (Ainslie 1998: 48).
Soils in the drier interior of the district are infertile, dispersive and unstable, with an 
extreme phosphorus deficiency (Ainslie et al. 1995). Closer to the coast, however, the 
soils are deeper, sandier and more fertile so that dryland field cultivation becomes a 
(somewhat) more viable proposition. The households with access to arable land, 
which still make use of these lands, plant them to maize, melons, beans and other 
vegetable crops. Pineapples are one noteworthy labour-intensive cash crop that has 
been grown intermittently over the years with some success on commercial estates in 
Peddie South, first by white farmers and later by the Ciskei Agricultural Corporation 
(CAC). At the time of my fieldwork, pineapple production had commenced again 
with government and private sector support, with a view to stimulating the local 
economy and providing much-needed employment to rural people in this area.
During the period 1977-1993, the more fertile alluvial soils of the mid-Great Fish 
River valley were utilised for the cultivation of cotton, vegetables and later maize 
under irrigation, although not without considerable ecological and institutional 
difficulties.15 In the pockets of alluvial soils along the middle reaches of the 
Keiskamma River, citrus estates that previously enjoyed state support proved to be a 
moderate success after privatisation. On the whole, given its topography, soils and 
rainfall, the largest part of the district was best suited to extensive livestock 
production, particularly of cattle and goats, on natural rangeland (Loxton et al. 1979; 
Steyn 1988). However, with the widespread abandonment of dryland arable
14 The weather station at Chiselhurst in East London (about 100km east-northeast of the town of 
Peddie) has a 90-year average annual rainfall of 864mm. The annual rainfall recorded at this station 
were: 1995: 983mm, 1996: 918mm, 1997: 965mm, 1998: 1,023mm, 1999: 859mm, 2000: 1,089mm, 
2001: 1,084mm and 2002: 1,064mm {Daily Dispatch 12 July 2003).
15 The Tyefu Irrigation Scheme was established at great cost to help give the Ciskei bantustan a 
semblance o f a viable agriculture sector and to employ some of the black people forcibly removed 
across the Great Fish River under apartheid removals (Holbrook 1998).
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cultivation from the early 1970s, bush encroachment of the palatable sweet-thom 
{Acacia karoo) increased the suitability of the vegetation to goats, since this bush was 
well-suited to the browsing habits of goats. On the other hand, invasive karroid 
shrubs that were unpalatable to livestock, principally ‘blue bush’ (Pteronia incana), 
became a serious problem (Fabricius 1997).
Spatial geographies and some demographic features of Peddie District
Prior to the nation-wide re-demarcation of district and municipal boundaries that took 
place in 1999, Peddie District consisted of two ‘proclaimed towns’, 68 villages (many 
of them in the eight ‘Locations’) and some 60 freehold farms.16 The town of Peddie, 
which contained a resident population of about 6,000 people, straddled the N2 
national road. This road extended eastwards from Cape Town through to Durban, 
along the east coast of South Africa, and was the most important route traversing the 
Eastern Cape Province.
Following a period (1975-1994) characterised mostly by economic decay under the 
Ciskei bantustan regime, the small town of Peddie had regained some of its pre-1975 
status as a focal point for local economic activity, especially in the administrative and 
service sectors. Home to the only bank and post office in the district, it partially 
fulfilled the role of commercial service hub for Peddie District and offered a locally 
significant number of white-collar employment opportunities, especially in the district 
offices of government departments. As a result, the spatial boundaries of the town of 
Peddie had expanded to virtually encompass some of the adjacent villages. This was 
the result of the increase in ‘informal’ housing, constructed by a steady influx of people 
(Manona et al. 1996; Cross 2001). Peri-urban settlements occurred close to the main 
roads leading into and from the town. This was a testimony to the economic pull of 
small towns like Peddie, even though until very recently the town lacked basic services 
such as a domestic water supply and electricity (Manona et al. 1996).
16 Renamed Ngqushwa Municipality by the Municipal Demarcation Board in 1999, it consisted of 
2,246 km2, as opposed to 1,760 km2. An additional 32,000 people living in 44 villages that formerly 
fell under Zwelitsha District, were incorporated into the municipality. In 2002, the estimated total 
population o f Ngqushwa Municipality was 93,997 people, living in 20,757 households (Ngqushwa 
Integrated Development Plan (IDP) 2002: 26).
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Map 2: Tenure patterns in Peddie District, ca. 1981.17
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In the early 1990s, many of the residents of the new Peddie Extension who moved in 
from more distant villages in the district were attracted by the increased chances of 
securing some form of employment in town, especially in informal trading, as well as 
the banking and better transport and communication services, health, social welfare 
and police services. Not all such mobility should be seen as voluntary, however, and 
as Cross points out for KwaZulu-Natal Province, the significant mobility of rural 
households is often characterised by ‘crisis moves’ that occur in response to
17 Both the forced resettlement and voluntary migration o f people considerably increased the number 
o f villages and the population sizes o f  existing villages in the coastal areas o f  Peddie District from 
around 1978.
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politically inspired violence, job market failure and the search for better infrastructure 
and services (Cross 2001).
In the past three years, the sole commercial bank in Peddie town had taken on the job 
of cashing people’s monthly state welfare cheques, for a fee per transaction. This 
consistently drew large numbers of the elderly and disabled to town to avail 
themselves of this service, a journey that was facilitated by the privately owned taxi 
business. Nompumelelo Hospital, situated on the outskirts of the town, served the 
entire district, although a number of clinics and sub-clinics in villages offered a 
limited range of health services. The hospital used to offer training in nursing science, 
but by 2001 it no longer did so.
Peddie town had a commonage which was the main grazing resource for the cattle 
and goats owned by people who lived in town and the adjacent villages. A break­
down in the management of the commonage resulted in the owners of livestock not 
having to pay for this access (Higginbottom et al. 1995). This meant that existing 
town residents and the people who chose to move into town from rural villages did not 
have to relinquish their cattle and goats when they settled in town (Bank 1997b: 23). 
Cross et al. (1996b: 183) detect a similar trend among rural people in KwaZulu-Natal 
who have moved closer to town but instead of ‘giving up the rural resource economy, 
they have tried to bring it with them as they move towards jobs’ (see also Cross 2001; 
For a contrasting case in Gaborone, Botswana, see Kruger 1998; cf. Potts 2000).
The other, far smaller ‘urban settlement’ is Hamburg, situated at the mouth of the 
Keiskamma River. It had grown slowly from its origins in 1858 as a German settler 
village. Along with Wooldridge, Bell, Bodiam and German Village, Hamburg was 
founded to set the German mercenaries who had fought for the British in the Crimean 
War up as small farmers. The ‘urban’ status of Hamburg was an anachronism, since 
its currently dilapidated infrastructure hardly qualified it to be called an urban centre 
(Cook 1980: 35). Rather, this status was based on its having had its own ‘village 
board’ (later municipality) and its own commonage for much of the twentieth 
century. This distinguished it from neighbouring villages and essentially served its 
‘white’ residents and holiday-makers who patronised this attractive, if rustic, holiday 
destination. This status brought many more local employment prospects than were
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available in neighbouring villages of equivalent size, and over the years attracted a 
Xhosa-speaking population, which numbered about 1,500 people, to the area.
By far the majority (as many as 95%) of the people in Peddie District resided in the 
rural villages of the district or, at least, had their imizi [permanent homes] there 
(Ngqushwa IDP 2002: 24).18 At first glance, this accounted for the rural and 
apparently agrarian character of the district. But the stagnant local economy that 
characterised Peddie District for most of the second half of the 20th century made for 
poor local employment opportunities, and thus high population rural-urban mobility. 
The fact that the district was situated between the major employment centres of Port 
Elizabeth/Uitenhage (some 200 kms away) and King William’s Town/East London 
(50-100 kms) meant that people in Peddie District were extremely well located to 
develop a range of ‘rural-urban linkages’ with these centres (Manona et al. 1996;
Bank 2001; De Wet & Holbrook 1997).
High mobility among the local population was not without precedent though, as long­
distance labour migration to distant mines or industries on the Witwatersrand and the 
Orange Free State was undertaken by people (mostly men) from Peddie District from 
the turn of the 20th century (Bundy 1988). What is significant, though, was that as 
early as the mid-twentieth century these long-distance migrant routes were being 
replaced by employment (both of both men and of women) in the provincial port 
cities of East London and Port Elizabeth and in Cape Town (Mayer 1980b: 48ff). 
Furthermore, the trend since the early 1970s, at least for those people with the 
requisite education and qualifications, had been to take up the even more localised (if 
labour unfriendly) employment opportunities on offer in the ‘border industries’ set up 
in Zwelitsha, Dimbaza and Berlin (Manona 1980a: 185-187; Mager 1989). During the 
1980s, as the Ciskei bantustan bureaucracy underwent rapid expansion, white collar 
work in the Ciskei capital, Bisho, and district administrative towns provided further 
opportunities for employment and upward mobility for a somewhat wider section of 
the local population (De Wet & Holbrook 1997; Leibbrandt & Sperber 1997).
18 Some o f these ‘villages’ were concentrated settlements of some 1,000 households, others had less 
than 70 households. Overall there was no settlement hierarchy, i.e. nodal settlements with superior 
infrastructure and facilities, to speak of in the district (Ngqushwa IDP 2002: 25).
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Bank (1997b:25) makes the compelling argument that, in the absence of a clear urban 
hierarchy in the Eastern Cape, people do not gradually ‘move on’ to the next biggest 
and more economically active town or city. Instead they become ‘trapped within 
stagnant pools on the fringes of [economically] depressed towns. Rather than seeking 
out better opportunities [through long-distance, perhaps permanent migration to urban 
centres], [many of them] spread their risks by circulating between urban and rural 
places within the same locality’. This risk-averse behaviour, which remains a feature 
of many parts of the Eastern Cape, rests not least on many people’s poor educational 
qualifications that put a brake on their upward mobility. These factors ensure that, 
while the local economy has remained stagnant, there has been a constant and 
significant flow of people, resources and information between town and country 
throughout the Eastern Cape Province for a number of decades.
Demographic features of Peddie District were reminiscent of the overall situation in 
the rural former bantustan areas. As many as 52% of the total population of 
Ngqushwa Municipality (a larger area which included Peddie District) consisted of 
children between the ages of 0 and 19 years. A further 11% of the population was 
over the age of 60. Labour outmigration by men continued to affect the sex ratio in 
the district, with 47% of the total population male and 53% female. However, this 
mismatch was especially noticeable in the age groups older than the 30 years of age, 
with a 39% male and 61% female ratio the mean for the five age categories (i.e. 30- 
39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69 and 70+). Women-headed households constituted 52% of the 
households in the municipality (Ngqushwa IDP 2002).
Agrarian change and conflicts over resources in Peddie District
Land-holding in Peddie District is an artefact of the colonial and apartheid-era 
confiscation of land, the racialised overlordship and the radically skewed ownership 
of productive land in the Eastern Cape. Prior to 1818, the present-day Peddie District 
was occupied primarily by the amaNdlambe Xhosa and amaGqunukhwebe people, 
the latter also Xhosa-speakers. During the ‘Frontier War’ of 1818-1819, these Xhosa 
people were driven out of this area and an uninhabited buffer area between white 
settlers and Xhosa-speakers was declared by the Cape governor, Charles Somerset 
(Peires 1981: 79).
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With the relocation of the ‘refugee’ amaMfengu [‘Fingo’ people] from Gcalekaland 
(east of the Great Kei River) to Peddie District in 1834, land was set aside by the 
Cape Governor D’Urban for the establishment of six locations under communal 
tenure and two mission stations (Manona 1980b; Webster 1991).19 D’Urban’s strategy 
was that the amaMfengu would serve the colony as a buffer against the ‘marauding 
and cattle-rustling’ Xhosa peoples. To draw the amaMfengu into the colonial 
economy, an annual hut tax of ten shillings per hut was imposed in their locations as 
early as 1848 (Switzer 1993: 93).
From 1849, grants of land in Peddie District were made to white settlers, both Dutch­
speaking - who were given land along the middle and lower reaches of the 
Keiskamma River - and English-speaking settlers. The English-speakers were given 
farms in the central and eastern portions of Peddie District, which constituted the best 
agricultural areas of the district (Bullock 1960: 28). White farmers were deliberately 
interspersed among the ‘natives’, in order to ‘educate’ the latter in more advanced 
European methods of farming.20 By 1854, there were 8,688 people resident in the area 
that would become known as Peddie District (Lewis 1984: 245).
By the late 1860s, some mostly Mfengu Xhosa-speaking peasants had begun to 
establish themselves as successful transport riders and entrepreneurs and a few were 
able to purchase small farms under freehold title in the district, where they 
successfully turned their hand to farming (Bundy 1988). One hundred years later, 
however, thanks to the Land Acts (1913 and 1936) and the apartheid policy of ‘black- 
spot’ removals, as much as 50% of the land in the district was in the hands of white 
farmers under freehold title. The major share of the balance, i.e. the ‘reserved areas’, 
was held in trust by the state which delegated the responsibility for managing the 
resources thereon to local authorities (see Ainslie [1998: 33-41] for a detailed discussion 
on ‘modified communal tenure’ in the Eastern Cape). A small number of black owners of 
freehold land were still on the land (see Bundy 1988). The result was low population 
density on this white-owned, commercially fanned land and a far higher concentration of 
Xhosa people in the locations that were ‘reserved’ for African occupation.
19 These same areas of Peddie District were ‘scheduled’ for the exclusive occupation and ownership by
Africans in the Natives’ Land Act of 1913.
20 Thus ushering in the functional interdependence of black and white people in Peddie District and the 
surrounding districts that has carried right through to the present time.
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For well over one hundred years, resources in the reserve areas were utilised by local 
residents under the eye of the headmen, chiefs and native commissioners (later 
magistrates). Since the early 1990s, this role has supposedly been taken up by the 
non-statutory, village-level residents’ associations. In earlier decades, residential sites 
and arable allotments were held and controlled by individuals (historically only by 
men and widows with certain conditions) who had exclusive usufruct rights to these 
resources as long as they resided in the village and paid their taxes. The rights to 
arable land could be inherited but not sold, thus effectively preventing the emergence 
of a stratum of rich peasants. Significantly, grazing resources for livestock and other 
natural resources were held in common in that every person who was a recognised 
member of a particular village ‘community’ had rights of access to the grazing 
resources of that village (De Wet 1987a: 461). By the 1940s, as with other Ciskeian 
reserve areas, the reserves of Peddie District were experiencing chronically high 
people-to-land ratios, deteriorating agrarian conditions and growing pressure on 
natural resources. Although in principle every (married male) person still had the 
right to residential and arable land, access to arable land was increasingly denied by 
the growing scarcity of land throughout the Ciskeian reserves (De Wet 1987a: 460).
The crumbling agrarian system, already highly reliant on inputs that were sourced 
through migrant labour, was struck a further blow when the severe drought of 1945 
decimated livestock herds in the reserve areas of the Ciskei (Mager 1999). From the 
late 1950s, landlessness was further accentuated by the arrival of large numbers of 
former tenant workers and farm labourers, who were pushed off white-owned farms 
as farming operations in Peddie and neighbouring districts were increasingly 
capitalised and mechanised (see Charton 1980b: 229; Manona 1988a). The fact that 
the various discrete reserve areas were hemmed in on all sides by white-owned farms 
precluded any expansion of the area available for human settlement or for grazing and 
cultivation and the extraction of key natural resources.
As if land ownership and land use had not already been sufficiently politicised in the 
countryside, from the 1940s the state responded to the increasingly visible signs of 
natural resource degradation in the reserves by implementing a programme of 
‘Betterment Planning’ (De Wet 1995a; Beinart 1984; Vetter 2003). This entailed
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replanning local land parcels and their subsequent demarcation, division and re­
allocation into separately fenced-off residential, arable and common grazing areas. 
This meant that many already-poor rural homesteads had to relocate to the area set 
aside for a block-plan residential settlement.
One particularly odious element of the programme for rural people was that the 
notional ‘carrying capacity’ of grazing resources in each area was determined by 
agricultural planners. Any livestock deemed to be in excess of the carrying capacity 
were to be culled or sold and the owners compensated for their loss (De Wet 1995a; 
Mager 1992). Henceforth, a limit was placed on the number of cattle each household 
could own and grazing fees were to be collected. Bank and Qambata (1999: 15-17) 
note that the implementation of betterment in Mooiplaas near East London in 1958 
entailed the imposition of a limit of 10 cattle per household. This was viewed by local 
people as an unwarranted attack by the state on one of their last remaining avenues of 
accumulation in the decaying agrarian economy. The move was so vigorously 
resisted that government officials were reluctant to follow through with it and the 
practice was later abandoned (Beinart 2003; Mager 1999).
The reserve areas of Peddie District were subjected to these ‘Betterment Planning’ 
schemes in the 1950s and 1960s, in the face of vehement opposition in some areas. In 
the eMazizini area in Peddie South, two chiefs were murdered by villagers because 
they had agreed to the implementation of betterment, apparently without adequate 
consultation with local residents (Mzozoyana 1995a). But only the residents of Tyefu 
Location, an agriculturally marginal and already heavily eroded area, with the political 
support of Port Elizabeth-based members of the African National Congress Youth 
League (ANCYL), managed to mobilise local residents and resist the implementation 
of betterment (Mager 1999; Ainslie 1998). As a result, Tyefu Location consists of 
eleven dispersed villages, which each retain the sprawling, ‘NgunV settlement plan with 
loosely defined and mostly unfenced grazing areas. The opposition to the erection of 
fencing by local authorities that would demarcate discrete livestock grazing camps for 
each village stemmed from the fact that no single village had sufficient year-round 
grazing resources to meet the needs of all the livestock in the village. However, in the 
absence of institutional controls, fences or herdsmen, the lack of formal grazing 
management consistently made it more difficult for individual livestock-owners to
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improve cattle production through selective breeding, improved animal health regimes 
or enhanced forage provision strategies (see Ainslie 1999; cf. Cross et al. 1996b).21
In the run-up to the ‘independence’ of the Ciskei bantustan in 1981, all freehold farms 
under white ownership were expropriated. Under apartheid legislation, no white 
South Africans were permitted to own land in the ‘independent’ Ciskei bantustan.
The white farmers were compensated by the state and their farms were taken over by 
the South African Development Trust (SADT), for incorporation into the Ciskei 
bantustan. Simultaneously, considerable numbers of Xhosa-speaking people were 
removed from ‘common’ South Africa and forcibly resettled into the Ciskei, mostly 
just prior to its taking ‘independence’ in 1981 (Surplus People’s Project [SPP] 1983: 
312ff; Manona et al. 1996: 13). Some of these people were resettled on previously 
white-owned farms in Peddie District and were placed under the nominal control of 
headmen and chiefs. Here they frequently came into conflict with the people who had 
previously been employees of the white farmers and who were still resident on these 
farms now ‘consolidated’ into the Ciskei.
The resettlement of people onto these farms effectively ‘recommunalised’ large areas 
of land that had been under freehold tenure for 130 years. In Peddie District alone, the 
forced removals of ‘black spots’ and resettlement of this period saw several thousand 
families forced to re-establish their homes as best they could in the already 
overcrowded and impoverished reserve areas. At the government-established 
resettlement camps at Glenmore, Kama’s Kraal, Zweledinga, Bell and Bingqala, 
many people (4,500 in Glenmore alone) had to endure years of considerable hardship 
and, under threat of further resettlement, uncertainty about their futures (Manona et 
al 1996: 14). Those who had brought livestock with them often had to watch 
helplessly as their livestock succumbed to adverse weather conditions, previously 
unknown diseases and unfamiliar poisonous plant species (MacLennan 1987).
91 Prompted by concerns over the spread of bovine diseases and stock-theft, the state was also more 
vigorous in its attempts to enforce the existing legislation which restricted the movement of cattle out 
of the reserves. By slowing down the sale of livestock into and out of the ‘locations’, these controls 
over the movement o f livestock restricted agrarian economic activity in the reserves and were widely 
resented (see Ainslie 2002c; Beinart 1997).
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A contrasting pattern was exhibited by the defiant settlement of Loverstwist Farm by 
an assortment of mostly former farmworkers in the early 1980s. These people hailed 
from the neighbouring farming areas, and they did not fall under, nor did they readily 
recognise, the authority of chiefs or ‘tribal authorities’. Some of them had been or 
were still resident on previously white-owned pineapple farms in Peddie South that 
had been consolidated into the Ciskei a few years earlier (Palmer 1997a: 91-92).
From 1985, most of these farmworkers were forced to make way when these farms 
were consolidated again to form the Ciskei National Ranch and the Ciskei 
Agricultural Corporation (CAC)-managed pineapple estates. By then, a few 
households of displaced farmworkers had settled by stealth on the farm of 
Loverstwist, setting up their shacks among the trees. The farm was being used by 
CAC to fatten oxen bought in the villages prior to resale. Following the overthrow of 
President-for-Life Lennox Sebe in 1989, farmworker families invaded in numbers 
and squatted on the farm, resisted removal and demanded that they be provided with 
services such as water and electricity.
Although their settlement was subsequently planned and officially acknowledged by 
the Ciskeian authorities, they continued to have a troubled relationship with the nearby 
village of Tuku A, which was the seat of the amaRhaule Tribal Authority. The people 
of Tuku A accused the residents of Loverstwist of encroaching on their grazing and 
arable lands and consistently threatened to drive them out of the area by force.
The broader Ciskei political machinations engendered considerable discord on the 
ground. In all cases of resettlement that took place around the district, whether state- 
led or ‘spontaneous’, competition for resources within existing villages and with 
neighbouring communities was fierce and gave rise to physical confrontations and 
sporadic violence (Manona 1980b; Andrew & Wotshela 1994). In many parts of the 
district, previously white-owned freehold farms were leased to ‘emerging’ black 
farmers, who were promised first option to buy the farms in future. In several cases, 
the presence of these farmers, only some of whom were originally from Peddie 
District, caused serious resentment among neighbouring villagers. This was because 
the impoverished residents of adjacent villages had made use of the natural resources 
on these farms and also illegally removed farm infrastructure, such as fencing, since 
the departure of the white farmers (Ainslie 1998). Overall, it would be fair to say that
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by the early 1990s the regulatory mechanisms that controlled resource use in this 
modified system of communal tenure had largely fallen away and the controls 
presided over by ANC-aligned, village-based residents’ associations, where such 
controls exist at all, were enforced in a far more ad hoc fashion (Ainslie 1998).
The upshot of this marked degree of contestation over access to agricultural and 
natural resources was a generally low level of investment of time and money in 
agrarian production at the household level. The relatively high risk of theft of one’s 
crops or dispossession through land invasions of one’s arable land meant that the cost 
of even basic agricultural infrastructure, such as fencing for the purposes of 
cultivation, was deemed by many to outweigh the potential benefits that might be 
gained from cultivation. For one thing, this situation contributed to the marked 
‘outward-orientation’ in the livelihoods of most rural households in Peddie District, 
with people seeking to gain their livelihoods in urban-based employment or claiming 
entitlements from the state welfare economy. However, the existence of various, 
increasingly locally mediated, forms of communal tenure and resource management 
regimes, as well as the continued (if haphazard) provision of an animal health service 
by the state, meant that many rural people found it prudent to continue to invest in 
livestock. It was especially cattle which represented one viable accumulation strategy 
still open to them.
It is this complex and contested situation that forms the backdrop to my analysis in the 
chapters that follow. In the next chapter, I set out the theoretical considerations that 
inform my study of the ‘cultural economics’ of cattle-holding in rural Peddie District.
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CHAPTER TWO 
Understanding cattle-holding in the former 
bantustan areas of the Eastern Cape Province
Introduction
Since Herskovits’ (1926) extended essay on the ‘cattle complex’, or the special regard 
in which cattle were held by many African peoples, debates have raged concerning 
what exactly this relationship between rural Africans and their cattle entails. To the 
extent that early structural-functionalist anthropologists showed cattle to be 
embedded in the web of social and economic relations that characterised African 
pastoralist groups, it was clear that cattle could not be equated with socially 
‘unshackled’ things or goods, i.e. as commodities to be exchanged at will (see Hunter 
1936; Evans-Pritchard 1940; Gulliver 1955).1 Nor were the cattle held by Africans 
simply or necessarily the cultural, local or pre-colonial equivalent of cash. In fact, it 
was particularly the differences and the similarities between cattle and cash, with 
each having distinct, albeit ambiguous and contested, attributes, agencies and 
associations in local practice, that was to become a focus of attention in the broader 
anthropology of rural Africa (Bohannan 1959,1968; Ferguson 1985,1990; Comaroff 
& Comaroff 1990, 1991; Hutchinson 1996; Galaty & Sperling 1990).
Other early observers, policy-makers and colonial officials, given the task of 
governing rural Africans, were more inclined to point to the ‘irrationality’ inherent in 
the tenacity with which pastoralists were observed to hold onto their cattle, even in 
severely adverse conditions, such as prolonged drought (see Schneider 1984; Kerven 
1992). The supposed preference of pastoralists for ‘quantity over quality’ in terms of 
the number of cattle they held and their consequent reluctance to market cattle came 
to be regarded as a significant factor in the degradation of the very rangelands on 
which their herds depended (see Hardin 1968; Behnke 1984).
1 Here, I used the term ‘pastoralist’ to denote all people who actually keep and farm with cattle (and other 
livestock) and not only those who derive their exclusive or primary livelihoods from cattle keeping.
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Mounting frustration in the 1960s and 1970s at the failure of numerous foreign donor- 
led ‘pastoral development’ interventions across sub-Saharan Africa led many 
commentators to draw on this stock of earlier characterisations of the ‘African cattle 
complex’ (Board 1960; cf. Scoones 1995; Simpson & Evangelou [eds] 1984). These 
arguments parallelled the debates in economic anthropology between the ‘formalist’ 
and the ‘substantivists’, with the latter, following Malinowski, rejecting the notion 
that native economies could be analysed and understood with the theoretical 
constructs and analytical tools of Western formal economic theory.
In the late 1960s, with the currency of the Marxist emphasis on the centrality of 
economic relations, analyses of the cattle sector shifted. Some observers of the 
African cattle sector sought to downplay the cultural (or extra-economic) dimensions 
of cattle-keeping and to argue instead for the intrinsic economic rationality of 
livestock-owning peoples. These analysts emphasised the considerable stream of non­
monetary or ‘subsistence’ value contributed by cattle and cattle products to local 
pastoral economies (Fielder 1973). Others writers who were sympathetic to Frankian 
‘dependency theory’ positions argued that pastoral peoples occupied a specific, 
structurally marginal position on the periphery of the global political economy.
Within the periphery, adverse economic conditions such as depressed price levels, 
limited security of investments in the financial sector and relatively weak local 
demand for consumer goods all acted as strong disincentives to the conversion of 
livestock assets to cash in formal markets, unless exceptional circumstances dictated 
differently (Palmer & Parsons 1977).2
Thus adherents of dependency theory were able to easily explain why, for instance, 
‘rational’ pastoralists could be expected to hold onto their cattle during the most 
devastating of droughts. The poor condition of the animals and the low prices that 
prevailed in the oversupplied markets that typically accompanied extended periods of 
drought made it irrational to exchange them for cash. Moreover, these livestock 
markets were structurally unffee and characterised by various health and other 
controls that prejudiced rural cattle-herders. From the herders’ point of view, it was 
worth holding onto their animals in drought situations because they never knew when
2 The central tenets of these arguments still inform much of the current debates around pastoral 
development and rangeland management in southern Africa (see Cousins 1996,1999; Ainslie [ed.] 2002).
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the drought would break. If it broke before their herds were depleted, there was a 
distinct possibility that they would be able to rebuild their herds. This was 
particularly the case in situations where pastoralists were living under different forms 
of communal tenure, as their overhead costs were generally low and herd recovery 
could commence almost immediately after the first rains and the subsequent increase 
in available forage.
Economic anthropology has moved away from these seemingly sterile debates. 
Questions are no longer posed about whether African pastoralists are rational or 
irrational beings. Instead, we appear to accept that what they think, do and say can 
sometimes be described as ‘rational’, and sometimes ‘irrational’, at least in a formal, 
economic sense, and that their thoughts, words and actions can best be understood by 
looking at the whole context of their lives and lived experience (Sharp 1985; Davis 
1992).3 More recent anthropological forays into this field of study, such as those of 
Ferguson (1990) and the Comaroffs (1985, 1992) in southern Africa, Galaty & 
Johnson (1990) in East Africa, Hutchinson (1996) in the Sudan and Turkon (2003) in 
Lesotho, reflect both this more progressive approach and a somewhat disturbing, 
post-structuralist open-endedness.
I argue that these studies have contributed to a greater understanding of the multiple 
and simultaneous roles played by cattle in the construction and mediation of the 
social and the material worlds of African people. Most importantly, these studies shift 
the emphasis from what Ferguson has identified as stubborn ‘linear metanarratives of 
emergence and progress.. .of imagined teleologies of the modem’ with their implicit, 
ethnocentric hierarchies, to focus instead on the disjuncture, fragmentation and global 
disconnectedness that are experienced by many African people in their daily lives 
(Ferguson 1999: 16-17,23).
In his earlier work, which owed much to Murray (1981a) and Sansom (1974), 
Ferguson (1985) argued convincingly that the ‘bovine mystique’ which surrounds 
(most of) the cattle held by Basotho people is not primordial but is in fact constructed
3 While virtually no-one argues nowadays that different groups of human beings are ‘wired’ differently in 
cognitive terms, social practices can be shown to deviate from ‘formalist’ models of economic rationality 
in all social groups (see Davis [1992] for some intriguing examples).
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and continuously (re)vitalised, primarily by senior men. As long-term labour migrants 
on the mines in neighbouring South Africa, these men have found cattle to be a most 
suitable good in which to invest their savings, and thereby render the latter relatively 
immune to pressures from the claims of spouses and close kin. Cattle are well suited to 
shoring up their status and authority, that is, to ‘stand in’ for them in the rural setting 
from which they are largely absent during the course of their adult working lives.
In a paper that is highly relevant to my study, Bank’s (1997a) analysis of the 
emergence of rural entrepreneurs in the tiny Qwaqwa bantustan of apartheid South 
Africa illustrates another crucial facet of the changing face of cattle-ownership. This 
is the negotiation of gender and class and the contested economic decision-making 
that takes place within the households that hold cattle and between these and other 
households without cattle, as both categories of household try to make sense of and 
engage with bigger changes in their social and economic situation (see also Hodgson 
[ed]. 2000; Anderson & Broch-Due [eds] 1999).
Bank skilfully unpacks the struggles and dilemmas that confronted the people faced 
with the realities of forced relocation into the bantustan from the 1950s, especially the 
increasingly dire shortages of land and the assault of the state on the cattle held by 
black South Africans. Some families opted to make the difficult switch from cattle 
holding to small-scale retailing (Bank 1997a: 190). They did this rather reluctantly 
given the iconic status of cattle, by shifting their material assets from livestock to 
‘deadstock’ i.e. commerce. Ironically -  particularly in light of the opposite response 
of the Tshidi Barolong (see below) -  their motive for doing so, Bank argues, was to 
retain some measure of cultural and economic autonomy in the context of the 
oppressive apartheid political economy and seriously overcrowded conditions of the 
Qwaqwa bantustan (Bank 1997a: 186-193).
Bank contends that those men who successfully made this shift into rural business -  
in successive waves over an extended period and thus under changing material 
circumstances -  did so because they were able to control and divert the labour of 
especially their female but also youthful household members, away from the 
domestic sphere and into their respective businesses (Bank 1997a: 194; cf. Guy 
1990). They orchestrated this shift by innovatively portraying these enterprises as
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‘imaginary herds’, which as collective resources at the household level were, on the 
one hand, subject to the claims of all household members, but on the other hand could 
legitimately demand the labour of household members for the care and increase of the 
‘herd’.
At the same time, however, in disposing of their cattle and thus withdrawing in no 
uncertain terms from the social relations that were underpinned by cattle, these 
would-be businessmen opened themselves up to possible social ostracisation and 
even accusations of witchcraft from disaffected kin, affines and clansmen. Bank goes 
on to discuss the intricacies of how storekeepers tried alternately to (re)present their 
affiliations and identities and to disguise the by-definition profit-seeking nature of 
their enterprises, in ways that resonated with powerful undercurrents in local political 
discourses.
In their wide-ranging exposition of the cultural practices of the Tshidi Barolong, the 
Comaroffs contend that Tshidi ownership of cattle is part of a subjugated people’s 
resistance to the ‘corrupting’ influences of colonial and Western value systems or 
segoa (‘the ways of whites’). In this sense, cattle occupy a central place in Batswana 
consciousness, representing Tshidi attempts to ‘dam the corrosive flow of cash’ and 
to attentuate the impacts of Western cultural domination more generally (Comaroff & 
Comaroff 1991; see De Wet & McAllister 1983: 65). Cattle, the Comaroffs argue 
pace Evans-Pritchard, can be said to ‘lay a bridge between material conditions and 
collective meaning, between practical activity and its cultural construction’.
Thus cattle, in their capacity both as producers of material goods and as stores of 
cultural value, can be harnessed by social actors in at least two significant ways. As 
both the economic currency of projects of accumulation and potent symbols of 
wealth, cattle may feature strongly in domestic social and economic relations, helping 
to define the shifting sands of conjugal, gender and generational relations. At the 
same time, cattle can be -  and indeed are -  paraded as symbols of cultural difference 
writ large, allowing people to espouse their particular cultural identity and celebrate 
their way of life in the face of global economic and cultural influences emanating 
mostly from the dominant Euro-North American metropolitan centres.
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For the purposes of my argument, it is the fact that these two streams are connected in 
the case of cattle held in Peddie District that is significant. The fact that cattle have a 
definite monetary value that can be realised through sale allows people some latitude 
both in the way they conceive of and plan their livelihood strategies and the ways in 
which they assert their cultural and individual identities in the face of the incessant 
push and pull of market forces (Gudeman 2001).
Hutchinson’s (1996) superlative account of the struggles of the pastoral Nuer in 
strife-torn Sudan explores these intricate processes. She describes how the Nuer have 
struggled to come to terms with and to integrate into their social, cultural and 
linguistic universes the considerable and often catastrophic changes they have 
experienced over the past six decades. These changes have been brought about by war 
and the penetration of the cash economy, and have profoundly affected not only their 
cattle-keeping economy but also their social and ritual practices. This sort of rich and 
incisive ethnographic description and analysis provide a powerful antidote to the 
narrow, (political-) economic debates that take for granted the primacy of economic 
rationality and thus seek to tinker with the ‘incentives’ deemed necessary to minimise 
the social pressures that disable maximising pastoralists.
It is, however, worth keeping sight of the utility value of cattle, i.e. the fact that cattle 
provide rural people with direct gains in the form of goods and services, such as milk, 
draught power, manure, meat, hides, etc. that can and do make a considerable 
contribution to the livelihoods of rural people in general (Barrett 1992; Shackleton et 
al. 2001). These real economic goods, as well as the cultural and social goods into 
which they can be readily converted, provide important clues as to why rural people 
continue to keep cattle. The ‘business’ of constructing livelihoods and the extent to 
which these bovine-linked livelihoods are tied to agrarian resources more broadly, 
thus deserves close attention.
Anthropology in South Africa since the 1980s
In one way or another, the purported ‘resistance’ offered by colonised, oppressed 
African peoples has featured strongly in South African ethnography and 
historiography (Mayer 1980b; Bundy 1988). This emphasis emerged in both the
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Marxist and ‘social history’ analyses of the mid-1970s and 1980s (see Murray, M. 
1996; Beinart & Bundy 1987).4 Ideas about the writing of a new ‘history from below’ 
(see, among others, Wolf [1982] and Scott [1985]) also filtered into debates and 
practice within a divided South African anthropology.5 Throughout the late 1970s and 
the 1980s, the discipline in South Africa was increasingly isolated from international 
debates, although there has been some recent discussion about the actual extent and 
impact of this isolation (Hammond-Tooke 1997). At the same time, practitioners 
responded to strident calls for more ‘relevant’ local anthropological analyses that 
would make an intellectual contribution to the struggle against apartheid (McAllister 
1997; Kieman 1997: 59; Mafeje 1996,1997). The main response from South African- 
based (as opposed to foreign-based), mostly ‘white’ anthropologists was to engage in 
what has been termed ‘expose anthropology’ (Gordon and Spiegel 1993: 89; Fry 
1992). This meant conducting studies which for the most part sought to expose and 
document the trauma and material deprivations experienced by black South Africans 
as a result of the workings of the apartheid system. In this regard, the migrant labour 
system and its effects came in for particularly harsh and sustained criticism.
However, the limitations of this approach quickly became evident. The underlying 
assumption about the exceptionality of apartheid generally made for narrowly 
bounded, empirical studies. These were often consciously non-comparative, even 
parochial in their scope, although they also contained generally sensitive historical 
accounts and for the most part strove to take cognisance of current theoretical trends. 
As the anti-apartheid struggle deepened in the 1980s, it continued to hold the virtually 
unassailable moral high ground internationally. It was considered morally and 
politically suspect for anthropologists to deviate from the good, if increasingly 
intellectually stultifying, cause of critically challenging the apartheid state in their 
work (Murray, M. 1996: 13; McAllister 1997: 2).
4 Glaser (2001: 166) suggests that ‘[r]adical historians [of South African history] developed their 
expanded definition of resistance partly to counterbalance top-down historical accounts focusing 
exclusively on heroic episodes and leaders, but also, at least arguably, to sidestep the uncomfortable facts 
of conservatism and quiescence in the black population’.
5 The discipline in South Africa has somewhat simplistically been portrayed as bifurcated into a social 
anthropology, taught mostly at English-medium universities, with strong links to the Durkheimian 
theoretical traditions of British social anthropology, and the volkekunde (ethnology), taught at Afrikaans- 
medium universities that takes up an extreme Boasian position o f cultural relativism and sees each culture 
as bounded and unique (Gluckman 1975; Kuper 1988; Kieman 1997; Gordon & Spiegel 1993: 84-7; cf. 
Hammond-Tooke 1997).
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The turn to neo-Marxist theoretical models from the early 1970s was a further 
confounding factor in the analysis of cultural difference within South African society. 
Apartheid was not exceptional, Marxist theorists argued, but was instead a variation 
of the capitalist exploitation theme, a ‘racialized super-exploitation’ of the African 
majority in the interests of the white minority and international capital (Magubane 
1979). This approach emphasised the concept of class in social analyses and 
theorising (Glaser 2001: 1 lOff). The pursuit of any fresh intellectual developments, 
such as the renewed global interest in ethnicity (not to mention post-modernism) in 
the late 1980s, did not sit well with the dominant materialist and ‘resistance’ 
approaches, although there were exceptions (see Gordon & Spiegel 1993: 89; 
Comaroff & Comaroff 1991; 1992; Wilmsen & McAllister [eds.] 1996).6
Overall, there was thus very little intellectual space for critical analyses of concepts 
such as culture and tradition. In fact, many anthropologists reasoned that, by studying 
these concepts and thereby recognising their use and potency, they would simply play 
into the apartheid state’s plans for the balkanisation of South Africa (Beinart & 
Dubow 1995:17; Spiegel & Boonzaier 1988; Kuper 1986: 3). ‘Culture’ was a key 
concept in the rhetoric of the apartheid state, and in choosing to challenge and 
deconstruct this rhetoric on its own terms, i.e. in the context of the South African 
experience, many anthropologists failed to adequately widen their critique through 
comparative and historical analyses (but see Boonzaier & Sharp [eds.] 1988). Indeed, 
if anthropology was struggling to cast off its label as the ‘handmaiden of colonialism’ 
(Asad [ed.] 1973), then a small band of ‘progressive’ South African anthropologists 
(certainly in the period 1976-1990) were adamant that their discipline was not to be 
labelled the ‘handmaiden of apartheid’ (Beinart & Dubow 1995: 18; see critique in 
Murray 1981b).
Inhabiting as we do the promised land of the ‘new’ South Africa, which is still very 
much under construction, what comparative ethnographic insights might 
anthropologists bring to bear on our understanding of the post-apartheid society and 
its place in the global ecumene? Kieman (1997: 61-2) argues that it is time for
6 The work of Jean Comaroff (1985) and the Comaroffs (1991, 1992) among the Tshidi Barolong, treated 
native ‘resistance’ to the ‘money economy’ and to ‘white ways’ more generally in a far more 
sophisticated fashion, and included nuanced analyses of identity and meaning construction that were 
previously neglected.
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anthropologists to move beyond the caricature of indigenous peoples as the 
dispossessed victims and to begin instead to look at issues of agency and at how 
people cope or ‘get on’ with the business of living and making sense of their worlds. 
He asks rhetorically whether it can
be that the economically impoverished are not only being consumed by an 
iniquitous system but, in some other sense, are actively consuming it and, in 
the process o f  consumption, are actually transforming it.
He notes, echoing a growing trend in anthropology, that ‘ordinary people [sic].. .are 
not lacking in cultural resources or in the capacity to resist the meanings which 
dominant others impose on events and to impress their own meanings on what is 
happening to them’ and proposes the study of this area as a new way forward in 
South African anthropology (Kieman 1997: 62).
As McAllister argues, ‘the question is how to both theorise and operationalise the 
reintroduction of [the concept of] culture’ into the analyses that anthropologists 
construct to explain particularly the continuities of social practices in post-apartheid 
South Africa (McAllister 1997: 3). At issue is the need for a rejuvenated critical 
South African anthropology to develop fresh, plausible explanations of the nature and 
significance of both the continuities and hybridities that exist in the diverse cultural 
practices in the country. These include people’s everyday lives and the extraordinary 
practices (such as ritual practices and ethnically marked rites of passage), that have 
survived and even flourished, albeit in modified forms, into the post-apartheid period.
‘Getting by’: Cattle production as practice
In his discussion of the objectification that characterises all anthropological inquiry, 
Bourdieu (1990) shows how the outside observer, lacking the practical, tacit mastery 
of the cultural forms s/he observes, substitutes this with objectified, abstracted 
models. Thus for example, a model of kinship as a cognitively logical system of kin 
relations is posited as representing how the kinship system of the X people ‘works’. 
This cognitive model, Bourdieu suggests, cannot but fail to encompass the essentially 
practical reality of kinship, as experienced by the people being observed (Bourdieu 
1990: 34-5). The relationship between the two, he contends, is much the same as that 
which exists between a map which represents ‘all the possible routes for all possible
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subjects and a network of pathways that are really maintained and used, and are 
practicable for a particular agent.’
Bourdieu’s simple example of the reified family tree (or genealogy) to demonstrate 
the difference between objectified understanding7 and practical logic, could serve as a 
model for understanding what Xhosa people who hold cattle in the rural Eastern Cape 
are ‘doing’. In producing, exchanging and consuming cattle, they are not necessarily, 
or only, engaged in actions which are consciously rationalised or logical (in the way 
posited by, for instance, rational-choice theories). Rather, their practices may well 
stem from a different logic, the logic of tacit, embodied history, of acting on the 
world in a certain way because of an inculcated cultural conditioning or ‘diffuse 
education’ (Bourdieu 1990: 103). This practice has its own economy of logic and 
instrumentality (as well as symbolism and meaning), which is implicated in ensuring 
the success of social production and reproduction in its broadest sense (Bourdieu 
1990: 95). ‘Practice does not imply...’, Bourdieu (1990: 11) argues, ‘mastery of the 
logic that is expressed within it.’
Developing some of these insights in her influential study of the Marakwet of Kenya, 
Moore (1986: 8) points that
[m]eanings are not inherent in the organisation of domestic space, but 
must be invoked through the activities of social actors... the result is a 
theoretical approach that is less dependent on the anthropologists’ modeis 
and more intimately related to the practical folk models of the social actors 
concerned [my emphasis].
This logic of practice, Bourdieu argues, means that, if called upon to explain their 
actions which until then were, for the most part, unreflexive, unconscious or self- 
evident and varying according to the situation, native agents may in fact resort to 
simple axioms such as ‘this is the way we do things here’.8 In the process they ‘leave 
unsaid all that [to them] goes without saying’ (Bourdieu 1990: 91). Any consistency
7 Of course, people who are native to a culture also construct, modify and utilise partial and ‘objectified’ 
maps of their social universe, but these have the advantage of being grounded in life-long socialisation 
and practice.
8 In a recent documentary shown on South African television, Quia Kwedini (A Rite of Passage), about 
one youth’s experience of undergoing the Xhosa male circumcision rite, the initiate’s middle-aged, male 
ritual nurse was questioned about the origins of the ritual. His response went as follows: ‘We grew up 
with this initiation. We came to it asking no questions. Our fathers didn’t ask either about its origins. So 
we just stepped into their shoes and carried on’ (Qubeka 2003; cf. Soga 1932: 295-6).
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of local cultural forms that is observed by the outsider, Bourdieu contends, is a 
product of the partial coherence that the generative principles or schemas (‘ habitus' ) 
‘derive from the structures of relations between the groups, the sexes or the 
generations, or between the social classes of which they are the product and which 
they tend to reproduce in a transformed, misrecognizable form, by inserting them into 
the structure of a system of symbolic relations’ (Bourdieu 1990: 54, 95).
Bourdieu argues further that another, explicit and normative understanding or logic of 
social action exists among native agents because ‘inculcation is never so perfect that a 
society can entirely dispense with all explicit statement’. ‘Officialization’, he 
contends, operates at the level of discourse in which ‘a group (or those who dominate 
it) teaches itself and masks from itself its own truth.. .tacitly defining the limits of the 
thinkable and the unthinkable and so contributing to the maintenance of the social 
order from which it derives its power’ (Bourdieu 1990: 107-108).
In arguing that even ritual or ‘religious actions’, for instance, are oriented towards the 
‘most dramatically practical, vital and urgent ends’ that are ‘totally present in the 
present’, Bourdieu (1990: 95, 92) makes three telling observations that are especially 
pertinent to my study. They are that: (i) rituals and other cultural activities have a 
practical logic for the native agents which can never be fully understood or ‘captured’ 
by the objectifying observer in his/her abstract models, diagrams or numbers9;
(ii) that by questioning agents about their practices, the ethnographer may lead them 
to speculate over that which, until that point, has been tacit or ‘misrecognised’, 
encouraging them to shape their responses ‘in terms of a theory of practice that 
meshes with’ the concerns, abstractions and specialisms which the observer brings to 
the fieldwork encounter. In the process, much may be left unsaid but, more 
importantly, any further prompting may lead the informant to resort to the 
‘ambiguous vocabulary of the rule’ or the norm, ‘the most codified aspect of 
tradition’, to explain social practice which derives from principles of practical 
mastery, and
(iii) that discourses of ‘officialization’ result in sets o f ‘authorized representations in 
which the group is willing to recognize itself (Bourdieu 1990: 36,108).
9 He wryly notes that ‘nothing is more suspect than the ostentatious rigour of so many diagrams of social 
organization offered by anthropologists’ (Bourdieu 1990: 85).
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These constructed representations are a significant obstacle to the ethnographer’s 
attempts to understand (and to interpret and communicate) the cultural practices of 
his/her informants. However, once these layers of analytical complexity are 
recognised by the ethnographer, it can be rewarding to subject such ‘authorized 
representations’ to intense critical scrutiny in order to uncover, for example, the sets 
of agents who are actively engaged in contesting, reinforcing or undermining the 
hegemony of these representations, in much the way that Long (1992b) advocates and 
Hutchinson (1996), for one, has attempted to do. Bourdieu’s work offers 
sophisticated insights into the complex interplay of the forces that shape people’s 
cultural practices and which give them a semblance of being a consistent and 
coherent ‘system’. His insights are also highly apposite with respect to the practical 
dilemmas that confront the ethnographer -  the ‘aesthete trapped in the instant’ -  in 
his or her attempts to grasp and interpret particular aspects of a cultural ‘system’ 
(Bourdieu 1990: 19,67).
Bourdieu’s theoretical innovations presage the ‘ Writing Culture’ (Clifford & Marcus 
[eds]. 1986) watershed in anthropology in several areas, not least in his ‘ethnography 
of ethnography’ which was so central to the later postmodernist deconstruction of the 
rational scientific method and its search for ‘truth’ (cf. Van Maanen 1995: 17; Van 
der Waal 1992; Clifford 1986). Bourdieu’s contribution is also striking for his 
perceptive comparison of the textual reconstructions of the anthropologist with the 
philologist ‘and his dead letters’ (Bourdieu 1990: 36, 288 footnote 5), his penetrating 
analyses of the contextual ‘symbolic violence’ inherent in the ethnographic moment, 
and his recognition of the necessarily partial, abstracted nature of the interpretations 
of the observer (Bourdieu 1990: 69,80).
Bourdieu problematises to a remarkable degree but ultimately cannot resolve the 
insider/outsider methodological dilemma characteristic of sociological enquiry. His 
work can be criticised for the way in which symbolism and meanings, so important 
for him at a higher scale of analysis, are reduced at the level of the individual to 
culturally learned, historical and instrumental ‘practical schemes’ effected on the 
body, which prioritise the functionality, i.e. the ‘maximum effectiveness for the effort 
expended...to [satisfy] vital material or symbolic interests’ in any particular context 
of everyday life (Bourdieu 1990: 91). Bourdieu’s sophisticated model nevertheless
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moves way beyond the ‘maximising rational actor’ model of neo-classical economics, 
and he goes to considerable lengths to argue this point (see Bourdieu 1990: 50-54).10
The ‘actor-oriented paradigm’ of Norman Long provides insights into the diverse 
social practices that animate the development sector (Long 1992a, 1992b, 2001). 
Useful for my purposes is Long’s adoption of an ‘open-ended, ethnographic 
approach.. .to unravel the complexities of meaning and social action... [through] a 
conceptual framework which accords priority to the understanding of everyday life 
situations’ (Long 1992a: 6). He insists that social actors are not simply ‘disembodied 
social categories.. .or passive recipients of intervention but [are] active participants 
who process information and strategize in their dealings’ with others. By combining 
an actor-oriented with a historical-structural approach, Long (1992b: 33) seeks to 
integrate ‘the broad historical changes taking place in the regional and national arena, 
with a careful documentation of the micro-histories and strategies of individual [rural 
people]’. This is the approach which I have adopted in the chapters that follow.
Long’s (1992b: 34-35) observation that at the interface of development local groups 
‘actively formulate and pursue their own programmes of development’, irrespective 
of the planned interventions carried out by external agents, is useful for my 
formulation of cattle development interventions, such as the Ciskei National Ranch 
(cf. May 1991; see Chapter Three).
At a different level, Long’s actor-centred approach sheds light on how the dominance 
of neo-liberal narrative(s) of agrarian change in South Africa (referred to in my 
Introduction) has developed. This is the world in which constant struggles are waged 
over intellectual paradigms and languages, over influential university positions and 
institutional ‘turf, where academic networks are policed and exclusions effected over 
institutional resources through the use of legitimising forms and tropes of knowledge 
and reputation (cf. Williams 1996; Hoben 1995; Bernstein 1996b; Roe 1991, 1995; 
Groenewald & Nieuwoudt 2003). Needless to say, this is the subject of another thesis.
10 He states that ‘the economy described by economic theory is a particular case of a whole universe of 
economies’ (Bourdieu 1990: 50).
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The sociology of commodities: production, exchange and consumption
Having all but jettisoned pre-eminently neo-Marxist theoretical concerns with 
production, much recent theorising in economic anthropology emphasises either the 
exchange (Appadurai 1986; Thomas 1991; Hutchinson 1996) or the consumption 
(Miller 1995) of things (commodities) in developing our understanding of social 
practices, including those of people on the post-colonial fringe.11 Appadurai signalled 
this break with his compelling analysis of commodities qua things, i.e. things that 
have economic value and that may be exchanged in contested systems, or ‘regimes of 
value’, in which value and exchange are mediated by political processes (Appadurai 
1986: 4,6; cf. Douglas & Isherwood 1996[1979]).
In justifying this shift in analytical focus, Appadurai (1986: 6,37) argued that 
commodities are not the exclusive preserve nor the ‘typical material representations’ 
of the capitalist mode of production that Marx had once posited them to be. Instead, 
he argued that the commodity potential of all things (including gifts) requires a new 
emphasis which involved following the things themselves, through the ‘total 
trajectory from production, through exchange/distribution to consumption’. Recalling 
the French flliere vivrieres (or food commodity chain) approach, Appadurai labelled 
this a ‘biographical approach to things’ (Appadurai 1986: 13; see Bernstein 1996b).
Appadurai’s notion of the ‘social life of things’, while paying close attention to the 
changeable nature, and indeed agency, of commodities themselves, is directed 
primarily at what he calls the ‘politics of value’ (Appadurai 1986: 56). He points out 
that commodity circulation, and thus both exchange and consumption, is subject to 
both ‘social control and political redefinition’ in a number of ways (Appadurai 1986: 
6,57; cf. Gudeman 2001).
Appadurai argues that the meanings of things are inscribed in ‘their forms, their uses, 
their trajectories’ and that, while it is people who inscribe or encode these meanings,
111 am not as comfortable with a wholesale jettisoning of what Marxists refer to as the ‘forces, means and 
relations of production’. It seems to me that where rural people still have direct physical and material 
involvement in activities of production -  as opposed to those who, increasingly, exchange and consume 
(only) ready-fashioned commodities -  the possibility remains that an analysis of this production will 
reveal ways in which such activity both reflects and informs cultural practices (see McAllister 2001: 12; 
Bernstein 1997: 8ff; Moore 1986).
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it is to the ‘things-in-motion’ themselves, as much as to the transactions and 
exchanges of them, that we must turn in order to understand the human and social 
contexts in which they circulate (Appadurai 1986: 5; cf. Ferguson 1985). Appadurai’s 
singular contribution to the study of commodities has been to focus our attention on 
the commodity potential of things in three dimensions. These are (i) the temporal 
dimension or the commodity phase, which recognises the fact that things are able to 
move in and out of a commodity state; (ii) the conceptual dimension, or the 
commodity candidacy of things, i.e. the culturally informed criteria that define what 
is exchangable and in what social contexts; and (iii) the contextual dimension, or the 
commodity context, which links the ‘commodity candidacy of a thing to the 
commodity phase of its career’ (Appadurai 1986: 15). He points out that ‘the 
commodity phase of the life history of an object does not exhaust its biography’ and, 
indeed, most of the ‘politics of value’ consists of struggles in which the zone of 
commodity candidacy of things is contested (Appadurai 1986: 17).12
Appadurai’s inspired treatise on the nature of commoditisation offers rich pickings 
for my analysis of the production, exchange and consumption of cattle in the 
livelihoods of rural South Africans. I show below that tracking these particular 
‘things-in-motion’, specifically how they are used, exchanged and consumed, can be 
a fruitful line of enquiry.13 Furthermore, plotting the commodity candidacy and 
context of cattle at different times in their lives and situating the lives and 
circumstances of the holders of cattle at different periods in recent history is similarly 
rewarding, as indeed the Comaroffs and others (for example, Hutchinson 1996; Bank 
1997) have shown. In this respect, Appadurai’s (1986: 21) concept of ‘tournaments of 
value’, or what he describes as ‘complex periodic events that are removed in some 
culturally well-defined way from the routines of economic life... [and in which] what 
is at stake is.. .the disposition of the central tokens of value in the society in question’,
12Thomas (1991: 21) has noted that ‘if ...value can be reinterpreted in specific social contexts, as well as 
at an abstract level of economic logic, then it must be appreciated that the estimations [which] people 
make draw upon a range of historical and sentimental considerations, which may qualify, specify or even 
negate wider systemic criteria such as scarcity, utility and cultural categorization.’
13 Although calves are literally produced through the reproductive powers of mature cattle, it is men (and 
occasionally women) whose ‘shoulders’ (i.e. toil, often as migrant workers) are said to produce cattle. 
Cattle in this sense embody the employment and personal histories o f their owners -  and consequently 
also a part of their owners’ perceptions of self -  and they may bear the names of the companies or work 
colleagues with whom their owners were engaged during the period of the purchase or birth of these 
animals (Derick Fay, personal communication, February 2000; see Comaroff & Comaroff 1990).
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is also suggestive. In a number of ways, the rural cattle auctions or stocksales that are 
held throughout the communal areas of the Eastern Cape exemplify exactly this, 
except that the ‘society’ in question is South African society, with all its sub-texts of 
racial and class difference (see Chapter Three).
For many Xhosa-speaking people, cattle are at least partially ‘enclaved’ commodities, 
i.e. they are ‘total social phenomena’ in that, particularly through their exchange, they 
embody, legitimise, give meaning and (differentially) empower the participants in a 
myriad of social relationships (Comaroff & Comaroff 1990).14 It is precisely at times 
when the relationships that exist between people, ideally so ably represented and 
mediated by cattle, are threatened that new cultural ambiguities are introduced and 
contestations of value might be anticipated. In the process, the partial or even 
complete commoditisation of the exchange and consumption of cattle may follow. In 
this dissertation, enquiry into the elements of commoditisation in the purchase and 
subsequent consumption of cattle through, for instance, ritual slaughter (see Chapter 
Nine), as well as the entrenched practice of selling cattle to outsider, mostly white 
buyers, serves to highlight significant gender, generation and class ambiguities 
among Xhosa people in the Eastern Cape.
It is Gudeman’s elegant treatise on the ‘anthropology of economy’ (Gudeman 2001) 
that provides the key theoretical framework for my study. His notion that economies 
should be seen as comprising two dialectically related realms, namely the community 
and the market, is particularly apposite for tying together the many strands of the 
‘cultural economics’ of cattle production in Peddie District.15 Gudeman (2001: 5) 
argues that economic practices and relationships take place within four 
incommensurate value domains (the base, social relationships, trade and 
accumulation), each with distinct local meanings that are contested and changing.
14 The Comaroffs (1990: 197) follow Kuper (1982: 11) in noting that one could list endless examples of 
‘the centrality of cattle in ritual and bridewealth, of their celebration in idiom and song, and of their 
salience as political currency’. They go on to argue, however, that this does not elucidate the reasons why 
cattle per se were drafted into this central role, by whom and on whose terms and indeed, how they have 
fared since being drafted in, which is where my interest lies.
15 Gudeman (2001: 1) writes that ‘[B]oth realms are ever-present but we bring now one, now the other 
into the foreground in practice and ideology.. .sometimes the two faces of economy are separated, at 
other times they are mutually dependent, opposed or interactive. But always their shifting relation is filled 
with tension’ (see also Gudeman 2001: 11-12). Although dualist, this formulation is qualitatively 
different to that of Houghton, Mbeki and others in their portrayals o f the South African (agrarian) 
economy (referred to in Chapter One).
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The main activity of the market, Gudeman notes, is to make profit and accumulate 
capital. In contrast, the central activity of a community is to expand ‘the base’, by 
which he means a community’s ‘commons’ resources (such as land and water), 
produced things, shared interests, forms of knowledge, laws and customs, as well as 
imagined identities and solidarities (Gudeman 2001: 25-67). He argues that the base 
comprises ‘cultural agreements and beliefs that provide a structure for all the 
domains’ and that these locally defined values are ‘unpriced, heterogeneous, and 
often sorted into incommensurate spheres’ (Gudeman 2001: 7-8, 44-45). Exchanges 
within community are predicated on social relationships, which consist of ‘valued 
communal connections maintained as ends themselves...through which the base is 
created, allotted and apportioned to people in community’ (Gudeman 2001: 8). 
Although exchange in the market prioritises profit maximisation through buying and 
selling, the market also constantly draws on and feeds off community, as it relies on 
socially constituted units and relationships and may at times draw a surplus from a 
community economy.
Echoing Ferguson (1985), Gudeman argues that economies always feature degrees of 
commensuration and exchange, but neither is ever total. Within the domain of market 
exchange are created pathways or bounded exchanges that reflect the presence of 
community and market. The ‘alchemy of money’, he suggests, ‘create[s] the fiction 
that a flattened, comparable world exists’ when in fact, the dialectics of community 
and market exist in all exchanges (Gudeman 2001: 15).16
Important for my analysis is Gudeman’s (2001: 20) view of community as ‘a 
repository of possibilities and incommensurate value arenas, rather than the negation 
of capitalism’, since the two, i.e. community and the market (capitalist production, 
exchange and consumption), are intertwined and mutually constitutive. He 
demonstrates how, for the Kekchi Maya of southern Belize, self-sufficiency in com 
[maize] production provides an assurance against economic uncertainty, plays a role 
in ritual and identity and constitutes a ‘badge of household position and village 
membership’. Com production thereby connects the household and the community, 
outside the market. By contrast, the rice that is produced by the Kekchi as a cash crop
16 He argues that Appadurai’s work on commodities, while useful, fails to fully explore the connections 
between the market and communal realms (Gudeman 2001: 19).
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fulfils few if any of these functions, yet allows for the accumulation of cash 
(Gudeman 2001: 44-45). Gudeman’s (2001: 163) plea is that since ‘...[our] disparate 
identities place on us incommensurate demands, the conversation concerning how we 
divide our economic life between community and market must take place outside the 
market discourse. We ought not let ourselves be persuaded that the coin has only one 
side’ (cf. Berry 1993). As my analysis in ensuing chapters shows, the people of 
Peddie District are all engaged in this conversation, both within their own households 
and villages and in their relations with the world beyond their villages.
Identity politics and ritual practice
The Comaroffs, like many others, have asked how it is possible to render ‘European 
imperialism and its aftermath without reducing it to crude equations of power, 
domination and alienation’ (Comaroff & Comaroff 1993: xiii). They answer this 
question by advocating a historical anthropology that ‘stresses.. .the brute realities of 
colonialism and its aftermath without assuming that they have robbed African peoples 
of their capacity to act on the world’. This clearly resonates with Kieman’s (1997) 
call alluded to earlier.
Concerns with ‘native’ agency have a clear precedent in the Eastern Cape, 
specifically in the ethnographic work conducted by Philip and Iona Mayer in East 
London during the late 1950s.17 The Mayers posited a fundamental divide between 
two categories of (especially rural) Xhosa people, the abantu ababomvu [red people] 
and the abantu basesikolweni [school people].18 The Red people, identifiable by their 
distinctive dress and their particularistic ritual and social practice, stood aloof and 
were said to be conservative or traditional for the manner in which they vehemently 
resisted the inroads of Western ways on their identity and cultural practices 
(McAllister 1980; cf. Lan 1989). In contrast, the School people had embraced the 
Christianity and Western education served up by the missionaries and were eager to 
participate as consumers in the ‘modem’ economy, albeit on their own terms and 
without jettisoning elements of their still-distinctive Xhosa cultural practices. Peddie
17 Their work was, however, criticised for being ahistorical and for lacking sufficient critical engagement 
with the political economy of apartheid South Africa (Magubane 1973; Beinart & Bundy 1987; Fay 
1996).
18 Also referred to as amaqaba [heathens] and amagqoboka [converted] (Mayer & Mayer 1961:1,72).
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District in the 1950s and 1960s, for instance, was said to be ‘very Red’, although 
sizeable pockets of School Xhosa were to be found, especially in villages adjacent to 
mission settlements (Mayer 1980b: 9,42,73).
In Mayer (1980b) a revised explanation of the ‘two ideologies’ is presented at some 
length. Here, Mayer argued that the division between Red and School Xhosa 
characterised the period from 1850 to about 1970. By the 1970s, however, both 
‘folk-cultures had been heavily diluted.. .by the spread into the countryside of a new, 
secular and consumerist, urban-influenced culture’ and had both evolved into an 
amorphous ‘rural resistance ideology [that was] opposed to the prevailing patterns of 
economic and political dominance’ by the white settler political and economic regime 
and whites more generally (Mayer 1980b: 3). Mayer argued that betterment schemes 
played a major part in finally destroying the Red folk culture as a coherent way of 
life, especially in the Ciskei (see Chapter Three of this dissertation). Conversely, 
higher population mobility and the townward migration of people, as a result of rural 
stagnation, sped up the ‘urbanization of the countryside’, leading to the development 
of greater affinities between School culture and ‘Black urban’ culture that 
undermined the previously distinctive School identity.
I am reluctant to make too much of the currently rather more fluid ‘Red’ and ‘School’ 
distinction as virtually all my informants pointed out that ‘everyone goes to school 
and church these days, so there is no more [distinctively] Red and School [people]’. 
Having said that, people in Peddie District did recognise and sometimes applied these 
labels to the differences of lifestyle and in ‘inward or outward’ orientation (in terms 
of both social and economic investments) that existed between the residents of 
different village sections of one village, or when making comparisons between 
different parts of the district itself.
Central to local forms of identity, and one of the many ways in which black people in 
South Africa act on the world, is ritual practice (see Chapter Eight). The Comaroffs 
argue that we should see ritual as ‘signifying practices,.. .as a vital element in the 
processes that make and remake social facts and collective identities’ (Comaroff & 
Comaroff 1993: xvi). They go on in their inimitable style to contend that
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[Ritual] is less about giving voice to shared values than about opening 
fields of argument; about providing the terms and tropes, that is, through 
which people caught up in changing worlds may vex each other, question 
definitions of value, form alliances, and mobilize oppositions’ (Comaroff 
& Comaroff 1993: xxiii, xxix).
This insight seems especially pertinent in trying to conceptualise what people in rural 
Peddie district are ‘really doing’ when they conduct rituals, during which they 
slaughter both cattle and goats to their ancestors with the regularity that they do.19 
This is particularly so if, as the Comaroffs suggest,
[RJitual, as an experimental technology intended to affect the flow of power in the 
universe, is an especially likely response to contradictions created and (literally) 
engendered by processes of social, material, and cultural transformation, processes re­
presented, rationalized, and authorized in the name of modernity and its various alibis 
(“civilization,” “social progress”, “economic development”...and the like). (Comaroff 
& Comaroff 1993: xxx).
It seems to me that the ritual slaughtering of cattle (and small stock) in the rural 
Eastern Cape did indeed open up social spaces for people to negotiate, contest local 
meanings (and critically, meanings dislocated through the contingencies of long-term 
and long-distance migrancy, residential fluidity and urban-rural straddling), social 
hierarchies, orders and power relations, including genealogies, inheritances and kin 
relatedness (Hughes-Freeland & Crain 1998b: 2). But these acts of intentionality were 
unlikely to be explicit or vulgar and they were not readily available to be ‘read off as 
a text by the observer (Crapanzano 1986). Rather, much contestation of social spaces 
was not only layered, multivocal and contradictory, but also subtle and embodied in 
practice (located in the ‘doing’ and the ‘being’ rather than the spoken) and thus be 
more or less opaque to the casual observer (see Bourdieu 1990: 13; Mitchell 1998).
However, as Crain (1998) argues cogently in her study of ritual in the Ecuadorean 
Andes, this aspect of agency and intentionality may be especially important in the face 
of apparently increasing individualism and a widening wealth gap that differentiates 
between related people in urban and rural settings and within each of these variously 
connected social spaces (see Campbell & Rew [eds.] 1999). Hence the apparently key
19 There is the danger here of engaging in arguments about ‘false consciousness’. In his subtle essay on 
exchange, Davis (1992: 25) questions the validity of an ‘assumption that under the surface of social 
activity lies a reality which is in some way truer or more real than mere appearances [and which the 
external observer can uncover].. .it is unjustifiable to assume that what is deeper is necessarily more real’. 
(See also Klopper 1991: 154).
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significance of the ideology of ‘building the home’ in this context of serious social 
dislocation and population mobility, economic uncertainty and involution and cultural 
changes (McAllister 2001; cf Ngwane 2003; Gudeman 2001).
Diverse livelihoods, multiple strategies: Straddling town and country
Since the late 1990s, a great deal has been written about livelihoods in southern 
Africa and elsewhere, specifically ‘rural’ and ‘sustainable’ livelihoods.20 Much of the 
recent interest in livelihoods stems from renewed attempts to understand the nature of 
poverty on the part of the British government’s Department for International 
Development (DFID). Carney (1998) and others based in the United Kingdom, 
particularly a number of researchers and policy analysts linked to the Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS) and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), have 
been influential in developing this area of study.21
Ellis’ notion of a ‘livelihood’ is that it ‘encompasses income, both cash and in kind, 
as well as the social institutions (kin, family, compound, village and so on), gender 
relations, and property rights required to support and to sustain a given standard of 
living. A livelihood also includes ‘access to, and benefits derived from, social and 
public services provided by the state such as education, health services, roads, water 
supplies and so on’ (Ellis 1998: 4; see also Ellis [2000: 10], where he defines a 
livelihood in terms of ‘assets, activities and access to these assets’).
The largely DFID-funded body of work on livelihoods, which Murray (2002: 493) 
refers to as the ‘official SL [Sustainable Livelihoods] approach, has quickly 
infiltrated the rhetoric and practice of development-oriented research aimed at 
investigating and mitigating poverty. Variations of the SL model have been adopted 
by researchers working in Zimbabwe (Campbell et al. 2002; Scoones et al. 1996) and 
in South Africa (Baber 1996; Cousins 1999; Lahiff 2003; Shackleton et al. 2001; 
Carter & May 1999; Murray 2000, 2002). In South Africa, non-governmental
20 Ellis (2000: ix) makes the point, however, that the ‘relatively recent discovery [of rural livelihoods] by 
the development profession should not be confused with the advent of something startlingly new... in a 
profession that is notoriously prone to fads, it is a mistake to confuse increased awareness of a 
phenomenon with changes in its nature, incidence or importance.’
1 More recently, DFID-funded livelihoods-related research in South Africa by a consortium of 
researchers from the University of Manchester and the London School of Economics (Murray 2002).
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organizations (NGOs) and parastatal institutions alike have adopted the livelihoods 
jargon, sometimes uncritically and without any explicit reference to the SL 
framework, as with the Agricultural Research Council’s ‘Sustainable Rural 
Livelihoods’ programme (Aucamp 2001).22
Recently, however, a number of criticisms of the SL framework have emerged 
(Bryceson & Bank 2001; Campbell et al. 2002: 125ff). Murray (2000, 2002) reviews 
the tenuous links that actually exist in many cases between what he calls 
‘prospective’ research as posited by the SL approach and the fraught and complex 
terrain of policy-making. As an opening gambit, he questions how we are to know 
now what livelihoods are going to be ‘sustainable’ in the future (Murray 2002: 492ff). 
On issues of methodology, he argues strongly for the need for longitudinal data on 
livelihoods, that trace people’s ‘livelihood trajectories’ to illuminate the processes of 
change and the impacts thereof on their lives. Murray expresses reservations about 
the ability of conventional SL research methodologies to transcend the boundaries of 
local ‘communities’ in trying to understand ‘both intra-household relationships and 
significant inter-household social relationships as these change over time’ (Murray 
2002: 501).
A further criticism of the SL framework is its weakness in relation to intra-household, 
particularly gendered, struggles over resource allocation and consumption (see Bank 
& Qambata 1999: 5-6), as well as the ‘relations between households and wider 
structures of politics and power’ (Farrington 2001; Baumann & Sinha 2001; Hussein 
2002).23 The SL framework is particularly weak on considerations of political 
economy, primarily in failing to problematise the modem state -  which cannot simply 
be viewed as a policy-making machine to be fed supposedly more nuanced data on the 
nature of poverty and livelihoods -  and the ‘world political order’ in the development 
of the ‘Third World’ or the ‘South’. Two examples will suffice to make this point. The 
first is Ellis’ innocuous statement that ‘the components of this framework are 
deliberately broad and lacking in matters of detail, since the key constraints and policy
22 Similarly, in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa, research into ‘sustainable livelihoods’ has 
flourished in recent years (see Ainslie et al. 1997; Monde 2003; Fraser et al. 2003; Kepe & Scoones 
1999, Kepe 2002a and LahifF2003).
23 See Ashley and Carney (1999: 48ff) for ‘Appendix 2: Uses, strengths and weaknesses of SL 
approaches’ and a recognition that the ‘SL framework overall can convey a somewhat cleansed, neutral 
approach to power issues’ (Ashley & Carney 1999: 35).
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issues that arise will always be specific to local circumstances (Ellis 2000: 241) [my 
emphasis]. The second is Ashley and Carney’s (1999: 35) suggestion that adapting the 
framework, through the inclusion of ‘political capital’ as a sixth asset, ‘may well be 
useful in some cases’. Neither of these does anything to dispel anxieties about the de- 
politicising nature of the SL project.
But Bryceson and Bank (2001: 11-12) argue that, in the current context of what they 
style as ‘post-modern liberalism’ in development thinking, this is to be expected. Such 
thinking, they argue, is built on consensus-seeking, open-ended plurality, ambiguity, 
and ‘unspecified directionless movement’ in which ‘cause-effect relationships are 
difficult to disentangle’. They see the livelihoods concept as a product of this new 
development context, and argue that
[T]he livelihoods approach consists, in its current development agency 
formulation, o f  situational analysis with an increasingly standardised 
atheoretical and ahistorical format...[that] abstracts] from larger 
contextual forces (Bryceson & Bank 2001: 11-12)
While not making explicit use of the ‘official’ SL framework, some studies have 
nevertheless been interested to explore the same set of issues, i.e. changing 
livelihoods, the viability or vulnerability of ‘peasant’ agriculture, as well as issues of 
poverty and identity in the face of political-economic, social and environmental 
change (for instance, Moore & Vaughan 1994; Ainslie 1998; Bryceson 2000).
In the Eastern Cape, a recent study comprising three, discrete case-studies was 
conducted in rural localities by three senior anthropologists attached (at the time) to 
Rhodes University.24 Although surprisingly weak on integration, the DARE case- 
studies generated new insights into the impact of changing livelihoods on household 
forms and social relationships, in the context of agrarian transformations and dynamic 
employment patterns (Manona 1999; Bank & Qambata 1999; McAllister 1999,2001; 
Bank 2001). It is with this anthropological literature, rather than the broader literature 
that adheres to the more formulaic and economistic checklist approach of the ‘official’ 
SL framework, that I engage here.
24 Cecil Manona, Pat McAllister and Leslie Bank. This study was done under the auspices of the ‘De- 
Agrarianization and Rural Employment (DARE) Project’ led by Deborah Bryceson at the African Studies 
Center at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands (Bryceson 1993,2002).
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The livelihood theme cuts across the other theoretical concerns of this dissertation. 
Understanding livelihoods constitutes a key analytical, and thus also methodological, 
concern of my study. Put simply, it encompasses how best to understand and capture 
the continuous, multi-directional movements of people, things, information and even 
cultural ‘styles’ between rural areas and urban centres -  and also within these spaces 
-  within the broader East London-Peddie District-Port Elizabeth nexus.
Materially, it is these movements that constitute the ‘stuff of diverse and dynamic 
livelihoods, as people parcel out their children to kin in other areas, work as migrants 
either in rural areas (as teachers, clerks or agricultural extension workers) or in cities 
(as industrial, service sector and domestic workers), or move between the two to 
secure rights to state transfers or deal with the government bureaucracy in other ways, 
to seek work, and so on.
But the mobility and migrancy that characterise the Eastern Cape bear the stamp of 
successive pieces of Apartheid legislation (Mayer 1980b: 19). African migrant 
workers were not allowed to reside permanently in urban centres, except in mining 
compounds, and were forced to maintain a rural base in a ‘native reserve area’ from 
whence they went out to seek work. Later, the systematic removal by force of ‘black- 
spot’ settlements displaced millions of Africans to rural ‘bantustan’ areas and the 
ironically named ‘closer settlements’ which were often situated far from centres of 
employment and education.
Significantly, even after the scrapping of discriminatory apartheid legislation, these 
movements persist and continue to have an impact in a number of ways on people’s 
notions of self, community and their understandings of the world around them (Glaser 
2001: 185). Their mobility influences and is influenced by the decisions they take 
concerning what and where to make their major material investments, for example, in 
houses, cattle and so on, and in respect of their social and ritual ‘investments’ in 
building their networks (Crain 1998).
Given this situation, how are we to understand cattle-holding in contemporary Peddie 
District? The people I encountered in rural Peddie District were fully integrated into 
the market (and money) economy and this was the case right in their villages, not
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only when they made forays into the city. There was no residual, separate 
‘subsistence’ sector that existed independent of the reach of the market. Peddie 
residents were, for instance, able to sell cattle by making one telephone call to any 
one of several speculators or meat-buyers nearby or in an adjacent urban area. This 
person would arrive within a day or two to negotiate a price for their animals.
However, to say that they were fully integrated into the money economy is not the 
same as suggesting that they were without other, more localised, ‘cultural’ means of 
structuring and assigning value (Appadurai 1986). Indeed, it was this economic 
connectedness that made their cultural ‘commodity paths’ at village level both varied 
and interesting. In the chapters that follow, I use the theoretical insights outlined here 
to explore the various dimensions of cattle-holding that animated the lives of people 
in Peddie District.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Aspects of Cattle Production in the Ciskeian 
Reserves/Bantustan and the Eastern Cape Province
(1930-2001)
If these races could be encouraged or enabled to eat more of their cattle, it is 
not inconceivable that they would thereby acquire energy and ambition which, 
irrespective of any taxation or recruiting organization, would lead them away 
from their tribes in search of money (Hutt 1934: 213).
Thirty-seven super-fertile Nguni bulls, [with a] price tag of R482 000 [are] to 
benefit at least 100 black small [sic] farmers in the Eastern Cape and Northern 
Province. The bulls are rotated among farming communities to sow their seed 
[sic] among the cows.. .Agricultural experts say it will take 3 to 4 years for the 
bulls and their progeny to make their mark on the general herds, yielding better 
prices for farmers’ livestock. This will allow them to buy other superior stock.
‘There should be an explosion of improved material,’ says Paul Magnusson of 
the Agricultural Research Council, which managed the government grant 
(Daily Dispatch, 3 August 2001).
Introduction
In this chapter, I examine some of the social, economic and agrarian change s that have 
taken place over the period 1930-2001 in the ‘Ciskeian’ reserves and particularly in 
Peddie District.1 I also explore the changes and continuities that characterised ‘official’ 
thinking and interventions into cattle production in the reserves during these seven 
decades (cf. Wolmer & Scoones 2000; Nieuwenhuysen 1964a).
My analysis focuses especially on the period that constituted Ciskeian ‘self- 
government’ and ‘independence’, i.e. the years 1972-1994, and the first seven years 
of post-apartheid government (1994-2001). By analysing some of the key 
development interventions2 over these two periods, I point to the lasting legacy of 
ethnocentric, modernist premises in the agricultural/rural development sector of the 
province (Kepe & Cousins 2002; Wotshela 2001, 2004).
11 rely for the most part on published and unpublished secondary sources, and on the available archival 
record, including the extensive (but incomplete) records of the Ciskei Agricultural Corporation.
21 do not revisit in detail the implementation of ‘Betterment Planning’ for which there exists an 
extensive literature. See, for instance, De Wet (1985a, 1987b, 1995a), Hendricks (1989, 1990), Beinart 
(1984, 2003), McAllister (1992) and Mager (1999).
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The imperative to enhance ‘commercialisation’ in the agricultural sector has an 
impressive legacy in the rural Eastern Cape, surviving the demise of the bantustans to 
become a central tenet of the ANC-led government’s neoliberal economic programme 
for rural areas. However, there remain two obstacles to ‘commercialisation’ that are 
intrinsic to the working of the ‘modified’ communal tenure regime (Beinart 1994: 19; 
Cousins 1996).3 The first is the right, enjoyed by all adult men (and their widows) by 
virtue of their birth (or later acceptance) into a particular village, to graze whatever 
livestock they own on the communal rangelands in their respective villages (see De 
Wet 1987a; Kepe 1999: 418-9). The minor controls on these communal resources had 
ceased by the 1980s, and in many rural locations the grazing system became virtually 
‘open access’ (Cokwana 1988; Ainslie 1999). Beinart (1994: 31-33) points out that 
the persistence of various forms of communal tenure made it possible for migrant 
workers to continue to invest in livestock in the ‘communal’ reserves where they 
were relatively free from the threat of further alienation. Their ‘interest’ in cattle thus 
stemmed at least partly from the prohibition on establishing themselves in town.
The second obstacle to commercialisation was land-hunger, which was a bleak reality 
in the Ciskeian reserves by the late 1940s. The available rangelands were nevertheless 
perceived (correctly, as measured by their ‘commercial-farmer’ yardstick) by 
government officials to be grossly overstocked. Local livestock owners shared this 
concern, although the solutions they proposed to deal with this problem differed 
markedly from those of the state. The perception of rural people was that government, 
despite its interest in their affairs, consistently skirted around the overriding problem 
of land hunger (Beinart 2003: 353ff; Vetter 2003).
These two serious obstacles were not insurmountable. From the late 1930s through to 
the 1960s, the state was relatively successful in promoting the sale of cattle out of the 
reserves through its network of organised stocksales even though rural people 
remained distrustful of the actual intentions of the authorities. For the most part, 
however, it was left to rural white traders to play an intermediary role in buying and 
selling cattle (Fraser 1991: 138; Beinart 1977).
3 A third obstacle is the absence of other mechanisms for saving resources (see Chapter Four).
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In 1955, the Tomlinson Commission argued that 55% of the cattle in the Ciskeian 
reserves should be culled to commercialise reserve agriculture (Switzer 1993: 326). 
This programme never took off and it was only in the mid-1970s, with 
‘independence’ by then firmly on the agenda for the bantustans, that more serious 
attempts were made to develop the beef industry in the Ciskei. Even then, the state 
showed little resolve in implementing comprehensive programmes aimed at 
developing broad-based commercial beef production in the reserves. In any case, to 
be successful, such programmes would have required the co-operation of rural cattle- 
owners.
Where ‘development’ programmes were implemented, the approach remained largely 
unchanged and the overall impact remained patchy. Given that certain initiatives had 
been in place for decades-such as the bull leasing schemes-a degree of institutional 
‘path dependency’ developed, in which government employees in these schemes sang 
the praises of their particular project, not least to protect their jobs. Without reviews 
of the individual programmes, recurring annual budget allocations from the state 
simply underwrote the continuation even of ineffective schemes.
The Ciskeian reserves: To develop or to contain?
The reserve system was legally enforced in post-1910 South Africa through the 
passing of the Natives’ Land Act 27 of 1913. This Act set aside specific tracts of 
land for the exclusive occupation and ownership of ‘natives’, i.e. Africans. This 
meant, in effect, that Africans were prevented from acquiring land and accumulating 
capital outside these small specified areas.4
The schedule5 to the 1913 Act, which listed these areas, was based on the boundaries 
of the existing and overcrowded rural reserves in the Ciskei/Border region. Thus was
4 But the Act provided for the reserves to be expanded and consolidated to accommodate the African 
population (Switzer 1993: 196). The Supreme Court ruled in 1916 that die Act should not be applied in 
the Cape because it interfered with African franchise rights. Although this meant that between 1913 
and 1936 Africans in the Cape (including in Peddie District) could still buy white-owned [freehold] 
land outside the reserves, they actually lost more land than they acquired during this period. After the 
passing of the Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936, they lost this window and by 1949 Africans 
owned just 37% of the land they had owned in the Ciskei in 1916 (Switzer 1993: 199).
5 The scheduled Peddie reserves were identified as Area 26, with a surface area of 54,612 ha (U.G 
19/1916), which constituted 31% of the district. Another approximately 12,900 ha consisted variously
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brought into existence the ‘truncated Ciskei reserve -  the most underdeveloped area 
in South Africa’ (Switzer 1993: 13; Anonymous 1989). The scheduled areas set aside 
by the Land Act of 1913, as well as additional areas designated by the Native Trust 
and Land Act 18 of 1936, would be administered by the South African Native Trust 
(Beinart 1994: 118ff). The explicitly segregationist 1936 Land Act signalled a more 
active role for the central government in land conservation and resettlement inside the 
reserves, particularly in respect of livestock limitation and grazing management, and 
made provision for the establishment of a Tribal Trust Herd (Switzer 1993: 223; 
Bowen 1985).
The decline of peasant production in the reserves
The extent of the state’s intervention in the Ciskei reserves up to the mid-1950s, 
carried out principally through its Native Affairs Department (NAD), should not be 
overstated. Daniel (1981: 8) characterised the first half of the twentieth century as a 
‘period of stagnation’ for agricultural production in the Ciskei, stemming from the 
relative neglect of the black rural areas by the central government. There were 
isolated activities, such as in Herschel District in the northern part of the Ciskei, 
where costly soil erosion stabilisation work was carried out by the NAD during the 
1930s (Beinart 2003: 348-353). Valuable, if ultimately inadequate, extension work 
was also done in the Transkei reserves from the late 1920s through to the 1940s. In 
1937 alone, 16,000 bulls and 5,000 rams were castrated in the Transkei, with 1,000 
‘pedigree’ bulls and 1,200 Merino rams introduced in their place (Beinart 2003: 353).
From the late 1940s, interventions by the state in agricultural production and rural life 
in the Ciskeian reserves began to gather momentum. These interventions took a 
number of forms, including modifications to the communal tenure system itself and 
newly introduced ‘traditional’ forms of institutional controls by headmen and sub­
headmen that kept the white administration at arm’s length and allowed Xhosa men 
some space to recreate and embellish a pre-colonial patriarchal order (see Switzer 
1993: 94-6). But the growing economic stranglehold exerted by headmen, white 
traders and labour recruiters over local people grew as a source of considerable 
frustration (Switzer 1993: 229; Beinart 1979).
of black people living on mission land, African-owned farms, Crown land not yet designated as part of 
the scheduled reserve and white-owned land fully occupied by black people.
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Land-use planning interventions, specifically the introduction of Betterment Planning 
from the early 1950s, was a further frustration (see De Wet 1995a). Betterment 
involved enforced villagisation and the rationalisation of land-use through the 
demarcation and fencing of discrete residential, arable and grazing land-use areas, 
which rural people were obliged to recognise and maintain. It also included renewed 
efforts by government agencies to castrate or cull livestock, to genetically improve 
‘inferior’ Xhosa-owned cattle and to initiate livestock sales in rural areas (De Wet 
1987b; Mager 1999).6 These interventions, coupled with growing poverty and rural 
overcrowding, had serious implications for agrarian livelihoods and livestock 
holdings in particular in the reserves. Not surprisingly, in the absence of any increase 
in land-holdings for Africans, these state-imposed changes in tenure and land use 
management were regarded with suspicion and open hostility by many of the affected 
people.
By the 1930s, overstocking was already the ‘perennial theme in official explanations 
of why land in the reserve[s] had deteriorated’ (Switzer 1993: 210, 229ff). Displaying 
their characteristic entrepreneurial flair, white fanners argued that the government 
should subsidise the sale of cattle out of African areas to reduce stock numbers 
without penalising the peasants (Switzer 1993: 399 ftnote 46).7
The Fagan Commission (UG 28-1948: 15) estimated the carrying capacity of the 
Ciskei reserves at 234,000 cattle units, and in 1955 the Tomlinson Commission 
would label the Ciskei the ‘most heavily overstocked’ reserve in South Africa 
(Switzer 1993: 210, 240). While the cattle numbers in the Ciskeian reserves 
fluctuated with droughts (see Table 3.1. below), Tomlinson noted that the number of
6 Regulations restricting the entry of stock into locations were initiated in the 1920s, but in the Cape, it 
was from 1934 that officials tried to restrict access by ‘inferior’ stock to grazing lands in the Ciskeian 
reserves, by means of Proclamation 198 (Switzer 1993: 405 ftnote 116). Houghton and Forsdick (1950: 
81) observed that the proclamation of the Keiskammahoek District as a Betterment Area placed a limit 
on the number of stock that could be grazed and restricted the movement of stock. This ‘considerably 
reduced’ speculation in livestock, which had been widespread among the (white) traders before. They 
also noted that there were no regular stock markets in the district, that the natives complained that they 
could only dispose of their stock to the traders who paid them a poor price, only to fatten the stock and 
‘resell it at a handsome profit’.
7 But sales of reserve cattle typically declined during periods of higher prices, leading to accusations o f  
peasant ‘irrationality’. However, this constitutes rational behaviour given that cattle represented rural 
people’s savings, since fewer cattle needed to be sold when prices were higher in order to meet 
immediate household needs (Kerven 1992).
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cattle per household in the Ciskei was the lowest of all the reserves in the country 
(Switzer 1993: 400, ftnote 56).
Table 3.1. Cattle numbers and ‘cattle units’ in the Ciskei reserve, 1927-1953.
Year 1927 1930 1934 1936 1939 1948/9 1949/50 1953
Cattle 190 000 179 000 154 000 188 000 216 000 194 145 130 417 185 331
‘Cattle
units’8 391 763 412 163 329 563 367 163 412 963 394 373 304 465 408 261
% over
carrying
capacity
67.4 76.1 40.8 56.9 76.5 68.8 30.1 74.5
source: Switzer (1993: 240)
In relation to arable production, Bundy (1988: 224) identified three factors that were 
already common in the Ciskei by the 1930s: (i) falling yields; (ii) an increasing 
scarcity of agrarian resources and heightened competition for them; and (iii) high out­
migration that depleted the agricultural work force. These factors affected livestock 
production as well, as the two systems were well integrated. Oxen were used for 
ploughing and transporting produce and cattle grazed maize stubble, depositing 
manure on arable lands while doing so. Competition for arable and residential land 
meant increased pressure on common grazing resources, something which could pit 
livestock-owners against those without livestock (see Manona 1980a).
The first rehabilitation schemes in 1938 tended to focus on livestock-culling (Switzer 
1993: 230). The Ciskei was regarded as a test case for dealing with overstocking 
with the Livestock Control and Improvement Proclamation No.31 of 1939 first 
introduced in the locations in the King William’s Town District. Stock-culling was to 
take place only after the households affected had been consulted and a majority were 
in favour of the plan.9 Government officials in conjunction with local councillors 
would determine how many stock would be allowed to remain on grazing land in
8 One ‘cattle unit’ is equivalent to one head of large stock (cattle, horse, mules and donkeys) and five 
head of small stock (sheep or goats), see Switzer (1993: 240).
9 As Mager (1995: 770) points out, stock limitation was ‘the one single issue which provoked the 
greatest resentment... To reduce a man’s cattle was not only to strip him of his wealth...but to destroy 
his social base in the community and the foundations of male supremacy. Reducing cattle numbers 
interfered drastically with African social and economic relationships... While men held onto cattle they 
retained the symbolic power of the patriarchal order.’ Stock culling was, in short, ‘the most hated 
element’ of the rehabilitation programmes (Moll 1988: 34).
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each location. Condemned stock, mainly diseased or ill-fed animals and bulls and 
rams of poor quality, would be sold or otherwise removed from the proclaimed area 
(see De Wet 1980). Beinart notes that culling often took the line of least resistance by 
exempting most cattle and concentrating instead on donkeys, goats and sheep 
(Beinart 2003: 362). Although government officials hoped to reduce the number of 
cattle in South Africa’s reserves by 50%, very little progress in culling cattle was 
made after the start of the Second World War (Switzer 1993: 230).
In 1945, rural development planning moved from the contested culling of livestock 
and land conservation to population resettlement and land-use planning (Beinart 
2003: 363). The authorities remained concerned about the accumulation of large 
numbers of livestock by a rural minority and sought to flatten the profile of cattle 
ownership in the reserves, to give ‘everybody a chance to have stock’ (Beinart 2003: 
361; Milton 1996). ‘Progressive’ scholars have linked the sharp decline in peasant 
production over the twentieth century to the increasing dependence of the reserve 
areas on economic developments in the urban economy of South Africa (see Bundy 
1988). This dependence was said to be matched by the corresponding dependence of 
the mines and industry on the ‘subsidised’ labour and on meat-supplies drawn from 
the reserves (Wolpe 1972; Molteno 1977; see Milton 1996).10
In 1944, 35% of the household heads in the rural locations of King William’s Town 
District had no cattle (42% had fewer than 5 head, while only 11% had 10 or more). 
In Keiskammahoek District, 29% had no cattle and 33% had 1-5 cattle (Switzer 1993: 
210). In 1945, more than half the cattle and sheep and one third of the goats in the 
Ciskei reserves died as a result of the relentless drought (Mager 1992: 766). In 1948, 
R.W. Norton, who had been the Assistant Director of Native Agriculture for the 
Ciskei, summarised the situation as follows:
10 Green and Hirsch (1982: 66) articulated the ‘radical position’ on the African reserves with their 
pronouncement that ‘The creation of the reserve system amounted to the subordination of the 
remaining pre-capitalist social formations to the capitalist mode o f production at the level of the 
reproduction of labour. This was a politically necessary concession in the face of the seizure of most 
land by white farmers...[Disallowing individual land ownership in the reserves] seems to have been 
adopted for two reasons: firstly, it prevented complete proletarianisation for many Africans and 
maintained for them at least a token access to land; and secondly, it was an attempt to maintain the 
material basis of the power of chiefs and headmen [which was their remaining power of] discretion 
over the allocation of lands’. (See also Giliomee 1985).
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The average land-holder...owns...[a] sub-economic number o f  stock.
Above him is a relatively small favoured class o f bigger owners. While 
some men own over a hundred cattle and as many as a thousand sheep, 
over 60 p e r  cent o f  the population owned five  or few er cattle, and 29 p er  
cent owned no cattle at all (U.G.28-1948, quoted in Bundy 1988: 224-5, 
my emphasis).
When the Tomlinson Commission investigated the ‘socio-economic condition of the 
Native Reserves’ in the early 1950s, the African reserves were already in a deep and 
relentless crisis. Drawing on ideas that had a long legacy in government thinking, 
Tomlinson proposed that the reserve population be divided into two categories, i.e. a 
farmer class, allocated ‘economic units’ of land under freehold title, and a class of 
proletarianised, rurally-based wage-eamers who were to have no rights to arable land 
nor to own livestock but who would instead subsist by means of wages earned in the 
decentralised industries that would be encouraged on the borders of the reserves 
(Bundy 1988: 227; Wotshela2001: 4).
In the end, Tomlinson’s recommendations were mostly rejected by the Nationalist 
government, which recognised that extending freehold tenure would pose a serious 
threat to the resuscitated chieftaincy (Beinart 1994: 155). Under Verwoerd, the 
Nationalist Government would come to see the bantustans as key to the absorption of 
‘surplus’ Africans (see Posel 1991:4-5). Bantustan populations would be ruled under 
a reinvented system of ‘traditional’ authorities. To effect the programme, the 
government embarked on two initiatives, industrial decentralisation and renewed 
environmental rehabilitation in the reserves (see Rogers 1980: 1 lOff; Glaser 1987). 
The full-blown surgery advocated by Tomlinson, which required moving vast 
numbers of people out of the reserves and into non-existent urban houses and 
employment, was ruled out. Instead, Betterment Schemes were given a new lease of 
life and a new generation of planners set about restructuring land use patterns in the 
reserves. In the process, they sought to restructure, regulate and limit rural people’s 
access to arable land and to place restrictions on their rights to livestock ownership.
The related struggles of black tenants on white-owned farms
While livestock owners and cultivators were faring poorly in the reserves from the 
1930s, the state was making serious attempts to keep black people, especially the 
dependents of active labourers, out of the urban centres. Influx control legislation,
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such as the 1930 and 1937 amendments to the 1923 Native (Urban Areas) Act, sought 
to stem the out-migration from the reserves (Bundy 1988: 234). These measures were 
only moderately successful. The Ciskeian reserves could not absorb the growth in 
population over the period 1916-1951 and the proportion of African people who 
actually lived in the reserves declined steadily over time, i.e. from nearly 74% in 
1916 to 58.3% in 1951 (Simkins 1979: 19). As Switzer (1993: 200,236) notes,
‘Ciskei[an] Africans -  there are no published statistics but they must have numbered 
in the tens of thousands -  left the region each year and never returned’.
In the 1936 census, 37% of the total African population of South Africa were 
recorded as living on farms, 45% were in reserves and 17% were in towns (Beinart 
1994: 14).11 By 1945, wealthy white farmers in the Border Corridor (the farming 
corridor that extends from East London to Queenstown in the interior) were 
demanding the removal of black ‘squatters’ (i.e. African tenants). They wished to 
take advantage of the post-war boom in the demand for agricultural products by 
capitalising and mechanising their farming operations, free from the pressures of 
black tenants, and their alleged theft of fences and cattle (Mager 1999: 2Iff). In some 
areas, however, the daily lives and livelihoods of impoverished white land-owners 
and their African tenants were still intertwined. Drought in 1945 drove ‘nearly all the 
white farmers in Peddie District’ into wage employment and several white ‘rentier’ 
farmers came to rely heavily on the rents paid by their tenants. They also relied on their 
tenants’ cattle to plough the farmer’s lands, and expected the tenant to plough his own 
fields at the weekends (Mager 1999: 25). On balance, however, white farmers began to 
bring increasing political pressure to bear on the authorities to rid the Ciskei and Border 
areas of what they regarded as troublesome and superfluous black tenant-farmers.
Responding to these farmers’ demands, NAD officials argued that environmental 
problems which white farmers ascribed to labour tenancy could instead be addressed 
by livestock reduction (Mager 1999: 27-8). But grazing and dipping fees for tenants’ 
livestock were already high, as was pressure from individual white farmer on their 
tenants to reduce the number of cattle they owned. Increasingly, Xhosa men on farms
11 Beinart (1994: 14) makes the important point that ‘[T]here never was a ‘white man’s country’ nor 
‘white farms’ in the sense that these were zones o f numerically predominant white occupation, only in 
the sense that whites, through their economic and political power, exercised control over the people on 
them.’
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had to seek work as migrants to offset these costs. Tenancy thus became vulnerable 
and many Xhosa people could only continue through ‘a combination of male 
migrants’ earnings and women’s agricultural labour’ (Mager 1999: 29). Men’s 
mobility came at the expense of tying women to the land and having women take 
greater responsibility for agrarian production.12
Nor did nature help. The devastating drought in 1945 was followed by another in 
1949. Both of them devastated herds on white-owned farms and in the adjacent 
Ciskeian reserves (Mager 1999: 84). But continued tenancy on white-owned farms 
represented the last hope for Xhosa men living outside the reserve areas, who wanted 
to hold onto cattle and thereby ‘delay the moment of final proletarianization’ (Mager 
1999: 32). The first piece of legislation to deal with tenancy was the Prevention o f 
Illegal Squatting Act No.52 of 1951 (Wotshela 2001: 4). This was followed in 1956, 
when Chapter Four of the 1936 Land Act was finally proclaimed, empowering 
divisional councils to compel white farmers to curtail labour tenancy on their farms. 
All tenants were to be removed within fifteen years (Mager 1999: 40). While some 
dispossessed tenants were removed to places like Zwelitsha, close to King William’s 
Town, and the ‘townships’ adjacent to smaller towns in the region, considerable 
numbers of tenants ended up in the already congested reserves of Peddie, Victoria East 
and Middledrift Districts (Mager 1999: 46; Fox & Tipler 1996).
The increase in unemployment among unskilled black people who had been pushed off 
white-owned farms and removed from so-called ‘black spots’ during the 1960s and 
1970s meant that white farmers could afford to sacrifice their remaining labour-tenants 
(Bundy 1988: 235). The Ciskeian reserves were patently unable to absorb the several 
hundred thousand people who were forced into the villages and ‘closer settlements’ or 
‘growth points’ in the bantustans (Beinart 1994:195-9; Hindson 1987).
12 For the Ciskei reserves there was a sharp rise in the migration of adult women workers between 1936 
and 1946. By 1946 women constituted about half of the African population in Port Elizabeth and East 
London (Beinart 1994: 121).
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A period of modernisation and mimicry, 1972-1994
It has to be remembered that the Ciskei is not an economic island but part of 
an integrated border region...The outlook for the Ciskei is at present very 
bleak. It possesses all the features of a third world economy, under­
employment, land infertility, poverty, poor natural resources, problems that 
will not be solved merely by a declaration of independence (Freeman [1981:
25], writing four months before the Ciskei took ‘independence’ in December 
1981).13
The 1970s saw the culmination of the apartheid government’s evolving policy of 
dealing with the ‘black problem’ (Green & Hirsch 1982). In the late 1960s and early 
1970s, apartheid planners conjured up a number of ethnically based, supposedly 
economically and politically viable, ‘independent’ black states, with all the symbolic 
trappings of statehood (Jones 1999). For the Ciskei, this involved joining up the 
disparate fragments of communal reserve and black-owned freehold land, as well as 
some of the small towns. The consolidation proposals for the Ciskei that were mooted 
in 1972 indicated that the Ciskei would gain 185,385 ha of land, of which more than 
half (97,643 ha) was situated in Peddie District. The town of Peddie was incorporated 
into the then ‘self-governing’ Ciskei in August 1974 (Freeman 1981: 17).
Ciskeian economic viability was an illusion as the agrarian economies in most reserve 
areas had weakened considerably over the course of the twentieth century (Simkins 
1981). Race-based legislation that resulted in the uprooting of white traders and 
labour recruiters, who had played a pivotal, intermediary role in the rural economy 
for most of the previous century, compounded the problem. Addressing the weakened 
state of the ‘rural’ economy would require considerable planning and financial 
resources from the South African government. It is not clear from the planning 
documents I have studied whether the state planners realised the enormity and 
complexity of their ambition. Indeed, in his recent analysis of resettlement politics in 
the northern Ciskei, Wotshela (2001: 9) shows convincingly that black resistance, 
new ideological developments and the inability of the state to control black 
population movements meant that the apartheid state was ‘never fully able to realise 
its plans for resettlement in and around the Ciskei’.
13 Compare this with the following quotation, ‘The population o f the Ciskei, then, is more than just a 
number o f people; it is a distinctive group, a society, with its own structure, its own way of life, its own 
problems o f waste and inefficiency, and its peculiar burdens o f the very young and the very old’ (Els 
1971:49).
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Government planners in the late 1960s adopted two main strategies. One strategy was 
the promotion of heavily subsidised, supply-driven, industrial decentralisation 
through so-called ‘border industries’ and later, ‘growth points’ within the bantustans 
(Glaser 1987; Hirsch 1987). The border industries were set up close to the 
mushrooming rural slums, where millions of people found that the arbitrary 
redrawing of political boundaries placed them within the borders of ‘independent’ 
bantustans (Nel & Temple 1992). But none were established in Peddie District. 
Overall, these industries provided vastly inadequate (and exploitative) employment 
opportunities to the rural people stuck in the bantustans (Hart, G. 2002; Nel 1996).
The second strategy concerns us more directly here. As the South African regime’s 
exasperation mounted with apparent absence of any surplus production directed at the 
market in the reserves, the promotion of capital-intensive commercial agriculture in 
the bantustans, particularly with the aim of establishing a class of full-time, ‘small’ 
farmers, began to exercise the imagination of planners with a renewed urgency 
(Simkins 1984; Page 1981: 386ff).
In the late 1970s, the Ciskei National Development Plan was set out by a team of 
planners led by Gary Godden from the Ciskei Department of Agriculture and Forestry 
(cf. Wotshela 2001). Assistance came from the Rural Development Institute located 
at the National Party ‘ verligte’ stronghold of Stellenbosch University (see Page 
1981). I do not deal here with the envisaged institutional arrangements of the Plan. I 
am more interested to consider what empirical research data were actually available 
to this team in formulating their plans, specifically as these related to the cattle 
production sector in the Ciskei.
The standard reference text at the time was the collection edited by Els (1971), and 
especially the paper by D.L. Brown, Professor of Animal Science at the University of 
Fort Hare, which characterised the development of agriculture in the Ciskei as ‘a 
tremendous challenge’(see also Board 1960; Brown 1969; Brown et al 1975). Brown 
(1971: 170) argued that the ‘rapid development and re-orientation of the existing 
subsistence-type of farming... [was] of vital importance’. He noted that most natural 
resources in the Ciskeian reserves had been ‘universally reduced to a dangerously low 
level in terms of productive capacity’ and that [human] nutritional deficiency
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diseases, such as pellagra and kwashiorkor, occurred throughout the territory (Brown 
1971: 171).
Brown hinted at discord and lack of co-operation in the administration of the 
reserves. Firstly, although some 63% of the Ciskei’s rangelands had been planned by
1968, with rotational grazing systems introduced, the authorities had failed to gain the 
co-operation of all the livestock-owners affected by these grazing schemes. Secondly, 
despite drought and government culling, the Ciskeian reserves remained grossly 
overstocked, with the districts of Peddie, Victoria East and Middledrift exceeding the 
estimated carrying capacity by more than 100%. Thirdly, Brown noted that livestock 
census data were based on estimates, not actual counts, and were therefore 
underestimates because of the common practice of illegally moving livestock prior to 
the annual enumeration (Brown 1971: 177).
Regarding cattle husbandry, Brown argued that the ‘principle [or ‘tribal tradition’] of 
quantity and not quality’ still prevailed, that the cows in reserve areas 
underperformed reproductively, with low average calving percentages (30-50%) and 
high cattle mortality. He was critical of the 38% of the cattle population that were 
oxen (retained for ploughing purposes), but that placed undue pressure on the grazing 
resources. He conceded that fairly large numbers of cattle were sold annually on local 
auction sales.14 But he noted that they fetched prices that were consistently lower than 
white-owned cattle, apparently because of the higher incidence of cysticercosis 
among cattle in the reserves.15
To address these and other challenges, Brown advocated a ‘far-reaching policy in 
agrarian planning and reform.. .in activating further economic progress’ in reserve 
agriculture (Brown 1971: 182). However, he failed to elaborate any understanding of 
the subordinate role played by the reserves in the South African political economy. 
Thus he noted matter-of-factly that the population density of Ciskeian reserves was
14 Trollope (1976: 211) noted that there was a 27% decrease in ‘animal units’ in Peddie District 
between the 1955 livestock census (31,377 units) and the 1972 census (22,941 units), with goats 
decreasing from 41,378 to 25,696 (38%). He suggested that culling schemes and more recently, public 
livestock stocksales as well as the very severe drought conditions which prevailed between 1964 and
1969, accounted for the decrease in animal numbers.
15 Elsewhere, Brown (1969) argued that during the period 1958 and 1967, cattle sold on public 
auctions increased by 534%, and he took this as evidence of a growing ‘cash consciousness’ among the 
farmers (cited in Trollope 1976: 212).
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115 people/square mile and that the level of education of the adult farming 
community lay between standards two and four. He considered widespread 
malnutrition ‘among the Bantu.. .as the population’s inability to adapt itself to a 
sedentary form of crop and animal culture’ as well as ‘the direct result of 
geographical determination of boundaries’ (Brown 1971: 182). Although he 
acknowledged that the ‘thorny problems of existing forms of land tenure and credit 
facilities, which [struck] at the very root of agricultural production in the Bantu 
areas’, needed to be ‘recognised as vitally important considerations in modem land- 
use’, he offered no insights as to how he thought these issues might be addressed.
I have reviewed Brown’s paper in detail to illuminate a few points about the 
characterisation of the Ciskeian reserves at the time. The first, already mentioned, is 
that his paper (admittedly a chapter in an edited collection that included papers on a 
wide range of topics, including the history of the Ciskeian reserves) lacks any 
historical explanation of the agricultural sector of the Ciskei in the context of the 
broader South African political economy. He offered no account of the extensive 
contact (for instance, through the trade in livestock) between reserve farmers and 
white commercial farmers and trading-store keepers in and adjacent to the Ciskei 
reserves. He pointedly made no attempt to account for the low educational levels that 
were characteristic of the Ciskei. On the serious nutritional deficiencies that plagued 
the Ciskei reserve, he argued simply that the ‘Bantu are.. .liable to dispose of their 
crops of [nutritious] beans and peas.. .and to purchase refined maize-meal with its 
inherent deficiencies’ (Brown 1971: 171).
Secondly, his characterisation of reserve agriculture was of a tradition-bound and, 
with steady deterioration of the natural resources, ultimately entropic system, that had 
little inherent capacity to adapt to external changes, whether climatic or economic.16 
Only an undisclosed number of ‘progressive farmers’ registered a change regarding 
the ‘principle of quantity over quality’ (Brown 1971: 177). By characterising the 
difficulties facing outside stimulation of reserve agriculture as ‘human’, Brown glibly
16 Compare with Houghton (1964: 74): ‘...[Rural Xhosa] are most reluctant to sell or slaughter their 
cattle, except for purposes of ritual. Instead of slaughtering them in their prime when they would give a 
good yield of meat they are kept until they die of old age or succumb in the next drought. Moreover the 
savings of the people are invested in yet more cattle... The money earned by the sweat and toil of 
labourers in mines and factories is continuously being poured into the bottomless pit created by their 
cattle complex.’
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suggested (as have many other observers who preceded and followed him, see Lipton 
1979) that, although the agricultural solutions were clear for all to see in white- 
dominated, commercial agriculture, the ‘challenge’ was the long-term transformation 
of the very nature of the black man and his social institutions (Brown 1971: 182; Page 
1981: 386ff; Fraser 1991).
Thirdly, with white commercial agriculture on freehold land as his benchmark,
Brown saw no value in drawing any comparisons with more successful agricultural 
practices in other reserve areas in South Africa or Southern Africa (see also Trollope 
1976: 213). Comparative insights with potentially valuable lessons from development 
interventions implemented elsewhere were disregarded (see Nieuwenhuysen 1964b: 
134ff). The freehold utopia was unattainable in the reserves given the obstacles posed 
by high population densities, the communal tenure regime and the poor resource 
management practices in place here.
Brown’s politically sanitised characterisation of agriculture in the Ciskeian reserves 
found further expression in the explicitly modernist cattle production development 
initiatives of the 1970s and 1980s. By this time, despite the enormous credibility gap 
that haunted its leaders and bureaucrats, the Ciskei was already being 
characterised as a ‘developing country’ with national policies and priorities of its own 
(Rogers 1980; Ferguson 1997).17
In 1978, the Ciskei Commission chaired by G.D. Quail was set up by Sebe’s Ciskei 
administration and given one year to investigate and advise on the Ciskei accepting 
‘independence’ from South Africa (Quail 1980). Bekker (1980) reviewed their rather 
pragmatic methods of enquiry and their subsequent wide-ranging recommendations. 
The Commission clearly recognised that the Ciskei was economically unviable. It 
also noted the long-standing economic interdependence of the Ciskei and the rest of 
the (white-dominated) ‘Border’ region. Its report argued that the traditional economy
17 Daniel (1981: 16) quotes Venn (1978: 57), a white development consultant, as saying that ‘one of 
the most urgent requirements [of the Ciskei] is to win the support of rural communities. Homeland 
leaders need their support’. Venn saw development projects [as] ‘forming a bulwark against 
communism and leading to the creation of a middle class.’ Ten years later, Fraser’s 1991 doctoral 
thesis entitled, ‘Agricultural Marketing in Less Developed Countries with special reference to Ciskei’, 
still explicitly viewed the Ciskei as a separate country, finding a convenient fit with the international- 
recognised term, ‘LDC’. This led Fraser to use such terms such the ‘national herd’ of the Ciskei when 
referring to all the cattle in the bantustan (Fraser 1991: 110).
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of extensive farming, the communal land tenure system, the absence of able-bodied 
men, the ‘blocked exit from agriculture’ experienced by many rural people, as well as 
the resettlement of additional people into the Ciskei, created a ‘low-level equilibrium 
trap’ which only the termination of the migrant labour system would resolve (Quail 
1980: 72).
Given this scenario, Quail distinguished between two different options of agricultural 
development. The first was a ‘broad-based’ approach that aimed to gradually raise 
‘farm productivity’, by developing infrastructure, enhancing local cultivation 
practices and purchasing new seed varieties. This approach would also focus on 
inculcating improved cultivation and animal husbandry, extending credit and 
providing marketing facilities. However, the Ciskei held especially limited promise in 
this regard. It had only 30 extension officers who worked mostly with the newly 
established co-operatives. The ‘abysmally low’ agricultural productivity indices of 
the Ciskei reserves, the experts agreed, flowed from excessive population density, 
inefficient land use and low yields, even though the ‘theoretical potential of Ciskei 
agriculture... [was] superior to that of adjoining white farming areas’ (Quail 1980:
73). Again, many of the problems were deemed ultimately to be rooted in the ‘human 
factor’ and institutional incapacity.
The Ciskei Department of Agriculture was reckoned to have ‘very limited executive 
capacity, with insufficient administrators, senior agricultural specialists and extension 
officers’ (Quail 1980: 72).18 Compared with white farmers in the rest of South Africa, 
who enjoyed a 30-to-l ratio of farmers to extension officers, in the Ciskei the figure 
was 320-to-l (Quail 1980: 74; cf. De Wet & Leibbrandt 1991: 56ff).19
The second option for agricultural development was driven by the twin imperatives of 
giving the Ciskei a semblance of economic viability and of developing a ‘class’ of
18 In the period, 1972-1984, the department had no less than 8 Ministers and 9 Directors-General (De 
Beer 1986: 180). The department failed to publish an annual report in 1980/81 and again in 1981/82, 
while the 1979/80 annual report only appeared in 1983. Not that the Department failed to grow in size. 
In 1972, it had 5 directorates. By 1985, these had increased to 13. The casual approach to maintaining 
statistics on production levels has affected subsequent analyses of the sector. Fraser’s table dealing 
with a ‘Summary of animal and poultry products for 1983/84’ has more gaps than actual figures on 
production (Fraser 1991: 123-4).
19 Obviously, this depended on how many of the rural inhabitants o f the Ciskei were defined as 
‘farmers’, a contentious point in itself.
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commercial farmers. Only a few promising areas and a limited number of 
beneficiaries were selected for special attention. The capacity shortfalls in the Ciskei 
Department of Agriculture and Forestry would be taken up by various re-organised 
state corporations, that would oversee work done by firms of consultants managing 
new and existing ‘show-piece’ agricultural projects (Rogers 1980: lOOff).
The senior posts of the parastatals and their associated consultants were filled by 
white ‘expatriate’ South Africans, ex-Rhodesians and, at one stage, a few Israelis. 
This fact did not help the parastatals and their associated consultants in their 
relationship with the Department of Agriculture and Forestry (DAF) during the 
1980s. Officials in the parastatals increasingly saw commercialisation in agriculture 
as occurring separately from the activities of the DAF and, indeed, separately from 
those of the mass of subsistence farmers in the villages of the Ciskei. From this lobby 
group, the Quail Commission heard self-serving arguments that the constraints 
‘holding down agricultural productivity in the Ciskei’ could be significantly reduced 
in a short period, if an additional R17,5 million a year, over and above DAF’s annual 
budget of RIO million, could be made available over three years to selected projects, 
including R5 million for livestock improvement.
The approach adopted by the newly constituted Ciskei Agricultural Corporation 
prioritised capital-intensive projects, notably the (further) development of five 
irrigation schemes and two pineapple estates. By design, these projects tended to 
concentrate resources and to benefit a relatively small number of people, with the 
goal of developing a core of bona fide commercial farmers in the Ciskei (Daniel 
1981). While these projects provided negligible opportunities for employment and 
advancement, relative to the existing needs, their value to the Ciskeian and South 
African regimes lay in their contribution to rural political containment and to the all- 
important fa9ade of hi-tech agricultural development and ‘progress’. Politically, these 
projects formed part of a carrot-and-stick approach to ‘development’, whereby 
bantustan authorities rewarded compliant village communities and demonstrated to 
‘recalcitrant’ rural people what fruits lay beyond their reach because of their 
opposition to the Ciskei regime (Green & Hirsch 1982: 82; Holbrook 1998).
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The beneficiaries of these various projects included the few consulting firms that 
made a rather good living in the Ciskei (and other bantustans) in the period 1975- 
1994 (Daniel 1981; Holbrook 1992; Lelyveld 1985). The overall management of the 
Tyefu Irrigation Scheme in Peddie District, for instance, was placed under the 
managing consultants, Inter-Science Research and Development Services (Pty) Ltd.20 
The rather ambitious ‘long-run promise’ of these agents and of their parastatal 
minders, as quoted in the Quail Report, was of the ‘complete modernisation of Ciskei 
farming...[ to] a level of productivity easily capable of supporting the homeland’s 
current [i.e. 1980] population’ (Quail 1980: 73). Contrariwise, Daniel (1981: 18) 
argued that the irrigation schemes contributed little to food production or the 
production of fodder for the cattle in the dryland regions of the Ciskei.
The promotion of cattle production and marketing in the Ciskei, 1972-1994
With two-thirds of the land area of the Ciskei bantustan suited to livestock production 
off the natural veld, livestock, and especially cattle, constituted a major component of 
the farming sector (Fraser 1991: 108). This reality did not prevent the authors of the 
National Development Plan for the water-deficient Ciskei from reaching the conclusion 
that, ‘.. .due to the low rainfall for dryland crop farming and the limited land resources 
for stock farming, farming under irrigation will be the mainstay of agriculture in the 
Ciskei of the future’ (Page 1981: 413). As local studies demonstrated, though, 
cultivation and livestock production continued to be integrally linked at village level, 
with a study conducted in the Amatola Basin finding that in the 1980/81 ploughing 
season 76% of the sampled households cultivated their land, and that nearly 80% of 
them did so solely by using cattle as draught power (De Wet 1985b: 101).
Cattle production in the reserves was underpinned partly by the extensive state- 
sponsored dipping programme that had been in place since 1904 in most reserve 
areas, though not without opposition from local people (Kepe 2002b). The ‘self- 
governing’ and later ‘independent’ Ciskei administration maintained the dipping 
programme, but less systematically. It was particularly the related function of using 
regular dipping episodes to keep track of cattle numbers that suffered after the late
20 Other names such as Hill, Kaplan and Scott, as well as Loxton, Hunting and Associates and a group 
known as SA Farm Consultants, recur constantly in the grey literature. These teams of consultants 
churned out regular reports and plans on the schemes in which they were involved in the bantustans 
(Holbrook 1992; Keenan & Sarakinsky 1987).
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1970s. Under ‘Trust’ tenure, i.e. land owned by the South African Development 
Trust, rights to grazing for six head of cattle were allocated to each family. By the 
end of the 1970s, a flat rate rental of R3 per year was apparently being charged, with 
an additional 25c per head of cattle over five (Page 1981: 247; De Wet 1980). This 
unpopular livestock tax was dropped after Ciskeian ‘independence’ in 1981.
The main thrust, however, in developing cattle production, was the drive to improve 
the cattle in reserve areas, through the supply of ‘high-quality’ bulls. The idea was to 
improve the beef-producing qualities of cattle, rather than their milk production or 
disease-resistance qualities, although dual-purpose (beef/dairy) cattle were also 
promoted. The rationale was that bigger and better-quality beef cattle would 
command better prices at stocksales and thus encourage cattle-owners to sell more 
animals. This would lead to a greater off-take of cattle, thereby easing pressure on the 
overgrazed rangelands.
The Department of Agriculture had launched a breeding scheme in the Ciskei 
reserves in 1949, subsidising the provision of ‘improved’ bulls (and the simultaneous 
removal of ‘scrub’ bulls). It proved a tangible, politically palatable and thus enduring 
feature of government policy. But rural people engaged with it on their own terms, 
withdrawing from the scheme when it no longer suited them. Throughout the 1960s 
and early 1970s, the Ciskei department favoured the Brown Swiss as sires in the 
reserve areas (Brown 1971: 178). This much-criticised choice resulted from a 
national ‘zoning of the communal areas’ by a Professor Hamburger from the 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development in Pretoria, which declared 
the Brown Swiss ideal for conditions in the Ciskeian reserves (interview with J. 
Hundleby, 19 July 2001).21 The cattle were introduced through the unpopular Tribal 
Authority system, but as Steyn (1981: 25) noted, the breeds were not well-adapted to 
the area and most of them died soon after introduction, often succumbing to tick- 
borne diseases. This did not deter the authorities and between 1961 and 1970 the 
Department introduced a total of 901 bulls into the Ciskeian reserves. The programme 
was later deemed unsuccessful, because people tended to sell these bulls while they
21 Later, South Devon and Simmentaler breeds were promoted through the bull subsidy system. In 
1978, some 400 bulls were distributed in the Ciskei, with South Devons constituting two-thirds of 
these (interview with J. Hundleby, 19 July 2001).
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were still of ‘serviceable’ age. The bulls were not cared for properly when they were 
bought for the entire community, the method preferred by the Tribal Authorities.
These problems notwithstanding, the Animal Husbandry Section persevered with the 
scheme, supplying a further 104 bulls to Ciskeian farmers in 1979/80 (Ciskei DAF 
Annual Report 1979/80).
Other than terse statements in the Department of Agriculture and Forestry’s annual 
reports, little information is available on the impact of these schemes. I have not been 
able to locate any scientific papers on the number of bulls that would be needed to 
noticeably improve the beef qualities of village cattle or how this could best be 
achieved. It is not clear how such improvements would be measured in a systematic 
way, without expensive scientific performance testing that was unavailable to the 
authorities. Certainly it was recognised that unless all other ‘scrub’ bulls in the local 
communal grazing system were castrated or removed, the impact of the ‘improved’ 
bulls on improving the quality of local stock would be diluted (Beinart 1977: 134; 
Bembridge and Tapson 1993: 368). One local cattle specialist, Hundleby, argues that 
the introduction of large, dual-purpose (beef and dairy) breeds through the 
‘improvement’ programmes, aimed at producing bigger-framed progeny, only 
aggravated the problem of low calving percentages and poor animal condition during 
the critical low forage periods (Hundleby n.d.: 4).
If the effects of the introduction of improved bulls remained largely unknown, clear 
damage was done to the relationship between government officials and rural cattle- 
owners resulting from the changing official notions of what genetic material was 
desirable in the ‘reserve herds’. In earlier decades the state spent time and resources 
castrating and culling indigenous bulls (such as the Nguni and Nkone breeds and other 
‘nondescript’ animals), but this sentiment changed over time. By the late 1970s, it was 
increasingly recognised that these smaller-framed more fertile breeds were in fact far 
better adapted to conditions in the reserve areas (for instance periodic grazing and water 
deficits and nightly kraaling regimes) than the introduced exotic breeds. When the 
Ciskei National Ranch was established in the early 1980s, two adapted breeds, the 
Nguni/Nkone and the Bonsmara, were vigorously promoted. Naturally, cattle-owners in 
the reserves were suspicious of these U-turns in official thinking, and Hundleby noted 
that there was ‘consistently a problem with the perceptions of farmers in the communal
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areas against the Nguni ’ in the late 1970s and early 1980s (interview with J. Hundleby, 
19 July 2001).
To promote the marketing of cattle out of the reserve areas, the Ciskeian Marketing 
Board, an off-shoot of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry, entered into a 
joint venture with a private company, Cape Eastern Meats Co-operative, in 1978. 
Together they introduced a new livestock marketing system, known as the Ciskeian 
Livestock Marketing Board (CLB).22 The CLB provided a marketing system on a 
‘national’ (i.e. Ciskei-wide) scale and, through the use of a weight/scale system, 
offered a guaranteed floor price for all economically saleable animals (see Fraser 
1991: 132). After three years of operation, Gary Godden could glibly claim that the 
‘new scheme has been in operation for some time and is proving popular’ (Godden in 
Page 1981:405).
A close reading of the available documents suggests that none of these schemes was 
properly planned by the agricultural or marketing experts involved. The planners 
borrowed heavily and uncritically from similar earlier interventions in the Eastern 
Cape and elsewhere, in which ‘livestock specialists’ had been involved. There is a 
sense that the efforts in the late 1970s had to meet the unrealistic deadlines probably 
set by National Party and Ciskeian politicians who were desperate to make the 
‘independent’ Ciskei bantustan a reality. In the course of this headlong rush, 
discredited theories like Rostow’s ‘stages of development’ and the notion that 
Ciskeian farmers were ‘only interested in numbers and not quality’ (both in Page 
1981), were recycled and used as the basis for planning in the Ciskei. The consultants 
appointed to manage the various schemes either genuinely bought into these 
‘development facts’, or were simply incredibly cynical about the whole Ciskei 
bantustan project and were happy to be paid for services rendered and then to move 
on to the next assignment (see May 1991: 16; Tapscott 1992).
22 The Ciskei Marketing Board was established by the Ciskeian Marketing Act No. 10 of 1976, to 
provide ‘a Ciskeian organisation to regulate and control all matters concerning the production, 
processing and sale of agricultural products in the Ciskei.’ The Board was to operate under the ‘overall 
jurisdiction’ o f the Ciskeian Minister of Agriculture (Page 1981: 412). Elsewhere in his report, Page 
notes that in 1979/80 another parastatal, the Ciskei National Development Corporation (C.N.D.C.), 
was similarly involved in the sale of cattle, small stock and even milk (Page 1981: 269, 274).
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The establishment of the Ciskei Agricultural Corporation (CAC) through the passing 
of the Ciskeian Corporation Act of 1981 resulted in the consolidation of the Ciskei 
Marketing Board, the Ciskei Livestock Marketing Board (CLB), Ciskei Agricultural 
Services, Ag Tek and the agricultural section of the Ciskei National Development 
Corporation (Fraser 1991: 129).23 It is surprising then that by 1985 the CAC had a 
mere nine field officers involved in the marketing of all forms of surplus agricultural 
production, who had to service the entire bantustan. They conducted ‘farmers’ days’ 
in order to acquaint rural people with the necessary skills in pricing, collection points, 
times of collection and advice on the preparation and presentation of agricultural 
products.
The Livestock Marketing Section of the CAC was responsible for the marketing of all 
livestock in the Ciskei bantustan, whether through private, ‘out-of-hand’ sales or the 
regular auction sales held throughout the reserve. By 1985, auction sales were being 
held regularly at 24 sale pens with an average of three sales per pen per year. A total 
of 9 sales were held in Peddie District in 1985 (Fraser 1991: 132, 255). The plan was 
to raise the annual off-take from the ‘national herd’, which was unknown but 
presumed to be less than 5% at the time, to 10% by 1980 and to 15% by the year 
2000.24 This would increase the value of livestock production and effect a reduction 
in the total livestock numbers towards the Ciskei’s overall carrying capacity.
But this programme hit a number of snags. Stock sales were thick with suspicion and 
mistrust, and both rural cattle-owners and white buyers proved unreliable 
participants. CAC officials, as representatives of the bantustan regime, were 
frequently seen by local people as the enemy, intent on stripping them of their bovine 
wealth. ‘Massive anti-CLB sentiment’ was also expressed by local white speculators 
operating in Peddie District, who felt that the CLB (and later CAC) was cutting into 
their operations, which indeed it was (interview with J. Hundleby, 19 July 2001). In a 
rare evaluation of the CLB marketing initiative, Van Rooyen et al. (1981: 305) 
registered a number of telling observations. They argued that, in view of the skewed
23 The CLB was finally incorporated into the CAC in September 1983.
24 The reference to 1980 may have been a typographical error, i.e. it is possible that the target was 10% 
by 1990. Perhaps there was a perception that a focussed effort would yield substantial and immediate 
results, i.e 10% off-take by 1980. Off-take rates for the Ciskeian reserves had been calculated by 
Benso (1976), at a mere 1.8%. In 1988, Fraser and Antrobus (1988: 273), cited in Antrobus et al. 
(1994: 20), estimated off-take to be 2.6% of the Ciskei ‘national herd’.
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ownership of cattle in the Ciskei, the programme would be directed at only a minority 
group of wealthier farmers who had sufficient cattle to sell. The problem they said 
seemed to be ‘too few cattle owned by too many families’. To address this problem, 
they advocated that an economic value be placed on grazing rights, perhaps through 
the introduction of tradeable grazing rights. They argued further for the promotion of 
a ‘substitution process’ through which ‘livestock farmers must change their 
preference for saving money in cattle to a preference for saving money at financial 
institutions’ (Van Rooyen et al. 1981: 300). Achieving this would require ‘an 
educational process and an economic rationale, in which cattle farmers were shown 
that the returns on capital invested in commercial and financial institutions are more 
attractive than the more risky returns on capital invested in livestock’ (Van Rooyen et 
al. 1981: 300).25
The economic rationality of the stock sale also unsettled the authorities. When too 
few cattle were offered for sale, the prices were high and buyers lost interest and 
threatened not to return. Conversely, on occasions when large numbers of stock were 
offered, prices were depressed and sellers proved reluctant, often after hard 
bargaining, to part with their animals (Fraser 1991: 133). Sellers did not like the fact 
that the selling price was settled in public, a process that allow everybody present to 
know the amount that they had received for their cattle. Sellers were accused of 
entering animals that they had no intention of selling and of using the stocksale to 
‘show off their animals or to establish the current value of an animal they intended to 
sell ‘out-of-hand’ to a speculator or in the village afterwards. Buyers were known to 
blatantly organise ‘buying rings’ that saw them co-operating with each other to 
reduce the competition on the animals entered for sale.
But the Ciskei Development Plan was silent on these predictable obstacles and 
promised that ‘modernisation’ of the sector would proceed apace, with the ‘training’ 
of farmers high on the agenda. Improved cattle-breeding on a government-operated 
cattle-holding and breeding station would be possible through the purchase and 
introduction o f ‘expensive, highly bred exotic species’ (Page 1981: 404). At least one
25 Ironic then that earlier in their paper the authors quoted Fielder (1973) and acknowledged that the 
potential returns from investment in cattle (up to 15%) ‘may be far more profitable, though more risky 
than a Post Office savings account, or even most industrial shares’ (Van Rooyen et al. 1981: 295).
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livestock extension centre was planned for the Ciskei, to provide demonstration 
facilities for improved animal breeding and feeding techniques.
At no point in the Development Plan is there any acknowledgement of the fact that 
the Ciskei authorities had a woeful grasp on aggregate agricultural production output 
for the sectors in which they wished to intervene. They relied on consultants’ reports 
with data gleaned from outdated NAD documents. They also referred to village-level 
surveys conducted by the University of Fort Hare and made out-of-context reference 
to dated ethnographies (such as Hunter 1936) to corroborate their ‘research findings’ 
or justify their approach (cf. May 1991).26 The advent of the DBSA-sponsored 
‘Ciskei Development Information’ files in 1985 did little to appreciably improve the 
quality of the data available. The introductory so-called ‘Concise Description’ section 
of the Agriculture and Mining report (Section 7) notes that, ‘due to the 
incompleteness of the available data, a total production figure and the gross value of 
production cannot be given... [and] it is very difficult to describe the impact or the 
role of the private and subsistence farmers and co-operatives in Ciskei agriculture due 
to the unavailability of data...’ (DBS A 1985: 2). Nor were there any signs of a 
gradual improvement in this regard.
The Ciskei National Ranch
Although other sites were mooted, the Ciskei National Ranch (measuring some 
23,162 ha) was set up in the south-eastern comer of Peddie District, on high-quality 
land that had previously been white-owned farmland under freehold tenure.27 By 
August 1980, an extensive block of land of some 50,000 ha in Peddie South had been 
ceded to the Ciskei as a result of the consolidation of the Ciskei’s boundary, and the 
affected white farmers who had their land expropriated were compensated. Much 
concern was expressed about the deterioration of this prime agricultural land ‘as a
26 In their paper, ‘An economic evaluation of cattle marketing in less developed agricultures with 
special reference to the Ciskei’, Van Rooyen et al. (1981: 299) were forced to admit that ‘[FJormal and 
empirically observed data is [sic] scarce and still difficult to obtain but some conclusions can be drawn 
and trends established from available information and evidence of the practical situation in the Ciskei 
as well as from available information on comparable situations in other LDCs [Less Developed 
Countries]’.
27 In their Fish/Kat River Basins Study (Volume 3a), Loxton et a l (1982) recommended setting up two 
national ranches, one at Bira (Peddie South) and another at Tukulu, south-west of the town of Alice. It 
seems that the latter proposal was never implemented and the Bira Ranch became known as the Ciskei 
National Ranch.
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result of neglect, squatting, theft, vandalism, poaching, etc.’, and one of the urgent 
steps required was to bring these farms under ‘effective Ciskei Government control’ 
(Loxton et al. 1980).
The Integrated Rural Development Plan in Peddie South District, as approved by the 
Ciskeian cabinet in March 1982, included the development of mixed pineapple- 
livestock operations and the National Ranch. Loxton, Hunting and Associates, who 
had developed the plan, were appointed as consultants and managers of the project. In 
1984, the recently established CAC assumed responsibility for all agricultural 
developments in Peddie South. The Plan envisaged establishing 50 ‘yeoman’ 
(pineapple-livestock) farmers, farming on about 100 ha each, with a target net income 
of R6,000 per farmer per annum. This scheme would create 2,100 (seasonal) jobs.
The target net income for the envisaged 1,000 ‘commercial’ farmers was set at 
R2,400 to R3,000 per annum, with estimates that this scheme would create 5,000 
jobs. Six community farms were to be established in collaboration with the six Tribal 
Authorities in the area. Central Servicing Units would serve as the developmental hub 
at each of the various settlement schemes (Loxton et al. 1980).28
The National Ranch, for its part, also had three distinct components. One was the 
provision o f ‘store cattle’ to the above-mentioned settlement schemes on a ‘grazier 
scheme’ basis. The second component was to develop the national herd, which led to 
the building up of two registered stud herds, Bonsmara and (later) Nguni, over the 
course of nearly a decade. The idea was that these animals would be distributed to 
farmers across the Ciskei to improve the overall quality of their herds. The 
performance-tested Nguni herd in particular, which consisted of 700-800 animals by 
1993, was regarded as ‘one of the three best Nguni stud herds in South Africa’ 
(interview with J. Hundleby, 19 July 2001). The third component of the Ranch was 
the holding ranch (one portion of which was on the outlying farm of Loverstwist), 
where, for a fee, cattle owned by local people were fattened for a period of 3 to 6 
months before (theoretically) being sold on to abattoirs or feedlots. To kickstart this 
third component, in what was regarded as a temporary measure, speculating in cattle
28 In 1991, it was admitted that the three pineapple farming settlement schemes comprising 10 families 
each on a total of 420 ha had proven to be unworkable and the project reverted to ‘estate farming’ 
managed by CAC.
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by the National Ranch itself was envisaged, i.e. no more and no less than ‘buying thin 
animals, fattening them and selling them’ (Loxton et al. 1980: 67). The idea was that 
some 20% of the cows purchased would prove to be suitable for retention as breeding 
stock and that orthodox breeding would ‘gradually displace’ speculating as the main 
production activity on the Ranch. The animals would be sold at the regular stock sales 
held in the area to auctioneers, butchers and the two large feedlots in the area.
In 1982 the projected costs of the National Ranch, excluding housing and the 
purchase of livestock, were estimated at R1 million. Loxton et al. (1982: 43-44) 
indicated optimistically that, with a herd of 3,850 animals and based on the sale of 
1,440 cattle every year, the operation would turn a modest net profit of R102,500 per 
annum. Given its grander designs, the promise of turning any profit was seen in a 
positive light by the Ciskeian authorities.
The Ciskei National Ranch got underway in 1984, a year which also marked the end 
of the devastating drought that had ravaged the Ciskei bantustan. The first task was to 
fence the consolidated farms, where infrastructure had deteriorated markedly in the 
preceding four years. The scheme started with 1,500 cattle. About 1,000 cattle per 
annum were supplied to the abattoir in Port Elizabeth. Their straightforward approach 
was to sell 500 head of cattle and then buy in another 500 from local black farmers 
(interview with C. Snyman, 15 March 2001).
When the breeding herds were established, the distribution of improved stock to the 
local cattle farmers began. The Department of Agriculture would buy about 40 heifers 
from the scheme and then resell them to individual farmers in the neighbouring 
villages at a 30-40% subsidy. The number of heifers supplied to farmers increased 
steadily. In the year to May 1989, 777 heifers were sold to 283 Ciskeian farmers for 
R470 each, which represented a 30% subsidy and was regarded as ‘very affordable 
for an adapted weaner heifer’ (CAC Annual Report 1988/89). Then things began to 
speed up. In October 1989, it was reported that 2,575 breeding heifers were supplied 
to Ciskeian farmers during the preceding 17-month period. In the five months up to 
end of October 1989, a monthly average of 317 heifers had been sold. The National 
Ranch, it was felt, was fulfilling its mandate. It was suggested that CAC’s breeding 
herd would ‘stabilise’ at 3,300 cows. This would allow 740 heifers to be sold to local
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farmers through the subsidy scheme, so that ‘thousands of heifers’ were sold into the 
villages of Peddie District, with local people ‘lining up’ to buy heifers (interview with 
C. Snyman, 15 March 2001). Christo Snyman, a manager at the National Ranch from 
1984, claimed that once the two stud herds were developed, for every 300 Nguni 
heifers produced per year, about 200 would end up in the neighbouring villages, such as 
Wesley, Benton and other villages adjacent to the Ranch. Such was the demand locally 
for animals that the beneficiaries of this scheme were virtually all Peddie people. Few 
of the ‘improved’ cattle from the National Ranch were distributed to farmers in other 
parts of the Ciskei, with the costs of transporting animals a disincentive in this regard.
However, the National Ranch (and CAC in general) ran foul of the Department of 
Agriculture and Forestry, ostensibly because of weak auditing controls and poor 
accounting. Snyman suggested that officials in DAF were jealous of the National 
Ranch’s success. But the financial problems ran deeper than jealousy. In 1987, 
concerns over financial controls saw the entire marketing function of CAC transferred 
to the newly established Ciskei Farmers Co-operative. The activities of the CAC 
Head Office were rationalised and further changes in 1988 resulted in a shake-up of 
the Board of Directors and the appointment of a new managing director for CAC. 
Satisfied with the tighter financial controls put into place, senior CAC management 
made the decision to increase the breeding herd on the National Ranch to 4,000 
animals. This would enable the supply of 900 quality weaner heifers and 120 
‘superior sires’ per annum to the farmers of the Ciskei.
With a policy shift towards privatisation in the late 1980s, some 4,275 ha of farmland, 
leased out to ‘underperforming’ 19 yeoman and commercial farmers in the ‘initial’ 
period, were re-appropriated and carved up into roughly 500 ha blocks. It was 
envisaged that these farms would be sold off to ten (later 18) ‘emerging’ black 
farmers by the end of 1991.29 Prior to this, the farmers displaced in the process would 
have to be provided with some of the land presently farmed by CAC.
29 These new farms were never registered with the Surveyor-General in Cape Town and do not appear 
on a cadastral map. In this sense they do not exist officially and, as of December 2001, despite the 
government’s land reform programme entering its seventh year, the ownership of this valuable land 
remains unresolved.
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With unions such as the Food and Allied Workers’ Union beginning to organise 
workers in the Ciskei in the early 1990s, CAC management decided to remove the last 
of the former caretakers, farm employees and other farm dwellers from the CAC 
pineapple and cattle farms. This would casualise their labour-force and minimise the 
threat of disruption through union-inspired industrial action and political ‘unrest’.
These people were either moved by the CAC to nearby villages or they simply invaded 
adjacent farms. The nearby settlements swelled, increasing competition for daily waged 
labour on the pineapple plantations and for the available grazing for their livestock.
Subsequent to the coup which toppled President-for-Life Lennox Sebe in 1989, 
violence escalated in the Ciskei. Considerable damage was done by local people who 
looted and vandalised the offices and equipment of the CAC in Peddie South, from 
which the project never recovered. The ensuing lawlessness saw cattle being stolen 
from the Ranch. In 1992, it was reported that CAC had suffered over R769,000 worth 
of damage in burnt cars, tractors, equipment and buildings. Later that year, the CAC 
was given a ‘firm directive’ by the Ciskei Government to move out of production and 
to transfer forthwith all land under its management to Ciskeian citizens. As a result, 
the Livestock Section at Peddie Coast (the National Ranch) sold the bulk of its herd, 
retrenched most of its workers and privatised its farms. By March 1993, 67 workers 
and 3 salaried staff had been retrenched. The Nguni Stud was reduced from 1,100 to 
500 and the remaining animals were moved to Woodlands farm in Peddie District, 
where seven workers and one manager were retained to safeguard this valuable herd 
as an interim measure.30
By 1994, the National Ranch had been ignominously closed down. The Bonsmara stud 
herd was sold to a retired senior Ciskei bureaucrat, S.N. Manjezi. He has since become 
a recognised breeder and respected commercial farmer. The Nguni stud was split and 
subsequently dispersed, amid great acrimony, to the University of Fort Hare, Fort Cox 
Agricultural College and Dohne Agricultural Research station (all in the Eastern Cape). 
More than 70 Nguni stud cattle died after they were allegedly poisoned by local people 
just prior to being removed. Accusations of theft were rife during the winding up of all 
the Peddie South projects -  a process that dragged on into 1996 -  especially since some
30 White buyers travelled considerable distances to avail themselves of this sale of quality Nguni cattle.
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of the best stud bulls were said to have simply ‘disappeared’. Several of the CAC 
employees were implicated in the controversially drawn-out official investigation that 
followed. This embittered many of the individuals involved and cast a shadow over 
what had been a significant commitment of public resources and a sustained effort on 
the part of those involved over a ten-year period.
The Ciskei National Ranch epitomised the supply-driven, state-led development of 
late modernism, apartheid-style. But in spite of its rational scientific, technicist and 
depoliticising approach to development, the National Ranch was an integral part of 
the political illegitimacy that enveloped the Ciskei (cf. Anonymous 1989; Dennie 
1992: 86). It could never shake off the fact that local cattle-owners regarded it with 
suspicion, even while they sought to purchase increasing numbers of cattle at 
subsidised prices from it. Its managers were white men who, despite controlling vast 
herds of cattle and swathes of prized grazing land, did not conform to the Xhosa 
cultural role of big men. The managers’ credibility vis-a-vis the local villagers was 
undermined by the fact that, while projecting a slavish respect for abstract budgets 
and ever-present financial constraints, several of them were part-time farmers or 
speculators who bought cattle from the Ranch from time to time, either for 
themselves or for white farmer friends outside the Ciskei.31 The key issue was that 
the Ranch monopolised valuable grazing land that local people had believed they 
would gain control over as one benefit of Ciskeian ‘independence’. An continuous 
battle to keep the cattle (and especially the ‘scrub’ and diseased bulls) of 
neighbouring communities out of the National Ranch poisoned the relationship. 
Lastly, local people were irked by the questionable bureaucratic process which 
apparently permitted only a few well-connected individuals to gain access to 
‘commercial’ farms on the Peddie South scheme.
The National Ranch struggled to establish the particular merits of its approach to 
state-led livestock development. Criticism came from influential local observers, like 
Dave Tapson, director of the Agriculture and Rural Development Research Institute 
(ARDRI) at the University of Fort Hare in the early 1980s, chairman of the Ciskei 
Agricultural Corporation between 1982 and February 1986, and later a senior policy
31 This dealing in cattle on the part of employees compelled the CAC to issue a directive about the 
conditions under which its own employees were allowed to buy cattle from the National Ranch.
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analyst at the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA). Tapson’s own research 
in the Transkei and KwaZulu bantustans led him to advocate a ‘leave well enough 
alone’ policy in respect of the production and marketing of cattle there. Much to the 
dismay of agricultural specialists in the various bantustan governments, he showed 
that functional marketing systems existed in the ‘complete absence of permits, 
slaughter control, price-setting, subsidy and bureaucracy’ (Tapson 1982: 20; cf. 
Tapson 1990).
Moreover, by the mid-1980s, the Development Bank of Southern Africa had 
established itself as the primary source of funding for agricultural development 
interventions in the bantustans, including the Ciskei.32 When approached by CAC in 
1985 for loan financing for its livestock projects, DBSA officials expressed 
reservations about the allegedly unclear objectives of the Ciskei livestock 
development initiatives, the high potential for duplication with other projects, and the 
fact that the projects represented interference with the free market. They required a 
more convincing motivation why CAC should conduct these projects rather than the 
private sector. DBSA officials were even unconvinced of the demand for improved 
sires in the Ciskei. Instead they argued that the market should be allowed to iron out 
anomalies like the provision of quality bulls in areas where they were needed. They 
argued that sufficient demand in the reserves would induce white farmers outside the 
Ciskei to bring their surplus bulls to the market for sale. In contrast to this 
‘enlightened’ perspective, CAC officials were motivated, certainly in the period 
1984-1990, by the pressing if deluded objective of developing a viable ‘national’ 
agricultural sector for the Ciskei. They viewed white ‘RSA’ farmers and consumers, 
not as functional partners in a common economy, but primarily as ‘export’ markets 
for the surplus output of the National Ranch.
32 The DBSA was established by the Nationalist government to, among other things, provide financing 
for capital projects in ‘self-governing’ and ‘independent’ states in Southern Africa (Tapscott 1992). 
This allowed bantustans to turn to the Bank rather than the apartheid state itself for financial assistance 
and technical expertise. This relieved the state of some of the pressure o f the enormous central 
planning juggernaut that it had created to manage the bantustans. It also assisted bantustan regimes to 
deflect the criticism that they were wholly in the pocket o f the Pretoria regime. In the process, 
however, the development sector became a partly-privatised industry in South Africa, underwriting a 
whole set of often dubious (white) ‘development experts’. From the mid-1980s, these ‘experts’ 
proceeded to gorge themselves on the carcass of apartheid, facilitated by the multitudinous ‘research’ 
and ‘development’ contracts issued by the DBSA as the latter oversaw, in rather bureaucratic and very 
costly fashion, the convoluted demise of the entire ‘independent’ bantustan project.
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It is likely that, for senior DBSA officials, the funding of livestock development 
projects was unattractive for their potential to raise the ire of entrenched Afrikaner 
political interests in the conservative South African meat industry. Whatever the case, 
their response to proposals of this nature was so obscure as to be labyrinthine 
(Tapscott 1992). One example of this politicking was the ‘negotiations’ around the 
proposal for a DBSA-funded abattoir to be built for the Ciskei at Zwelitsha, at which 
officials from the South African Meat Board (SAMB) insisted that, ‘because of the 
differences in [operating] standards and therefore overheads, it would be unfair to 
import meat, slaughtered at a C grade facility, into the RSA [sic] where an A grade 
abattoir operates [in East London]... As a result, the Abattoir Corporation 
(ABAKOR) would be likely to resist the importation of meat from the Ciskei.’
Despite the political machinations typical of the red-meat industry (see Karaan et al. 
1993), the local economy and cattle-owners in Peddie District certainly benefited 
from the activities of the National Ranch. It is widely recognised that the National 
Ranch had a positive impact on on the quality of cattle in the adjacent villages. Many 
local people readily attributed this improvement to the subsidised sale of breeding 
stock by the National Ranch and were keen to see a similar programme re-instituted. 
The superior quality of local cattle also sustained the interest of speculators who buy 
cattle in the area to the present day. The question of whether the methods adopted 
were necessarily the best or the most effective use of the funds expended is quite 
another matter.
Ultimately, the National Ranch and other CAC initiatives were ‘parachuted’ into 
these areas for political reasons and at significant cost to the South African tax-paying 
public. In the process, they disrupted the allegedly exploitative yet long-standing 
practices and relationships of exchange that had existed between white farmers and 
speculators and cattle farmers in the reserves. The most serious problem that CAC 
and its National Ranch never came close to addressing was the pressure on grazing 
resources in the communal villages of Peddie District. In fact, they added to this 
problem by occupying scarce grazing land and by subsidising the purchase of 
adapted, more fertile heifers by rural people. However, their efforts to increase the 
off-take of cattle from communal rangelands by offering a ‘floor price’ for cattle sold 
at stock sales were insufficient incentive to induce the majority of cattle-owners to
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abandon their extra-economic reasons for keeping cattle and to become market- 
oriented producers of beef.
By 1994, CAC itself was in serious trouble. Some staff had already opted to accept 
transfers to the Department of Agriculture and Forestry in the Ciskei. With the 
publicity surrounding the incoming ANC government’s Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP), parastatals like CAC were desperate to cast 
themselves in a positive light and quickly adopted ‘RDP-speak’. Thus the CAC began 
to tackle adult literacy, to facilitate the building of creches and primary schools and to 
promote brick-making, knitting and sewing projects in Peddie South. At the same 
time, increasingly fraught negotiations were being conducted with other bantustan 
parastatals and the new provincial government to determine the shape of a new 
provincial agricultural development entity.
In 1997, the CAC was officially consigned to the scrapheap of history and its staff 
either retired or resigned to become private consultants. Regrettably, the few valuable 
institutional lessons that might have been gleaned during the nearly 12 years of its 
existence, most relating to the intricacies of how illegitimate and/or weak 
governments should not centrally plan, undertake and manage agricultural 
development projects, were neither learned nor documented. Instead, the same ideas 
have resurfaced, remarkably unchanged, in the livestock development rhetoric and 
programmes of the post-1994 Eastern Cape provincial government.
Developments in the post-1994 Eastern Cape Province
The ANC-led government has consistently shown that it views agriculture as a 
conservative, technologically backward and marginal sector of the economy. This 
comes through most strongly in the miniscule budget allocated to land reform, 
arguably one of the most politically explosive issues in Southern Africa over the past 
decade. The government’s main response to serious underdevelopment and poverty in 
the former bantustans has been to radically expand the coverage of its social welfare 
programme (see below). The welfare economy is funded by national government but 
is administered by the nine provincial governments. By putting so much money into 
social welfare, government could be accused of undermining its own efforts and those
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of other organisations that are aimed at promoting local economic development and 
intensified agricultural production, especially directed towards achieving greater 
food-security at the household level.
In the struggle for resources in the ‘new’ South Africa, public agricultural services 
have fared poorly. Government has decided that the state had encroached into areas of 
agriculture that could be financed and facilitated by the private sector. As with most 
other provinces, the Eastern Cape provincial Department of Agriculture (ECDA) is 
severely cash-strapped. This is the way that the National Treasury would apparently 
prefer to keep it, given well-founded concerns about the capacity of provincial 
departments to manage and spend their budgets. Recurring expenditure on personnel 
costs consumes around 94% of the ECDA’s annual budget, even though the 
department has insufficient staff to perform its constitutionally derived mandates 
(ECDA Strategic Framework 2000/2001). Consequently, even if it had a workable 
plan to do so, the Department has very little in the way of real resources that it can 
use to develop agriculture in the former reserve areas (Nel & Davies 1999). As a 
result, the Department continues to rely somewhat begrudgingly on external 
consultants, many of them schooled in the bantustan institutions and the DBSA 
during the 1980s.
The collection of basic statistics on agricultural production (a minimum prerequisite 
for rigorous planning and administration in the agricultural sector) is still regarded as 
an unaffordable luxury. In respect specifically of agriculture in the former bantustans, 
government has taken up a cheerleading role, exhorting farmers to form ‘commodity 
associations’ that can promote the ‘commercialisation of agriculture’ and to which it 
can make development funding available. But government officials lack both the 
financial resources and the business acumen to facilitate any commercialisation of 
agriculture, except on the tiniest of scales.
In the period 1994-2001, the Eastern Cape provincial government failed to table a 
comprehensive livestock development plan. This is not surprising, though, because it 
has also failed to table an overall White Paper on Agriculture. In the absence of a 
White Paper, the Eastern Cape Department of Agriculture has developed into a knee- 
jerk 'ad hocracy ’, where every whim and fancy of the publicity-seeking Member of
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the Provincial Executive (MEC), the political head of the Department, is the latest 
‘project’ to be adopted.
In the absence of any substantially new articulation of development objectives by the 
provincial government, some old programmes have continued, at least on paper. The 
decades-old Bull and Ram Leasing Schemes continue under the banner of the 
‘Livestock Scheme’. The state-subsidised dipping programme and efforts to market 
cattle out of rural villages both continue, albeit haphazardly. Micro-development 
projects, supposedly aimed at establishing rural enterprises, especially ‘piggery and 
poultry’ projects, are unimaginatively sponsored on a one-off basis by several 
provincial government departments. The cash-strapped Eastern Cape Development 
Corporation, which emerged from the restructuring of the Transkei and Ciskei’s 
various development corporations, flies the neo-liberal flag and has busied itself 
writing ‘business plans’ for a wide range of enterprises, including one for the 
commercialisation of beef production in the former bantustans. Its initiatives in this 
regard have met with no notable successes to date.
A United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded programme 
that was launched in September 2000 involved stimulating rural markets across a 
range of agricultural commodities. The Agribusiness Linkage Programme (Agri- 
Link) set about organising stocksales in selected areas of the former bantustans in the 
Eastern Cape, in conjunction with a local livestock-marketing company. In the period 
October 2000 to September 2001, Agri-Link facilitated 109 rural stocksales that 
realised the sale of 6,300 cattle. Agri-Link also organised individual sales of cattle to 
reputable buyers, and in the first six months of operations facilitated the sale of a 
further 617 cattle (ARD 2001). Agri-Link was partnered by the Agricultural Research 
Council which, among other things, made 19 wholly subsidised Nguni bulls available 
for distribution to rural areas in the Eastern Cape, some of them sponsored to projects 
in the villages adjacent to my research sites.
By providing more resources and better on-the-ground organisational capacity, Agri- 
Link facilitated 25 stocksales in Peddie District during the calendar year of 2001.
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This was up from 12 sales that took place during 1999.33 The number of cattle sold 
during 2001 was more than double the number sold during 1999, at least at organised 
stocksales. News of the higher prices paid at these stocksales spread in the district and 
may well have encouraged people to sell some of their older, non-reproductive stock 
(a practice known as ‘target selling’). Buyers came from as far afield as the Free 
State and sales were competitive and brisk. It is probable, however, that the increased 
sales were ‘distress sales’ that related more to the deepening poverty which forced 
men to ‘turn to their kraals’ in order to feed their families. Sales, informants told me, 
was also linked to the higher stock numbers after six years of good rains. This 
allowed people to sell some cattle, for instance, old cows with tick-damaged udders, 
without compromising the growth potential of their herds. The higher prices offered 
and the approach taken by the Agri-Link facilitators were viewed in a positive light by 
cattle owners, who appreciated the persuasion used by these facilitators to push up the 
prices offered by buyers.
By 2002, however, villagers had apparently disposed of all the old and unproductive 
animals from their herds, and sought to retain their remaining breeding stock. As a 
result, the numbers of animals on offer at these Agri-Link-facilitated sales declined. 
Buyers’ interest declined correspondingly and, with fewer buyers, prices were less 
attractive to sellers, so fewer sales were concluded. At the same time, the established 
white speculators in Peddie District were unhappy about having their own buying 
disrupted by the Agri-Link stocksales or resented being chided by the (black) Agri- 
Link field staff into paying more than they would usually pay for local ‘trade’ cattle. 
By the end of 2002, however, the Agri-Link programme collapsed dramatically, 
allegedly because of the misappropriation of funds by individuals in the Pretoria head- 
office of the U.S. firm that was managing the programme on behalf of USAID.
In Peddie District, a solitary speculator, linked to a local feedlot situated near East 
London, moved in to fill the vacuum left by Agri-Link. Yet again, an initiative had 
been started and, although it appeared to be relatively successful in the short run, it 
was unable to sustain the momentum. Again, it seemed destined to fail because it 
operated without a full appreciation of rural people’s myriad uses of cattle and of the
33 A change in the marketing agents organising the stocksales in 2000 disrupted the sale of cattle 
during that year.
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intrinsically cyclical nature of cattle production and selling in the former bantustan 
rural areas.
Conclusions
The question I set out to explore in this dissertation is why cattle have remained 
attractive to rural people in areas like Peddie District. Here, I have provided some 
historical context of the past seven decades that begins to answer this question. The 
‘cattle economy’ iii particular offers a clear challenge to the ‘dual economy’ 
characterisation of the South African economic landscape. As part of this challenge, I 
provided examples to demonstrate how the long-term developments in the agrarian 
sector of the Ciskei reserves, and later the Ciskei bantustan, were intimately tied to 
wider changes in the South African political economy.
In the first place, I argued that it is significant in terms of cattle production by rural 
people that the former reserve areas of the Eastern Cape Province remain subject to 
modified forms of communal tenure. Following the opposition to Betterment 
Planning, the apartheid government in the 1960s shied away from effecting major 
changes to the way the communal tenure system worked in places like Peddie 
District. This belated ‘hands-off approach allowed rural people virtually unlimited, 
and increasingly unregulated, access to communal grazing resources, albeit under 
conditions of rapid human population growth and thus congestion in the reserves. 
Critical in this regard was the illegal and highly contested use cattle-owners made of 
‘released’ land, i.e. formerly white-owned farms, often adjacent to their villages (see 
Ainslie 1998). This took pressure off the more heavily grazed rangeland resources in 
the reserve villages. Access to these grazing resources on freehold land was 
particularly important during the protracted drought of 1982-84.34
Secondly, although agricultural support under the Ciskei was sub-standard and 
inconsistent, the free dipping programme was sustained as part of a state-provided 
animal health regime, as were vaccinations and inoculations against local bovine 
diseases, quite probably at the instruction of the apartheid authorities. These
34 To some extent, as arable production declined the local area available for grazing increased, but the 
absence of crop stover for the winter season had a negative effect on livestock condition.
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interventions subsidised the costs of owning cattle, which was particularly important 
during the economically tough 1970s and 1980s.
Thirdly, in Peddie District at least, the Ciskei National Ranch and the related CAC 
activities of subsidising the provision of adapted breeding stock to rural people and of 
maintaining a floor price for cattle offered at stock sales ensured that cattle remained 
readily convertible to cash, and thus a useful component of the livelihood portfolios 
of many households.
Lastly, although the Ciskei bantustan offered greater opportunities for unskilled 
people to find temporary work, the chronic lack of alternative investment 
opportunities for rurally-based people inclined them to continue to look to cattle as a 
viable store of wealth, notwithstanding the risks involved.
So, while the mantra of the state has consistently been that cattle production in 
the reserves should become more efficient to relieve pressure on the 
overstocked communal rangelands, contradictory policy and programme 
interventions undermined this. Moreover, rural people have consistently 
sought to engage with both the state and the market on their own terms and in 
ways that enhanced their local accumulation strategies. In the next chapter, I 
consider how households in Peddie District have struggled to secure their 
livelihoods in the changing regional economy.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Constructing ‘Rural’ Livelihoods in Peddie District
Livelihood is never just a matter of finding or making shelter, transacting 
money, and preparing food to put on the table or exchange in the market 
place. It is equally a matter of the ownership and circulation of information, the 
management of relationships, the affirmation of personal significance and group 
identity, and the interrelation of each of those tasks to the other. All these 
productive tasks together constitute the work of livelihood (Wallman 1984: 22-3).
Introduction
By livelihoods, I mean livelihood strategies and activities that taken together keep 
households above a notional ‘household subsistence level’ (however problematic this 
concept is), i.e. able to feed, clothe, shelter and educate their members, and to enjoy a 
minimum level of social interaction with their fellow villagers (see Monde [2003] and 
Ellis’ definition quoted in Chapter Two of this dissertation). Moreover, I define ‘rural 
livelihoods’ as any livelihoods that contribute to the well-being of rurally-based 
homesteads and their members (see Ardington & Lund 1996: 35). Since many 
livelihood strategies in Peddie District were essentially urban-derived, I place the 
‘rural’ in rural livelihoods in inverted commas.
Constructing livelihoods, in the sense that these activities require people to make 
choices between alternatives, encompasses negotiation over the nature of people’s 
consumption patterns, and is informed by their social resources and their cultural and 
material preferences.1 These negotiations took place on a daily basis both within the 
households of Peddie District and between each household and its wider social 
networks of kin, neighbours, friends, as well as the various institutions of the state 
and the market. Gudeman (2001: 22) characterises this as rural people’s having to 
manage the complex ‘dialectics of community and market... [or].. .the tension 
between keeping identity and the base [on the one hand], and spreading ties to others 
[through exchange] and accumulating capital [on the other].’
1 Labour availability, a crucial element of people’s decision-making between livelihood options, hinges 
on a range of factors including household structure and the health status of household members (see 
Kepe 2002a: 94).
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While the residents of rural Peddie District had long been accustomed to continually 
adapting their livelihood strategies to changing circumstances in their local 
environments (for example, in response to drought), they also had to adapt these 
livelihoods to significant changes in the wider political economy. In trying, 
ultimately, to account for why cattle ownership continued to be attractive to rural 
people, it was significant (although not surprising) that their overall repertoire of 
livelihood strategies was mediated locally by cultural norms, expectations and 
practices, including the division of labour along the lines of gender and generation. In 
addition, growing structural unemployment placed new demands on rural households, 
for instance, in making the issue of each individual’s educational achievement, and 
the overall educational profile of the household, more important than before.
I analyse some of the workings of the ‘rural’ household economy in Peddie District. In 
particular, I provide an analysis of the ways in which and the extent to which cash and 
material resources that derived from elsewhere, such as from extra-village sources, 
were incorporated into and diffused through the rural sector, in the context of people’s 
everyday consumption, accumulation and investment activities. In essence, I argue that 
in the context of dire poverty there continued to be rather limited scope for investment 
in assets that were both easily convertible and reliable over the longer term in either 
rural or urban areas (see Monde 2003). This singular fact underpinned the surprisingly 
high levels of population mobility of people and goods between town and country, even 
though it was nearly twenty years since the repeal of apartheid-era legislation that 
restricted the free movements of African people between town and countryside. The 
lack of a range of convertible reliable assets also helps to explain why people chose to 
maintain and even increase their investments in particular types of trusted and social 
assets, notably livestock, in rural areas like Peddie District, as opposed to investing in 
other, perhaps town-based, assets (cf. Schmidt 1992; Ngwane 2003).
In the interests of brevity, my review of some of the methodological challenges in 
studying ‘rural’ livelihoods appears as Appendix One of this dissertation. Therein I 
review the much-criticised concept of the ‘household’, and discuss the character of 
the Peddie District version of the typical Xhosa ‘umzV [homestead], and some of the 
implications of the ways it was culturally constructed. I also examine some of the 
difficulties of conducting research into livelihoods. To situate my ethnographic
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material in the Eastern Cape’s former bantustans as a whole, I review the relevant 
literature on ‘rural’ livelihoods. I explore whether rural households actually were 
reliant on a diverse range of livelihoods and I argue that the ‘groundswell of 
livelihood diversification’ (Bryceson 2002: 726) should not be assumed to hold 
universally in rural Africa, but must be empirically demonstrated at the household 
level, ideally -  as Bryceson notes -  on the basis of longitudinal data (Bryceson 2002: 
730).2 Part of the confusion arises, I suggest, because of a lack of precision in the 
livelihoods terminology currently in use, and I review some key definitions used in 
the literature (see Ellis 2000). Again, in an effort to be as succint as possible in this 
chapter, I have placed this discussion, which relates to the content of this chapter, in 
Appendix One.
It is self-evident that rural households in Peddie District sought constantly to ‘match 
their uneven and unstable incomes to [their] continuous household consumption 
needs’ to buffer themselves against livelihood vulnerability (Ellis 2000: 58,62). Ellis 
argues that a key means of achieving this buffer is through a ‘substitution between 
assets and between activities’, i.e. by exchanging one type of asset for another type, 
in the hope that the asset type secured will be more profitable (either in terms of 
reliability or the extent of the returns derived or both) over the long-term (Ellis 2000: 
238). In rural Peddie District, this substitution happened all the time and took the 
form of, for instance, exchanging labour for wages, wages for cattle, or substituting 
cattle for money to pay for the costs of a child’s education, or by the making of cash, 
in-kind or labour contributions towards the hosting of a ritual event. Substitutions of 
this nature converted these resources into social networks of support and reciprocity 
that were aimed at buffering livelihood vulnerability in future. Cash was, as virtually 
everywhere, the most readily convertible of all assets, but this property could be 
either beneficial or problematic, depending on the context (Fraser et al. 2003: 173; 
Shipton 1989).
2 Of the three Eastern Cape case-studies in the influential DARE programme (see Chapter Two) only 
McAllister’s (1999, 2001) case-study had access to longitudinal data and arguably throws up more 
anomalies because of it (see Bryceson 2002: 728-733). This should serve as a caution about the extent 
to which generalisations about social change in the Eastern Cape countryside, such as the rise of 
women as the 'new custodians of isiXhosa tradition' (Bank & Qambata 1999: 119,126), can be made.
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In the first section below, I explore the impact of two bundles of livelihoods, i.e. the 
social welfare economy and the ‘jobbing’ economy in rural Peddie District. I suggest 
that by the late 1990s, the social welfare (grant) economy had matured to the extent 
that old-age pensions and disability grants had become the acknowledged livelihood 
mainstay of a large proportion of rural households. Simultaneously, macro-economic 
policies put in place by the post-apartheid government have seen real prospects for 
long-term regular employment decline across the board, and become especially bleak 
for poorly educated rural people. This brought the practice of ‘jobbing’ to the fore. 
‘Jobbing’ was a local term that describes the short-term piece-work employment that 
was increasingly the only work available to many rural people. With wage work 
scarce, opportunities for ‘jobbing’ on community projects were hotly contested in 
rural villages. I argue that social welfare disbursements that did not keep pace with 
inflation and intermittent ‘jobbing’ opportunities as dominant livelihood sources have 
both had a deleterious effect on the longer-term livelihood security of many 
households in Peddie District. For one thing, the increased contribution of the 
welfare economy to ‘rural’ livelihoods has resulted in a contraction in remittances 
and an increase in household dependency ratios. Moreover, irregular income for rural 
households, through ‘jobbing’ rather than remittances or local regular wage work, 
will seriously undermine longer-term household projects of accumulation.
In the second section of this chapter, I account for the different livelihood strategies 
adopted by individual households in Hamburg and Loverstwist as people attempted to 
secure more resilient livelihoods. I show how the educational levels of their constituent 
members worked to narrow their options in this regard. Notwithstanding some notable 
variation, the overall pattern was that most of these households had a rather limited 
range of livelihood options -  given their limited overall command of assets and the 
poor convertibility of their available assets, such as unskilled labour -  with which to 
realise the conversion between assets and between activities that was key to 
establishing and maintaining resilient livelihoods. This is similar to the extremely 
marginal livelihoods that Monde (2003) found in neighbouring Alice District.
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Changes in ‘ rural’ livelihoods in Peddie District
Livelihoods in rural Peddie District exhibited a limited range of dominant livelihood 
strategies at household and village level (Ainslie et al. 1997).3 These dominant 
livelihood strategies were: (i) entitlements to social welfare pensions4 and grants; (ii) 
remittances; (iii) local and commuter formal employment, such as that of teachers, 
policemen, nurses, municipal workers; and (iv) local informal ‘jobbing’ (Ainslie 
1999; cf. Kepe 2002a: 88ff).
As documented elsewhere in rural South Africa, these four dominant livelihood 
strategies were commonly supplemented by the widespread use of natural resources, 
both productive use, i.e. agricultural production (particularly livestock production) 
and extractive use, such as natural resource harvesting and self-provisioning and for 
sale (see Cross et al 1996b: 188; Cocks & Wiersum 2003). I found that in general the 
livelihood strategies linked to natural resource use were, in themselves, rather 
marginal and at best supplementary livelihood strategies, albeit ones that served as a 
very valuable ‘fall-back’ position for the most vulnerable. The exception here was the 
use of grazing resources by the livestock that were owned by a range of households. 
As a natural resource-based livelihood strategy, livestock-keeping played a key part 
in the survivalist and accumulation strategies of a significant proportion of rural 
households, even for those households that did not actually own livestock 
(Shackleton et al. 2001).
Of course, the role of both agricultural production and opportunistic natural resource 
harvesting in allowing people to diversify their livelihoods differed from place to 
place and from household to household. In Peddie District, the natural resource 
endowment, for instance, was circumscribed by agro-ecological characteristics, such 
as soil quality, topography and rainfall, that increase the risk of failure in dryland
3 By dominant I mean a livelihood source that constituted more than 50% of a household’s cash 
income. Conversely, I define as significant diversification a situation where the single biggest 
household income source contributed no more than one-third of overall household income, in cash 
terms (May 1996: 21-23). Although identifying dominant sources of livelihood, as measured in cash 
income, in this way can mask the extent and relative importance o f non-monetary contributions to 
livelihoods within each household (a valid criticism of this approach to understanding livelihoods [see 
Shackleton et al. 2000, Cousins 1999]), it is nevertheless indicative of the ways in which people in 
rural Peddie District constructed their livelihoods (see Ellis 2000: 227).
4 In 2001, an old age pension was worth R540.00 per month. It increased to R570.00 per month 
towards the end of 2001.
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fanning (Steyn 1988). In only a few cases did these natural resource-based 
livelihoods constitute the mainstay of any particular household’s livelihoods, and 
these strategies could not actually sustain more than a tiny number of households in 
rural Peddie District for any length of time. This is not to suggest, however, that the 
supplementary contribution of natural resource harvesting to livelihoods at the 
aggregate level was negligible, merely that it was highly variable (cf. Cocks & 
Wiersum 2003).
Importantly, livelihood diversification and overall resilience was also an artefact of 
past household investments or disinvestments, as evidenced by the widespread 
abandonment of field-level cultivation in the drier western and central areas of Peddie 
District. Furthermore, the possibility of diversification into the so-called ‘formal 
economy’ was severely limited for people who were unemployed and languished in 
Peddie District with poor education and skills levels, i.e. because of a lack of prior 
investment in education.
‘Straddling9 town and countryside
In the period prior to 1994, the fact that rural Peddie District had a poorly developed 
economy meant that much of the work of livelihoods took place outside the rural 
sector, with rural people overwhelmingly dependent on the jobs, resources, people 
(both kin and other social networks) and information to be found in urban centres (see 
Chapter One). These are the rural-urban linkages that were key to people’s 
livelihoods in Peddie District. As I have indicated, these linkages have long been 
underpinned more by circular migration and commuter migration than by the classic 
pattern of long-term labour migration to distant centres of employment.
With few exceptions -  cattle production being the most obvious one -  the village 
economy in Peddie District was characterised more by consumption and social 
reproduction than agricultural production for the market, and this had been 
increasingly the case since at least the 1950s (cf. Maree & De Vos 1975; De Wet 
1997: 7-8). Over time, many families responded to this dire economic situation by 
abandoning their rural homesteads and leaving the area permanently for cities and
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towns, albeit against the tide of apartheid-era proscriptions which sought to confine 
black people to the overcrowded reserves.
The people who remained in the village came under pressure to seek out new 
opportunities, or to reinvigorate old ones, to make rural life more economically 
attractive, as well as socially appealing and culturally meaningful, both for 
themselves as village communities of residents and for those umzi members 
employed in town (see McAllister 1981,1985; Ngwane 2003).5 In short, I argue that, 
in the face of a weakening rural economy, maintaining and even increasing their 
‘entitlements’ to resources generated through the livelihoods of town-based umzi 
members and to the resources made available by urban-based state institutions 
became the real and very necessary work of the people in rural imizi.6
However, in their endeavours to encourage investments in their rural imizi by their 
urban-based employed kin, the people who were committed to a rural existence had a 
limited repertoire of real economic investment options (as opposed to more obviously 
social, ritual, cultural or moral ones). This was partly because people in the reserves 
did not have title to their residential and arable land. I argue that, given the present 
configuration of modified ‘communal’ rangeland management regimes and far more 
laissez faire (some would say ineffectual) post-apartheid state intervention in 
agriculture, cattle-ownership (and to a lesser extent, goat-ownership) was one 
attractive investment option that was accessible to most imizi in rural Peddie District 
(see Cross et al. 1996a: 139; Scoones & Wolmer 2003: 2).
The repeal of ‘influx control’ legislation in 1986 meant that black South Africans 
were no longer prevented from settling in (racially segregated) urban areas.7 Bank
51 do not wish to suggest here that rural people connived to deliberately plot out a ‘marketing strategy4 
for their village, but my observation was that at the umzi level and radiating outwards into the village, 
rural people were consistently and collectively mindful of keeping their kin, who were away in towns, 
materially and socially involved in their rural homes (see Crain [1998] and Bank [2002a] for similar 
arguments).
6 In the past, a significant way of securing urban-to-rural transfers o f resources was through demanding 
bridewealth from male migrants or urban-based men. I argue that rituals had largely taken on this role 
(see Chapter Eight).
7 Note, however, that the huge ‘satellite’ settlement of Mdantsane, as well as places of employment 
such as Zwelitsha and Dimbaza, were situated within the Ciskei and thus their residents were not 
subject to 'influx control' regulations, but did experience other restrictions on their mobility beyond the 
borders of the Ciskei (De Wet & Holbrook 1997).
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(1997b: 20) suggests that most of the rapid expansion of informal settlements around 
every town and city in the Eastern Cape consisted of people moving in directly from 
the villages of the then bantustans (see also De Wet & Holbrook 1997). Most of this 
influx of people took place from the late 1980s through to 1995. The movement of 
especially young people out of rural villages had an equivocal effect on rural 
homesteads.8 On the one hand, it went some way to relieving the pressure of having to 
provide for these younger, often more demanding umzi members. On the other hand, 
securing both regular remittances and future investments in the rural umzi by those 
employed in regional towns proved more difficult (Moodie 1994; Manona et al. 1996).
Given that the urban job market continued to shrink through the 1990s, relatively few 
of these young people, who virtually all lacked a network of contacts and the 
‘experience of urban job searches’, were successful in setting themselves up on the 
urban periphery (Cross 2001). As a result, they somewhat reluctantly began to 
straddle the town and the rural village to survive. Indeed, there is considerable 
evidence that urban-based employed people were all too aware, even in the post-1994 
period, that an urban-centred lifestyle involved increased exposure to economic, 
social, ritual and even physical risks. To offset the risks of urban life, many town- 
based people chose to actively maintain ties with their rural homes (Ainslie 1998: 
185-6). The perception of greater rural social stability and a wider social support 
network in rural villages has long been important for the category of single mothers 
working in towns or cities who relied on their parents back in the village to care for 
their school-going children. Moreover, certain socio-economic categories of urban- 
based workers, especially those in unskilled jobs, were particularly vulnerable to 
retrenchments, evictions and other negative aspects of urban life, such as the 
relatively higher cost of living and higher incidence of crime and violence. These 
factors contributed towards making ‘straddling’ an attractive option for many of the 
people employed or simply resident in town.
The conspicuous investment in housing by town-based people in their rural ‘home’ 
villages must be taken as evidence of their maintenance of the option of rural
8 Any man under the age of 34-35 years was regarded as a youth who, even though he has been 
initiated into manhood, cannot ‘stand for himself [hold his own] in the company of senior men.
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residence as a risk-spreading strategy, including the possibility of rural retirement 
after a career spent living in the city (Manona 1999: 33). Where villages boasted 
basic services, including good vehicular access roads, electricity and water, and 
educational facilities, they enjoyed renewed regard among some town-based people 
as attractive, long-term prospects for material investment and eventual residence, 
especially where they were within easy reach of the city (Ainslie 1998: 197ff; Beinart 
1998; James 2000: 153-4).
The rise of the social welfare economy
For many households, much (but not all -  see below) of the work of securing their 
dominant livelihoods more than ever took place in spaces other than in the rural 
village itself (Fraser et al. 2003).9 For instance, securing an old-age pension made 
people beholden to the government officials in Peddie town and in the provincial 
capital of Bisho, and not to anyone in the village. During the period 1994-1997, for 
instance, the chronic unreliability of the disbursement system of social welfare grants 
kept rural people’s attention firmly focussed on the local media for assurances that 
they would indeed receive their bi-monthly (later monthly) grants. Not only pensions 
and grants but also the salaries of those fortunate enough to be employed in the 
district in the government service came from Pretoria or Bisho. Where remittances 
were still important to the rural umzi, the work of ensuring that remittances were sent 
regularly to the rural home from a town-based husband or wife, son or daughter kept 
many rural people focused squarely on political and economic events in the cities and 
on the specific circumstances experienced by their town-based kin.10
SAIRR (1999: 461) indicates that provincial expenditure on social welfare 
disbursement in the Eastern Cape jumped by 25,5% in 1996/97, as large areas of the 
former bantustans, and the qualifying recipients of welfare grants, were rapidly 
brought under the state’s social welfare umbrella. However, in the period 1996-1998,
9 Twenty years ago, De Wet and McAllister (1983: 70), noted for the neighbouring Keiskammahoek 
district that '...[a]t present agriculture is at best a secondary source o f subsistence to families whose 
major sources of income come from outside the local community, either in the form of remittances or 
of pensions... [a]nd much of their lives within it are geared to time-consuming activities such as 
domestic chores .. .or to education as a means of getting out of the community.'
10 Manona et al. (1996: 74), in their 1993 sample of 50 households in Peddie Extension, found that 
84% of the household members who resided outside Peddie District, were in various urban centres in 
the Eastern Cape and the remaining 16% were in Johannesburg and Cape Town.
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several reviews of the social welfare system, which were initiated by the provincial 
government to rid the system of ‘ghost’ recipients, also withdrew pension and 
disability grant benefits from several thousand legitimate claimants across the Eastern 
Cape Province. Some of these desperately needed grants were suspended for up to 
two years, causing people to rue their increasing dependence on pensions.
By early 1999, though, monthly disbursements had become more reliable and less a 
cause for distress than they were in the fairly chaotic initial post-1994 period. As a 
result, pensions and disability grants (as well as child support grants and HIV/Aids 
sufferers’ support grants, which were more recent innovations) became central to 
rural people’s livelihoods, to the extent that by 2001 they were regarded as entitlements 
that qualifying rural people command in the rural sector (Sagner 2000; Van der Berg 
1997; Aliber 2003).
Although far more could be done, the economies of rural villages across the district 
have benefited from pension and disability grant disbursements, with many small 
businesses specifically geared to capturing as much as possible of the social welfare 
cash that was disbursed regularly into the local economy. At times these attempts 
took place with government assistance, as in community projects aimed at 
commercial pig or poultry production that tried to synchronise their produce sales 
with social welfare pay-outs. Of course, a high percentage of this regular supply of 
cash into rural villages leaked out, back into the towns and cities, as most people 
preferred to buy food and other necessities more cheaply in bulk from town-based 
wholesalers.
What were the key impacts of the post-1994 roll-out of social welfare disbursements 
on household livelihoods? Firstly, the roll-out had the effect of further concentrating 
(and thus politicising) the dominant livelihood sources of the greater majority of 
households in rural Peddie District. Secondly, it entrenched the fact that the bulk of 
household livelihoods were derived from sources other than the productive use of 
natural resources, specifically field agriculture. Thirdly, the rise of social welfare 
disbursements also contributed to more people returning to the village where they 
were only partially supported by pensions and grants, while many of them contributed 
to increased levels of extractive harvesting of certain natural resources, such as
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firewood and wild foods (see Kepe 2002a: 98; Shackleton et al 1999). Fourthly and 
rather critically, social welfare grants placed a significant new emphasis on the social 
and economic role of the elderly and especially of elderly women. As many as 70% 
of the old-age pensioners in rural South Africa were women (SAIRR 1999: 240). This 
was partly because women qualify for pensions at the age of 60 years, five years 
earlier than men, and because women lived longer than men on average (Moller & 
Ferreira 2003).
The new significance of the welfare economy as a proportion of the livelihoods of 
most rural households proved to be both a blessing and a curse. In many of the 
households that benefited from social welfare disbursements, a realignment of the 
politics of household consumption took place at the same time as a redistribution of 
umzi members in space, often in favour of (cheaper) rural residence. Increasingly, in 
those cases where town-based employed adults had left their school-going children in 
the care of their elderly village-based parents, the parents complained that there was a 
drop in the regularity and amounts transferred as remittances from town. The reason 
was that those in town took the new-found pensions-derived spending power of their 
elderly parents to be sufficient to maintain the rural homestead (cf. Breslin et al.
1997; Hajdu 2003: 25). Also, unemployed town-based umzi members took to 
returning to the village more readily and, once there, to making demands on the 
pensions and grants of their parents and kin, in ways that exacerbated existing gender 
and generational tensions.
With the unemployment rate in the Eastern Cape estimated to be 48,5% in 1996, the 
livelihoods of the majority of rural households were under considerable strain.11 In 
effect, the households that came to rely on state transfers to elderly or disabled 
members as their dominant (sometimes only) source of livelihood also saw their 
livelihood vulnerability increase (Van der Berg 1997: 499). From a development 
perspective, it thus became clear that pensions and grants were insufficient to lift 
most of the households that were rurally based out of what was in effect chronic 
structural poverty. In the absence of other employment opportunities, one unfortunate
11 This is using the so-called 'expanded' official definition of the unemployed as those who have not 
worked during the seven days prior to the interview, and were available to start work within a week of 
the interview (SAIRR 1999: 299-300).
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effect of an increased reliance on pensions was an exacerbation of rural poverty, i.e. the 
relegation of many unemployed, impoverished, disabled and sickly people to the rural 
periphery, where the opportunities for upward mobility remained severely constrained.
‘ Jobbing’ as a component of ‘rural’ livelihoods
‘Jobbing’ was important for all rurally resident men and women in the economically 
active category. ‘Jobbing’ was a widely used local term which encompasses any work 
of a temporary, usually poorly paid, nature. When asked whether an absent household 
member was employed in town, people often responded, ‘Hayi, akaphangeli, 
uyajobba nje ’ [No, s/he is not employed, s/he is just ‘jobbing’]. For most people, 
‘jobbing’ was distinct from what they would regard as real work, i.e. waged or 
salaried employment of longer and preferably permanent duration, in any sector of 
the ‘formal’ economy, whether in town or in the village. The main difference between 
‘jobbing’ and working was the level of job insecurity, but the level of remuneration 
was also a consideration.
It is worth noting that the widespread casualisation of work in the rural former Ciskei 
reserves was not a recent phenomenon, but in fact had a long history. In Peddie 
District, public works programmes and poverty relief projects that casually employed 
people were instituted virtually from the establishment of the first Mfengu settlement 
in 1835, and have continued right through to the present time. By the end of the 
1970s, as the decline in job opportunities in the formal economy began to take its toll 
on people’s livelihoods, casual work surfaced as an especially important survivalist 
livelihood strategy (Switzer 1993: 329).12 In the period 1980-1994, ‘jobbing’ in 
Peddie District included short-term contracts and piece-work on a wide range of 
projects initiated by government departments of the Ciskeian bantustan (Ainslie 
1998: 118). Some of these projects fell under the Ciskei Employment Action 
Programme (CEAP), a ‘poverty relief intervention, with party political strings 
attached. De Wet and McAllister (1983: 19) reported on the politicised nature of 
these jobs in Chatha, Keiskammahoek District, where each sub-headman would
12 SAIRR (1999: 405) notes an increase in annual real personal disposable income per capita in South 
Africa (for all ‘races’) in the period 1961 to 1980, except for decreases in the years 1973,1976 and 
1978. This index of personal income (the proportion of total personal income per capita minus direct 
taxes) peaked in 1980 at R9,690. Subsequently, in the years 1980-1998, it showed a decrease in ten of 
the 18 years, including during the five-year period, 1990-1994.
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identify the neediest people in his village-section and then forward this list to the 
location headman, who would decide on the final list of successful applicants. 
Residents who were openly opposed to the Ciskei bantustan were least likely to 
secure employment on these poverty relief schemes (Manona 1980a). The CEAP 
employed people on a casual basis to bring about often-superficial improvements in 
their local environment. Several people I interviewed in Hamburg recalled that during 
the early-to-mid 1980s, the only employment that they could secure was undignified 
work as litter-collecters around the village for a paltry daily wage, amounting to 
between R60.00 and R66.00 per month at the time.
In 1985, there were more than 4,000 people in 90 administrative areas around the 
Ciskei who were employed on projects to combat soil erosion (De Beer 1986: 193). 
When I started my first fieldwork research in Peddie District in 1994,1 encountered 
numerous adult men and women, ranging in age from 30 to the late 40s, who had 
never been formally employed. Instead, they had ‘jobbed’ intermittently on short­
term projects and, for the rest, relied on their parents’ pensions and wider social 
networks.
Various post-1994 government departments and parastatal organisations continued 
with the ‘jobbing’ approach in the villages of Peddie District. During my fieldwork 
and shortly before, Telkom, the telecommunications parastatal, employed mostly 
young men from Hamburg village on short-term contracts to repair the telephone 
lines along the main coastal road. A few men from Hamburg also benefited through 
contract employment from Eskom, the electricity supply and management parastatal, 
when vast areas of the former banstustans were electrified, with a few men fortunate 
to have their contracts extended for up to two years. At Loverstwist, jobs were made 
available, again mostly to men, during the reconstruction and upgrading of the R72 
coastal road. Although ten young men were intermittently employed as road 
construction workers, four other local men were taken on as security guards at the 
construction compound. Other projects involved the construction of infrastructure, 
including bulk water schemes, dip tanks and the perennial favourite, fencing.
In Hamburg in 2001,1 witnessed a fairly typical example of a supposedly labour- 
intensive project, this time an intra-village road maintenance initiative. This project
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was awarded on public tender to a private contractor who was required to negotiate 
the precise terms of the labour-intensive component with local community 
representatives. These negotiations resulted in the job creation component of the 
project that set out to provide employment for 121 men and women over a four- 
month period. The 121 people were divided into four groups of 29 workers, with five 
other people forming a core ‘supervisory’ team.
The members of the four groups of men and women working together were each 
supposed to work for a total period of 20 days, and to get paid a daily wage of 
R43.00. Had this programme been followed, each person would have made R860.00. 
As it happened, however, several people decided to share their allotted work days 
with kin or friends, for a variety of reasons. These reasons included recognition of the 
serious need of other people, which was in line with the masincedisane [let us help 
each other] norm of good neighbourliness (see McAllister 1992: 204; Hammond- 
Tooke 1974c: 361-2).13 In other instances, it occurred simply because the appointed 
worker was unable to work on a particular day or period and ‘gave’ the day to another 
person, sometimes another member of their household. Some senior men could not 
contemplate working in a group with younger men and women and instructed a 
younger member of their household to do the work instead.
In the end, wages paid to the people employed on the project amounted to a mere 
R220,000, while the entire project had a budget of over R4 million. For a supposedly 
labour-intensive initiative to rehabilitate about eight kilometres of gravel roads, the 
project appeared to rely to an inordinate extent on hired mechanical plant to effect 
what appeared to be a relatively simple road-maintenance exercise. A few months 
later, heavy rains had rendered the ‘upgraded’ roads more impassable than before the 
project had commenced. Moreover, virtually everyone in the village was disgruntled 
about the project. Local people were convinced that they had been robbed by the 
contractor. People felt that he, aided by the venal officials in the municipality who 
had awarded the contract, had pocketed the bulk of the project funds.
13 This is the ‘economy of obligation’ to which Sansom (1981: 104) refers, (see Moodie with Ndatshe 
[1994: 38] for parallels with their explanation of ubudoda among Mpondo migrants). Masincedisane 
was not necessarily linked to the dominant patriarchal value-system. It also served as the idiom for a 
range of social practices that involved women who were apparently increasingly operating outside the 
patriarchal model.
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A more recent government innovation was to insist that explicit quotas of women, the 
disabled and the youth were employed on projects funded by the state. This created 
new tensions at village level, particularly around what constitutes men’s work and 
women’s work. In late November 2001, for instance, three women and one man in 
Loverstwist were employed for eight weeks to do the physically demanding labour of 
digging perhaps 1,5 kilometres of shallow trenches. They were to be followed later by 
a mechanical shovel, which would deepen the trench to accommodate the piping that 
would finally deliver water to the village. Several men and women took exception to 
the fact that women rather than men should get this work. They were also upset that 
the three women were members of the village Water Committee, raising questions 
about the procedures involved in allocating these jobs.
For Hamburg and adjacent coastal villages, the year 2000 ushered in a highly 
lucrative innovation in the local ‘jobbing’ repertoire. This was controlled harvesting 
of abalone from the sea. Abalone is a sought-after shellfish that commands a high 
price in the export market. Some forty people, mostly women in this instance, were 
each granted a seasonal license to wade into the sea and, with the assistance of a 
contracted diver, to extract a daily quota of abalone. This licensed harvesting was 
soon dwarfed, however, by the extent of the parallel illegal extraction (by other men 
and women) of this high-value resource. Although lucrative, this activity was still 
considered by local people as ‘jobbing’, because it did not guarantee a monthly 
income (legal diving only took place in fair weather) and because people knew that it 
would only be of short duration.14
On the face of it, the challenge of stimulating local economic development was neatly 
addressed by offering work to underemployed rural people on much-needed local 
infrastructural delivery projects. However, there were a number of problems with the 
‘jobbing’ approach, specifically in relation to people’s longer-term livelihoods. Firstly, 
these projects did little to enhance rural people’s skills, with participants generally only 
providing unskilled manual labour. Also, the short project cycle of the ‘culture of 
jobbing’ had a pervasive negative impact on the rural economy of the district. This was 
because sporadically provided casual or contract work seriously limited the longer-term
14 At the height of the abalone harvesting, some young men were claiming to earn Rl,500 a week from 
this activity, a considerable sum of money that was equivalent to the price of one heifer.
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accumulation strategies of rural households, simply because the people so employed 
were not able to plan further than a few months ahead. This was demon-strated in the 
case of 31 -year old Themba Natazo, even though he was fortunate to be employed by 
Telkom on an unusually long two-year ‘jobbing’ contract in June 1997.
The case of Themba Natazo, contractor worker
Themba completed his schooling in 1993 in Hamburg. He went to East 
London to seek employment, but could only find jobs with building 
contractors, as a ‘casual’, i.e. day-labourer. Unsuccessful in securing 
longer-term work, he returned to Hamburg by 1996. In June 1997, he 
secured a two-year long contract with Telkom. This was fortuitous because 
his widowed mother had not yet reached the pensionable age of 60 years 
and no-one else in the Natazo household was employed at the time. Instead, 
they were making ends meet by rearing pigs, which they slaughtered and 
sold in the village. His mother also sold vegetables from her garden.
With his wages from Telkom, Themba bought three piglets for his mother.
Then he wanted to have the umgidi [feast] that the family had been unable 
to afford when he had been initiated into manhood. After three months of 
work he paid Khayalethu Mapayi, the owner of the biggest herd in the 
village, Rl,200 for an ox. He also bought imithombo [the prepacked 
ingredients for brewing ‘traditional’ sorghum beer] and a case [i.e. 12 
bottles] of brandy. His mother and the husband of his elder sister helped 
him to buy groceries for the feast.
Once the umgidi was over Themba felt free to spend his wages on whatever 
else he needed. He bought cement to repair and plaster his flat. He also 
bought a bedroom suite and a colour television. He bought clothes for 
himself and his girlfriend. His main problem, he volunteered, was that he 
went on to spend too much of his wages on alcohol, increasing his ‘credits’
[i.e. debts] at several local shebeens. He did, however, spend R400 every 
month during his period of employment on food for his home, because, as 
he put it, ‘my mother and my sisters are very strict [about this].’
Having conducted an umgidi [feast] to ritually thank his ancestors and to inform the 
community at large that he was now a man, Themba might be expected to turn his
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thoughts to longer-term goals, like marriage and setting up his own homestead. 
However, the short-term and uncertain nature of ‘jobbing’ means that he might have a 
long wait before being presented with another opportunity to earn some money. With 
no post-secondary qualifications and no immediate prospect of securing any, it was 
clear that by the time Themba was employed again he would have incurred debts 
around the village. He would also be morally and materially indebted to his mother so 
that any wage he earned may have to be spent on repaying his debts and contributing 
to the homestead. Unlike other young men employed by Telkom, Themba did not 
invest any of his wages in some form of savings, such as by buying a few cattle. With 
the job over, his dependence on the material support and goodwill of his (now) 
pensioned mother and unemployed siblings did not bode well for his longer-term 
economic upward mobility.
Without resorting to blaming the poor for their predicament, I want to suggest that 
‘jobbing’ stifled other more entrepreneurial forms of economic activity in rural 
villages. This was because the villages were usually awash with rumours that the 
contractor who would implement a long-awaited infrastructural project and thus bring 
jobs to the village had just been sighted in the area and was about to introduce this 
project. The likelihood of the imminent arrival of yet another project was often 
reinforced by local politicians, who quite understandably worked hard to secure 
sought-after services and infrastructural improvements, and the opportunities for 
work that these initiatives entail, for their constituents.
Moreover, ‘jobbing’ had considerable social costs. In the past, as pointed out above, 
this had to do with the political dimension of the allocation of jobs. With the demise 
of this political order, the jockeying for inclusion became less of a (perhaps simpler) 
‘us-and-them’ situation, but serious contestation increased on the part of the people 
who were structurally unemployed and on the basis of gender (especially with women 
vying for jobs in what many men regarded as customarily male domains of work). 
Every new project was ushered in by an inevitable sequence of well-attended public 
meetings. I attended several of these community meetings which involved the 
communal scrutiny and weighing up of the livelihoods and the perceived relative 
neediness of individuals and the households to which they belonged or claimed to 
belong. Not surprisingly, the tension was often palpable, with direct and veiled
114
comments about specific people’s eligibility or otherwise to secure work. A 28-year- 
old young man recounted to me his version of how fraught the process of selecting 
people to work on projects in Hamburg actually was.
Ms. X [who is about 20 years old, from a relatively well-to-do family in 
Hamburg, and whose mother is influential in community matters] had her 
name placed high enough on the list to ensure that she would secure work 
on the roads project. Her mother told the meeting that her daughter was an 
unemployed school-leaver and could not be expected to live at home 
[supported by her parents] forever.
Mrs. N  is a community leader who, instead o f  making sure that the most 
deserving people are catered for, is herself among those who will be 
working on the project. She cannot be trusted at all. She might even alter 
the list by putting her friends on it once the meeting is over.
The way this community employment list works is not right. In the past, 
when I wanted my name included on the list, I was blocked because some 
people said that both my parents were pensioners and that we weren’t 
struggling enough. So, at yesterday’s meeting, I tried to tell people that since 
my father’s death there is only my mother’s pension in our home, and that 
this [degree o f poverty] entitles me, a man who is unemployed and who does 
not drink [alcohol], to get work on this project. When I [finally] got the 
opportunity to see where my name had been placed on the list, it turned out 
that I was placed at #83 on a list o f  84 names. People are going about these 
things in very wrong ways, even those people one can usually trust seem  
unable to reason properly when it comes to the projects list (Zolile Mthi,
Hamburg village).
In the absence of more reliable longer-term employment, ‘jobbing’ provided a 
valuable income, some of which was channelled into the household as a whole. 
Indeed, the very public dissection of different people’s perceived relative deprivation 
hinged on an analysis of the livelihoods -  and the relative contributions and indeed 
the personal character and habits -  of both male and female members of each 
household that had members vying for a place on the list. This resulted in 
considerable social pressure being exerted on the recipients of ‘jobs’ to use their
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wages to ‘build their homes’ and not to squander their earnings, especially as they 
may have a desperately long wait, given the numbers of unemployed local (and town- 
based)15 people, before a ‘jobbing’ opportunity came their way again.
In the analysis of livelihoods in Loverstwist and Hamburg, I draw on the data that I 
collected by means of a household questionnaire survey that was administered to a 
random sample of 90 households in the two villages during Sep-Oct 2001.
Constructing livelihoods in Loverstwist and Hamburg, ca. 2001
The demise of regular long-distance labour migration for most of the economically 
active men in these villages has added to the complexity and variety of ‘rural’ 
livelihoods. Whereas at the height of labour migration to the mines and urban 
industries the household developmental cycle was a powerful tool in understanding 
typical changes in the development of rural households over time (cf. Murray 1987), 
things have shifted somewhat. Livelihoods have become more varied and less secure 
and factors such as educational opportunities, skills levels and spatial accessibility 
have arguably increased in importance in the analysis of households and livelihoods.
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151 encountered several examples of unemployed town-based people who, acting on the advice of their 
family members in the village, returned to the village specifically in an attempt to secure employment 
on the various 'jobbing' projects.
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Although only some 17 kilometres (by road) apart, Loverstwist and Hamburg were 
surprisingly dissimiliar in some of their more general socio-economic features. 
Loverstwist was established in the mid-1980s on what was previously freehold 
farmland. As pointed out in Chapter Three, the residents of Loverstwist were mostly 
drawn from neighbouring farms, on which the older and middle generations had spent 
their lives employed as unskilled or at best semi-skilled farmworkers, and later, under 
the Ciskei’s agricultural development parastatal body, CAC, as pineapple estate 
workers and tractor and lorry drivers. Many of the families in the village shared ties 
of kinship and clanship and some had previously lived together on the same or 
adjacent farms for several generations.
The farm of Loverstwist had minimal grazing land for livestock and even less land 
that was suitable for arable production. The fact that the farm was claimed by the 
neighbouring village of Tuku A made some people reluctant to demarcate, clear and 
utilise ostensibly disputed arable land. Given the size of the farm, opportunities for 
natural resource harvesting were limited, and this undermined the attempts of poorer 
households to supplement their livelihoods. The current younger generation of 
residents, i.e. that group of youth bom since 1990, was the first to enjoy full access to 
secondary education, and they attended the school some three kilometres away in 
neighbouring Tuku A village. At the risk of over-simplifying the local situation, 
Loverstwist was relatively undifferentiated, both economically and educationally, and 
differences in wealth across households were not (yet) significant.
By contrast, Hamburg was a much older settlement, dating to the 1850s. Hamburg’s 
municipal status meant that it had long had a sizeable municipal commonage, for the 
exclusive use by the livestock of local rate-paying residents, who also paid grazing 
fees for this service. About 80 of the 245 Xhosa-speaking households in Hamburg 
had security of tenure (if not actual freehold title) to four-acre (1,89 hectares) plots of 
land in the village, which were much larger than the typical residential site in 
Loverstwist, and were used for residential and arable purposes.16 The balance of 
households in Hamburg had smaller sites or simply squatted on municipal land.
16 Some of these plots were granted from 1958 when some black residents were forced to move from 
prime land close to the sea.
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Loverstwist had five civil servants (all teachers) resident or employed in the village. 
Despite its modest size, there were more than 30 civil servants who worked in 
Hamburg village.17 This very high number of civil servants, relative to other villages, 
was partly because Lennox Sebe, the leader of the Ciskei bantustan government 
between 1973 and 1989, ensured that the administration and facilities of the village 
were maintained and further developed.
Economically, Hamburg was far more internally differentiated than Loverstwist.
Many of the longer-established families had managed to accumulate far more in the 
way of assets, such as cattle and farming equipment, than the poorer families in the 
same village. The longer-established families also lived in bigger, more elaborately 
constructed homes. Many of them had ensured that their children were well-educated 
and in steady urban-based employment. But this gave rise to out-migration by the 
economically active in search of employment, which resulted in many well-to-do 
households in Hamburg exhibiting the ‘missing middle generation’ syndrome, with 
many of the older generation distinctly reliant on the social welfare economy.18
The economic opportunities on offer in Hamburg, limited as they were, had also 
encouraged the in-migration of people uprooted from other villages and farms, over 
the past 30-40 years. These mostly less well-educated people were more often 
unemployed and constituted the distinctly poorer section of the village community. It 
was notable, however, that the households of these poorer families were dotted 
around the village and did not form discrete neighbourhoods. These people did not 
own the land on which they lived, their houses were far more modest, and for the 
most part, their livelihoods were altogether less secure. However, many of the poorer 
families sought to demonstrate ties of kinship and clanship to better-off households in 
the village. In effect, Hamburg was a village of significant contrasts in economic 
fortunes between households, but one in which the livelihoods of the poor remained 
closely tied to the fortunes of the better-off households, through ties of kinship and 
moral obligation.
17 As teachers, policemen (18 in total), administrative clerks and labourers at the municipality, nature 
conservators, municipal councillors, cashiers, nurses, cleaners and a dipping foreman. Other people in 
Hamburg worked as domestic workers and gardeners for white holiday home-owners in the village.
18 The difference in resident household sizes between the villages was notable. The Loverstwist sample 
had an average household size of 5,2 members, while the sample of households in Hamburg had only 
3,6 resident members on average.
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A further structural difference between Loverstwist and Hamburg was the issue of 
accessibility. Loverstwist was situated directly adjacent to the R72 coastal route. This 
road connected the two industrial port cities of Port Elizabeth and East London, 
which were some 270 kilometres apart and which together formed the backbone of 
the Eastern Cape economy. This proximity to the R72 and especially to East London 
made the people of Loverstwist extraordinarily mobile. By contrast, the people of 
Hamburg had to contend with being the last stop at the end of an additional 14 
kilometres of gravel road that was sometimes in indifferent condition. For the 
majority of poor people who relied on transport by mini-bus taxi, this apparently 
small detail constituted a costly impediment to their mobility and negatively affected 
their livelihoods.
In the section that follows, I try to explain some of the differences and similarities of 
how a sample of households constructed their livelihoods and households in 
Loverstwist and Hamburg.
Table 4.1. (Dominant’ livelihoods in Loverstwist (n=30) and Hamburg (n=60), 
measured by source of cash income.
LOVERSTW IST HAM BURG
SOURCE OF INCOME No. OF H/HOLDS % No. OF H/HOLDS %
Pensions/Grants 12(9,5) 40 2 4(6 ,0 ) 40
Remittances 8 (6,25) 30 Nil —
Local Formal Employment Nil — 6 (4,3) 10
Local informal/’ Jobbing’ 7 (6,6) 20 28 (9,4) 47
Savings 1 (8 ) 3 2 (4,5) 3
Hand-Outs19 2 (5 ,3 ) 7 Nil —
TOTAL 30 100 60 100
While I am mindful of the fact that concentrating on dominant livelihood strategies 
does not provide a complete picture of all contributions to household livelihoods, it is 
nevertheless useful in highlighting several differences and similarities between the 
two villages, as indicated in Table 4.1. The table shows that entitlements to social 
welfare pensions and grants occupied first place in terms of the dominant livelihood 
in households in Loverstwist, with 40% of the households in that sample listing
19 Handouts include material support in cash or (more commonly) in kind given to destitute people and 
households by kin and neighbours on the basis of the masincedisane norm.
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pensions/grants as their dominant income source. In Hamburg, 40% of the sampled 
households also listed pensions/grants as their dominant income source, but this was 
eclipsed by the 47% of households that listed informal employment/’jobbing’ as their 
dominant income source.20
What is telling about the total (i.e. resident and absent) household size (noted in 
brackets in Table 4.1.) is that in Loverstwist, the category with the highest average 
household size (9,5 members) was the category in which people listed 
pensions/grants as their dominant income source. In Hamburg the largest category 
(i.e. that had informal employment/ ‘jobbing’ as its dominant income source) also had 
the largest households, with 9,4 members on average. However, only 17% of the 
households in the Loverstwist sample and a mere 5% of those in the Hamburg sample 
had eight or more household members who were usually resident in the village. In the 
current economic situation, large households with high dependency ratios were not an 
optimum livelihood adaptation strategy. Instead, these large households were likely to 
be among the poorer households in the respective villages.21
In Hamburg, remittances did not constitute the dominant source of income for any of 
the households in the sample although there were households in the village that 
depended on remittances for their livelihood. In contrast, 30% of the households in 
the sample in Loverstwist listed remittances as their dominant source of income. This 
had to do both with the greater mobility of Loverstwist people who were employed in 
town and with the fact that many of them were, for economic and cultural reasons, 
still attached to their natal homesteads in the village.
Many of the ‘missing middle generation’ of people in Hamburg were resident in 
town, where probably the majority were employed. They had set up their homes in 
town and either elected not, or were not in a position, to remit regularly to the village. 
The absence of remittances as a dominant livelihood in Hamburg was also a 
reflection of the much greater access in Hamburg to local wage-earning and
20 Note that by my definition of significant diversification (see above), neither the Loverstwist nor 
Hamburg sample of households exhibited livelihoods that are significantly diversified.
21 To a point, a numerically bigger household does, however, allow for greater ‘economies of scale’ with 
respect to consumption, since it is generally cheaper to buy and prepare food in bulk than it is to duplicate 
these activities across several smaller, discrete households (see Baber 1996; Waller 1999: 25).
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‘jobbing’, as well as greater opportunities for local salaried employment in Hamburg 
than were available to the residents of Loverstwist.
It is clear that the greater number of salary-based incomes in Hamburg had the effect of 
increasing the opportunities and proportion of incomes that might be derived from 
‘jobbing’. This was because the comparatively much higher number of people in local 
employment in Hamburg spent a fair proportion of their income locally, even in the 
cases where they were commuter migrants in the village, i.e. not members of Hamburg 
households. Some, even most, of this money then circulated in the local Hamburg 
economy, through support for local businesses. The local grocery store, owned and run 
by a local woman (who employed four or five local people) and the shebeens in the 
village benefit from this support.22 Opportunities for part-time and temporary jobs for 
local people provided by wealthier households were also more common.
A proportion of the money paid as salaries to employed people in Hamburg was thus 
spent on the day-to-day consumption-centred livelihoods of households in Hamburg, 
such as buying food and paraffin. A smaller proportion was invested in the savings 
and accumulation projects of Hamburg households. The rest of the money that was 
paid as salaries leaked out through the remittances which those in the ‘non-resident 
employed persons’ category repatriated to their homes elsewhere.
The overall effect, however, was one in which local economic activity was stimulated 
and opportunities created for a greater proportion of resident people to 
opportunistically piece together their livelihoods in the village than was the case in 
Loverstwist, where significantly less money entered the village by way of salaries and 
wages (i.e. earned by household members who were resident in the village). There 
were consequently fewer businesses in Loverstwist attempting to capture all 
incoming money and much of this money simply passed through the village, to be 
spent again on purchases in town. This was illustrated by the fact that, as shown in 
Table 4.2, 28% of the sample of households in Hamburg were reliant on the ‘informal 
sector’ only, while the proportion in Loverstwist was 7% of the sampled households. 
Also, 53% of the Hamburg sample of households included what I have called
22 One young woman who owned a shebeen informed me that her business usually cleared R700.00 a 
month, which was much the same as the three other shebeens in the vicinity.
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‘informal-sector’ activities in their overall repertoire of livelihoods, while only 33% 
of the Loverstwist sample did the same.
Table 4.2. Cash-based livelihood sources in Loverstwist and Hamburg.
LOVERSTWIST HAMBURG
No. OF LIVELIHOOD SOURCES No. H/HOLDS % No. H/HOLDS %
One source of Livelihood (7,5 people)23 (4,42 people)
Pension Or Grant Only 4 13 10 17
Informal Sector Only 2 7 17 28
Local Salaried Employment Only Nil — 3 5
Remittances Only 5 20 Nil —
Handouts Only 1 3 Nil —
Savings or ‘Package’24 Only 1 3 2 3
Two sources of Livelihood (7,15 people) (6,87 people)
Pension and Remittances 3 10 7 12
Pension and Salary Nil — 3 5
Pension and Informal Sector 2 7 5 8
Salary and Remittances Nil — Nil —
Salary and Informal Sector Nil — 3 5
Remittances and Inf. Sector 2 7 3 5
Remits and Handouts 4 13 Nil —
Inf. Sector and Handouts 1 3 3 5
Pension and Handouts 1 3 Nil —
‘Package’ and Inf. Sector 1 3 Nil —
Three sources of Livelihood (10 people) (5,5 people)
Pension, Remits and Inf. Sector 1 3 2 3
Remits, Inf. Sector and Handouts Nil — 1 2
Salary, Inf. Sector and Handouts 1 3 Nil —
Pension, Remits and Handouts 1 3 Nil —
‘Package’, Inf.Sector and Remits Nil — 1 2
TOTAL 30 -100 60 -100
Rather than providing evidence for Bryceson’s notion of increased livelihood 
diversification in the (unplugged) ‘informal sector’ as a result of growing 
unemployment in the formal sector of the economy (see Bryceson 2002), it appears 
that the greater diversification of livelihoods in Hamburg, at least relative to 
Loverstwist, was underwritten by the greater number of salaries that were earned in 
formal employment locally and then diffused into the local village economy in 
Hamburg. This was indicative, I suggest, of the extent to which the majority of rural 
people in fact remained connected to the mainstream cash economy and cannot be 
said to be engaged in a diversified ‘second economy’.
23 This was the mean total household size for the households in this category, i.e. including both 
resident and absent household members.
24 A ‘package’ refers to the retrenchment payment in cash that may have accrued to an employee when 
he or she was retrenched.
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Table 4.2 summarises the range of combinations of livelihoods that were found in the 
sampled households. This picture challenges the ‘emerging consensus’ of 
considerable livelihood diversification at the household level, at least for this sample 
of households in rural Peddie District. This is because a mere 9% of households in 
Loverstwist and 7% in Hamburg derived their cash-based livelihoods from three 
different sources of livelihood. In contrast, 46% of the households in Loverstwist and 
53% in Hamburg made ends meet by relying on a solitary livelihood strategy. The 
balance of 46% in Loverstwist and 40% in Hamburg did so through a combination of 
only two livelihoods.25
To illustrate this concentration of livelihoods, I have grouped a wider range of 
livelihoods into six main categories that are, for the most part, self-evident. Only two 
of these livelihood categories need to be spelled out more clearly. As pointed out 
above, ‘hand-outs’ includes support in cash or (more often) in kind from kin or 
neighbours and were distinguished from remittances or direct contributions from 
bona fide household members who were employed or ‘jobbing’. This ‘hand-outs’ 
category also includes three specific cases of support from boyfriends to young 
woman members of households in Loverstwist.26
Given my assertions about the limited evidence supporting livelihood diversification, 
the potentially more contentious category is the one I have called the ‘informal sector’. 
My definition of an informal job refers specifically to employment and other livelihood 
activities that yield a cash income but for which no formal written contract of 
employment is entered into between the parties concerned. Here, a fairly wide range of 
marginal livelihoods was given by respondents and I list these in Appendix Three.
251 reiterate here that the the ‘informal-sector’ livelihoods in Table 4.2 do not include the livelihoods 
directed at self-provisioning use, firstly of the many natural resources, such as firewood, Araa/wood, 
timber and mud for building, wild fruits and vegetables, game, medicinal plants, and secondly of 
agricultural resources, such as vegetable and grain crops, as well as livestock (draught, milk, meat, 
hides and manure). Instead, the livelihoods that I include under ‘informal sector’ are the ones such as 
‘jobbing’ in which people were paid for piece-work, even where the piece-work in question may be to 
sell firewood (a natural resource) in the village.
26 Survey respondents in Hamburg were understandably reticent about this sort of support, but several 
informants told me that ‘gifts from boyfriends’ (essentially in exchange for sex) constituted an 
important livelihood for several young women in Hamburg. This seemed likely given the fact that a 
number of employed men, including policemen, teachers and nature conservation officials earn (in 
relative terms) good salaries and spend time in the village fraternising with residents (cf. Liebenberg 
1997; Scoones et al. 1996: 153, 184; Ferguson 2001 [1990]: 127).
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Table 4.2. gives an indication of the extent of livelihood specialisation in the two 
household samples. It is interesting to note from these data that 33% of the sampled 
households in Loverstwist and 53% of those in Hamburg included what I have called 
‘informal-sector’ activities in their various livelihoods bundles. In Loverstwist, this 
reliance on informal-sector livelihoods was spread across the three livelihood 
categories, so that households that had ‘informal-sector’ livelihoods were included 
among those that had either one source, two sources or three sources of livelihood. In 
Hamburg, there was greater concentration of households that are reliant on the informal 
sector only, at 28 per cent of the households in the sample. A further 18 per cent listed 
informal-sector activities as part of a two-stream livelihood package and seven per cent 
listed these activities with two other livelihood activities. In terms of definitions, I 
would characterise this situation less as one of increasing livelihood diversification, and 
more as livelihood substitution and specialisation (see Ellis 2000: 215-6).
The impact of educational status on accumulation prospects for households in 
Loverstwist and Hamburg
Without discounting the many factors discussed above, it is not surprising that at least 
some of the differences in livelihoods between the villages and also within the two 
villages can be traced to differences in educational attainment. Here, the weakness of 
the household as unit of analysis is exposed, because education is, of course, attained 
by and measured on an individual-by-individual basis. However, there is a fairly 
predictable pattern that emerges from the data, which is that the households that have 
one or two adult members who had attained significant levels of education were also 
more likely to put an emphasis on educational attainment for their children and thus 
had a higher aggregate educational level than households in which no-one was well 
educated.
My argument is simply that, as the macro-economy has become more specialised and 
technology-driven, the ability of poorly-educated people to secure long-term 
employment has diminished. Squeezed out of the hi-tech urban economy, where the 
casualisation and devaluation of the low-skilled menial work for which they qualified 
were the norm, the poorly educated were thrown back onto the social welfare system 
and the meagre livelihood opportunities available in the rural areas. The two case-
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studies presented below highlight some of the livelihood implications of educational 
differences.
Case-study of the Mkhaya household in Hamburg
Gcinikhaya Mkhaya was 47 years old. He had three years o f schooling. His 
wife, MaTshezi, was 44 years old and had ten years o f  schooling. Both were 
formally unemployed, although Gcinikhaya had a casual job as a night 
watchman in Hamburg. They had four children aged 19 years (these are 
twins), 13 and 3. Gcinikhaya and his wife were also responsible for the care 
o f their granddaughter, aged 4. Three o f  their four children were scholars.
One o f the twins was repeating standard ten, while the other was struggling 
to pass standard seven.
During 2000, Gcinikhaya’s family was supported by ‘hand-outs’ from his 
father, an old-age pensioner and ixhwele [herbalist] o f  some renown, who 
also lived in Hamburg. Since acquiring a two-roomed government-subsidised 
‘RDP’ house in the new ‘Phola Park’ section o f  Hamburg village, the family 
have moved out o f the homestead o f Gcinikhaya’s father. However,
Gcinikhaya and his son (13 years old at the time) still herded the five cattle 
o f his elderly father. This was not unusual since Gcinikhaya, as his father’s 
eldest son, had a close interest in the well-being o f  his father’s cattle, which 
he stood to inherit one day. Moreover, by persisting with the herding o f these 
cattle, Gcinikhaya continued to enjoy at least two meals a day at his father’s 
homestead, and was able to prevail on his father occasionally for ‘tobacco’ 
money. Also, because o f his own household’s precarious financial position, 
Gcinikhaya’s son continued to reside with his grandfather and Gcinikhaya’s 
other children were frequent recipients o f meals there.
For various reasons, MaTshezi was not on good terms with her affines.
Instead, she was pleased to finally have her own domestic space. She made 
small amounts o f  money by gathering sea shells on the beach nearby with 
which she made decorative objects for sale. She also collected and sold 
oysters to tourists or fishermen in the village. The household had a radio, a 
freezer (which could not be used, as their house had no electricity) and some 
rudimentary items o f  furniture, but otherwise they had virtually no
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possessions. Cooking was done by MaTshezi and her daughters on a paraffin 
cooker.
Gcinikhaya previously spent 19 years as a migrant worker, employed on a 
number of different gold mines on the Witwatersrand. During this time, he 
was a regular remitter to his wife in Hamburg village, something that his wife 
readily confirms, and he was able to accumulate a small herd of cattle. In 
fact, he had bought cattle with his wages since he was an inkwenkwe [boy]. 
When they married in 1980, he had paid the lobolo of eight cattle for his wife 
‘in cattle, not cash’, he told me. For most of her married life, MaTshezi has 
lived with her in-laws.
In the prolonged drought of the early 1980s, six of his cattle died. Gcinikhaya 
subsequently bought one cow from the Mhlaza family in Hamburg. The cow 
calved several times, but most of its calves died, the last one in 1998. At 
present, only the cow and one of its calves survive. The family’s only other 
livestock is two chickens. Gcinikhaya has no arable land of his own, but he 
(and latterly his son) assist with the ploughing and sowing of his father’s 
lands.
When I interviewed them, they were about to sell the cow for Rl,800 to a 
Hamburg family, which was closely related to MaTshezi, who were in need 
of an animal to slaughter for a funeral they would be hosting. It was 
MaTshezi who found the buyer for their remaining cow. She told me that 
they would use some of the money from the sale of this animal to buy 
fencing material and poles with which her husband would fence their small 
yard at their new home in Phola Park. This would allow them to start a small 
vegetable garden. They would also use some of the proceeds from the sale of 
the animal to set MaTshezi up in a clothing business. She planned to travel to 
Durban to buy clothes to sell locally. She also wanted to make and repair 
clothing for people in the village. They had not given up entirely on owning 
cattle and hoped to increase their cattle numbers by way of the future 
progeny of their one remaining heifer, which remained in Gcinikhaya’s 
father’s byre. Plans for their one daughter to study nursing after completing 
her secondary schooling rested firmly on securing financial assistance from 
Gcinikhaya’s father.
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In a vein that I was to encounter frequently, especially with regard to former male 
migrant workers, Gcinikhaya’s economic fortunes had ebbed drastically over time. 
Within six months of his retrenchment from the mines in 1996, his retrenchment 
‘package’ had dried up and with it his position as head of household and intsika 
yekhaya [pillar of the home] began to come under pressure. To the extent that his own 
skills, employment aspirations and labour featured in the future livelihood plans of 
the household, these were directed towards setting his wife up in business and in 
gardening. His predicament was brought into sharper focus by comparison with 
another household in Hamburg, that of the Mthozamile Raduma.
The case of Mthozamile Raduma’s household
Mr. Mthozamile Raduma was a 58-year-old father of six. He had ten years of 
education and earned a comparatively very high salary (by village standards) 
as the headmaster of the primary school in a nearby village. He was married 
to Nokhaya who was 47 years old, 11 years his junior and a daughter of the 
large Gushana lineage of Hamburg. Nokhaya had several years of education 
(the exact number I could not establish) and made a regular if modest income 
from her sewing business, which she ran from home. When surveyed, five 
members of this eight-member household were resident in Hamburg.
Mthozamile had three daughters aged 38, 34 and 31 years. The two older 
daughters each had a tertiary qualification in teaching, but both were 
unemployed. The oldest daughter lived at home at the time, and the other 
daughter was single and lived in Cape Town. The youngest daughter (31) had 
12 years of schooling, was married and lived in Port Elizabeth.
Mr. Raduma’s oldest son, Mawethu, who had only six years of schooling, 
resided at home. He was ‘jobbing’ with Eskom. His second son, 26-year-old 
Lindikhaya, had recently completed a degree in agricultural science at the 
nearby University of Fort Hare. He had thus far been unable to find regular 
employment and was living at home and also ‘jobbing’ with Eskom. In the 
past month, the two young men had assisted their father financially by paying 
for the spare parts he needed to repair his tractor. Mr. Raduma’s youngest 
son, Dumisa, was in the process of completing his standard ten in Port 
Elizabeth. When not teaching, Mr. Raduma and his sons worked in their 
garden and cultivated his two fields (his second field was situated on the
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fertile floodplain of the Keiskamma River adjacent to the neighbouring 
village of Bodiam).
When surveyed, Mthozamile Raduma had 56 cattle, the second-largest herd 
in Hamburg.27 He also owned a tractor and maintained a bank account, which 
he joked was ‘always empty’ because his tractor was so ‘thirsty for diesel’.
The family lived in a large modem home. They owned a colour television, 
lounge suite and kitchen unit as well as an electric and a gas stove.
Mthozamile Raduma had plans to buy a ‘decent’ bakkie [light delivery van] 
in the near future to facilitate his daily journey to work and to scale up his 
agricultural activities.
Note that the impressive educational qualifications that the members of this 
household had managed to secure were not in themselves a guarantee for securing 
long-term employment. This was particularly as the public sector, struggling to 
overcome the political barriers to ‘right-sizing’ through retrenchments of poorly 
qualified teachers and other civil servants, had virtually stopped hiring teachers, 
nurses, policemen and the like. These qualifications did, however, allow for a 
measure of livelihood diversification in this household, in that, in contrast to the 
Mkhaya household, four people in this household were contributing to its livelihood.
Some local modes of saving and accumulation
The majority of rural people across South Africa had a rather tenuous toehold in the 
market domain of the economy, which was epitomised by the established banking 
sector.28 Recent research shows that 72% of black South Africans did not have a bank 
account. In the Eastern Cape, this figure was as high as 79% for black women and 75% 
for black men. Reasons for not holding a bank account included unemployment and 
irregular income, distances from banks, illiteracy, innumeracy and ‘blacklisting’ by 
credit bureaus for defaulting on credit repayments.
27 At an average value of Rl,800 per animal, this meant that Raduma had just over R100,000 ‘on the 
hoof, which constituted a very sizeable amount of money in the context of rural Peddie District. As a 
school principal, he probably had a net income of around R4,000 per month.
28 Nowhere was this made clearer than in the inability of many people to keep a bank account, the most 
elementary mechanism for transacting and, significantly, saving money in the formal economy. In the 
bank in Peddie, I was told that when no deposits were made into a person's account for three months, 
the bank concluded that the person had lost their job and closed the account.
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However, despite the fact that there was only one commercial bank to serve the 
population of Peddie District, I found that 37% of household heads in the sample of 
households in Loverstwist had a bank account.29 Another 17% indicated that, while 
they did not have a bank account, their daughter or son, who was absent from the 
village, had one. Two household heads indicated that they held post-office accounts, 
in one case in preference to a bank account. In Hamburg, 35% of household heads in 
the sample indicated that they had a bank account, with another 5% holding a post- 
office account.301 attribute these somewhat higher-than-average frequencies of bank 
account-holders to the fact that a relatively high proportion of households in both 
villages did their shopping, including buying furniture and appliances on credit, in 
towns, particularly King William’s Town and East London, and thus necessarily had 
an association with banks. This relatively large proportion of bank account-holders 
among my sample of households also supports my argument about the overall 
economic integration of Peddie District into the wider regional economy. However, 
this does not mean that the households in the two villages who held bank accounts 
were in a position to save large sums of money in this way. All the evidence that I 
have points to the contrary being closer to the truth, except where a recently 
retrenched migrant worker had his ‘package’ deposited into a bank account and 
planned to make it stretch for as long as possible.
On the whole, though, maintaining a bank account with a view to registering a ‘paper 
trail’ in the market domain of the economy could be financially unrewarding. Rural 
people knew that, through the burden of ‘bank administrative charges’ and charges 
associated with depositing and withdrawing money, the amount of money that a 
person deposited into a bank might actually decrease in value over time. Moreover, 
travelling to the bank in Peddie town or to East London to gain access to these funds, 
was itself costly and time-consuming.
Local imigalelo [rotating credit] clubs and masingcwabane [lit. ‘let us bury each 
other’, burial societies], in which many rural and town-based people were active, 
offered a locally managed and more sociable form of sharing and (temporarily) 
saving money for extraordinary household expenses, such as the buying of expensive
29 Eighty-two per cent of these household heads with bank accounts were male.
30 Sixty-seven per cent were male.
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appliances, or helping to cover the expenses of a funeral.31 Sixty-seven per cent of the 
sampled households in Loverstwist made contributions to either an umgalelo club, a 
burial society, or towards a funeral policy with an insurance company (or 
combinations of two of these), at an average monthly rate of R60.00 per household.
In Hamburg, 52% of the households in the sample did the same, with the 
contributions to imigalelo with members who were employed generally higher 
(R100-R250).
Ukwakh ’umzi, masincedisane and the politics of ‘rural’ livelihoods
The sharing of resources between households by means of masincedisane, i.e. good 
neighbourliness or mutual assistance, has already been alluded to and was much in 
evidence in both villages, and included organised bodies, such as church groups, 
credit associations, burial societies and more informal sharing, such as neighbours 
helping each other. However, credit associations and (to a lesser extent) burial 
societies tended to exclude the households that were without a reliable source of cash 
income to make the regular contributions. In Hamburg in particular, because it was 
more differentiated yet with poor and wealthier people living cheek-by-jowl, other 
forms of the masincedisane norm may be expected to play an especially important 
part in flattening out inter-household socio-economic differences.
These other forms of sharing between households were, however, frequently 
undermined by an emphasis on the norm of ukwakh ’umzi. For one thing, Hamburg 
had more, and longer-established, lineages that co-operated (and, of course, 
competed) internally to a greater extent. Because of family tensions and conflicts, 
however, there was a much greater preference for residential separation from one’s 
parents, siblings and other kin relations than was the case in Loverstwist.
The move to households that had fewer de jure members, but that nevertheless 
retained a moral and ritual connection to their respective natal imizi, was 
demonstrated by the development in the early 1990s of an ‘informal’ settlement 
known as Ndlovini on the outskirts of Hamburg village. In significant ways, however, 
this residential separation of kin threatened the longer-term rhetorical and practical 
overlap between membership of actual households -  that generally organised their
31 The respondents to this question did not clearly distinguish their payments to these various clubs and 
societies. When pressed, many people felt that these were merely variations on a theme that did not 
need to be categorised rigorously.
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domestic labour and consumed independently of other households -  and of 
homesteads -  that obviously had kinship-based, but also the other moral and ritual 
underpinnings. It is significant that this contraction of the household had not occurred - 
in Loverstwist, which contrasts with Hamburg in this regard.
With the livelihood insecurity that most households faced, residential separation 
places greater demands on, and thus greater contestation over, the nature and norms 
of household-level sharing, including ukwakh ’umzi [to build the homestead] and 
masincedisane [let us help each other]. Where household membership had shrunk in 
size due to labour migration or other forms of residential separation, livelihood 
strategies had to be adapted. Some livelihoods, such as field cultivation or livestock 
production, became less viable, given the reduced labour in the household. To 
maintain these livelihoods, other options that assist to redistribute the available labour 
in the village had to be entertained. These included more selective co-operation with 
neighbours, such as entering into sharecropping arrangements or agreements to share 
herding responsibilities. Alternatively, people might decide to pay outside helpers to 
assist with the day-to-day tasks relating to livelihoods and social reproduction (cf. 
Waller 1999: 24; McAllister 1992: 204).
While especially male household heads, benefiting from the patriarchal dividend (see 
Connell 1995), enjoyed some success in controlling the labour (and incomes) of the 
younger members of their households, this was a source of considerable tension in 
many households in Loverstwist and Hamburg. Since the mid-1970s, it has become 
more difficult for sons to secure employment that will allow them to marry and to 
establish their own homesteads. In many cases, their membership of their natal home 
might continue to be recognised indefinitely, but their status in the village would 
suffer, because they were regarded as being unable to uzimele [stand alone] as men.
On the other hand, unmarried sons and daughters who were insecurely employed (or 
‘jobbing’) in town were under considerable pressure to send remittances to their natal 
homesteads to contribute to the project of ukwakh'umzi [building the home]. Their 
attempts to secure a livelihood were also subject to constant and painful public 
scrutiny by other household members and everyone else, particularly their age-mates, 
in the village.
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In the interests of brevity, I have placed a case-study of a young man’s tribulations in 
respect of ukwakh ’umzi, together with the extended case-study of the household of 
Ma’am Gitywa who, by the accounts of people in other homesteads in Hamburg, 
failed to live up to the expectations of the masincedisane norm, in Appendix Two.
An inward-turning/outward-engaging investment orientation
In this short, final section of this chapter, I initiate an exploration of why certain 
households in rural Peddie District were more inclined to invest in agrarian 
production (notably cattle-holding) than others. I emphasise the economic and social 
‘orientation’ of each household (cf. Ainslie 1999; Mayer 1980b: 38). This approach, 
while it emphasises livelihoods and accumulation strategies, also touches on the 
identity and lifestyle aspirations, choices and decisions of the individual members of 
each household. In this, I have drawn on some of Ferguson’s (1999) insights in his 
acclaimed recent book, Expectations o f Modernity. Ferguson’s exposition of urban 
Zambian identity and cultural styles is particularly compelling. He shows how 
people’s choice of a Tocalist’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ cultural style is informed by their 
experience of sustained economic collapse in Zambia.
His approach regarding these cultural styles owes something, it seems to me, to the 
pioneering work of Mayer & Mayer (1971 [1961]) on ‘Red’ and ‘School’ Xhosa in 
and around East London and tends to suffer from some of the same limitations (see 
Mafeje 1963: 206ff). Principal among these limitations is the explicit dualism of 
Ferguson’s two contrasting categories, which Sharp (2001: 154) is quick to point out 
in his review of Ferguson’s book. In his own stimulating discussion of identity among 
Xhosa-speakers in the townships of Cape Town, Sharp argues that, in terms of the 
ways the residents of Joe Slovo Park construct and contest their identities and cultural 
styles, ‘Xhosa tradition’ and ‘Western’ consumerism are not mutually opposing or 
exclusive styles or value systems for these people. The extent of context-specific 
hybridity, he suggests, shows that ‘Cape Town is far too complex a context to 
approach from a dualist perspective of any kind’ (Sharp 2001: 157). I argue that 
geographically ‘stretched’ places like Peddie District, characterised by intensive 
movements of people between town and country, are similarly too complex. As such, 
dualist characterisations do not exhaust the ‘full repertoire’ of people’s ‘cognitive
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mapping’ of relational (i.e. rural-urban) and local cultural differences, specifically in 
the ways that these differences relate to livelihood options over time (Sharp 2001: 157; 
Robins 1997).
In Peddie District, the first level of complexity concerns the contestation over cultural 
styles within the household. The dispersal of household members between urban, 
peri-urban and rural areas could make these struggles particularly fraught, especially 
when household members were assembled in one place, for instance, at a funeral or 
umsebenzi [ritual ‘work’ -  see Chapter Eight]. Intra-household struggles over cultural 
style were underpinned by generational and gender differences (given the normative 
Xhosa division of labour), while class and religious affiliation were also differences 
that provoke contests over the dominant identity or cultural style adopted by 
particular households. I use evidence of agrarian investments, specifically in cattle 
ownership, as an indicator of the economic orientation of a household, ever-mindfiil 
of the fact that this orientation did not necessarily overlap with the cultural style that a 
household -  not to mention its constituent members -  adopted. Indeed, the cultural 
style of the household was likely to change with the changing economic fortunes of 
the household, particularly its head, over time.
Having reviewed the data I collected, my sense is that it was the extent to which the 
pursuit of livelihood and accumulation strategies -  whether characterised as 
constituting the inward-turning or outward-engaging orientations -  could be converted 
into social status that guided a household’s accumulation strategies, at least over the 
medium term. Investments by a few wealthier households in self-consciously consumer 
goods such as a satellite dish or an off-the-shelf pit latrine,were objects of curiosity and 
envy for a short while.32 Young men in particular were keen to watch international 
football matches that were only screened on satellite television channels. But, given 
the fractious nature of ‘community’ in rural Peddie District, and the limited arena for 
investments in socially meaningful rural assets, it was an open question how such 
individualist investments in objects of consumer culture -  a particularly anti-social
32 A fibreglass latrine cost around R600,00 -  more than the value of one month’s old age pension 
during my fieldwork period. The pit latrines of most homesteads were constructed locally from old bits 
of corrugated iron fixed to a timber frame, which was placed over a hole dug to about 1,5 -2m deep. 
Significantly, the construction of a pit latrine -  the work of young men -  would take about two days to 
complete and would earn a young man between R50 and R100.
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(i.e. contradictory) case of ukwakh *umzi -  would contribute to the status and the 
social standing of these households in the longer term, particularly among senior men 
and women in the village. Sustaining a subscription to satellite television would, for 
instance, have placed strain on the household budget, without obvious long-term 
social returns in the village.
By contrast, investments in cattle and to a lesser extent in a tractor or bakkie, both of 
which could be utilised to help other people and households in particular contexts, 
went much further towards bolstering the local social standing of a household. This 
was because of the high convertibility of cattle, relative to other assets, in two 
spheres. Firstly, barring losses to one’s herd through drought, cattle guaranteed a 
future income stream. Secondly, households that held cattle were able to spread 
resources around the village in the spirit of masincedisane, such that these cattle were 
readily converted into increased social status.
Conclusions
In this discussion of ‘rural’ livelihoods in Loverstwist and Hamburg, I have pointed 
to the rather limited range of reliable livelihood options that were available to people 
for their long-term accumulation strategies. Given their livelihood vulnerability, one 
option rural people had was to manipulate the form of their household by dispersing 
or augmenting the members of their households in various ways and over time.
Twenty years ago, De Wet and McAllister (1983: 65) wrote of ‘a rural situation [in 
the Eastern Cape] in which the overwhelming trend has been towards greater and 
greater impoverishment of the people through both drawing them into the wider 
economy and preventing them from fully sharing in the fruits of that economy’. The 
current reliance on a small range of dominant household income sources was 
evidence that this was being played out. I have pointed out the importance of both 
structural and contingent local differences in the construction of local livelihoods, 
such as the higher number of formally employed people whose earnings were 
diffused into the Hamburg economy. This made the ‘informal-sector’ livelihoods in 
Hamburg more robust and far more viable in Hamburg than in Loverstwist.
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I have highlighted the role that education played in affording people improved 
chances of securing reliable employment. I have also indicated that in many 
households educational advancement in ‘traditional’ careers such as nursing, teaching 
and the agricultural sciences had become more likely to leave graduates stranded in 
the race for jobs in the stagnant public sector.
I have pointed out that, notwithstanding the widespread self-provisioning use of 
natural resources, the majority of households in Loverstwist and Hamburg did not 
have diversified livelihoods. This has two important implications. Firstly, it meant 
that most households remained vulnerable to economic shocks, such as the loss of 
pension income upon the death of a grant recipient in the household. Secondly, it 
placed the spotlight firmly on the rather limited range of assets that continued to offer 
people high convertibility over time. One of these assets was cattle.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The distribution of cattle-holdings and the 
costs of cattle production in Peddie District
If a man has a few cows and that’s all he has in life, he must hang onto them. If he 
loses them, even if he has money, he may never be able to buy more. Why? Because 
he sells a beast for R600 at the stocksale. Then he goes to Van der Merwe, the 
farmer, to buy two weaners [but] they cost Rl,200 and Rl,500. [So] he goes home 
with no animals (Interview with Mr. Siza Manjezi, 15 September 1999).
Introduction
Having explored some aspects of people’s ‘rural’ livelihoods in Peddie District, I now 
turn to an examination of where cattle-holding fitted into this picture. In the first part 
of this chapter, I review the quality of available data on cattle-holdings in Peddie 
District and discuss the difficulty of drawing any hard conclusions from these data. In 
the second part of the chapter, I present data from the structured questionnaire which 
I administered (with the assistance of Welile Mzozoyana) to a stratified sample of 48 
of the cattle-holding households across the district during 1999.1 briefly consider the 
costs of acquiring and keeping cattle.
In the third section of the chapter, I reflect on some of the sociological features of 
cattle-holding households in the two villages of Loverstwist and Hamburg.1 Making 
use of the ‘Livelihood Survey’ which we administered to 90 households in the two 
villages, I present a short analysis of some of the similarities and differences between 
the households that held cattle and those that were without cattle when the surveys 
were conducted.
To conclude the chapter, I suggest that changes in cattle holdings are a useful (and 
thus far neglected) index for understanding longer-term changes in wealth and 
poverty indices and investments in agrarian livelihoods at different levels (household, 
village, district) in the former bantustans of the Eastern Cape Province.
1 In Appendix Five, I present some data on herd structure and production indices from the ‘Herd 
Survey’ census that my research assistants and I administered to all cattle-holding households in 
Loverstwist and Hamburg.
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To start, though, I must explain my use of certain terms. All my informants argued 
that cattle-loaning between households had declined sharply since the 1940s and 
1950s (younger people in rural Peddie District had never heard of ukunqoma), and 
hence that issues around the ownership of the cattle in a particular byre were clearer 
now than in the past. Nevertheless it was not always possible to distinguish between 
the cattle held by a household and the cattle actually owned (in the legal sense) by 
various members of the same household. Furthermore, there was the issue of cattle 
held in the byre of homestead A that were owned by someone from homestead B (cf. 
Beinart 1992).2 In most cases it took long and careful probing to find out just how 
many of the cattle in a particular byre were in fact owned by that household and how 
the ownership of these cattle is distributed within the household. I thus use the term 
‘cattle-holding’ throughout this chapter to indicate this.3
The quality of data on cattle-holdings in Peddie District
During the 1990s, the Department of Agriculture in the Eastern Cape Province 
inherited a programme of free ‘Blanthrax’ inoculations for all the cattle in those areas 
of the former bantustans that were susceptible to blackwater and anthrax diseases. 
Administering the inoculation presented the Department with an opportunity to 
conduct an annual census of cattle numbers and to check the numbers of cattle 
inoculated against the dipping registers. For decades, the recording of cattle numbers 
had taken place at the dip-tank, but I found that these records were hard to come by, 
and were not particularly reliable, especially for the Ciskeian reserves (Ainslie 
2002c). Rural people were understandably suspicious of the motives of the authorities 
in wanting to keep records of their animal numbers and they resisted this by failing to 
present their cattle for dipping enough of the time to bedevil the accurate recording of 
cattle numbers. As mentioned in Chapter Three, some of the holders of large herds 
loaned their animals out to kinsmen in other areas in order both to evade the counting 
of their herds and to minimise the risk of stock losses during times of drought (Brown 
1971: 177). Another strategy was to maintain ‘ghost herds’, in which people would
2 Hodgson (2000a: 11) argues that ‘ownership’ itself is a historical category, with associated 
presumptions about private property, alienability, and individual control that differ from more 
communal and cooperative notions of rights and responsibilities.
3 Having said that, by far the majority of cattle held in the villages of Peddie District were actually 
owned by people who were resident or had strong attachments to homesteads in the district. This meant 
that ‘absentee owners’, about whom much was made in earlier literature, were not a major factor here.
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dip half their herds on one occasion and the other half on the next occasion, thus 
contributing to a 50% undercount of these herds. People could also evade the 
monitoring of their cattle numbers by selectively failing to register the births, deaths, 
sales and slaughter for home consumption (Tapson 1982; Hendricks 1991). Eighty 
year-old Mr. Maramba in Peddie Extension told me in 1999 that ‘it is not exactly that 
I am hiding some cattle [kept in another village], it is just that I have cattle there that 
are not [recorded] on my dipping card.’
A further confounding factor in the former Ciskeian reserves related to its 
‘chequerboard’ settlement pattern, with blocks of white-owned farms interspersed 
between reserve areas under communal tenure. Earlier cattle records did not always 
differentiate satisfactorily between the cattle of the white farmer and of his employees 
and the cattle of the people in adjacent communal reserves, with varying numbers of 
these cattle all dipped at the nearest functional dip-tank. This problem was carried 
through into the post-1994 situation, where the dipping of the cattle of (black) 
commercial farmers and the (former farmworker) people occupying freehold farms in 
Peddie District was not subsidised by the state. To gain access to free dip for their 
cattle particularly during the summer months of serious tick infestations, some of 
these farmers would dip their cattle in the communal reserve areas adjacent to their 
farms. These complications afforded the households that held cattle considerable 
room to manoeuvre if they were set on evading the authorities’ attempts to count their 
cattle. The dipping foremen’s role was critical here and only in a situation in which a 
dedicated dipping foreman took the trouble to engage continuously in the anti-social 
‘detective work’ of trying to keep abreast of all the changes in local cattle production, 
exchange and consumption of cattle (his own cattle often included) was there any 
hope of keeping accurate records at this level. In practice, the numbers recorded at the 
dip-tank were liable to ‘correction’ to bring them in line with previous census data 
once they were submitted and aggregated at the district level.
This situation deteriorated further in the late 1990s, when the Department of 
Agriculture failed to budget adequately for the purchase and supply of acaricides, so 
that the only leverage the dipping foremen had enjoyed fell away. As a result, cattle- 
holding households were encouraged to pool their resources and buy dip for their cattle 
and consequently had little interest in assisting the dipping foreman to keep his cattle
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records up to date. Thus die data on cattle numbers for any particular locality of the 
former Ciskeian reserves have long been little more than educated guesswork on the 
part of dipping foremen and local authorities and should be treated with caution.
Notwithstanding all these pitfalls, veterinary personnel in the Department of 
Agriculture were under the impression that gross numbers of cattle in the Ciskeian 
reserve areas (and those of Peddie District in particular) had remained fairly constant 
over time since at least the early 1960s, other than during and immediately after 
periods of drought.4
The cattle register for the year 1978 that I retrieved from the dipping foreman for the 
dip-tank in Hamburg - which was used by residents of Hamburg and eNtilini villages 
as well as the people resident on the adjacent farms - told an interesting story. It 
showed that registered cattle numbers stood at 1,643 in July 1978. These cattle were 
registered in the names of 158 people (although I do not know what proportion of 
households in the village this represented). Figure 5.1. shows that 1978 was the year 
in which cattle numbers in Peddie District were at their highest for the 25-year period 
1973-1998. In the July 1998 ‘Blanthrax’ census, there were 1,494 cattle registered in 
the names of 150 people at the same dip-tank. This represents an overall decline of 
9% in cattle numbers and a 5% decline in registered holders of cattle. It is noteworthy 
that, of the 65 herds that were still registered in the same name and could thus be 
easily traced over the 20-year period, 25 (38%) registered declines of more than three 
animals, 20 (31%) indicated that their herd sizes had increased by more than three 
animals, and 20 (31%) registered that their holdings were within a three-animal range 
(more or less) of their herds in 1978.
4 There was a sequence of drought (in 1968), floods (in 1970), another drought (in 1972) and flood (in 
1974). A devastating drought occurred in 1982-1984. As indicated, the five-year period 1994-1998 was 
one of higher-than-average annual rainfall in Peddie District, which should have allowed people’s herd 
sizes to build up. I do not go into the debate about the the notional ‘ecological carrying capacity’ that 
might characterise the forage/cattle relationship in Hamburg. In essence, what this means is that, 
because animal numbers of a finite area stay close to or at this carrying capacity, they survive at a 
‘maintenance’ level and the annual increase in the size of the overall herd matches off-take (deaths, 
sales, home-slaughter). Effectively, the overall herd is in ‘equilibrium’ with the available grazing 
resources at a low level of productivity, in line with a low level of management inputs. What this 
model ignores is the availability and use of key resource areas, such as neighbouring farms, the fact 
that cattle are sold or moved to other areas, that people hand-nursed the calves of cows with tick- 
damaged udders, etc. (cf. Vetter’s [2003] study of livestock and grazing management in Herschel 
District, Eastern Cape).
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Actual statistics on cattle numbers for the reserve areas of Peddie District, although 
they had apparently been recorded, were simply not available for many years, 
particularly in the 1960s and again for most years in the period 1987-2000.1 was 
assured by the State Veterinarian that during the period 1986-1997 all the cattle 
census data for the former Ciskei areas were kept in a ‘filing cabinet’ in the regional 
Animal Health Clinic in Zwelitsha.5 Despite my sustained efforts to locate it, this 
filing cabinet remained unaccounted for, as did the records it apparently housed. 
Anything but the gross numbers of cattle in the reserve areas remain largely 
unknown.6
Figure 5.1. The number of cattle in Peddie District, 1973-2001.
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Moreover, the proportion of cattle-holding (and cattle-owning) households remains 
nothing more than an informed estimate, even after two post-apartheid population 
censuses, firstly because official figures on the number of households seemed
5 1 conducted several interviews with Dr. Nick Fischer, State Veterinarian for Peddie District, and Ms. 
Lulama Mpati, the (acting) Control Animal Health Technician in Peddie District, during the period 
1998-2001.
6 1 was given permission by individuals to record the information on their stock registers (‘dipping 
card’). Some old men had retained their dipping cards from the early 1970s and I could build up a 
picture of the periodic increases and decreases in local herd sizes. But in their efforts to thwart the 
authorities, some people managed to ‘lose’ their dipping cards or to fudge the recording of information 
in them, so that these cards too are not the key to understanding cattle-holdings.
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inaccurate (and were subject both to blurring between the notions of household and 
homestead and some manipulation at the point of enumeration, because the household 
was a key unit of delivery for government services).7 Secondly, these estimations 
remain problematic because of the difficulty mentioned above of determining actual 
cattle ownership. Thus all discussion on the numbers of cattle and their distribution 
remains conjectural in the absence of reliable and context-rich longitudinal data. 
Consider the livestock data I located for the Tyefu Location of Peddie District 
(Ainslie 1998).
Table 5.1. Human and livestock populations in Tyefu Location
POPULATION
CATEGORY
YEAR O F CENSUS
1854 1946 1997
HUMAN 1,509 4,889 14,000
CATTLE 2,989 2,938 3,548
SHEEP 46 5,388 5,120
GOATS 514 18,464 14,488
The pattern described above is clear in Table 5.1, i.e. that aggregate cattle numbers 
have remained remarkably constant over time, while human and small stock 
populations increased dramatically, although both the number of sheep and goats 
show a decline in the 51 years since 1946. But this is only a small part of the overall 
picture. Firstly, without more contextual information, we do not know whether the 
three census years in question coincided with a ‘wet’ or ‘dry’ period in terms of 
rainfall, or an outbreak of bovine disease, or were recorded just as a drought was 
ending.
Essentially, the data are synchronic, with each data-set representing a snapshot of part 
of the situation that prevailed at that time. Without accurate longitudinal rainfall 
figures, and reliable records on sales, exchanges, home-slaughter, births and deaths at 
regular intervals over the 143-year period, we cannot deduce much from these 
numbers. Secondly, we learn nothing about the structure (cow/heifer/bull/ox) of the 
overall (cattle) herd in the location, much less the structure of the herds held by
7 The population estimate for Peddie District dropped from 89,000 in 1994 (Ainslie et. al 1997: 13) to 
61,000 people (living in 13,700 households) in 1996 (Statistics South Africa 1998).
141
individual households. Moreover, it is possible that, because of changes to the 
vegetation structure and the quality of forage resources, the average size and weights 
of the individual cattle decreased over time and that many of the cows in these herds 
might well have been in a ‘maintenance’ condition of low fertility and negligible milk 
yield (see Moll [1988], who quotes Rutman [1972: 147] on this point). In other 
words, a typical cow in 1946 may well have been smaller, have provided less milk 
and reproduced less frequently than did a cow in 1854 (notwithstanding an almost 
identical overall herd size).
Thirdly, we learn nothing (from the data presented in Table 5.1.) of the actual 
distribution of cattle ‘ownership’ among the population, whether cattle-holdings 
became more or less concentrated over this period, and how this changed in relation 
to the increase in the human population and the changing structure of the homestead 
as a social and economic unit (cf. McAllister 1992). Fourthly, we are none the wiser 
about the factors that underpin the gross changes in animal numbers we observe, that 
is, the possible range of constraints or opportunities that emerged in the local 
economy and the wider political economy that had an impact on patterns of cattle- 
holding at these three moments. Fifthly, as the data show, it can be dangerous to 
consider long-term trends in cattle numbers in isolation from changes in the numbers 
of goats and sheep in the same area. These changes may provide important clues to 
significant changes in the ratio of grazing to browsing resources over time (Fabricius 
1997).
Characterising cattle-holding households in Peddie District
There was a considerable increase in the number and presumably the diversity of 
people and households in rural Peddie District in the period since the early 1960s (see 
Ainslie 1999). Given that there were also serious droughts that struck the reserve 
areas of Peddie District in 1968, 1972 and especially 1982-84 (and to a lesser extent, 
1991-92), which had a negative impact on animal numbers in the district, just who 
were the cattle-holding households in 1998?
Despite the reservations I have outlined, I make use of the data-set that I derived from 
the 1998 ‘Blanthrax’ inoculation to characterise what I estimate to be the roughly
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28% of the households that held cattle in Peddie District in 1998.8 The records of the 
names of cattle-holders and the numbers of cattle they reportedly held indicated that 
in July 1998 there were 2,644 cattle-holders in the reserve areas of Peddie District. 
These people held just over 23,200 cattle in the ratios outlined in Table 5.2.9
Table 5.2. Numbers of cattle holders in Peddie District by herd size 
as at July 1998.10
CATTLE HELD No. OF HOLDERS % OF TOTAL OW NERS
1 -6 cattle 1 412 53
7-12 cattle 691 26
13-20 cattle 323 12
21 and upwards 218 8
TOTAL 2 644 -1 0 0
Firstly, the data from the 1998 ‘Blanthrax’ register (see Table 5.2), indicate that more 
than half (some 53%) of the population of cattle-holding households held six or fewer 
head of cattle.11 In fact, nearly 80% of the cattle-holding households held 12 or fewer 
cattle. At the other end of the scale, just over eight per cent of cattle-holding 
households had 21 or more head of cattle. Among the households that held cattle, these 
animals were thus relatively evenly (and thinly) spread across households. This could 
be an indication of the difficulties that rural households encountered in trying to 
rebuild their herds in the aftermath of recurring episodes of drought. The 
deteriorating animal health regime during the early to mid-1990s, considerable 
contestation over grazing resources and a general decline in household 
livelihood prospects would have contributed to these difficulties. It also suggests that
8 Ainslie et al. (1997: 81) indicated that in a sample of 379 households in six villages in Peddie 
District, 31% of these households held one or more (bovine) animal. See Manona (1998: 115) for a 
similar proportion of cattle-holding households in Melani village, in the neighbouring, inland district 
of Alice. The data I collected in the higher-rainfall, two coastal area villages of Loverstwist and 
Hamburg indicated proportions of 36% and 41% respectively, evidence that cattle-holding was a more 
attractive investment in these areas than in some of the drier inland villages (although higher rainfall 
and more grazing did not exhaust the reasons for the higher proportion of cattle-holding households).
9 Despite the satisfaction on the part of the veterinary services about the coverage of this programme, it 
is likely that this constituted an undercount, as not all cattle-holders would have presented their cattle 
for inoculation. Many people, especially in Tyefu Location, believed that the government’s 
inoculations and vaccinations were what made their cattle sick and actively avoided presenting their 
animals, such that the veterinary staff had to threaten to prosecute them. Also, those people who were 
avoiding the dipping register were likely to have avoided the ‘Blanthrax’ inoculation as well.
10 A further 893 (25% of the overall, cumulative total) names were still listed on the register, but were 
recorded as no longer having any cattle.
11 Note that ‘cattle’ refers to units of bovine animals of any size and not to large stock units (LSU).
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many households were either unable (because of limited means and/or labour 
constraints) or unwilling to invest more than a limited amount of their scarce 
resources in the restocking of their byres and the husbanding of their cattle.
Characterising the households that hold cattle in Peddie District12
The average age of the household heads (both men and women) in my 1999 district- 
wide sample of 48 cattle-owning households was 62 years (see Table 5.3).13 As many 
as 46% of the household heads were 65 years and older, and the average age of this 
group was as high as 71 years of age.14 It is also remarkable that nine of the 
household heads (19% of the sample) were older than 80 years of age. With just 11% 
of the rural population of the district said to consist of men and women 61 years of 
age and older (Statistics South Africa, Census 1996; also see Lloyd and Levin 1995: 
4,73), and given the fact that the 22 households (46%) with the heads of household 
over 65 years of age held the highest category average of 9,5 head of cattle, it was 
clear that a significant generational concentration of bovine wealth in the hands of 
this category of older heads of households was a feature of this sector.
Table 5.3. Age distribution of the heads of cattle-holding households in the 1999 
district-wide survey and their respective cattle-holdings (n=48)
AGE OF  
H/HOLD HEAD
No. OF 
H/HOLDS
% No. OF 
CATTLE HELD
AVERAGE
HOLDINGS
Up to 40 years 6 13 55 9,2
41 to 64 years 18 38 143 7,9
65 years plus 22 46 209 9,5
Do not know 2 4 14 7
Total 48
ooI 421 8,8
12 See Ainslie (2002e) for the sample selection procedure that was followed before administering this 
questionnaire schedule during 1999.
1 The notion of household head is not unproblematic given the local context of extensive rural-urban 
mobility, which dispersed members of the household and affected the ways in which day-to-day 
decisions were made within such households. The determination of household headship that I adopt 
here was that decided by my informants themselves. In every case, they had an unambiguous, even 
emphatic, response to this question, which does not, of course, negate the reservations expressed above 
(see Guyer & Peters 1987; Niehaus 1994).
14 In Loverstwist this age category headed 42% of all cattle-holding households, while in Hamburg the 
proportion was 36%.
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For the remaining 24 households in this survey for which data were available on the 
age of the household head, the average cattle-holding was only 8,3 head.15 The 
detailed herd surveys conducted in Loverstwist and Hamburg showed, however, that 
the age category 41-64 years of age dominated in terms of total number of cattle 
under their control and (in Hamburg) also average herd size per household. In 
Loverstwist, the age category up to 40 years, although only comprising three (out of 
47) households, had the highest average holdings (8 cattle per household).
Gender aspects of cattle-holding
It is not always clear what exactly the concept ‘female-headed households’ entails in 
the context of the varied and dynamic household structures and livelihood sources 
observed in the rural context studied. Where and with whom, in these situations, does 
domestic authority lie and how are relationships within and beyond the household 
mediated? Critically, given a particular constellation of these variables, who in a 
specific household or extended kin-group has primary authority over the ‘family herd’ 
of cattle? I address these questions in the three chapters that follow this one,
Table 5.4. Gender distribution of the heads of cattle-holding household in Peddie 
District (n=48)
H/HOLD HEADS BY GENDER No. OF H/HOLDS %
H/holds headed by men 38 79
H/holds headed by women 10 21
Total 48 100
The significantly gendered pattern of cattle-holdings in the reserve areas of Peddie 
District is confirmed by Table 5.4 which indicates that households headed by women 
constituted a mere 21% of the cattle-holding households in our sample. This means
15 The small sample size is problematic here, as the high average cattle per household for the senior (65 
years and over) category was skewed by one household which held 47 head of cattle. This constituted 
the biggest herd held in the entire sample of 48 households. By excluding this household, the average 
for this category dropped to 7,7 head per household, which was then the lowest in the survey.
However, excluding the biggest herd in each (household head) age category (i.e. 30 and 24 animals in 
the first two categories respectively), meant that the senior age category (over 65 years) again had the 
highest average number of cattle (7,7 per household, as opposed to 5 and 7 cattle per household 
respectively). The fact is that bovine wealth was concentrated in the households with senior men as 
their heads (see Chapter Six), although this was somewhat less pronounced in the villages that lay to 
the east of the town of Peddie.
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that cattle were overwhelmingly concentrated in the rural households headed by 
senior men.16 It is instructive to compare this with the 1996 Census data which 
indicate that some 54% of the households in the district as a whole were headed by 
women.
Six of the female household heads in the sample (i.e. 60% of the 10 female-headed 
households) indicated that they were widows and had inherited cattle when their 
husbands died. In the case of another household, a widow did not inherit her 
husband’s two cattle as these were claimed by the two brothers of the deceased man. 
The cattle were herded by her deceased husband’s older patrilineal relative who was 
resident in the village. While she claimed to be the head of this household, it emerged 
that her authority did not extend to the two cattle held by the umzi [homestead]. As 
long as her only reliable source of livelihood was the occasional remittances from 
these brothers-in-law who both lived and worked in East London, she was in no 
position to contest the ownership of these cattle. This was very different from the 
position of two other women, one of whom was MaDlamini Mzantsi of Rura village.
A never-married woman, MaDlamini Mzantsi, was an old-age pensioner 
in her sixties. She explained that the family herd o f  13 cattle was under 
her control. When her father died in 1950, the dipping card was changed 
into her mother’s name at the magistrate [sic]. While MaDlamini and her 
brother both worked in Port Elizabeth, they bought cattle for their 
parents’ homestead in the village. Upon her mother’s death in 1978, the 
card was changed into her name, ‘as the first-born child’. She and her 
younger brother co-operated very well. He used to say, ‘Sisi, you decide’, 
whenever a decision about the homestead and its assets needed to be 
made. M aDlamini’s brother died in 1983 and at the time o f  the interview 
she lived with his daughter (Mimi) in the family’s original homestead. A 
determined old woman, MaDlamini had previously taken a young man 
whom she had employed as a herder (at R5 0/month) to court because he 
had taken her cattle to his girlfriend’s house and tried to pass them o ff as 
his own. She recovered her cattle. She recently sold a heifer in Rura 
village for R l,500 in order to pay the student fees o f  her ‘grandson’ (her
16 But see Manona (1998: 115) who notes that 43% of the cattle-holding households in Melani village 
in the neighbouring district of Alice were headed by women, all of whom were widows.
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brother’s daughter’s son) who was a nursing student in Cape Town. The 
heifer was bought by a person in the same village who wanted to build 
his herd.
Interestingly, the range of ages for the ten female-headed households in the district- 
wide sample was wide, as Table 5.5 suggests.
Table 5.5. Age distribution and average holdings of female-headed 
households that held cattle in sample of Peddie District 1999 (n=10)
AGE OF H/H HEAD No. OF H/HOLDS AVERAGE HOLDINGS
Up to 40 years 2 2,5
41 to 64 years 4 9,5
65 years plus 4 6,3
Total 10 6,8
Table 5.5 also shows that these ten female-headed households held a total of 68 cattle 
at an average of 6,8 cattle per household. This is lower than the overall average of 8,8 
cattle per household for the 48 sampled households, but it masks the fact that four of 
these ten households had ten or more cattle (i.e. more than the average), and suggests 
that the gender of the household head was not a decisive factor in predicting the 
number of cattle held. It is noticeable that the age category 41-64 years of age held the 
most cattle on average. Other important considerations in understanding the factors 
that played out in female-headed household that held cattle were issues such as the 
number of cattle that were inherited by the widowed household head. If these cattle 
constituted a viable herd in terms of the proportion of fertile cows, then there was a 
good chance that the integrity of the herd would be maintained over time. The point is 
that women as household heads were not opposed to keeping cattle and were well 
aware of the monetary and social benefits of doing so. Other than as widows 
inheriting cattle, they were more restricted in the sense that they had fewer socially 
acceptable routes available to them to gain initial entry into the male-dominated cattle 
economy.17 The most common route was for women to take control of the umzi herd 
when their husbands passed away. Once in this position, they could augment the herd
17 Mrs. Makhulo in Hamburg was exceptional here. She was in her mid-50s, married and was a 
practising igqira [traditional healer]. In about 1991, she unexpectedly received a heifer as payment 
from one of her patients. From that time, she switched to charging people in cattle and not in cash. This 
was how this Makhulo household started keeping cattle.
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by buying in cattle or by demanding cattle as bridewealth or as ‘damages’ (in the case 
of premarital pregnancy) for their daughters.
It emerged that the survival or growth of the herd, as in male-headed households, was 
dependent upon the continuous availability and reliability of male labour in the 
household or agnatic cluster to perform routine animal husbandry tasks. In each of the 
ten households headed by women, the household heads indicated that they consulted 
their adult sons (and sometimes daughters) or other kin (especially on their husband’s 
side) when making decisions about the overall management (including any intended 
sale or ritual slaughter) of these cattle. In these circumstances, a widow’s role was 
often regarded, especially by her adults sons, as simply that of ‘keeping’ the cattle, i.e. 
acting as guardian of the cattle, for the eldest son of her deceased husband.18 But her 
‘mother-manager’ role (see Jones 1996) could be much more active and decisive than 
that, depending on the gender and generational dynamics and livelihood 
circumstances that prevailed within particular households. Indeed, my more detailed 
research into cattle-holding, especially in Hamburg, revealed several cases of widows 
who had been guardians of the umzi herd for periods of more than twenty-five years.
Educational profiles of cattle holders
There is a notion that cattle-holding in the former bantustans was the preserve of the 
poorly educated or, conversely, that educated rural people were least likely to keep 
cattle. Indeed, Table 5.6 shows that as many as 33% of the household heads in the 
sample had never been to school. The 1996 Census pegged the proportion of 
unschooled adults in these age categories at 27% for the whole of Peddie District. In 
other words, the district-wide sample of cattle-holding households did not fare much 
worse than the average adult in the district, particularly considering the severely 
limited educational opportunities that were available in the 1940s and 1950s to the 
numerically dominant older cohort of heads of cattle-holding households.19 A further 
30% of the household heads in my Peddie sample had enjoyed less than seven years 
of formal education. In fact, only 10% of the sample had a standard nine (11 years of
18 In certain circumstances, it could be the youngest son who inherited the umzi and family herd.
19 There were, for instance, some poorly educated household heads whose children and grandchildren 
were well-educated. Although I have data on the education levels of all household members in the 
district-wide sample, I do not make comparisons between households on the basis of the overall 
educational ‘profile’ of the different households here.
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schooling) or higher level of education. It is significant though, that this matched 
exactly the proportion quoted for this group in Peddie District in the 1996 Census. Of 
those with at least 11 years of schooling, only two household heads (4% of the 
sample) had a tertiary education, and both of these people had teaching diplomas.
Table 5.6. Levels of education of household heads in the district-wide sample of 
cattle-holding households (n=48)
No. OF YEARS OF 
SCHOOLING
No. OF H/HOLD 
HEADS
PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL
AVERAGE CATTLE 
per HOUSEHOLD
No formal education 16 33 11
1-6 years 14 29 7
7-10 years 8 17 8
11-12 years 3 6 10
Tertiary 2 4 17
No Response 5 10 9
Total 48 100 8,8
According to the 1996 Census, a paltry 1,5% of the people who were resident in the 
district had any form of tertiary education/training (including a post-secondary 
‘certificate’ of any kind). In other words, most people resident in Peddie District were 
relatively poorly educated in the formal sense. As the data presented above show, 
however, this does not mean that cattle-holdership was exclusively the preserve of the 
formally less educated. In fact, it is interesting to note that no correlation appeared to 
exist between average numbers of cattle held and the education levels of household 
heads in the sample. The households with the highest and second-highest average 
numbers of cattle were drawn from those with the most and the least formal education 
respectively. After some discussion about this matter, my research assistant, Patrick 
Gusha, gave me his considered opinion on who would own cattle in future:
In future, there will be two groups of people with most of the cattle.
Amaqaba [uneducated people] who will fuza [rear livestock], you know, 
concentrating on cattle, just like their parents have done before. In 
Hamburg, most of the cattle will be in Qolweni [section] as the maqaba 
there have long invested their money in cattle. [Then there will be] the 
educated people, like Khayalethu and Mthozamile, who have learned 
about cattle and money, and have money to buy things and farm properly.
[These two groups will be the]...serious farmers with many cattle. [As
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for] the other people, the majority will not be following tradition and will 
not have enough money to fuza properly. They will give up having cattle 
in future.
As pointed out above, a higher level of formal education on the part of the (male) 
household head did not translate into a disinterest in cattle-holdership. This was 
significant in suggesting that cattle-holdership, at least to the educated men (see 
below) in Peddie District, was not anachronistic and outmoded. Where a positive 
correlation was most likely to exist, however, was with the almost total disinclination 
on the part of better-educated, never-married women, who were heads of their 
households, to hold cattle. One of my arguments in this thesis is that while an 
enhanced level of formal education quite obviously opened up new economic options 
and social spaces for rural people in Peddie District -  and, to some extent, closed 
down others -  this did relatively little to negate the desire on the part of many of these 
people, and particularly of men, to hold cattle. The modernist notion that greater 
exposure to education will lead to disengagement with the ‘traditional modes’ of 
accumulation such as cattle-holding (Sansom 1974), did not hold here, I suggest, 
because the opportunities for upward mobility that a typical rural education (i.e. 12 
years of schooling) presented were actually minimal and in fact appeared to be 
declining. I have already provided some clues why this should be so in Chapter Four, 
and in the chapters that follow I examine this in greater detail.
Livelihoods and cattle-holding
In the interests of brevity, I want only to note the fact that for 60% of the households 
in the sample, old-age pensions and other state welfare transfers constituted the 
dominant (and often sole) source of household livelihood at the time of my fieldwork 
(cf. Ainslie 1999). By contrast, only 15% (7/48) of the heads of households in the 
district-wide sample were in salaried employment but, given the average age of 
household heads in the sample, this is not surprising.20 What is of interest was that 
these seven households held a total of 98 cattle, at an average of 14 cattle per 
household, which is considerably higher than the average for the entire sample (8,8
20 Ten per cent of the households claimed that the remittances sent by town-based members of their 
families were the ‘primary source’ of income for their households.
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cattle per household) and again suggests an interest in the cattle economy, rather than 
a disengagement from it. The households that were reliant on the informal sector for 
their dominant source of livelihood (constituting 23% of the sample) had the lowest 
cattle-holdings, at an average of 8,5 cattle per household.
Acquiring cattle
The majority of households in the Peddie District-wide survey relied on the natural 
increase of their existing animals to build their herds. Households with sufficient cash 
resources were not averse to purchasing heifers from time to time to augment their 
herds. All households would purchase an animal if they wished to conduct a ritual and 
did not have a suitable animal in their family herd or if they did not wish to use one of 
their own animals.
It emerged that only a very small proportion (4%) of the total animals they held had 
been acquired through lobolo [bridewealth] payments, because these frequently 
involved the transfer of cash. Only 10% of the households in the sample indicated that 
they had acquired cattle in this way. Informants told me that, on the part of the 
prospective bride’s family, it was risky to ask for cattle because then ‘anything on 
four legs, even calves’, could be delivered. The cattle of lobolo were said to die easily 
when brought from afar, because of the unfamiliar local conditions. From the 
prospective groom’s point of view, the fact that the (negotiated) cash value of lobolo 
cattle ranged from R500 to Rl,500, which was below the stock-sale price of a 
reasonably-sized heifer, meant it made sense to pay the ikhazi in cash.
More substantial were the numbers of cattle acquired through inheritance. At least 87 
cattle (20% of the total number of cattle held by households in the sample) were 
inherited by 21% of the households.21 Where cattle were purchased (either to augment 
the herd or to slaughter in a ritual), people turned both to their neighbours and to 
neighbouring white and, to an increasing extent black, commercial farmers to do so 
(however, only 13% of the households in the sample mentioned having bought an
21 Ten households indicated that they had inherited cattle, but two households did not indicate the 
number of cattle they had inherited. The number and proportion of inherited cattle was skewed, 
however, by one case of inheritance, in which 53 head of cattle were inherited and then duly sold off by 
the children of the deceased man.
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animal for slaughter purposes).22 Steyn (1988), who conducted research in the two 
villages of Nyaniso and Lujiko in south-central Peddie District, found that especially 
the post-drought rebuilding of seriously depleted herds was based almost entirely on 
purchases from white farmers/speculators from outside the district. A small number of 
these white farmers both sold cattle outright to people in Peddie District and 
exchanged young cattle (especially heifers) with rural people, where the white farmer 
provided two heifers in exchange for a full-grown ox. One of the black commercial 
farmers in Peddie District indicated to me that he had ‘a queue of local people wanting 
to buy both heifers and mature cows’. Cows (and oxen) were often for use in ritual 
slaughter.
As discussed in Chapter Three, a further means of acquiring animals has been through 
the various government schemes aimed at the introduction of ‘improved sires’ into the 
reserve areas. Schemes of this nature were first introduced in the Ciskeian ‘reserves’ 
in 1949 (Steyn 1988: 320).
The costs of keeping cattle
With regard to the costs of keeping cattle, it emerged that byre maintenance was the 
most expensive element of keeping cattle in gross rand terms for all the households in 
the district-wide sample (cf. Shackleton et al. 2000). Byre maintenance was usually 
undertaken once a year, or more frequently than that if a ritual was to be conducted in 
the byre. In fact, a makeshift byre had to be purpose-built when hosting a ritual at a 
homestead that had no cattle. For those with cattle, it was necessary to build a 
sufficiently secure byre to contain and protect the animals at night. It is significant, 
however, that 60% of households in the Peddie-wide sample (n=48) did this work 
themselves at no or very little (direct) monetary cost for the labour component, while 
the remaining 40% of the sample indicated that they paid someone in cash to complete 
this task. This meant that this cost fell disproportionately on these households, 
essentially as a result of their labour deficits. For those who paid for byre 
maintenance, this involved paying for
22 In fact, this question was poorly phrased and did not enquire directly about cattle purchased for the 
purpose of herd augmentation.
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(1) the labour to chop amahlahla [saplings and brush] in the forest,
(2) the transportation of the amahlahla by tractor and trailer, ox-drawn 
‘scotch’ cart or bakkie to the homestead
(3) the labour involved in the repair/rebuilding of the byre itself.
Where payment was made for byre maintenance, the payment varied between R20, 
which seemed to be a one-off token amount paid to small boys or a family member for 
their assistance, and R650 per annum when done entirely by an unrelated person in 
the village.23
The second major cost incurred in cattle husbandry was that of purchasing medicines 
and dip for cattle. There was a significant component taken up by the cost of travel 
here, as people usually had to travel to King William’s Town or East London to buy 
livestock remedies. On the other hand, people seldom made a special trip to purchase 
stock remedies, unless there was an emergency, and preferred to make these purchases 
on ‘pension-day’ or ‘pay-day’ when they were town-bound anyway.
Payment for herding also fell unevenly on some households. Thirteen per cent of the 
sample (6/48) indicated that they paid a herdsman to care for their cattle. As 
mentioned above, people tried to utilise the labour of their immediate family and even 
of more distant kin for this purpose. The cost of hired herders varied between R50 and 
R200 per month, depending on what exactly this herding entailed. Payments in kind 
rather than in cash were made by some households.
So what were the average costs incurred by cattle-keeping households in rural Peddie? 
In total, eleven of the reduced sample of forty-one households24 in the Peddie survey 
(i.e. 27%) indicated that they had no direct costs in respect of keeping cattle. Their 
costs included the opportunity cost of their productive labour, much of which could be 
discounted, given the current high rate of unemployment, and the costs of sustaining 
the households members actively involved in cattle husbandry. Taken together, these
23 At September 1999 cash values, although these had not changed in 2000-2001, when I conducted the 
bulk of my fieldwork.
24 Information given by seven households on the actual costs (in rands) of keeping cattle was either 
vague or ambiguous and could not be used. The remaining households were asked to supply evidence 
of their costs. Where such evidence was not available, they were asked to give a close estimate of their 
expenditure.
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eleven households held 100 head of cattle, with an average of just over nine head each 
(i.e. higher than the average of 8,8 cattle/household across the sample). This indicates 
that it was not simply a case of households with only two or three animals incurring 
minimal cost in their upkeep.
For the remaining 30 households, costs ranged from R5 per annum, in the case of 
people who claimed that they had never incurred any costs in relation to their cattle in 
the past, but had recently paid a small sum towards dipping costs, to R2,560 per 
annum. The total estimated outlay incurred (for the 12 months January to December 
1998) by these 30 households in maintaining the 258 head of cattle they held was 
R13,850 per annum, at an average of R54 per animal per annum. When the cattle of 
the other eleven households -  which incurred no cost in keeping their cattle -  were 
included, then the overall average cost per animal of keeping cattle in Peddie (still 
based on our reduced sample of 41 households) dropped to R39 per annum, or just 
over R3 per animal per month, which was somewhat more affordable for most 
households.25 What this average per annum cost to maintain an animal masks, 
however, was the highly variable costs incurred by individual households. These costs 
varied widely between households, partly because of the different numbers of cattle 
they held, but also because of their particular household circumstances (see below).
One household headed by a widow, Mrs. Matomela, held 13 cattle. Mrs.
Matomela received an old-age pension and variable remittances from her 
children. With no-one in her household available to herd the cattle, she had 
to pay a herdsman R200 per month to manage the cattle. The herdsman also 
maintained the byre. Mrs. Matomela estimated (she had no receipts 
available) that she spent R160 per annum on medicines and dipping 
material. Her total annual outlay in maintaining her herd was thus R2,560, 
or some R213 monthly. Her average cost per animal was a relatively high 
R197 per annum (or more than R16 per animal per month).
Another household was headed by an 84-year-old man, Mr. Xesi. He and 
his wife each received an old-age pension. Like Mrs. Matomela, Mr. Xesi
25 While recognising the inherent difficulties, Shackleton et al. (2000: 59) computed the monetary 
value of the ‘economic contribution of livestock (including cattle) to livelihoods’ in the former reserves 
across South Africa. They found that this contribution amounted to R1,200 per household per annum 
for all rural households in the former reserves and not only those that held livestock.
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held 13 cattle (he also had 6 sheep). Mr. Xesi and his son did all the herding 
of the cattle themselves. He paid R300 per annum for byre maintenance and 
a further R40 per annum for stock medicines and inoculations. His total 
annual outlay was thus R340 or just over R28 per month. While Mr. Xesi 
probably did have an outlay (which he failed to disclose), i.e. that of 
occasionally giving his son some money and, of course, paying for his son’s 
board, his average cost per animal worked out at at a mere R26 per annum 
(just over R2 per month), which was less than one-seventh of the cost 
incurred by Mrs. Matomela.
Given that the majority of rural households in Peddie District earned less than 
Rl,500 per month (Ngqushwa IDP 2003: 28-30), it was clear that the households 
which experienced shortages of labour were prepared to invest a considerable 
percentage of their cash resources in the maintenance of a herd of cattle. It is likely 
that the high costs that people like Mrs. Matomela incurred were a temporary 
phenomenon, which they endured while they tried to find ways of rearranging their 
household labour to enable a male family member to take over the herding duties. In 
situations where this was not feasible, they might be faced with having to ‘place’ their 
animals in the byre of another homestead, which is not without risks, or with the 
possibility of relinquishing their cattle altogether.
Cattle-holding and cattleless households in Loverstwist and Hamburg
Hamburg had many more cattle-holding households in total (101) than Loverstwist 
did (48), but this can be attributed to the fact that Hamburg was a much bigger 
village, with 245 occupied homesteads at the time of my fieldwork, while 
Loverstwist had only 134 occupied homesteads. Nevertheless, at least 41% of the 
homesteads in Hamburg held cattle, while at least 36% of the total homesteads in 
Loverstwist held cattle.26 The cattle-holders in Hamburg (at 10,4 cattle per 
household) also fared much better than their mostly poorer counterparts in 
Loverstwist (at 5,7 cattle per household), a mere 14 kilometres away.27 This was the 
case even though 37% of the cattle-holding households in Hamburg held six or fewer
26 As noted, the resident businessman who held the biggest herd of cattle in Loverstwist declined to be 
interviewed or to volunteer any information about his cattle. This herd of around 50 cattle was kept on 
a farm some distance from the village and not in the village itself. Neither the homestead nor the herd 
feature in my analysis below (i.e. from this point onwards for Loverstwist, n=47).
27 A small proportion of these cattle were owned by other people who ‘placed’ their animals in a senior 
man’s byre (see Chapters Six and Seven).
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cattle. Moreover, only 11% of the cattle-holding households in Loverstwist held 13 
or more animals, while the equivalent proportion for Hamburg was 21%. The fact 
that herds in Loverstwist were on average nearly half the size of those in Hamburg, 
suggests that the average household in Loverstwist was poorer than that in Hamburg, 
although in terms of cattle-holdings the more restricted grazing resources of 
Loverstwist also played a role.28
My 2001 census of all cattle-holding households in the two villages yielded slightly 
higher proportions (28% in Loverstwist and 29% in Hamburg) of woman-headed 
households than the 1999 district-wide sample (21%). Virtually all of these cattle- 
holding households were headed by widows, although in some cases it was unclear 
whether the woman in question had been married previously or was an unmarried 
mother who had returned to her parental home to live there and subsequently inherited 
the homestead and its possessions (cf. Jones [1996: 47] for how ‘perceptions of 
marital status are susceptible to retrospective review’).
What I do in this section is to use the data I collected to briefly explore the hypothesis 
that cattle-ownership is part of a complex of factors that together constitute an 
‘inward-turning’ orientation on the part of certain households (see Chapter Four). 
Stated differently, I want to see the extent to which cattle-holding involves households 
in these two villages in ‘local conversations’, i.e. intra-village economic exchanges 
between the members of particular households and between different households.
The ‘Constructing Livelihoods’ questionnaire survey was administered to a random 
sample of 30 households in Loverstwist, of which nine (30%) were found to hold 
cattle. These 30 households represented a 22% sample of the occupied households in 
the village. It was also administered to a random sample of 60 households in 
Hamburg, of which 29 turned out to be cattle-holding households (47%). These 60 
households represented a 25% sample of the occupied households in Hamburg. I 
found that 5,2 cattle was the average herd in the Loverstwist ‘Livelihoods’ sample and 
11,8 cattle the average herd in the Hamburg sample.29
28 Also, eight households in Hamburg (compared to one household in Loverstwist) held herds of 24 or 
more animals. The biggest herd in Hamburg numbered 77 cattle, which pushed up the average 
holdings per household in Hamburg.
29 Since the census of cattle-holding households revealed that 36% and 41% respectively of the 
households in Loverstwist and Hamburg held cattle, at mean herd sizes of 5,7 and 10,4 cattle, there was 
a reasonable correspondence between data from the ‘Livelihoods’ sample and the census of cattle- 
holding households.
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To summarise the data presented in Table 5.7, it is clear that households that held 
cattle in both villages had household heads who were on average older (by as much as 
11 years older in Hamburg) than the households without cattle. This suggests to me 
that the tougher economic conditions in recent times had prevented many households 
from buying into cattle. Cattle-holding households also had larger households in terms 
of mean total (resident and absent) members, as well as being on average over 30% 
larger in terms of mean resident household sizes than those households without cattle.
Cattle-holding correlated with more of the males in the household being resident in 
the village, which showed up in the mean number of resident males. Here the cattle- 
holding households in both villages had at least twice the number of resident (i.e. 
village-based) men, suggesting that these households were focussed on the local 
agrarian/pensions economy. However, the cattle-holding households in both villages 
also had proportionally greater numbers of members (men and women) who were 
both absent from the village and employed.
As pointed out in Chapter Four, poorer households in Hamburg relied heavily on 
‘jobbing’ for their livelihood. There is a correlation between this and being without 
cattle, since as many as 71% of the households without cattle had ‘jobbing’ as their 
dominant source of livelihood (DSL). For the remaining three categories (cattle- 
holders in Hamburg and both categories in Loverstwist), social welfare transfers 
(‘pensions’) formed the dominant source of household livelihood. In addition, in 
Loverstwist, ‘jobbing’ was the dominant livelihood source for 29% of the households 
without cattle, while remittances were dominant for 24% of these households.30 One- 
third of the cattle-holding households in Loverstwist had remittances as their 
dominant source of livelihood, while the balance of 22% had ‘jobbing’ as the 
dominant source of household livelihood.
In contrast, not one of the 60 households in Hamburg had remittances as its dominant 
source of livelihood. For the cattle-holding households in Hamburg, social welfare 
transfers ranked as most frequent DSL, with local salaried employment by resident 
members the dominant source of livelihood for 21% of the households, and ‘jobbing’
30 Two of the 21 households (9,5%) relied on ‘hand-outs’ from other households to survive.
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the dominant source of livelihood for 17% other cattle-holding households. The two 
remaining households (7%) in this category had private pensions as their dominant 
livelihood source. What these data reveal is that cattle-holding correlates both with 
(what is currently) better integration of the household into the market economy and 
greater use of agrarian resources (grazing and arable land). The first part is illustrated 
by the greater reliance firstly on pensions in both villages and secondly on remittances 
in Loverstwist and on salaries in Hamburg among cattle-holding households for their 
DSL. The second part is demonstrated by the proportionally greater use of arable land 
by cattle-holding households. This also stands to reason, as cattle provide much of the 
draught in both villages.
Households without cattle had ‘jobbing’ as a far more important part of their overall 
livelihoods. This is not unexpected, though, as we might associate cattle, in their 
capacity as a form of savings, with wealthier households (i.e. those who are least 
reliant on ‘jobbing’) anyway. Certainly households holding cattle in both villages 
hosted proportionally more rituals which involved the slaughter of cattle over the two- 
year period 2000-2001. They also had proportionally higher scores for ownership of 
‘luxury’ items, such as a colour television and a fridge, and although they were by no 
means secure in respect of their longer-term livelihood prospects, they were far less 
likely to be among the poorest households in the village. Again, this is self-evident, 
because cattle-holding served as a fairly effective buffer over the medium term against 
the serious impoverishment that was experienced by some households in both villages.
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Table 5.7. Differences between households with and without cattle in 
Loverstwist (n=30) and Hamburg (n=60)
Variable Loverstwist No Cattle
Loverstwist
Cattle
Hamburg No 
Cattle
Hamburg
Cattle
No. o f  
households 21 9 31 29
Mean age of 
H/hold head 54 59 54 65
Mean total 
H/hold size 6,8 9,3 4,6 6,4
Mean H/hold 
size resident 4,7 6,2 3,0 4,3
Female-headed
H/holds 52% 33% 52% 48%
Mean no. 
resident males 0,6 2 0,8 1,6
Mean no.
absent
members 2 3,1 1,6 2,1
Absent
members
employed 12 (57%) 11 (120%) 17(55% ) 34(120% )
Most frequent 
DSL (dominant 
source o f  
livelihood)
Pension (38%) Pension (44%) Jobbing (71%) Pension (55%)
2nd-most 
frequent DSL Jobbing (29%) Remits (33%) Pension (26%) Salary (21%)
3rd-most 
frequent DSL Remits (24%) Jobbing (22%) Salary (3%) Jobbing (17%)
Arable field 7 (33%) 5 (55%) 6 (19%) 11 (38%)
Field in use 3 (14%) 4 (44%) 3 (10%) 16(55% )
No. Slaughter 
Rituals in 2000 
and 2001
3 (14%) 3 (33%) 5 (16%) 8 (28%)
Colour
television 2 (10%) 3 (33%) 2 (7%) 12(41% )
Electric fridge 5 (24%) 3 (33%) 6 (19%) 14 (48%)
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Conclusions
The specific ‘livelihood’ conditions in Peddie District had changed over the past few 
decades. Because of the development of ‘border industries’ and other low-paying 
employment in the region, people were working in more local metropolitan centres 
and were thus able to travel home far more frequently than during the heyday of long­
distance (male) migrancy (De Wet & Holbrook 1997). This meant that some of the 
inherent risks of cattle production (bovine diseases, drought episodes, shortages of 
labour, stocktheft and disputes over grazing), although ever-present, could be better 
anticipated, more speedily acted upon, and ultimately more successfully ameliorated. 
Indeed, it was the rather less common figure of the comparatively well-paid long­
distance migrant worker who came home once or twice a year who was more wary of 
investing his earnings in cattle, particularly in the earlier years of his career.
Given that grazing and animal health services - however insufficient and inadequate 
these were - remained free in these areas, it is clear that keeping cattle remained a 
vital and viable option for a significant number of households. But cattle-holdings 
could use up valuable household cash resources and divert (some) male labour in the 
household from potentially more productive livelihood pursuits. However, once the 
initial expense of investing in them was absorbed, high-value rurally based 
investments like cattle could be useful for the way in which they tended to focus and 
hold the attention particularly of town-based male household members. Cattle thus 
served not only to lock scarce resources in the rural sphere -  resources that might 
otherwise have dissipated rapidly if held as cash or if spent in the urban sphere. They 
also helped to ensure a flow of more resources to the rural homestead, through 
contributions towards the purchases of acaricides, the occasional purchase of a heifer 
or ox, payment of the labour needed for herding and of the costs of hosting ritual 
slaughter events. In short, to build the (rural) home.
I argue that closer monitoring of the changes in the numbers of cattle, the age and 
type (esp. cow-ox) of individual herds and in the nature and number of cattle-holding 
households, which have long remained opaque, can be useful for understanding both 
the state of livelihoods and poverty at the household level and of the overall 
performance and well-being of the rural economy.
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Although intensive specialisation in cattle-holding and production is the preserve of a 
minority of households in rural villages, changing cattle-holdings can serve as an 
index of the negotiation within households regarding strategic livelihood investment 
options, gender roles and the relative economic clout of individual household 
members. The decision, for example, whether to pay for a daughter’s tertiary 
education or to send money to a son struggling to find work in Cape Town could 
provide valuable insights into the politics of intra-household negotiations over value. 
These decisions rested on questions such as whether the son could be relied upon to 
remit some of his income if he found work and the length of time he would continue 
to do this. They also rested on whether the daughter would apply herself to her 
studies or drop out. If she was successful and graduated, would she try to find 
employment locally and contribute financially to the home? If yes, should some cattle 
be sold to pay for her studies or was this too high a risk as she might marry soon and 
make less and less of a contribution to her parental homestead? These sorts of 
questions went to the heart of what it meant to maintain a rural umzi and precisely 
what expectations this engendered among and between household members.
As I have suggested in Chapter Four, in order to understand the forces that were 
pushing for and against a greater concentration of cattle-holding, we must examine 
the structure and the biographies of differently situated rural households and 
individuals that are members of these households. Moreover, contextualising people’s 
lifestyle choices means taking a closer look at their personal biographies, their social 
networks and their broader cultural frames of reference (see Murray 2002). It follows 
from the above that I regard the decision of whether or not to invest in cattle per se 
not as some all-or-nothing cultural imperative (despite the sensibilities of my senior 
male informants), but as a choice that was made and (almost continuously) contested 
in mostly male-headed, but also widow-headed, rural households.
I suggest that, in terms of understanding currently less predictable and more varied 
social and demographic changes taking place, the household developmental cycle is 
less useful than it was 30 years ago. But this is not to deny that many households in 
Peddie District still passed through a fairly recognisable path of change over time, 
and that it is along this long-term trajectory of generational change that we need to 
locate our research subjects (Murray 1981: 89, 2002; Fay & Palmer 2002). Needless
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to say, changes over the course of time in the size and structure of households still 
had a bearing on the balance of intra-household gender and generational power and 
labour availability. In an effort to move beyond the synchronic data-sets presented 
and analysed in this chapter, I make use of the biographical approach in the two 
chapters that follow. The idea is to identify a ‘generation’ or ‘cohort’ and to isolate 
case-studies within these cohorts that capture some of the distinctive features of 
socially different rural households. This is appropriate as the rural Xhosa-speaking 
people I studied did in fact have fairly rigid age-based structural forms that were 
linked to socio-economic entitlements (see Wilson et al. 1952). This affords me a 
way of capturing the effects of historical fluctuations in the wider political economy 
over the past 50-60 years, using the lived experiences of differently aged individuals 
as indicative of these changes.
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CHAPTER SIX
Fanning cattle, cultivating relationships. A 
biographical approach to cattle husbandry
The specific trajectories of individual’s working lives, in circumstances 
of constantly shifting opportunities and constraints, and against the background of 
the changing life-cycles of households and extended families, are important to an 
understanding of patterns of accumulation, dispossession and differentiation (Murray 
2000:139-140).
In the previous chapter, I described who the holders of cattle were and what 
distinguished them, to the extent that they were in any way distinct, from their fellow 
villagers. In the first section of this chapter, I focus on the category of household 
heads aged 65 years and older who headed nearly half the households that held cattle 
in the Peddie District-wide sample. I ask whether it is surprising that the category of 
household heads aged 65 years and older should constitute such a high proportion of 
the cattle-holding households in our sample and whether these households were 
headed by the ‘traditionally inclined’ rural patriarchs who remained attached to the 
complex of cultural values that included holding cattle, in the face of other, possibly 
more advantageous investment opportunities.
In the second section of the chapter, I refer briefly to the engagement of men who 
were younger than 65 years of age with cattle. These were men who were not yet old- 
age pensioners, and thus found themselves in a rather more difficult economic 
predicament from that experienced by senior men over the past ten years. Because of 
space constraints, I am unable to pay as much attention to three younger cohorts (53- 
64 years, 41-52 years and under 41 years of age) of men who headed cattle-holding 
households in Loverstwist and Hamburg.1
11 have placed the case-studies from what initially constituted a separate chapter on ‘Cattle husbandry 
by younger men’ in Appendix Seven of the dissertation.
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A cultural ideal encounters some modern-day snags: Senior men and cattle
From the extensive literature on southern African migrancy, we know that it was 
often the case that the majority of household heads of this senior cohort (65 years and 
over) who still had rural ties sought to retire from urban-based employment and 
become more or less permanently resident in a rural village. Once in the village, they 
generally tried to do two things. Firstly, they sought to at least maintain, and 
wherever possible to improve, their economic position. This often meant nurturing 
the herds of cattle (and also goats and sheep) that they had tried to build up over the 
years of their employed life and perhaps cultivating whatever land they had access to. 
Secondly, they would try to consolidate their control over the labour of the members 
of their household and particularly the fruits of this labour. The examples of 
Sangwane and Matya, both senior men who held cattle, demonstrate this.
The returned migrant: Lisolomzi Sangwane (67 years old), Hamburg
In the 1940-50s, the father o f  Lisolomzi Sangwane [Mlambo clan] had 
lots o f  cattle. He was a migrant worker in Port Elizabeth [‘P.E.’] and 
only came home during holidays. Lisolomzi was the one who herded the 
cattle at that time. As a boy, Lisolomzi went to the mines in eRhawutini 
[Johannesburg] in 1953 for one year. After returning and going to the 
bush [to be circumcised], he went to work on building sites in Port 
Elizabeth, until 1974. Then he worked for Shatterprufe [windscreen- 
makers] until he was pensioned o ff in 1993, which was when he came 
back to his home village. When he was in P.E. he would come home to 
Hamburg at Easter and December. He moved to KwaZakhele from 
Korsten [both outside Port Elizabeth] in 1958, but he never bought a 
house in KwaZakhele. His wife and children stayed in Hamburg all the 
time he worked in P.E. After his divorce from his first wife, he 
remarried in 1980. O f the children from this second marriage, only their 
daughter survived. She lived with them. They were all active members 
o f  the Gospel Ambassadors o f Christ Church.
Lisolomzi’s deceased father’s cattle were okhay’enkhulu [at their big 
home]. His mother was still alive when I interviewed him. She was 95 
years old, and two o f his younger brothers lived at home with her, but in 
their own houses. Lisolomzi had moved away and started his own herd
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by buying cattle. He paid bridewealth with some cattle and more bred in 
his kraal [byre]. He bought cattle mostly from people in the village. 
While he lived and worked in Port Elizabeth, he entrusted his cattle to 
the care of his brother Joel, but since returning permanently to the 
village, he was responsible for these cattle which were at his umzi.
He had a small garden. He had already harvested mealies [maize] and 
when I interviewed him he had only potatoes growing in the garden. He 
received a provident fund pay-out when he retired and was getting an 
old-age pension. His wife was too young to get a pension and she did 
not work. He bought groceries on account at Mrs.Mei [the local shop], 
where he cashed his pension cheque. Lisolomzi did not have a bank 
account nor any policies. He had 12 cattle and a small number of goats.
The peasant farmer: Bawo’uMatya [Mr. Matya], Hamburg village
Zithulele Albert Matya was bom in Hamburg in 1918, making him 83 
years old when I interviewed him. His father, Velani, was bom on the very 
site on which he lived. Bawo ’uM atya’s clan-name was Dlamini. His 
grandfather, whom his father told him had died in 1906, once had many 
cattle. He had worked in the goldmines of eRhawutini. Bawo ’uM atya’s 
father went to work in Cape Town in the docks. The family were left to 
grow up in the village with their mother. She was MamThembu from 
Newtondale in Peddie. Bawo ’uM atya’s father was actively buying cattle 
then and, as the last-bom son, he had inherited Bawo ’uM atya’s 
grandfather’s cattle, as his brothers had predeceased their father. When 
Bawo ’uM atya’s father died in 1932, he was buried in the graveyard in 
Hamburg. Bawo ’uMatya's mother took over his cattle. All these cattle 
died in the drought.
Bawo ’uM atya’s elder brother went to work in Port Elizabeth and he [aged 
22] joined him in 1940 and worked in a bakery. After three years,
Bawo ’uMatya went to Cape Town, where he also worked in a bakery. He 
stayed there for only one year. In 1945, he came back to Hamburg and 
right through to 2001 he never again worked outside Hamburg. Instead he 
busied himself ploughing and looking after cattle. He claimed that he was 
left to look after the home after his elder brother went to Port Elizabeth. 
This brother didn’t send money to their mother, he just stayed in Port 
Elizabeth.
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By contrast, while Bawo ’uMatya was working away, he sent money home 
and he bought a single animal on three [different] occasions. He got 
married in 1948 to a girl from Bell [village]. His wife died after having 
four children. Two daughters survived, had married and lived in Port 
Elizabeth. Bawo ’uMatya remarried in 1972 and had two sons. One was 
still alive and resided in East London. Bawo ’uMatya also had five children 
out of marriage, of whom three survived.
His son in East London gave him money, but only once in two years or so, 
and none of his other children helped him at all.2 He was not helped by his 
brothers or sister earlier in looking after their mother or in cultivating the 
family land in Hamburg.
Bawo ’uMatya was a member of the Zion Church which met for services 
on Sundays. Bawo ’uMatya told me that he still believed in his ancestors 
and, in moving his cattle byre, he would make traditional beer and tell 
them that he had changed the position of his kraal.
He claimed to grow sorghum and maize. Other people didn’t grow 
sorghum, he told me, because it was difficult to keep the birds away from 
the ripening crop. Bawo ’uMatya did the ploughing with his own oxen, but 
he was involved in isahlulo [sharecropping] with three women who did 
the weeding for him.3
He claimed that most of his cattle had died in the many droughts that had 
plagued the area since 1945. After these droughts had broken, he would 
try to exchange his cattle for young females to rebuild his herd. After the 
‘drought of 1979-83’, he only had three animals left and he had to build up 
his herd again from there. In 2000, Bawo ’uMatya was said to have a herd 
of 27 cattle, even though he declared just 11 of them during our survey of 
all the herds in Hamburg.
I argue that it was the longevity and close attention of the household heads like Matya 
that underwrote the integrity of their herds, albeit with occasional drastic drought- 
induced losses. They frequently had a relatively high number of fertile cows in their
2 For reasons I will not go into here, this son grew up in another homestead and is somewhat 
ambivalent about his father.
3 Matya previously used his oxen and wagon to collect building shingle [sand and crushed shells] from 
the beach at Hamburg for sale in the village and neighbouring areas.
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herds which allowed them to practically double the size of their herds every other 
year during good rainfall years, although they experienced problems with calf 
mortalities. As intsika yekhaya [the pillar of the home], they were the primary 
decision-makers in matters concerning their herds, although they conceded the 
necessity of consulting spouses, brothers, adult sons and also knowledgeable and 
trusted friends before making important herd management decisions. There was 
always a chance that their respective herds would dissipate upon their deaths, but 
their widows could maintain and build the herd, as long as the contestation over 
inheritance was minimal. In a situation where the cost of replenishing herds by 
buying calves (invariably heifers) from outside the reserve areas (for instance, from 
white farmers) had been relatively high since the late 1970s, inheritance was one 
mechanism for transferring cattle -  and the myriad responsibilities of being intsika 
yekhaya -  from the men of one generation to those of the next, via the widow of the 
deceased household head. Thus inheritance allowed a small group of younger men to 
establish themselves as holders of cattle.
‘Mystifying9 the relationship between senior men, cattle and the homestead
While the longevity of men who held cattle fed into the ‘mystique’ of the relationship 
between cattle and people, this was in fact a critical area of disjuncture for many 
households in the rural sector (cf. Ferguson 1990). The ‘mystique’ played out on two 
related levels. At the level of the homestead, cattle were seen, in one important and 
widely acknowledged sense at least, as key signifiers of a successful implementation 
of the normative project of ukwakh ’umzi [building the home]. Many of my 
informants, both men and women, took a very practical line on this, contending that 
this long-term project rested on the pillars of primarily the long working career, 
constant social (and ritual) involvement and consistent economic oversight -  including 
marshalling the earnings of his offspring -  by the (male) head of the household, in ways 
that were pleasing to the ancestors of the umzi. Commitment to the timely performance 
of key rituals, which in turn reinforced and ensured the continued goodwill and 
attentiveness of the ancestors, was a signal part of this project. The reward for this 
commitment was the protection of the homestead and its members from supernatural 
harm, which was demonstrated by the material (including bovine) success of the 
homestead, the health of its members and the longevity of its (male) head.
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One ritual that made this link explicit was that of inkonjane.4 On 26 January 2001, 
having recently bought two heifers from a white farmer near Wesley, Mr. Mkhaya 
went to his byre with a clansman (Daliso) and two senior men who were friends of 
his (Ngqala and Mahlobalo). His purpose was to conduct an inkonjane ritual. When I 
asked him about this later, he told me that this ritual was performed whenever a 
person bought a new cow/calf. He had to buy a bottle of brandy and tell the whole 
family (including his ancestors) that he had brought a new animal into the byre. 
Ubulele izinyanya zakhe [he thanks his ancestors] for his good fortune. Some brandy 
was poured onto the ground in the byre for the ancestors and those men present who 
drink alcohol would partake of the brandy. Each would be given a tot to drink until 
the bottle was finished. In this case, most of the men were teetotallers and Mr.
Mkhaya returned the bottle to his steel trunk after the ritual. This simple ritual 
performance, which took only a few minutes to enact, served the very practical 
purpose of informing the ancestors and senior men in the village about the newly 
purchased cattle. They were being asked to witness the fact that these heifers had 
been properly bought and had been marked and placed in the kraal of this umzi. On 
another level, this served as a powerful symbolic means of enhancing solidarity 
between senior men, by including them in the consolidation of the herd and thus the 
material success of the umzi.
Indeed, the relationship between a homestead and the larger village community, 
which could be altered radically by changing economic circumstances or by the 
sometimes unpredictable behaviour of the members of a household, needed 
constantly to be re-affirmed and re-enacted in practice. Cattle in the byre signified a 
moral universe that was in balance, albeit one that could be easily disrupted by a wide 
range of actions or omissions.5 It was a universe in which the social position, dignity 
and relative status of the cattle-holding umzi within the larger community had been 
established and were continually confirmed through both ritual observances and the 
day-to-day actions of its members (McAllister 2001: 178). Siphila phantsi komgquba
4 Also known as ukubingelela. Inkonjane is also the identification markings made by cutting the ear of 
the animal in a particular way. In earlier times, each clan and lineage had its own way of marking the 
ears of their cattle (I am grateful to Nokuzola Mgxashe for pointing this out to me).
5 ‘Cattle look after the family. If there is a problem in the family, especially among women, then you 
will see people with intambo [a necklace around their necks], this is from the inkomo yekhaya [the cow 
of the home]. This will help them... [This] inkomo yekhaya is always a cow. It cannot be sold, even in 
dire circumstances, as to do so, would cause bad luck to the family’ (Mr. Macwembe, 85 years old, 
Hamburg 15 February 2001).
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was what several senior men told me. This means literally that ‘we live under 
manure’.6 Men at the head of households that held cattle could generally be relied 
upon to act reasonably and charitably -  if firmly -  in the patriarchal mould of 
ubudoda. This was the idealised Xhosa notion of manhood, with its associated 
complex of normative behaviour (see Moodie with Ndatshe 1994: 38; Moodie 2001).7 
‘Living under manure’ also meant that one’s chances of being recognised by other 
men and women as a responsible, ‘proper’ Xhosa man were greatly increased. By 
holding cattle, these men had cleared a significant economic and moral hurdle in 
earning the respect of the community, and had a culturally potent and demonstrable 
stake in, and a contribution to make to, the affairs of the community.8
However, the cultural complex of cattle-senior men-homestead was actively 
challenged especially by single, younger and better-educated women and more 
passively by younger men who, in private, poured scorn on rural modes of living, 
even though their chances of escape through, for instance, securing employment in 
the city seemed negligible. The complex could also be undermined by the actions of 
men who were deemed to hold too many cattle or did not play the (cattle-holding) 
game by the locally sanctioned cultural rules.
Pointed comments, like those of Bawo ’uMatya, reinforced the centrality -  at least to 
people in the village -  of the ideology of building the home. Unlike his apparently 
recalcitrant elder brother, who Matya claimed left the village to work in Port 
Elizabeth and then failed to send any remittances to his mother in Hamburg village, 
Matya himself had been both a hard-working farmer and committed builder of the 
home. Even during his short period as a migrant, Matya claimed that he sent money 
home to buy cattle. By his own description at least, Matya had been unswerving in 
aspiring to the moral injunction of ukwakh ’umzi through his constant attention to
6 This, it was explained to me, was most graphic in the way manure was placed under the vats of 
mqombothi [traditional beer] as the beer was brewed in preparation for an ancestor veneration ritual.
7 ‘A man must have cattle. If he has no cattle then he is not a man. Cattle are his bank. We don’t want 
to know how much money he has in the bank, we want to see his cattle in the kraal. Cattle are there to 
plough, milk and to slaughter’ (Mr. Macwembe, Hamburg, 15 February 2001). ‘It is umthetho [Xhosa 
custom] that each house should have a kraaV [byre] (Mr. Mafela, Hamburg, 13 June 2001). Mr. 
Somana told me, with reference to the way a family is judged by the behaviour of the household head, 
that ‘the dignity of the man equals the respect of the family’ (Hamburg, 5 July 2001).
8 ‘In earlier times, men without cattle could not stand up and address a community meeting. We would 
say, ‘who is this person? Where does he come from?’ M.D. Hintsa, Grahamstown, 7 March 1999.
169
agrarian production, both arable and livestock, even though this had not been his only 
source of income over the years. As a result, his strong sense of entitlement to the 
family site and homestead in Hamburg was, at least in his own mind, unquestionable. 
Not only this, but Matya had cemented relations with his neighbours by using his 
herd of cattle to their mutual benefit through their sharecropping relationship.
The same cannot be said for his siblings who had made, he claims, no contribution in 
either caring for their mother or cultivating the arable land of the umzi. Matya’s 
insistence of his own model behaviour in building the home seemed to hint at his 
anticipation of claims from the offspring of his amatshipa [absconder] siblings. These 
people also had some rights to the homestead and associated arable land of their 
deceased grandfather and they may seek to press these claims upon Matya’s death, 
which his elderly (second) wife would have to fend off. Matya’s own children, who 
had not fared any better in supporting their homestead, left Matya with no obvious 
male candidate to whom he might bequeath (via his wife) the homestead and its 
(bovine) assets. This was a situation that could easily result in contestation among the 
next generation of the agnatic cluster.
One point emerging from the above is clear. The decision to contribute towards 
building the home was one that each young adult, particularly if employed, 
necessarily made. However, because most people found employment far from their 
rural homes, their decision to build the home was, at least from the perspective of the 
rural homestead members, easily and worryingly undermined by new-found urban 
concerns. Because of this tension, employed people’s commitment to building the 
home was constantly subjected to scrutiny and comment by their rural relatives. Their 
continued commitment needed to be re-enacted in two ways. It needed to be 
materially demonstrated through such things as regular visits home, the purchasing of 
groceries for the home and of shoes and clothes for children. It also needed to be 
culturally re-enacted through participating in networks of support that actively sought 
employment for rural relatives and unrelated fellow-villagers, and by contributing to 
the performance of rituals and attendance of funerals in the village. Participation in 
imigalelo [rotating credit clubs] and contributions to masingcwabane [burial 
societies] in one’s home village were other ways of demonstrating this commitment.
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To opt out of this project was to place oneself on the fringes of the family, socially, 
economically, ritually and morally. The amatshipa [absconders] were those who slink 
away into the distant townships, who were seldom or never heard from again, and 
who made no visible contribution to their households or to the village at large. They 
were regarded as a threat to both the economic and the spiritual well-being of the 
homestead and, by extension, to the community itself.
This normatively patriarchal value system was rooted in the exogamous patrilineal 
kinship system of Xhosa-speaking peoples in which many people venerated their 
agnatic ancestors and where inheritance was based on agnation and the principle of 
primogeniture. Not surprisingly though, it had been grafted onto the economic 
realities of the day, where formal employment was predominantly urban-based and 
resulted in the social fragmentation and economic differentiation of homesteads and 
villages. Naturally, it was also influenced by the varied religious beliefs (mostly 
Christian-based with sometimes strong indigenous/ syncretic elements) which people 
in these villages held. Thus the senior men who held cattle were unanimous on one 
point. They were the heads of their respective households and the culturally 
legitimate guardians of the destinies of their households. It was thus not by chance 
that, mounted on the lounge wall in the home of the devout Christian, Lusiba 
Sangwane -  who told me emphatically that he ‘believes in his bible, not his 
ancestors’ -  there was a white-on-black plaque which was unequivocal in’its 
pronouncement that Intloko yekhaya nguTata [lit. Father is the head of the home]. It 
was these patriarchal values, in which all adults were implicated, that were a 
significant and consistent site of contestation in households and villages across the 
district.9
While their biographies were intriguingly different, both Sangwane (the returned 
migrant) and Matya (the long-term peasant farmer and minor entrepreneur) were 
good examples of the particular dilemma experienced by this senior cohort of men. 
Their problem was that, even though they controlled a sizeable proportion of the rural 
cattle herd, their command of the labour of their own household members was often
9 My host, Bawo ’uMkhaya [Mr. Mkhaya], commented to me that ‘the children o f the single women at 
Ndlovini are the ones stealing our goats and things, because they have no fathers, no intloko yekhaya 
[male head of household].’ Ironically, it is these same respectable men who have many girlfriends and 
children out of marriage, thereby contributing directly to the ‘problem’ of children with no fathers.
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rather limited. Their labour deficits stemmed firstly, from both men having 
experienced the misfortune of several of their children passing away during their 
lifetimes. But neither had they accumulated sufficient wealth during their working 
life to materially support adult children, especially sons or grandsons, whose labour 
could be wholly harnessed into agrarian production in the rural sector. Consequently, 
neither man could risk overcapitalising his agrarian-based livelihood, whether cattle 
or field-based arable production. However, in a low-income but high-risk economic 
environment, some diversification of one’s sources of livelihood must be the 
economic strategy of choice. On the other hand, neither man had sons or grandsons 
who were actively positioning themselves, through ukwakh ’umzi projects, to inherit 
their cattle. To invest primarily in cattle at this stage of their lives thus made little 
sense to either Sangwane or Matya.
Ideally, herding should be done by a male household member who had the interests of 
the umzi at heart, but this was not always practically possible. The other day-to-day 
tasks associated with cattle husbandry were also primarily the concern of the 
members of each homestead, but could include other members of the agnatic cluster, 
where household labour was in short supply. A situation where unrelated men had to 
be employed to herd cattle was least desirable because they had little spiritual, moral 
or even real economic stake in the survival of the herd. In a typical village situation, 
the jealousy of poorer people was said to be easily aroused by one’s relatively 
bountiful herd of cattle. This could result in depredations against one’s herd, and the 
medicines employed to protect them might not be as effective as they would be if 
deployed by a herdsman who was also a kinsman. Matya, who had 27 cattle and lived 
only with his elderly wife, was in this predicament. An especially fierce old man of 
whom many younger men seemed genuinely scared, Matya relied on the non-kin 
members of the ploughing team (to which he loaned animals) to provide him with 
daily assistance in managing his herd of cattle.
Nor did Sangwane have a resident son, grandson or any other younger patrilineal 
male relative nearby, other than his brothers, who could assist him with the day-to- 
day tasks associated with animal husbandry. These brothers had herds of their own 
and it was uncommon for a senior man who was permanently resident in the village 
generally to herd his cattle with those of his resident brothers. So Sangwane’s
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brothers themselves were of little use to him in this regard. He could, however, 
request that they dispatch one of their sons to herd his cattle. This would be seen in a 
favourable light by his brothers, particularly as Sangwane had no sons of his own 
who would inherit his cattle and his brothers might have seen this as an opportunity to 
assert a posthumous claim to his cattle.
The advanced age profile of the household heads in this cohort does not mean that 
these cattle-holding households were constituted exclusively of elderly people. On the 
contrary, with an average household size in the Peddie District-wide sample of 6,6 
people, it was clear that these were predominantly multi-generational households. 
Typically they included a number of younger people, most often skipping a 
generation to include the grandchildren of the elderly household head. However, with 
the high rural-urban mobility of many younger people, not all of these people were 
consistently resident in their respective rural homesteads.
Animal husbandry work was still performed predominantly by the younger 
generation of boys and young men (usually under 35 years of age). They had an 
important role to play in driving the cattle out to pasture and to the dip-tank. They 
would be sent to search for missing cattle. They also provided the labour to effect 
repairs to the byre and in other matters relating to cattle and small stock (including 
treating common ailments and also milking, where relevant). The importance of the 
ideology of building the homestead in motivating especially young men to continue 
contributing their labour in this way was unequivocal.10
The discussion above has focused on the cultural complex of senior men, cattle- 
holdership and the normative project of building the homestead, but where did this 
leave the senior men who did not hold cattle? Mr. Nathi, a resident of Loverstwist, 
was an example of a senior man who had no cattle.
10 The situation in the small towns of the Eastern Cape, to which retrenched farm-workers were 
moving in considerable numbers, was different: here, it was common to see elderly men sitting in the 
fields and along the road, actively herding their cattle. This speaks eloquently to the fact that they had 
effectively lost control over the labour of their male offspring.
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Mr. Nathi (about 60 years old), without cattle11
Nathi was from Rwantsana farm. From there, he first moved to Hoyi 
[village] and then to Loverstwist. There were cattle before at his home, 
but they died when the family arrived at Loverstwist. Even the goats 
died here. The cattle died because of drought. Nathi was still very 
interested in owning cattle and goats. He thought that if his daughters 
got married he would be able to have cattle again [through the payment 
of lobolo\, because he still wanted to own cattle again.
Interviewer: Which is better, to have money in a bank account or cattle 
in your kraall
Nathi: I don’t have a bank account and I don’t have cattle. The money I 
get from my pension [a disability grant] is not enough to buy groceries. I 
don’t have cattle because I don’t have money. If I can get money, I can 
buy cattle.
Interviewer. What about stock-theft, sickness and drought? Aren’t these 
things that make people wary of buying cattle?
Nathi: No, [they] are not major problems, as I see it.
Interviewer. It is sometimes said that men without cattle are not 
respected in these villages. Would you say that’s true?
Nathi: It is true. I don’t get respect in the village because I don’t have 
cattle, but I do get respect in the church. Xhosa tradition is that you 
aren’t respected if you don’t have cattle. Another thing is money. If you 
have money, people respect you like Jehovah.
Interviewer. Do you plough or cultivate a garden at all?
Nathi: I don’t have a field, but I do have a garden, which is not yet 
ploughed.
Interviewer: Where do you get the manure for your garden and for 
brewing mqombothi [traditional beer]?
Nathi: I will go to my brother if I want manure for the garden, but as I 
am a religious person I don’t make mqombothi at all.
Interviewer: Are you really still interested to have cattle in future?
Nathi: If I had the money, I would definitely go out and buy cattle. It is 
terrible not to have cattle, because cattle in the kraal are the bank of the 
amaXhosa and if you don’t have cattle you are a poor person. I still 
hope to buy goats, because these are very good and grow very fast. In
11 Interviewed by Sonwabo Mase, Loverstwist, 11 November 2001.
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December times, there are many [ritual] things you can do with goats, 
and without them, it is very bad...
Given the other demands on their pensions or grants, saving up enough money from 
these sources of income to buy a heifer was virtually impossible. The reality was that 
elderly men like Nathi, even though they were in the fortunate position of having a 
guaranteed reliable income, were unlikely to hold cattle again. That said, the one ace 
up the sleeve of these elderly men might have been to have any prospective 
bridewealth paid partly in cattle. This obviously only happened in cases where these 
older men had young daughters from a second marriage or from having ‘adopted’ a 
granddaughter at birth and raised her as their own daughter. Even then, however, 
labour constraints for herding such ikhazi [the cattle from bridewealth] and the 
expenses associated with a formal wedding, which often went hand in hand with 
bridewealth payments, might have undermined this scheme.
Cultivating relationships through the exchange and slaughter of cattle
The ways in which people made their cattle work for them in a social and cultural 
sense needs to be examined in more detail. While there were a number of avenues for 
effecting the conversion of cattle into social currency in the village, a key one was 
that of freely sharing meat at particular times with all villagers, as in the case below.
Slaughtering Mr. Mkhaya’s cow
My host in Hamburg village, Mr. Mkhaya (77 years old), announced to 
me one morning that one of his cows was in poor health. Its 
hindquarters had collapsed and the animal could barely walk, let alone 
go out to graze. He did not have a ready explanation for its condition, he 
said, and he (probably mostly as a courtesy) asked my advice. I 
suggested that I could telephone the district state veterinarian, describe 
the symptoms to him, and ask his advice. This was agreed.
The vet advised that the animal be put out of its agony. He said that its 
condition sounded serious, and was probably caused by the growth of 
internal spinal abscesses that developed as the result of numerous 
tickbites over years. These abcesses would eventually have cut off the
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nerve connections in the animal’s lower spine, a painful and debilitating 
condition that was irreversible.
Having already lived with the family for six months and quizzed them at 
some length about their five cattle, I was surprised when Mr. Mkhaya’s 
adult son, Mazizi, and I were dispatched to speak to Mrs. Mawe, a 
widow and pensioner who lived on the other side of the village. Mrs. 
Mawe’s unmarried daughter was the recently elected mayor of 
Ngqushwa [Peddie District] at this time and it had become clear to me 
that old Mrs. Mawe was a force to be reckoned with in the village. We 
were to inform her about the fate of the animal and that Mr. Mkhaya 
wished to slaughter it. When I queried this, I was told that she was the 
real owner of this animal which had been left in Mr. Mkhaya’s care. For 
reasons not made explicit, Mr. Mkhaya said that he would allow Mrs. 
Mawe to choose another of his cows to replace this one. Mrs. Mawe in 
turn asked that Mazizi telephone her teacher son, who lived in Gcinisa 
village [some 20 kms from Hamburg by road]. Mazizi was to tell him 
about the cow. This son was duly informed and agreed to the proposed 
course of action.
By 9h30, the word had gone out and there were 14 young men 
assembled in Mr. Mkhaya’s yard, eager to slaughter the cow and to 
begin cooking the meat over fires of hastily collected brushwood. Mr. 
Daliso, a clansman and fictive son of Mr. Mkhaya, oversaw the 
proceedings. Because this was not a ritual slaughtering, the animal was 
not slaughtered in the byre but alongside it. No women were to be seen. 
Experienced hands thrust a long but apparently blunt knifeblade into the 
terrified beast’s neck, just behind the head, and severed the spinal cord. 
The blood that gushed out of the wound was saved in a basin to be 
cooked and consumed later. When the animal continued thrashing 
about, one of the men suggested slitting its throat as well.
Several young men quickly skinned the carcass and the meat was 
cursorily examined. They discovered that the back of the animal was 
actually broken in two places. A few knifestrokes later and much 
noxious green fluid flowed out of the spinal cord itself. The senior men 
casually looked over the animal and, after some conversation, decided
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that these fractures probably occurred at the dip-tank. Their conjecture 
was that a heavier animal probably landed on top of the still-submerged 
cow and in doing so, fractured its back. With this detail taken care of, 
the animal was deemed fit to eat, the carcass was cut up and some of the 
meat braaied [roasted] on the open fire and the rest set to boil in big 
pots.
Within a matter of minutes, eating commenced. I was invited to sit with 
the few older men who, having been informed of the slaughter, had 
assembled in Mr. Mkhaya’s yard. Younger men brought us some choice 
pieces of meat, including the liver. With one or two exceptions that were 
quickly remarked upon, all the men present observed the age-ranking 
system with regard to seating arrangements, even on this informal 
occasion. This meant that, in constant succession, the youngest man of 
those seated with the senior men would give up his seat to a newly 
arrived more senior man. Mr. Mkhaya, who had been busy inside his 
house with patients [he is an ixhwele or herbalist], joined us in the sun 
and pocket-knives were produced to cut off strips of meat to assist worn 
teeth. Mr. Mkhaya joked that ‘the whole village will be here later, [both] 
men and women, when they see the smoke... ’
Later, a few sizeable pieces of meat were taken down to the local 
highschool by Mr. Daliso to be given as a courtesy to the teachers. Still 
later, when several teachers arrived to partake in the meat at the Mkhaya 
homestead, there was some speculation by Messrs. Mkhaya and Daliso 
as to whether the school principal had actually shared the meat provided 
with the other teachers or simply took all of it for herself....
In acting out this role of benefactor, Mr.Mkhaya was doing exactly what the 
community expected of a senior man in his (relatively wealthy) position. ‘His’ 
animal, which was worth about R2,000 at the time, was in terminally poor health. He 
was doing the normative thing of slaughtering it and sharing the meat with everyone 
in the village, including his patients who were not local residents, but who had 
travelled from elsewhere to consult him about their ailments. I estimated that about 
40 people, many of them among the neediest in the village, ate as much as they could 
consume of the meat on offer, and this number was similar in other instances. More 
men than women attended on this occasion, but this was not always the case. A few
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large cuts of the meat were carried into the kitchen of the Mkhaya residence, where 
the meat would be prepared on the stove for the family’s (and visitors’) consumption 
and some was refrigerated to be cooked and eaten later.
Mr. Mkhaya lost interest in the proceedings soon after the initial consumption of meat 
and went back indoors. No-one thanked him formally or informally for providing the 
meat, nor was anyone obliged to do so. Some men commented on the tenderness of 
the meat, but this seemed to be more a way of lubricating the conversation, leading as 
it did to comparisons with other types or ages of cattle and the toughness of the meat 
at other such occasions. When I remarked towards the end of the day that he had been 
generous ‘in feeding the people’, Mr.Mkhaya agreed easily but indicated that rather 
than being an act of individual generosity, this display of ubudoda was what was 
expected of men with cattle. His next comment was equally instructive. This sort of 
behaviour, he said, was not like that of
some people...like Radebe the teacher who, when they see an animal [of 
theirs] is ill, they quickly slaughter it and sell the meat to the people in 
the village...people come to buy this meat and eat it without any 
knowledge o f  the reason for its illness.
The concern expressed here was twofold. Mr. Mkhaya was concerned about the anti­
social nature of one of the wealthiest men in the village selling meat (i.e. specifically 
beef, since pork and chickens are regularly sold) in the village. He was also 
concerned about the failure to discuss the matter with other senior men so as to 
inform them of one’s predicament, to get their opinions for making an informed 
diagnosis of the animal’s condition and to put forward one’s proposed solution to the 
problem. Indeed, when I later asked the 38-year old policeman, Mandla Gushana, 
upon discovering that his sick animal, which was worth by his estimate about R800, 
‘only had brown liquid on its brain’, why he did not opt to sell the apparently 
uncontaminated meat to local people or meat-buyers from Mdantsane, he was visibly 
taken aback. ‘It is not possible to sell a sick animal,’ he told me. He then spelled out 
that he could not contemplate the sale of meat from a sick animal to his neighbours 
and fellow villagers and that he was certain that the meat-buyers from Mdantsane 
would not be interested in buying a sick animal. He had no problem selling an animal 
for slaughter to a neighbour, nor with selling a fertile animal, if he had a cash
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shortfall in an emergency, but selling a sick animal, and a calf at that, was 
unthinkable.
Although some of the other younger men, wealthy in cattle, were not playing the 
game entirely by these rules, senior men could be relied upon to follow the pattern 
described above. As a result, the cattle of these senior men were watched keenly by 
all men and boys in the village (some would say too keenly). Any indication of 
bovine ill-health was monitored very closely for a sign that an opportunity to help 
slaughter the animal and to eat the meat was at hand.12 For their part, the mostly 
younger men with large herds who were regarded by poorer villagers as ‘proud’ and 
‘stingy’ were chided whenever an occasion arose to do so, for not sharing their wealth 
in cattle by the local cultural norms that applied to amadoda anenkomo [men with 
cattle].
Effecting ties that bind
Another social dimension of successful cattle husbandry involved the ways in which 
animals were loaned out and exchanged with other families. I was consistently told 
by informants that the ‘traditional’ practice of ukunqoma [the ‘loaning out’ of cattle 
by large herd-holders to build up patron-client relationships and to minimise risk] had 
‘died with our grandfathers ’ , i.e. was not practised these days (see Kepe 2002b). 
However, I slowly uncovered evidence to show that the practice had effectively been 
inverted. Instead of the holders of large herds13 loaning out some of their cattle to
12 The frequent references in my fieldnotes indicate how common this was, particularly during winter. 
On 4 May 2001, the Nyongo family have slaughtered a cow because of its advanced age and people 
have turned out to eat it. On 8 May 2001, a young ox at the Gushana homestead is suspected of having 
contracted inyongo [gallsickness] and is to be slaughtered. I asked who would alert the household 
head, Mr.Zilindile Gushana, as he has a painting job in Maqubeni (the formerly ‘white’ residential area 
of Hamburg), so that he could set the knives to work. Returning later the same day from another 
interview, I found the animal slaughtered with the consent, not o f Mr.Gushana, but by his deceased 
brother’s second eldest son, Mandla Gushana, who, I was informed, was the actual owner of the ox. On 
9 May 2001, Galelekile Masi says that Mzukisi Mthoba slaughtered an old cow on Tuesday at Qolweni 
that was sick. Someone reported that John Tozi has a sick Brahman ox. It is said to be coughing -  a 
sign of TB -  but Thumelekile Goje says he saw it in the veld and it looked better now. He says, 
however, that one of Ndindwa’s animals has been sick for the past few days and is being watched 
closely. It is duly slaughtered on 11 May 2001. On 12 June 2001, eleven men assembled at Mpahlaza’s 
place to slaughter and eat a sick calf while on 30 June 2001, a crowd assembled to eat the calf that had 
died at Mr. Macwembe’s place the day before.
13 Based on the observations of informants, I take a large herd to consist of 12 or more cattle, although 
my informants generally spoke of a man with 20 cattle as umntu onemfuyo eninzi [a person with many 
cattle].
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destitute families, it was the families with few cattle who requested that successful 
cattle-holders include their few animals into these larger herds.
The intention and indeed the effect was the same as before, at least from the 
perspective of the holders of small herds. Their aim was to establish and cement 
social ties of trust and patronage. Crucially, they also got around the problem of 
insufficient household labour resources for herding in their own households and 
thereby saved on the costs of having to hire labour to herd and husband their cattle. 
There was, moreover, the possibility of benefiting from this person’s superior animal 
husbandry knowledge, with explicit reference sometimes made to his supernatural 
prowess with cattle, and his superior resources with respect to dipping, inoculating 
and treating sick animals, that could mean the difference between a poorer family’s 
animals surviving an untimely disease or succumbing to it.
Widows heading households that held cattle appeared to be most likely to resort to 
this practice of ‘placing’ their animals. This was often simply because they did not 
have sufficient control over the labour of a son or young male relative who could do 
the ‘men’s work’ of herding and managing their animals.14 In these circumstances, 
they sought ideally to place their animals with a male relative, usually a brother or a 
male consanguine, or trustworthy friend or neighbour who was a successful 
herdsman.
This option might also have been more attractive to widows who feared that their 
deceased husband’s kin would lay claim to the cattle that they inherited upon their 
husband’s death. In other ways too, widows could find themselves in structurally 
vulnerable positions, especially given the reality that most witchcraft accusations 
were directed against single and elderly women (cf. Englund 2002; Niehaus 1997). It 
was thus a prudent strategy for vulnerable women to ally themselves with influential 
senior men (and women) in the village. One way, although by no means the only 
way, of doing this was by placing some or all of their cattle with senior men in order 
to cultivate a relationship with them that may have helped to shield them from such 
odious accusations.
141 found only one example in the two villages (with a combined total of 149 cattle-holding 
households) where a (young) woman was the regular herder of the homestead’s cattle.
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Becoming active members of local societies and church groups, as well as helping 
with the preparations at other people’s rituals, were other strategies that vulnerable 
women adopted. The animals thus loaned were frequently included, for reasons of 
practicality, in the herd register of the recipient, thereby contributing to an apparent 
increase in the number of cattle held by these men. This practice played havoc with 
the dipping foreman’s often casual attempts to record cattle numbers accurately. 
Consider the case of the cattle in Mrs. Mapela’s byre.
The case of Nontembeko Mapela (65 years old)
Mrs. Mapela was a widow and an old-age pensioner. She had two cattle 
that were loaned out. One was an ox on loan to her brother in Hamburg 
village. She said that the animal was left at his home at a time when she 
had no-one to look after it, as her [grand]children were too young.
Another ox was on loan to her sister’s husband on Mthana farm, 
adjacent to Hamburg. Mrs. Mapela said that the grazing was better in 
this area, so the animal would grow faster there. Whilst these two were 
her own cattle, there were a further eight animals in her byre held by her 
son, Mzukisi Mapela (33 years old), who worked in Port Elizabeth. He 
inherited these eight cattle from his deceased uncle, Mthobeli Ntenge.
The cattle at this homestead were cared for by Lunga Mapela, a 17-year- 
old youth, who was the grandson of Mrs. Mapela.
The lack of labour for herding also constrained some households that were headed by 
men. Zamani Matshoba, who worked in East London and thus lived outside the 
village for much of the time, arranged for his self-employed neighbour in Hamburg, 
Zwelidumile Bacingwa, to look after his 12 cattle in his absence. In another case, the 
pensioner Thandumzi Nxamani, who lived in Loverstwist with his wife and two sons, 
held eight cattle, and looked after the seven cattle of his absent neighbour, Vuyisile 
Peter.
A less visible and clearly less socially palatable variation on the theme of ‘placing’ 
one’s cattle was the notion of cattle being given as surety against loans provided to 
needy individuals. The biggest cattle-holder in Hamburg, Khayalethu Mapayi, used to 
be a money-lender in the village. There were cattle in his herd that had been ‘placed’
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there by other people, especially widows. At times it proved difficult to unearth the 
specific reasons that individuals had for placing all or some of their cattle with the 
holders of larger herds, especially when they clearly had sufficient labour (at the time 
of my enquiry anyway) to herd their cattle. None of the people I interviewed 
volunteered that their animal was in someone else’s byre as surety for a loan, but 
some of the responses to this line of probing were ambivalent or vague, suggesting 
that something of this nature might in fact be the case. To be sure, there was an 
almost constant movement of work-seeking men, especially young men, between the 
village and the cities of East London and Port Elizabeth. What this means was that 
people who held cattle continually had to adjust their strategies to best exploit the 
male labour available to them to ensure that their cattle were not neglected.
Exchanges of cattle
Selling cattle, particularly to white buyers in the morally negative space that was the 
extra-village stock sale situation, was widely regarded as a socially undesirable 
economic necessity. It was particularly undesirable for the way it publicly exposed 
the acute need of households forced to engage in a ‘distress’ sale to the white 
outsiders. It was also undesirable because the sale (rather than exchange) of any 
animal to white buyers was seen as detracting from the project of building the 
homestead, which was epitomised by an increase in cattle numbers. By extension, 
selling an animal at the stocksale also deprived the community of their rights to this 
animal. In contrast, selling to other members of the village community was less 
problematic because, as McAllister (2001: 180) points out, ‘people are implicated in 
the building of every homestead’ in the village. This included selling or exchanging 
animals with other homesteads, so that their material or spiritual well-being may be 
improved.
Where cattle were sold in the village, the holders of cattle couched their need to sell 
in the idiom of a charitable act, as an instance of masincedisane [let us help each 
other]. This meant they spoke of the sale as an example of their helping the person or 
family in question so that they might conduct their funeral or ancestor ritual 
successfully. Where the seller was not desperate for cash, he or she might try to 
negotiate an exchange of cattle, rather than take ‘slippery’ cash for the desired animal.
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Direct exchanges of cattle were only possible, of course, between cattle-holding 
households and these circuits thus excluded the households that were without cattle.
Such exchanges -  and sales -  of cattle amongst households in the village were yet 
another way in which people tried to cultivate and cement relationships. In fact, the 
buying and selling of cattle were probably the most significant (in cash terms) 
economic activity carried on between households in rural Peddie District.15 These 
exchanges happened fairly regularly, as both people with and those without cattle 
seek out cattle, held by other households, that were deemed suitable for building their 
herd or for slaughter at their funerals and ancestor-veneration rituals.
Invariably, the terms of any exchange of animals between villagers, which usually 
involved payment in cash for an animal, corresponded more with the nature, history 
and closeness of the relationship between the two parties and with their reading of 
their positions of relative need than with the optimum cash price that could be 
achieved were the animal to be sold at the stocksale. These sorts of calculations are 
not unusual, because exchange everywhere, Ferguson (1992: 56) has noted, is 
culturally constituted and ‘hedged in’ by particular moral, legal and cultural 
principles. In this, the exchange of cattle between households in rural Peddie was no 
different. Every exchange was a social encounter in which all the nuanced implicit 
meanings and markers of social relationships, including ties of kinship, clanship or 
neighbourhood, estimations of social difference and distance, as well as calculations 
regarding expectations of reciprocity and estimations of generalised demand and 
relative neediness, were considered prior to and during the transaction itself.
The movement of cattle through sale and exchange around the village and between 
villages can provide valuable clues to the topography of social relationships and 
economic differences between homesteads, as rural people struggled to secure their 
livelihoods and to build their homesteads. Without doubt, exchanging cattle was all 
about realising value, but this value was not measured merely by the cash-equivalent 
value of the animal(s) in question. Rather, each exchange presented households with 
cattle with an opportunity to enhance or dent their social standing, by displaying
15 Probably matched only by the payment for the annual ploughing of arable lands by oxen or by 
tractor.
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generosity and fair play or by driving a hard bargain and running the risk of being 
accused of stinginess. Their choices over time would become well-known to other people 
and would affect their social network and influence in the village and the local area.
Was Nolakhi re-affirming her alliances by exchanging cattle?
Nolakhi Melwane, a member of the Radebe clan, was 62 years old. She 
was a widow and an old-age pensioner. She was also an igqira 
[traditional healer] and acknowledged as a powerful and well-connected 
woman in Hamburg village. Nolakhi was recently involved in two 
exchanges of cattle with senior men in the village, namely Mzwanele 
Mahlobalo and Mthozamile Raduma (both Radebe clan). The latter was 
the holder of the second biggest herd in Hamburg.
In both instances, she exchanged an ox for a cow. The exchanges were 
probably on terms unfavourable to her, since people usually reckon an 
ox to be worth more than a cow, but as her stated reason for these 
exchanges was that she wanted to have more cattle, the cows were likely 
to have fully or nearly fully functional udders -  a rarity in this tick- 
infested area in which tick-damage to udders was common -  and were 
thus worth more than usual to local people.
When I came to hear of these exchanges, the cow exchanged with 
Mahlobalo had already calved at Nolakhi’s homestead. She had not yet 
collected the cow from Raduma’s kraal and seemed likely to leave it 
there, perhaps until it was pregnant. The cattle were cared for by her 
son, Ace (35 years old), a one-time municipal councillor but who was 
then unemployed, and by two younger grandsons who lived with 
Nolakhi.
Why was this particular case of interest? All around the village, there was evidence of 
people’s herds flourishing with the good rains in recent years and the ample grazing 
available as a result of these rains. Oxen in particular were generally a strategic 
resource in the village environment, because they were sought after for use in 
ploughing and they served as high-value goods which could be sold at the stocksale 
in cases of acute need. Moreover, they were used for important ritual slaughter,
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associated with the death of household heads. Unlike cows or bulls, they did not, 
however, actively build one’s herd. Nolakhi had decided that she wanted to benefit 
from the current favourable climatic conditions by building her herd and exchanged 
her remaining oxen for cows.
Having acknowledged that it makes economic sense during a high rainfall cycle to 
buy cows and build one’s herd, what social explanation can be put forward for the 
way she went about doing so? Why did Nolakhi choose this moment to exchange her 
oxen and why with these particular two men? In the first instance, both men were 
clansmen of hers and both were amenable to an exchange of animals with her. Part of 
the explanation, I think, must also lie with the fact that Nolakhi’s son, Ace, was 
recently accused of raping a retarded minor and, while the court case was pending, he 
had been reduced to idling at home, out of the public eye, but still very much in the 
village.
I think that Nolakhi spent time negotiating the exchange of cattle with these two 
influential clansmen in an attempt to smooth some of the ruffled feathers in the 
community, where frustration at the behaviour of wayward young men like her son 
had reached boiling point. It also seemed very likely that she decided that Ace 
literally needed ‘something to do’, particularly since he was now dependent on her 
old-age pension for his livelihood. Herding cattle, although not something that Ace 
himself would have relished, would contribute towards rehabilitating his shattered 
reputation in the community. His belated assumption of an activity so strongly 
associated with the precepts of ubudoda [manhood] would send a powerful signal to 
the abantu abakhulu [big people] in the village that his social rehabilitation was * 
underway. Furthermore, Nolakhi’s plan was likely to keep him from idling away at 
the shebeen [drinking house] where, in his present state, he was likely to work up a 
sizeable debt that she would be regarded as the guarantor of. Lastly, she was 
ensuring that he contributed in a visible and culturally potent way to (re)building the 
homestead, both materially, by supplying the labour needed to husband their new 
herd, and socially, by rebuilding their bridges with other homesteads in the village.16 
Whether Ace would buy into his mother’s plans remained to be seen. If he chose not
16 Using her oxen to form a ploughing team might have been another strategy. This would have 
required Ace to be adept at ploughing, which was not the case.
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to, his dim hopes of reclaiming his political and social position in the Hamburg 
community were probably doomed.
Changes in the rural economy: Cattle husbandry by younger men
It emerged from my detailed interviews with younger men (i.e. in the various roughly 
11-year cohorts of less than 64 years of age) that the observable socio-economic 
differentiation in the village could be linked to the varied life (especially 
employment) experiences and the different cultural politics of successive 
‘generations’ of individual adult men and women. It emerged, for example, that while 
some men had quite consciously stuck to one or two jobs through their working lives, 
other men had moved between jobs with greater frequency. Their more intermittent 
periods of work were punctuated by what were often longer periods of 
unemployment.
These differences in individual employment histories could, in many instances, be 
correlated with their differentiated accumulation of material possessions and 
associated social prestige, of owning what I call their visible projects of homestead 
consolidation,17 Of course, several other factors such as educational levels, a spouse’s 
employment history and the relative success of adult children in securing employment, 
as well as a measure of good fortune and the extent to which individuals were able to 
grasp and capitalise on such good fortune, also had a significant bearing on these 
projects of consolidation.18
Many of the men I interviewed were carefully marshalling their bovine assets in an 
attempt to increase their herd and thus strengthen their financial position, while also 
keeping an ear out for local piece-work or urban-based employment opportunities. 
Building their herds was subject to social pressures, as well as domestic demands for
17 Measures that were used by villagers to gauge the relative material (and thus social and ritual) 
success of these projects tended to focus on visible, static investments such as those in brick-and- 
mortar homes comprised of a number of extensions and separate outbuildings, and the ownership of 
motorcars and tractors. Investments in the education of one’s children and in cattle (and small stock) 
ownership were further important measures. Regular evidence o f conspicuous consumption, especially 
by way of the adequate provision and consumption of food and liquor for all who attended a 
homestead’s rituals, was another important index.
18 As Sharp (1994: 77) points out, creating and maintaining stability or a secure base within the rural 
housestead, tended to generate larger flows of remitted wage income from migrant workers who chose 
to remain attached to such households, thereby compounding their opportunities for successful 
accumulation.
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food and clothing. Men in this category needed to develop the skills to manage the 
complicated and contradictory livelihood projects of fulfilling their masincedisane 
obligations as men with cattle and of staving off the demands on their herds 
originating from relatives and fellow-villagers. Given the dominant patriarchal social 
ethic, cattle were important instruments of associational village life, helping to build 
and sustain relationships between people and households, both within the village and 
between villages and, more crucially, with those who were away in the cities.
Although virtually all men benefited from the patriarchal dividend, it was the big 
herd-owners (who were often in their early 50s), who tended to act as the sturdy 
patriarchal bulwark against various pressures for social (and agrarian) change.19
By contrast, poverty-stricken men, who often lived alone or in socially marginal 
households, were frequently alcoholic and were social failures in several senses.
They failed to live up to the Xhosa ideal of a man’s role, as husband and father, being 
that of intsika yekhaya [the pillar of the home]. These were the men whom many 
women in the village referred to as ‘useless’ and with whom most women (even kin) 
tried to minimise their social interaction. Because of their poor social standing, these 
men undermined the dominant patriarchal order in rural villages across Peddie 
District, which rested on constructions of men as breadwinners and providers in their 
households and as the arbiters of moral authority in the home and the community. 
These men were evidence of the failure of this dominant masculinity to adjust 
adequately to structural changes in the economy. Their predicament also put serious 
strain on the masincedisane [let us help each other] norm, because they could not be 
relied upon to pass on whatever help they received from other households to their 
dependents or other struggling kin. Moreover, they were unlikely to ever be in a 
position to reciprocate the material assistance provided to them.
Men of 40 years of age and younger, trading on the culturally enclaved status of cattle, 
were not averse to investing some of their resources in cattle. Many of them had only 
temporary jobs and resolved to convert some of their ‘slippery’ cash into ‘hard’ cattle. 
This served to protect their resources from the relatively expensive hard-living
19 Their age category was probably related to the fact that many of them appeared to have commenced 
their serious accumulate cattle in the 15 or so years since the 1982-84 drought. The ‘patriarchal 
dividend’ is a concept coined by Connell (1995: 79) to describe ‘the advantage men in general gain 
from the overall subordination on women.’
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lifestyle that they and their unemployed friends sought to maintain in the village. This 
lifestyle included feeding off each other’s incomes derived from ‘jobbing’ for the 
purposes of visiting shebeens, travelling around locally or to town, buying gifts for 
girlfriends and so on. They found that buying cattle provided them with a culturally 
resonant foil which legitimated tying up some of their disposable cash in the umzi 
byre, where it was safe from predation by friends in need of cash or the demands of 
their girlfriends and the mothers of their children.20
For young men who still lived at home, a similar pattern emerged. Many young men 
had responsibilities towards the (often several) children they had fathered with 
girlfriends in the village or neighbouring area. As long as a young man was 
unemployed, even the courts, to which young women resorted to force and enforce the 
payment of child maintenance, were powerless to act against him. As soon as a man 
found work and began to earn a wage, these demands on his cash wages could be 
almost overwhelming. Having built up considerable debts with siblings and friends, 
not to mention outstanding ‘credits’ at shebeens and izirhoxo [small shops selling 
household goods], these men were also likely to be accosted by the mothers of their 
children, eager to press their entitlements to some of the young man’s newly earned 
wages. Diverting some of their earnings into the purchase of cattle, that were then 
placed in the relative security of the family byre, could be an effective strategy for 
avoiding some of these onerous demands, while at the same time winning kudos from 
their parents, siblings, extended families and other people in the village for their 
contribution to building the home. It is worth emphasising, however, that my case- 
studies point to the fact that purchasing cattle for the homestead byre was most 
attractive to the first-born (or eldest surviving) sons and much less so to other sons, 
who recognised that they might struggle later, once their parents were deceased, to 
retrieve the cattle they had contributed to the parental byre.
20 During fieldwork, it transpired that buying cattle also helped these young men to launder the 
relatively large sums of money they earned from illegal abalone harvesting into the village economy.
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Conclusions
I have provided ethnographic material in this chapter to show that cattle constituted a 
culturally potent and economically significant mechanism for accumulation and 
upward mobility, at least for a considerable proportion of the male section of the rural 
population. In focussing on the senior cohort of cattle-holding household heads, I 
found ukwakh ’umzi [to build the homestead] to be an important cultural script that 
informs many of their social, economic and ritual investments in their rural homes. I 
argued that this was undoubtedly partly an artefact of the considerable urban-rural 
straddling in which most households of necessity continued to engage.
In seeking answers to the question, ‘why do people invest specifically in cattle?’, I 
found that cattle retained and even increased their cash-equivalent value well. In this 
sense, they were valuable assets in an otherwise asset-poor environment. At the same 
time, and unlike money in the bank, they were also socially embedded in the 
relationships between people in the rural villages of Peddie District, helping to 
smooth over glaring differentials in wealth between households. In a variety of ways, 
cattle were made to work for people, and especially men, to help build their imizi and 
their social networks and to cement their standing in the moral economy of the 
village. In Gudeman’s (2001) terms, cattle helped to build the base.
At the same time, cattle allowed men without cattle to gain a modest but legitimate 
and, importantly, a masculine livelihood in working for and interacting with men and 
women in the households that held cattle. Because cattle were considered to be a 
special category of thing, every person in the village had a stake in all the cattle, even 
though the cattle were held by a minority of households. But the special status of 
cattle needed constant reinforcement and policing. Where some cattle-holding 
households deviated from the cultural script, the overall ‘mystique’ associated with 
cattle-holding showed signs of strain and the values of ‘community’ were 
undermined.
As pointed out in Chapter Four, possibly the most significant event in the first post­
apartheid decade, at least in respect of the economy of the former bantustan areas, 
was the coincidence of an increase in the value of social welfare transfers with a
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marked decrease in employment opportunities for middle-aged and young men. More 
and more elderly and disabled people were able to secure access to pensions and 
grants (and latterly young mothers to child-support grants) since April 1994 in what 
effectively became government’s main mechanism for wealth redistribution (Sagner 
2000). But securing an old-age pension upon reaching the requisite age did not 
resolve rural people’s livelihood dilemmas. The pension represented a cash income 
that was easily dissipated by the constant stream of material needs within each 
extended household. Indeed, research in Peddie District showed that the households 
in receipt of pensions tended to have more resident members who were dependent or 
who made demands on this source of livelihood. In this situation, tying up part of the 
wealth of one’s household in cattle, which enjoyed the status of a special category of 
good, could be an attractive strategy to beleaguered household heads while they tried 
to secure entitlements to alternative cash incomes.
This chapter suggests that, as long as a sizeable proportion of senior household heads 
continued to hold sufficient cattle that could underwrite the conduct of rituals and 
lubricate social relations in the village, cattle would form a significant part of the 
rural economy. Indeed, it was increasingly those in the younger age cohorts who 
headed their own households who appeared to be interested in cattle. At one level, the 
approach of younger men to cattle was similarly informed by patriarchal notions of 
ubudoda [manhood], ukwakh ’umzi [building the home] and masincedisane [let us 
help each other]. At another level, there was some evidence of a creeping 
commercialisation in the way these younger generations of men held and managed 
their herds which posed a challenge to the dominant patriarchal livelihood and social 
projects of rural households. In the next chapter, I turn to examine some of the gender 
and generational struggles for the homestead in rural Peddie District in which cattle 
were implicated.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
‘Amadoda ahamb ’emva '. Gender and generational 
struggles for the homestead in Peddie District1
The politics of commodities are always twofold: interested categories of people 
enter into contestation not only over who will have the goods, but equally over 
how the terrain o f goods itself will be structured. And this contestation is not 
only political, but simultaneously moral, legal, and cultural (Ferguson 1992: 70).
Introduction
In an important collection of essays, Hodgson and others set out to deconstruct the 
‘enduring myth of the patriarchal African pastoralist’ (Hodgson [ed.] 2000). Hodgson 
(2000a: 4) argues that as the attention of anthropologists has shifted to more 
processual, historically informed and actor-oriented approaches, so their work has 
increasingly revealed both ‘the complexities and contradictions that organize social 
relations’ and the ‘heterogeneity, fluidity and dynamism of the social relations 
themselves.’
Hodgson is especially critical of earlier (male) ethnographers of African pastoral 
societies for their too-easy acceptance of the ‘male point of view’ as reality, rather 
than as ideology, which led them to repeat and thereby reinforce these ‘androcentric 
ideologies’ in their scholarship (Hodgson 2000a: 3-5; see Layton 1997: 187-190). 
Where Hodgson is undoubtedly correct is in her insistence that ‘pastoral life, and 
therefore pastoralist gender2 relations, is about more than just livestock production’ 
and that ethnographers would do well to consider the full house of historically
1 Literally, ‘men are walking at the back or behind [these days].’ It was a common practice for Xhosa 
men to stride out ahead of their wives, rather than to walk alongside them. The quotation refers to the 
way in which women were taking the lead in the home and the village. In my analysis here, I am mindful 
of Jones’ (1996: 102) critique of the ‘male marginalisation’ thesis which purports to explain the 
marginality of black men within the family in terms of their structural marginality of society as a whole 
(see Sansom 1974: 171). Jones argues that this denies the agency of black women, by appending them to 
men’s experiences and structural position, and thereby undervaluing the agency, resilience and creativity 
of these women in dealing with considerable adversity (cf. Van der Vliet 1991).
2 1 adopt Hodgson’s (2000a: 5) definition of gender to mean the ‘mutually constitutive symbolic and 
material relations of power between and among men and women. Gender roles and relations are 
dynamic, historical and produced through the actions and ideas of men and women, in interaction with 
local and translocal processes and structures’. Though as MacDonald et al. 1997 (quoted in Chant & 
Gutmann 2000: 4) note, ‘...in the world as it is at present, gender relations are a hierarchy with men at 
the top.’
situated meanings, perspectives and relationships between men and women (Hodgson 
2000a: 4-5). In an approach similar to the one I have taken throughout this 
dissertation, Hodgson (2000a: 9-10) suggests that
The stereotype of the patriarchal family (male head of household with wife 
and dependent children) is in fact only one stage in the developmental cycle of 
family growth and decline.. .As members of the household move through their 
life-cycles, it is inevitable that the gendered relations of power within the 
domestic unit shift accordingly...Such cyclical transformations are further 
complicated by broader historical changes in the political economy which can 
disrupt household production and reproduction, increase and even 
institutionalise social stratification, dismantle household security networks, 
and restructure generational relationships of dependence and independence.
Irrespective of the gender of the ethnographer, however, it was extremely rare (but 
not entirely unheard of) to see women engaged in driving cattle, dipping or spraying 
cattle or in ploughing in rural village contexts throughout the Eastern Cape during my 
period of fieldwork. The near-absence of women from the sphere of cattle was a 
cultural artefact which was consistently applied in the villages of Peddie District 
(Steyn 1988; cf. Potts 2000: 817).3 Women were infrequent sellers at the local 
stocksales and only widows and those who headed their own households who had 
inherited cattle actually attended stocksales (and then rarely) in order to sell an 
animal.
Moreover, since married women were not supposed to cross the courtyard nor enter 
the byre of their married home, nor that of any household other than the households 
of her grandfather, father or her brothers, it was rare for women to milk cows and 
unheard-of that they would participate in the actual slaughter of cattle (Mtuze 2004). 
Even the female meat-sellers who visited the villages from East London in order to 
buy animals were no exception. These women paid men to slaughter the animals they
3 1 do not pursue the interesting question of the extent to which this exclusion was also a political and 
economic artefact, which had been enforced more strictly (by senior men) since the mid-1970s when 
the men who were retrenched from town-based jobs were pushed back into their home villages 
(compared to the 50-60 years prior to that when male labour for animal husbandry was in short 
supply). However, as I hinted earlier, it is fair to accord some role in this regard to the colonial, 
apartheid and bantustan states in ‘overlaying systematic racial discrimination with gender-based 
discrimination’ (Walker 1990b; Bryceson & Bank 2001: 7). To take one example, the Home 
Improvements section of the Ciskeian Department of Agriculture and Forestry, employed only women 
-  17 of them in 1984 -  to provide ‘agricultural’ extension services to women in ‘feminine’ matters 
relating to personal hygiene, food preparation and preservation, vegetable gardens, clothes-making, 
poultry and home industries (De Beer 1986: 182,192; Mager 1999).
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bought in the village, to carve up the meat and bundle it into their vehicles before 
they drove it away and sold it at the taxi-rank in town.
But while women in rural Peddie District played an insignificant role in daily tasks 
relating to cattle-holding, husbandry and exchange, this does not mean that they were 
not involved in the politics of cattle-holding. This, of course, is Hodgson’s point and, 
indeed, all adult women participated keenly in the day-to-day financial goings-on of 
their respective households. They also actively contested the nature and necessity of 
expenditure and consumption and the struggles over the apportionment of labour, 
scarce cash and other material resources in meeting the livelihood needs of the 
household. In the households that held cattle or wished to hold cattle, older and 
younger women were known to apply pressure on husbands, fathers, sons and other 
male relatives to use the cattle of the umzi to serve particular consumption interests and 
projects of accumulation (as with the umzi of Gcinikhaya Mkhaya in Chapter Four).
Such contestation does not imply that married women (or other women) were 
necessarily or always opposed to investments in cattle, since cattle were, as I have 
argued, clear evidence of the efforts of all household members (including women) to 
build the homestead. Further, money invested in cattle was money saved for future 
use (rather than squandered on alcohol, for instance), although usually for fairly 
specific, even prescribed, expenditure, such as the paying of school fees or the costs 
of a funeral or another ritual.
The interviews I conducted with women and men made it clear that, although married 
men as household heads (a relatively modest proportion of the households in my 
sample of 90 households)4 may conduct and control in a public sense the activities 
that related to the husbandry, purchase, sale and slaughter of cattle, these activities 
took place in consultation and only after reaching some degree of agreement with 
their respective wives on how to proceed with their plans. One middle-aged 
unemployed man whose umzi held eight cattle (inherited from his father), and who 
relied on his wife who was employed in town to give him pocket money, told me that
4 Forty per cent o f the households in my Loverstwist sample and 32% of the households in the 
Hamburg sample were headed by married men.
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‘[I]t is very difficult to be a man these days, really.. .my wife is.. .[continually] 
wanting to know about this and the cost of that... ’
As social spaces and economic opportunities opened up for more women, especially 
younger (employed) and older (pensioned) women, so the push for greater 
independence from the patriarchal social order, which was still dominant in the 
villages of the rural Eastern Cape, became ever more strident (Liebenberg 1997; 
Mager 1989; Ngwane 2001). With the advent of democracy in 1994, the ‘low- 
intensity war’ that had raged between men and women in the rural hinterland for 
decades -  overlain by the patriarchy that was reintroduced and entrenched through 
apartheid social engineering (see Mager 1999) -  has been brought increasingly into 
the open (cf. Cornwall 2001).5
Where generational conflict between older and younger men had once taken centre 
stage, regional newspapers in the Eastern Cape during the 1990s began to register case 
upon case of serious domestic violence, rape and even murder against women and girl- 
children, with women in the deprived former bantustan reserve areas of the Transkei 
and Ciskei faring particularly poorly in this regard (Wood & Jewkes 2001).6 A regional 
newspaper reporting on this crisis under the headline ‘ What’s wrong with SA men?’ 
noted that in 2001 a staggering 52,860 rapes were reported in South Africa and a 
woman was killed by her partner every six days {Daily Dispatch 12 September 2003).7
5 In Ado, Nigeria, one woman who had left her husband told Cornwall, ‘I have been to the war front 
and returned peacefully. Enough is enough’ (Cornwall 2001: 81).
6 A letter written to the Daily Dispatch newspaper (12 August 1999), pointed out that ‘the 
unemployment situation of our country has turned the sons and daughters o f the current pensioners into 
their dependents, let alone the little orphans [sic] left at the mercy o f these pensioners by the same 
dependents.’ Compare this with the quotation from some 65 years earlier, from a Mpondo informant of 
Hunter that ‘[F]ormerly an umzi was under the thumb of the father, now it is under the thumb of the 
son’ (Hunter 1936: 60, quoted in McAllister 1985: 132).
7 During my stay in Hamburg, there were two separate cases of local men who were accused of raping 
a minor and a mentally retarded women respectively. Although I never actually witnessed acts of 
physical violence, I was reliably informed that wife-beating ‘happens all the time’ in both Loverstwist 
and Hamburg and was a topic o f daily conversation in the village. Men beating their girlfriends and 
their ukuhlalisana partners was also very common. When pressed for examples, one young male 
informant indicated that he himself had been arrested the previous year for beating his (then) girlfriend. 
The girl’s single mother, although very upset, declined to press charges against him. Asked to recall 
another example, he mentioned, without any hesitation, his friend in Port Elizabeth, who was arrested 
and sentenced to three weeks in prison for severely beating his (then) girlfriend, which left her with 
‘scars on her head’.
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The patriarchal ukwakh ’umzi project rested on the (putative, as it was sometimes 
more abstract than real) presence of a man as intloko yekhaya [the head of the home], 
fulfilling the role of intsika yekhaya [pillar of the home].8 This project, which ideally 
included presiding over a ‘byre with fresh manure’ (i.e. evidence that the homestead 
held cattle, a fact that was pleasing to the ancestors), appeared to be under serious 
threat, and the backlash from men to these threats was characterised by acts of 
violence (see Ramphele 2000).9
Thus far, I have characterised the gender and generational struggles that were waged 
in Peddie District around cattle and broader projects of accumulation in relation to 
different age cohorts, to the relative successes and failures of men in holding down 
employment over the long term, to the principle of male primogeniture and to cultural 
imperatives around the need to provision and underpin the rural umzi in a material 
and a ritual sense, which included supporting poorer imizi in the village through the 
idiom of masincedisane.
In this chapter, I pay closer attention to the gendered and generational struggles for the 
rural homestead and the village. Again, I use cattle-holding and exchange as my 
analytical point of entry to examine some aspects of these struggles. As I have argued 
in preceding chapters, it was clear that differently situated people had different interests 
in the wider cultural economics of cattle. If married women took a keen interest from 
the ‘side-lines’ (at least in public) in the essentially male-mediated cattle economy, then 
widows, especially those with adult sons, sometimes registered a more ambivalent 
interest in the cattle of the umzi, which they held in trust for their (eldest) sons.
For their part, single women, both never-married mothers who were heads of their 
households and other single women without children, showed least interest in the 
cattle economy as a form of investment, certainly for their own households. But even 
they had a residual interest in that they could enter this economy through acceptance 
of cattle as bridewealth that was due to them when a daughter married (see Jones
8 This is somewhat different to the more legalistic umnini wendlu [lit. the owner of the house] to which 
Jones (1996) refers. See De Jager (1971: 175) for the normative duties and responsibilities of the 
intsika yekhaya role (cf. Minnaar 2003).
9 Including acts of violence against women suspected of practising witchcraft, with widows often 
targetted in this regard.
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1996: 118). More controversially, when her own father died, a separated woman 
might try to claim a share of the cattle previously paid as bridewealth for her at the 
time of her marriage. Whatever the extent of their current (structurally contingent) 
interest in cattle, everyone in the villages of Loverstwist and Hamburg was aware of 
the high cash-equivalent value of cattle, and through kinship and neighbourhood ties 
to cattle-holding homesteads retained an interest in investments in and the daily use, 
exchange and consumption of cattle.
Cutting across these structural concerns were generational issues of class and lifestyle 
aspirations. Many of the generation of younger rural women and men were intent on 
the decidedly modernist accumulation of commodities that their parents and 
grandparents were denied under the apartheid regime. With some notable exceptions, 
they scoffed at the notion of owning cattle, frequently resisted pressures to contribute 
their labour towards the husbandry of the livestock of the umzi, and were scornful of 
the whole notion of pursuing an agrarian lifestyle in the former reserves. They had 
good reasons for adopting this position, since it was amply supported by the evidence 
around them. Agricultural output in general has been on a steadily downward 
trajectory for decades (see Simkins 1984) and was seen by many younger people as 
part of ubuqaba, i.e. the complex of traditionalist and conservative rural values (see 
Bank & Qambata 1999: 84-5).
Reinforcing its association with ubuqaba values, examples of conspicuous, personal 
enrichment through success in agricultural production were indeed rare. By contrast, 
the ‘expectations of modernity’ on the part of the younger generation placed a 
premium on what they saw as burgeoning urban culture -  tantalisingly within reach in 
the city of East London -  and its (costly) icons of fashionable clothing and up-to-the- 
minute accessories like the latest-model cellular telephones, televisions, sound 
systems and even motor-cars. The cruel reality was that these expectations look set to 
be dashed, as the opportunities for any sustained upward mobility by the poorly 
educated majority of youth (other than by high-risk, illegal means) showed no signs 
of growing (Everatt 2000).10 But this may only have increased the allure and 
aspirational nature of this sort of lifestyle.
10 In rural Peddie District (and much of the Eastern Cape), anyone under the age of 34-35 years was 
considered to be ‘a youth’ and did not enjoy all the social rights o f a Xhosa adult. Needless to say, this
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In earlier chapters, I have presented several case-studies of predominantly men and 
male-headed imizi with a range of investment strategies that could, to some extent, be 
plotted along the household developmental cycle. Here, I concentrate on issues 
relating to female-headed households,11 especially single women (with or without 
children) and their relations with the wider community, including where these 
relations intersect with men and male-headed households.
Spurred on by the post-1994 government-endorsed emphasis on greater ‘gender 
equity’ (which was itself given a boost by contemporaneous events such as the 1995 
World Conference on Women in Beijing), rural women were asserting themselves 
economically and socially with considerable vigour.12 At times, they couched their 
assertiveness in relation to men, which was often overt in community meetings and 
social functions, in the rights-based discourses on gender equity that began to seep 
into the rural villages. In increasing numbers, women in Peddie District were 
prepared to ‘go it alone’ without men, either by shunning marriage altogether or 
through divorce or estrangement (Preston-Whyte 1978, 1981: 159). They found the 
means to head their households and secure their livelihoods (however meagre) and 
tried to educate their children.13 They socialised mainly with other women in church 
groups, transacted with each other in rotating credit associations or burial societies 
and generally ‘built the homestead’ in broad adherence with Xhosa cultural norms, 
but without the social stigma that in earlier decades came with the status of being
had been fiercely contested in recent times, not least by the young ‘comrades’ in the struggle for 
liberation (see Bank 2002a).
11 Renewed attention paid to female-headed households in the Eastern Cape notwithstanding, this form 
of household was hardly a recent phenomenon, as the Mayers (1971 [1961]), Pauw (1963) and others 
recorded them as common in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The gross number and proportion of 
female-headed households does, however, seemed to have increased in the past three decades or so 
(Manona 1980a). Mayer’s preface in Pauw (1963: vii) argues for the continued relevance of patriarchal 
authority, claiming that ‘the patrifocal family... is both the moral and statistical norm of the Xhosa, 
urban as well as “tribal”, from the white-collared, down to the humble, unskilled worker... ’ (see Jones 
1996: 15).
12 It would be interesting to explore if and how post-1994 legislation that allows for abortion ‘on 
demand’ at state hospitals and the public campaign to promote condom use to combat HIV/Aids, has 
empowered young women in different socio-economic categories to exercise greater control over their 
sexual practices. For its part, the state-provided child support grant (R100 per month in April 2001) 
was said to encourage young women to have babies in the mistaken belief that this modest grant will 
give them greater financial independence.
13 Wilson (1981: 143) argues that since the gap in the age at marriage for men and women was five to 
seven years and increasing, there were many more marriageable women than men and thus nearly a 
fifth of the women found themselves without men to marry. In my sample of 90 households in 
Loverstwist and Hamburg, I found that only 27% and 32% of households respectively had spouses 
actually living together at the time of the survey.
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amankazana [unmarried mothers] (see Wilson 1981: 143). Indeed, in rural Peddie 
District, with high levels of rural-urban mobility, the stigma of illegitimate births 
seemed to have fallen away decades ago for most people, irrespective of socio­
economic status, except perhaps for a minority of well-off families.
On the strength of his research into ‘matrifilial families’ in the village of Bathurst,14 
Jones (1996: 26,70) found that the recognition of women’s rights (independent of 
men) to residential property was a central element of their pursuit of singlehood and 
matrifilial family organisations (cf. Preston-Whyte 1981: 168). Jones points out that 
until the 1980s African women in South Africa were accorded the legal status of 
perpetual minors and one of the implications of this was that these women were 
unable to hold title to or inherit fixed property.15 This argument would apply to the 
communal tenure villages of Peddie District, but less so to newly established villages 
like Loverstwist or in the new ‘RDP’ housing section of Hamburg (see below). 
Moreover, I came across examples which illustrated that it was possible for monied 
families to buy plots of land in rural Peddie for their daughters in areas where 
freehold land was titled.
Probably the key reason for their preference for domestic arrangements that excluded 
men as husbands -  especially husbands who were either insecurely employed or 
unemployed and permanently resident in the village -  related to women’s improved 
independent access to personal income and state-provided pensions and grants. Jones 
(1996) also noted that the proximity of Bathurst to metropolitan employment areas 
and the smallness of the town, which allowed for close co-operation between 
kinswomen, played a role in women’s preferences in this regard. These factors would 
also apply, to varying degrees, in the villages of Peddie District.16
14 Bathurst is situated about 20 kilometres west of the border of Peddie District, between Grahamstown 
and Port Alfred. The Xhosa-speaking residents of the town mostly comprised people who had lived on 
farms in the vicinity for several generations.
15 See Wilson (1981: 144-5) for the erosion of the property rights o f Xhosa women under early 
colonial law and well into the twentieth century.
16 Women in relatively well-off male-headed households are often subject to more gender 
discrimination, including abuse and greater livelihood insecurity than women and girl-children in 
poorer female-headed households (Ardington & Lund 1996: 50). Moreover, it is incorrect to 
automatically associate female-headedness with household economic marginality, as poverty studies 
routinely do. I encountered a considerable number of households in the villages o f Peddie District, 
headed by either widows of decades-long standing or by unmarried mothers, which could be counted 
among the better-educated and better-off rural households (cf. Wilson 1981: 145).
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Contests over the ‘ cattle of inheritance9
Given this context of livelihoods under threat and heightened gender contestation, the 
inheritance of cattle, which constituted a major financial resource in the rural 
economy, could take on particular importance. Gendered struggles over rights to 
homestead cattle focussed particularly on the categories of inherited cattle and 
bridewealth cattle, and combinations of these two. I came across numerous examples 
of the members of particular homesteads engaged in tacit and open struggles that 
have arisen around the sometimes unacceptable ways that inherited cattle were 
hoarded or disposed of. The Ntenge case was one such example from Loverstwist.
The case of the Ntenge family cattle, Loverstwist
Mr .Ntenge and Mrs. Ntenge, who have both died, had three daughters and 
two sons. Their eldest son had also died. The second son, Vuyisile, 
recently found work on the mines in eRhawutini [Gauteng]. One sister 
lived in Plettenberg Bay, another lived at Peddie Extension and the third, 
unmarried, sister, Nomfusi, lived at home in Loverstwist. The problem, my 
male informant [who was a neighbour of the Ntenge family] told me, is 
that Nomfusi and Vuyisile were twins (about 57 years old). Nomfusi lived 
ekhay’enkhulu [at the big home], while Vuyisile had set up his own house 
nearby. The cattle of their deceased father were still at the big home.
Sometimes, the sons of Vuyisile would take the cattle to their father’s 
place, to treat them with the mixture of acaricide and discarded engine oil 
that was used for tick control. This upset Nomfusi who maintained that the 
cattle were supposed to stay at the big home. Vuyisile’s wife often got 
involved, arguing loudly in public with Nomfusi.
The previous year, Vuyisile and his wife had taken an ox from his father’s 
byre and sold it in the Tyolumnqa area, because they were struggling to 
make ends meet. This caused a fall-out with Nomfusi who insisted that 
they should have cleared it with her first. Nomfusi was unemployed, with 
only her daughter working at the Engen petrol station in the town of 
Peddie, and she could hardly be regarded as well-off. Vuyisile then found 
work on the mines and his wife found a job as a domestic worker in 
neighbouring Tuku village. Complicating the dispute was the contention that 
at least some of the cattle in question were from the lobolo of an elder sister.
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My (male) informant was adamant that Vuyisile, the surviving son, was the rightful 
owner of these ‘cattle of inheritance’ (see Wilson 1981: 145). My informant’s opinion 
was that the problem was simply that Vuyisile had not unequivocally (i.e. publicly) 
moved away from his natal homestead. Instead, he had merely built his own house 
close by. Proof of this was that, ‘when he conducted his imisebenzi [rituals], he still 
did them at the big [parental] home.’
The point here is that Vuyisile had not yet (ritually) asserted his independence as a 
married man from his natal home. This assertion must be recognised as such by his 
family, his ancestors and the larger community of Loverstwist. Their attendance at 
the ukuvula ’mzi [to open the home] ritual he would host to this end would signal this 
recognition. Through the ritual, his social rights as a man with his own homestead 
were recognised and confirmed, and this would place him in a somewhat better 
position to assert his right over the family cattle. With this increased authority, 
however, would come the responsibility of caring for his unmarried sisters and their 
dependents. Until this ritual had been conducted, his assumption of a new status in 
the family was tenuous and was likely to be contested by his sisters. It was also likely 
to be a cause for concern for other people in the village, who would be reluctant to 
transact in cattle or matters relating to cattle with the Ntenge family.
If her brother had any plans to make off with the family cattle by stealth and to shirk 
his longer-term responsibilities to his siblings, Nomfusi’s ability to prevent this could 
prove to be quite limited (see Jones 1996: 146-7). It was for this reason that she 
monitored the movements of her deceased father’s cattle closely and insisted that all 
the cattle remain in the byre of the parental home. In the absence of her female 
siblings who could back her up in this dispute, she resorted to making the spat a 
public one, with the hope of bringing the weight of community sanction (including 
the support of a number of other women in situations similar to hers) to bear on her 
brother to bring him to order.
In August 2001, in a similar case in Hamburg, I was told that Crawford Ngxaba had 
sold an animal to a Raduma homestead. The Radumas required an animal in order to 
conduct a slaughter ritual. This animal was not Crawford’s to sell and his action was 
a cause of unhappiness in his family. Unravelling what had transpired in this case
200
highlighted many of the issues that emerged as central in my analysis of the micro­
politics of the cattle in Peddie District.
The case of the Ngxaba family cattle in Hamburg
In November 2000, Crawford Ngxaba, who was then in his late fifties, 
indicated during the ‘herd-survey’ that he had three cattle. Five months 
later, i.e. in April 2001, he had sold all of them. One animal was sold in 
December 2000 to the Somandla family in the village, where a long- 
delayed umgidi [party] was held for a son who had been initiated three 
years before. The other two animals were apparently sold at the stocksale.
It is unclear whether Crawford kept the proceeds to himself or shared them 
with his two sisters, Lulama and Noxolo. Why should he share this money? 
Because, upon closer enquiry, it emerged that the three cattle were not 
‘really’ his. The cattle were his deceased father’s cattle and were thus the 
inheritance of the three siblings. As the only son of his parents, but with 
two unmarried, older sisters, Crawford was (more than usually) obliged to 
consult his sisters, secure their agreement and then share the proceeds of 
the sales of the cattle with them.17
When I made further enquiries into this case, it emerged that Crawford had spent a 
good deal of his working life in Mdantsane (close to East London), which was also 
where his second sister (Noxolo) lived. The oldest sister, Lulama, who was an 
unmarried mother, lived in Hamburg. She was employed locally as a teacher.
While he was employed in East London, Crawford was an irregular visitor to the 
village and only returned to Hamburg in 1996 when he was retrenched. Before that 
time, the three cattle had been herded by the son of Noxolo. When this youngster also 
moved to Mdantsane, the cattle were placed in the Lugabos’ kraal. Since Ngxaba’s 
deceased mother was from the Lugabo family, this was easy to arrange. Apparently 
Lulama, who has cattle of her own, did not want too many cattle at her umzi, because 
she was already struggling to secure herding labour.18 With her own children at
17 There seems to be less obligation on the son who was the first-bom to be as explicitly consultative in 
this regard.
181 failed to uncover exactly how she came to have her own cattle, but my informant suggested two, 
not mutually exclusive, possibilities. The father o f her adult children was a prominent, married man 
from a neighbouring village. My informant thought it likely that this man had given her cattle years
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school, she had already ‘imported’ a youngster from a Ngxaba family from the distant 
(Peddie) village of Celetyume, who came to live in her home expressly to herd her 
cattle.
After 1996, the elderly Lugabo couple both died and Crawford came to take his 
father’s three cattle from their homestead kraal. He did not keep the cattle very long 
before taking them to Khayalethu Mapayi, the holder of the biggest herd in Hamburg, 
and requesting that Mapayi look after them for him. It was soon after this that 
Crawford took them from Khayalethu’s kraal and sold them.
Then Crawford made the mistake of taking one of Lulama’s cattle and selling it to a 
homestead in the village that was planning to conduct a slaughter ritual. He had no 
right to do so, but before he could be accosted he fled back to Mdantsane. I was told 
that he had many debts there that resulted from his serious drinking problem. It was 
these debts, people reasoned, that may have driven him to sell an animal that was not 
his. Lulama’s policeman son was very angry with his uncle but unsure of how to 
proceed. Pursuing the matter by legal means would mean airing the family problems 
in public, something he was loathe to do. Also, resolving the matter would require a 
meeting of the surviving senior members of the family at which Crawford, if he could 
be prevailed upon to attend, would no doubt admit guilt, but argue that he was broke 
and unable to repay Lulama or replace the animal.
I enquired whether this was a private matter to be resolved within the Ngxaba family, 
but my informant thought that it was not, since everyone in the village was aware of it 
and discussing it. Indeed, in conversations at the dip-tank, senior men unrelated to 
the Ngxaba family decried Crawford’s behaviour, calling him ‘a nonsense’ and 
saying that ‘he knows money, because he had worked at Wilson Rowntree [the 
confectionary company] before’. They implied that as someone who was unemployed 
after having a good job, a person like Crawford would be doubly desperate and could 
not be trusted with money or cattle. The implication was that no-one’s cattle were 
entirely safe from unscrupulous men like him, who would even steal from their own 
sisters. This sort of response implied that even senior men were relatively powerless
before to assist her with raising a family as an unmarried mother and that she had nurtured this herd. 
The other possibility was that her policeman son had built up the herd since he had started working.
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to act against stock-thieves, a fact which threatened the local cattle economy. It also 
shows how, no matter the extent to which people in the village knew who owned 
which cattle, it could be problematic to buy cattle locally. The Raduma family that 
bought the cow from Crawford, probably at a discount, could be accused of abetting 
him but they would plead ignorance regarding who the true owner of the animal was 
What is certain is that Lulama Ngxaba would have advised everyone in the village 
not to buy cattle from her brother in future, as his rights in family cattle had come to 
an end when he sold the last of these cattle. Given her own stature in the village and 
that of her son, this was something that most people in the village would take 
seriously. However, this case and the preceding one point to the abiding sense of 
entitlement on the part of many men with regard to their residual rights over the 
‘cattle of inheritance’.
This sense of entitlement by men was one of the reasons why single women often 
steered clear of cattle-holding and instead invested their financial resources and 
efforts elsewhere. But the contests over homestead property, which often include 
cattle, could be just as vexatious when it was a woman asserting her rights, as the 
case of MaRadebe demonstrates.
The case of MaRadebe, caught between feuding affines
MaRadebe was bom in 1930 into a large well-known family in Bodiam, 
the village adjacent to Hamburg. She went to school in Bodiam and 
finished with a Std.5 (seven years of schooling). At 16 years old, she 
started working as a domestic worker on the neighbouring white-owned 
farms. In 1960, at the age of 30, she married Bhunga Zatho, who paid 
seven cattle as lobolo to MaRadebe’s father. Bhunga was not well 
educated. Bhunga’s mother, Maggie, was from a Hamburg family and 
she had returned from her married home in Mpekweni village (in Peddie 
District) to Hamburg to work in the local hotel. Maggie had three 
daughters and two sons. Bhunga was the younger of her sons.
By 1964, MaRadebe was working in East London as a domestic worker 
and had her first child. In 1969, her husband stopped working on the 
mines and the family moved to East London. They set up in the one- 
roomed house owned by MaRadebe’s father in Duncan Village.
203
MaRadebe's six children were born in East London, but they were all 
sent back to Hamburg where they were cared for by her sister who had— 
married a Hamburg man. In 1992, when the grandchild that MaRadebe 
had adopted as her own daughter was eight years old, MaRadebe and her 
husband finally returned to Hamburg. Because of tension between 
Bhunga and the rest of his family, they did not live at or even near his 
natal home. Instead, they rented a house elsewhere in the village. 
MaRadebe and her husband survived by ‘jobbing’ at the municipality 
until 1995, when they both belatedly managed to secure old-age 
pensions.
The substantial herd of cattle that Bhunga’s mother, Maggie, had built up 
over the years was thanks, at least initially, to the 12 animals paid as 
lobolo for Bhunga’s oldest sister, Nomawethu, who now resided in Cape 
Town. The older brother, who worked for the Ciskei Police, had also 
augmented the family herd by buying some heifers, believing that he 
would inherit this herd eventually. Bhunga, partly because of his poor 
relations with his mother and siblings, and perhaps partly because of his 
structural position as the younger son, had failed to build the family herd.
I was told that Maggie, a ‘strong woman with a mind of her own’, had 
sold some of these lobolo cattle at the stock sale to build a new house, 
and that some of the other cattle had died. At one stage, Nomawethu sent 
her first-born son, Zolile, to live with his grandmother to assist with the 
cattle. Another sister, who was a nurse in Cape Town, assisted her 
mother financially to build and extend the main house. Once Zolile, the 
herder, had grown up and moved back to Cape Town, Nomawethu 
encouraged the daughter (Ntombi) of her nursing sister to occupy the main 
house, presumably in an attempt to prevent Bhunga and his family from 
doing so.
By the late 1990s, Bhunga’s older brother (who had risen to become a 
Brigadier in the Ciskeian police), his mother Maggie and his middle 
sister, the nurse, had all passed away. Bhunga and his family finally took 
possession of the natal homestead in Hamburg, displacing Ntombi, who 
moved elsewhere in Hamburg. Bhunga and his sons began to milk the 
remaining cows, getting plenty of milk to make amasi [sour milk].
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Bhunga began to treat these cattle as his own, and instructed his sons to 
herd and dip the animals as required. He even took to selling some cattle 
and slaughtered an animal to conduct an ancestor ritual.
In late 1999, however, Bhunga was stabbed to death by one of his sons. 
The commentary in the village was that this was just deserts for his 
maltreatment of his by-then deceased mother, Maggie. This left 
MaRadebe, his pensioned widow, with three dependents occupying the 
family homestead. When Bhunga died, his sister in Cape Town, 
Nomawethu, attended his funeral and laid claim to all the remaining 
cattle, saying that some were her lobolo and some were those of her other 
deceased brother. None were Bhunga’s and thus none would became the 
property of his widow, MaRadebe, or her sons.
MaRadebe told me that she could not ‘touch’ the five remaining cattle, 
which included three cows. Her sons were only required to look after 
these animals, seemingly as a quid pro quo for their continued 
occupation of the Zatho family home. They derived no benefits from 
these cattle, particularly as the three remaining cows had tick-damaged 
udders and could no longer be milked.
Thus, after 39 years of marriage, MaRadebe was left in an unenviable 
position because of a family dispute between her deceased husband and 
his siblings. For her livelihood and that of her three dependents, she 
relied on her old-age pension and the occasional remittance from her son 
who was ‘jobbing’ in Cape Town. Her sister-in-law in Cape Town, 
Nomawethu, laid claim to everything at the Zatho homestead, including 
the cattle in question, the house and the plot of land on which it was 
built. It was possible, MaRadebe thought, that Nomawethu might come 
back to Hamburg and expel her and her children from the family home. 
Actually, the likelihood of this happening was remote. As long as 
Nomawethu was unable or unwilling to find someone that she regarded 
as more trustworthy than MaRadebe, the family’s occupation of the 
Zatho family home looked safe. But when MaRadebe passes away, her 
dependents may be rather more vulnerable in respect of their continued 
occupation of the home.
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This particular case of a somewhat belated ‘absentee owner’ in the shape of 
Nomawethu shows how the many factors that built or broke social harmony among 
members of the umzi impacted in a real way both on how the property of the umzi 
was contested and how circuits of reciprocity and support among the dispersed 
members of the umzi were maintained or cut off. In this unfolding drama, calculations 
of what constitutes ‘ownership’ of the cattle of the home often played a contentious 
role. The cattle at the Zatho home were no longer closely herded. Where it was said 
they were once carefully hand-dressed to remove ticks, I frequently saw them covered 
with ticks. Indeed, MaRadebe and her two sons had little incentive to expend effort 
on them and the condition of ‘Nomawethu’s cattle’ was likely to deteriorate.
Negotiating marriage and bridewealth
A great deal has now been written on the subject of bridewealth in southern Africa 
(Krige and Comaroff [eds].1981; Murray 1981a; Kuper 1982). Perhaps the most 
interesting thing I found consistently was that the young women who were recently 
married and those who had imminent plans to marry, especially those with children 
from earlier, pre-marital relationships, seemed to do so very strategically and 
conditionally. This was because marriage was an area that was fraught with problems 
for them, especially as it was (still) formally mediated by senior men. Young women, 
especially those from well-to-do ‘respectable’ families, were usually expected to 
proceed along a predictable route to marriage. This includes the sometimes drawn-out 
negotiation of bridewealth between male representatives of the two families, the 
subsequent initiation of lobolo transfers, conducting a ‘white wedding’ (which might 
virtually be repeated in two different settings, in the village and in town or at the 
homes of the bride and of the groom) and, finally, taking up virilocal residence.
All this required that the couple submit to a considerable degree of control by senior 
men and women. For the bride, this period of submission could extend well into her 
married life. As a makoti [newly married woman], she was expected to adhere (often 
strictly) to a culturally sanctioned code of dress, behaviour and disposition towards 
her new affines, including her husband’s sisters.19 This role, which was invariably
19 A makoti [new bride] was, for instance, often made, by her new mother-in-law and sisters-in-law, to 
do a great deal of the manual work in the home, because it was said that uzengekhukho [she came with
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enforced by her female affines, could be particularly onerous and many young 
women balked at the prospect of being in this position in more than a symbolic 
sense.20 One young woman whose best friend had just got married put it as follows:
The only way to prevent being maltreated as a makoti is not to go into a 
marriage where you are living with your in-laws, because if you do, you 
will do everything for them. Even daughters who [previously] would wake 
up and make tea for their father, and would clean their room and the rest of 
the house, will stop doing any of this as soon as there is a makoti in the 
home. It is the makoti’s job to do these things.. .Women are jealous of each 
other, they don’t want to make space for a new wife, they want her just to 
do everything.
The case of Nomhle’s careful plans for marriage
Thirty-one-year-old Nomhle was the mother of a premarital child. Now she planned 
to marry another man, who was employed as a policeman in Hamburg. Three 
oonozakuzaku [representatives of her prospective husband’s family] had arrived at 
her father’s home in Hamburg to initiate negotiations with Nomhle’s patrilineal kin.21 
I interviewed her a few days after their visit.
The negotiations have to be done by men, women can’t do them at all, 
even if, as a man, you haven’t got a father or close male relatives. My 
boyfriend has brought R4,000 and 3 bottles of brandy, so even now I could 
go to his place as his makoti, because R4,000 is a lot of money [to pay]. 
But he still has to pay [the equivalent of] 10 cattle, around R13,000 
[although the actual amount has not been decided yet].
I will go to his home [in Tamara village, near King William’s Town] in 
three weeks time, but only for a weekend, as I am working [and have to be 
at work on Monday]. It is tough to be a makoti, so I don’t want to stay 
there, but I will have to wear the clothes of a makoti even when I am back 
in Hamburg [at work]. I am a bit worried about his sisters, who have been 
fine so far, changing now that I am a makoti in their family. [But] I know I
a grass mat], in other words, she was married into this family, with all the responsibilities and 
workload that this involved (cf. Liebenberg 1997).
20 One of the expectations was that the makoti must collect firewood and hoe in the field. These were 
things that many young women were very loathe to do.
21 This group of men included senior men who shared the same clan (Ndlangisa), but who did not 
appear to be actually related to Nomhle’s father.
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will come home after just one weekend, so it’s not a long-term thing that I 
have to endure. As for his sisters, one is away studying in Transkei and the 
older one is married and has her own place in Tamara. My boyfriend’s 
mother has died and it is only his father at their home... [Also] my 
boyfriend is the 4th-bom son, so there are very few [formal] 
responsibilities for him in his family.
[As for my family] I was going to leave home and find my own place 
anyway, even if I didn’t marry now. I can’t live here all the time, especially 
when Patrick and them get married, their wives will be here, which would 
be too much.
I know my [future] husband will continue to have other girlfriends after we 
are married, but I keep his bank card. If he wants money, he has to ask me.
My friends do the same thing, to stop our partners spending money on their 
girlfriends. I plan to have a house in Port Alfred because I like that place 
and I want my husband to get a job in the SAPS [South African Police 
Service] there. My husband already has five children, all with different 
women. He supports them all and one of these children has just moved in 
here with my family. He will have to keep on supporting them, and I will 
spend my money only on my new family. None of my money will go to 
these other children or women. I would like us to have one child 
[together].
Nomhle admitted that she had planned this marriage very carefully. She loved her 
boyfriend, she said, and this was why, even in these times when other women her age 
were refusing to marry, she still wanted to marry him. She had obviously closely 
observed the realities of other contemporary marriages and she was trying to cover 
every contingency. Of course, her status as an employed woman afforded her 
considerably more latitude in this regard than many other young women. The 
decision to get married was unequivocally her own.22
22 And when I interviewed her father three weeks later, he admitted discussing with Nomhle (among 
others) how much bridewealth he should demand, partly perhaps because o f the fact that she had a 
premarital child, but also because she would have worked out exactly what she needs to buy and how 
much her prospective husband can afford. He was initially adamant that the bridewealth being paid for 
his daughter as cash was his and only his to do with as he wanted, ‘such as buying household expenses, 
educating his children, and so on.’ However, when I pressed him further about why he did not ask for 
some of the bridewealth to be paid in cattle, he revealed that ‘we will need to buy things for the
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Other, poorer, women are forced to settle for less formal marriages. I was present at a 
beer-drink when MaDlamini (58 years old and a poor widow) said that, ‘as long as 
you have some nice clothes and food in your stomach, then even RIO lobolo is 
enough’. This is in line with Jones’ (1996: 46) assertion that ‘. . .customary marriage 
has lost its central defining aspect; the transfer of rights in and to a woman and her 
offspring is not formally transacted [in cattle].’ Based on his fieldwork among mostly 
poorer households in Bathurst, Jones (1996: 51) goes on to argue that
[B]ecause marriage is nowadays seldom transacted in the economic sense, 
paternity too is seldom transacted... [and] the ambiguities o f  such marriage 
introduce a host o f  corresponding ambiguities in respect o f  children’s jural 
and kinship identities.
As the case of Nomhle demonstrates, where bridewealth was still exchanged, the 
young women from better-off families wanted far more say over the nature and 
distribution of the bridewealth paid to marry them. While in a formal sense they 
might continue to be excluded from any formal control of such bridewealth which 
was still negotiated between men, in practice young women were actively involved 
behind the scenes. They were, for instance, keen to ensure that bridewealth was paid 
in cash, rather than in cattle. Bridewealth paid in cash, these prospective brides knew, 
bolstered their interests in having most of the bridewealth, which was formerly 
strictly the domain of their fathers, spent on meeting the costs of their wedding itself 
(if an elaborate, ‘white’ wedding) and on buying specific wedding gifts (including 
items such as a lounge suite and a bedroom suite and domestic appliances) that would 
grace their future home.
At best, their mothers were ambivalent allies in this project, as bridewealth as cash 
which was spent on wedding-related expenses, while it built the reputation of the 
umzi in the village, necessarily seeped away from the natal homestead. Jones (1996: 
54) noted, and my own experience in Peddie District confirmed, that older women 
continued to attach considerable importance to the social status that comes to women 
through marriage. In contrast to cash, lobolo paid as cattle would increase the status
married couple, so we need cash.’ It seemed that, while working within the constraints of someone in 
her position, Nomhle had thoroughly covered every angle of this important change in her status as a 
woman.
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of the umzi, and would also act as a savings bulwark against any future livelihood 
crises in the natal household. The downside of bridewealth cattle for the prospective 
bride’s mother was that they would be controlled by her husband (and possibly his 
agnates if the latter had supported him or his umzi in the past) and any future sales of 
cattle were likely to be a matter of negotiation between the bride’s mother and father.
In the next section, I examine the extent to which the ‘rise’ of these young women, 
who were not overly committed to marriage23 and tended to be dismissive of the 
dominant role of men, actually threatened to disrupt the rural moral and social order 
that was predicated on the patriarchy of senior men and the localised cultural 
economy, which included cattle, that they dominate.24 In a situation where formal 
marriages and thus lobolo exchanges were less frequent, men (in their capacities as 
patrilineal kin and the husbands who supplied bridewealth) were in danger of losing 
whatever control they previously had over women’s fertility (reproductive) 
functions.25 As a result, men had also increasingly lost control of women’s productive 
powers, in respect of controlling their labour in the domestic sphere, household and 
for agricultural production, as well as their remuneration for work done outside the 
household.26 The negotiation and control of lobolo payments for those women who 
still ‘submitted’ to marriage could be a seriously contested site of social intersection 
between the old and the emerging regimes of value.27 This was an arena in which the 
crumbling structure of rural patriarchy was pitted against (individual) young women 
who were often better-educated and had more social and economic room to
23 Jones (1996: 153) found that 80% of women between the ages of 15 and 32 had never married, while 
it was clear that ‘women in Bathurst are most unlikely to marry after [they reach] their early thirties.
24 Cattle and other things patriarchal maintained a semblance of male dominance, captured in the 
following intriguing extract from an interview with Mr. Daliso in Hamburg (on 27 February 2001): ‘As 
a Xhosa man, I slaughter for my father [at his death] to khapa and buyisa him to the kraal, this is 
where the ancestors are. No women are allowed in the kraal, ancestors only speak to men. [A] woman 
can dream about the ancestors, then she tells the men that she dreamed about a grandfather who wants 
meat or beer. The actual ritual is only done by men.’
25 As I have argued consistently, considerable evidence exists to show that men have lost their urban- 
based unskilled jobs in large numbers (Philip 2000). Such has been the domestic and economic fallout 
that many of these men have consequently lost and/or abandoned their roles as bread-winners, 
providers and symbols of moral authority as the household heads in their domestic units. The payment 
of bridewealth has also suffered, with a consequent rise in non-formal ukuhlalisana [to live together] 
relationships (see Jones 1996; Bank 2002b).
26 Mayer (1980b: 35) makes this point exactly, i.e. that ‘men gradually lost control over the female 
reproductive powers, by the transformation of marriage payments for daughters (lobolo) into indirect 
dowries (cf. Erlank 2000).
27 Widows and unmarried mothers can be as demanding as men/fathers in their attempts to secure a 
proper bridewealth for their daughters.
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manoeuvre than women in previous generations (see Manona et al. 1996; Manona 
1999). I recorded a number of cases in which a married woman was keeping a very 
close eye on the cattle of her deceased father that had been inherited by her brother, 
because this herd included lobolo paid for her (see below).
Bukeka Madinda: a young, single mother’s approach to cattle
My family is from Mt. Coke area [adjacent to King William’s Town]. We are 
Tshawe (clan). My grandfather moved to Hamburg. I am 29 years old and the 
youngest of 3 children. My brother is the eldest. He is employed as an assistant 
manager at Metro Cash and Carry [a wholesaler] in King William’s Town. My 
sister is a nursing sister in Grahamstown. My father worked in Cape Town 
before. He is retired and now receives an old-age pension. Last year he had a 
stroke, which has really affected him.
I matriculated in 1992.1 then studied computers for two years. I have two 
children [who have] different fathers. Only one of these men supports our 
child. I live with my two children at my parents’ home in Hamburg. There are 
eight cattle at home. They are my brother’s cattle, given to him by our 
grandfather when my father was in Cape Town. My brother has looked after 
them all along, so it has nothing to do with my father.
AA: Would you want lobolo paid [to your family] when or if you get married?
BM: Yes, but it should be paid in cash, maybe R10,000 would do, as [lobolo]
cattle are about R1,200 these days.28
AA: That would make it about eight cattle?
BM: Yes, but I would want the money to be paid though [not cattle]. I would 
want this money from my parents, once it was paid as lobolo, or at least some 
of it, to start my own house and spend it on things I want.
AA: Why not have your lobolo paid in cattle?
BM: Because cattle are expensive to keep. They need you to get someone to 
look after them, so they cost money.
AA: But they increase faster than money in the bank and the bank also charges 
you fees to administer your money...
28 The considerable discrepancy between the value of an animal arrived at through bridewealth 
negotiations and the often much higher market price of the same animal, gave senior men cause to 
argue that owning cattle allowed a man to sell some of his cattle to pay lobolo [and still have cattle left 
afterwards]. They argued that ‘this thing of paying lobolo in cash is new, and came about because of a 
lack of cattle’. I did not seek to verify this claim, but it seems to be a distortion of the facts, unless 
these men still regard a practice that is now several decades old as ‘new’.
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BM: Yes, but cattle can be stolen easily and then you are left with nothing.
AA: Do you want your lobolo to be paid in cash because you are afraid that if it 
is paid in cattle, then your fathers and brothers [i.e. patrilineal kin] will say that 
the cattle are under their control as men and then you will have no say over 
when and how to dispose of them?
BM: No, even if they were real cattle, they would be my cattle, not my 
brother’s at all.29
Bukeka was typical of the younger generation of assertive, no-nonsense young 
women, who had often given birth at least once by their mid-twenties, and whom I 
encountered frequently in rural Peddie District. Although she had post-secondary 
formal training in basic computer operating skills from a private college in East 
London, she had thus far failed to find employment. She was friendly with the young 
women who work at the municipality in Hamburg and, when young people were 
recruited to assist with the conducting of the national census in 2001, she was 
fortunate enough to secure a job as a local census enumerator. Because she was 
unemployed, Bukeka lived at home with her parents, where she looked after her two 
children and assisted with the domestic chores. The family subsisted on her father’s 
old-age pension and her mother’s income, earned as a cleaner at the Hamburg clinic. 
Support in cash and in kind also came from Bukeka’s brother and sister. Their 
homestead was well-kept and the umzi made up part of the ‘respectable’ educated 
section of the Hamburg community.
Note that in the Madinda umzi there was some contention over the existing herd of 
cattle, but that Bukeka had no say in how this herd was utilised. Also, although 
Bukeka was forthright about how she saw her (thus far hypothetical) marriage 
unfolding, it was worth noting that her aspirations and what might eventually 
transpire in this regard may in fact be poles apart. For a start, the fact that she already 
had two children would not be an attraction to potential suitors. Also, her own 
economic prospects did not look particularly rosy. She had no steady income of her 
own and was reluctant to start a business (for instance, hairdressing) in Hamburg,
29 This was a position that many young women took regarding (admittedly hypothetical) bridewealth 
payments. One young women, who owned a shebeen in Phola Park, and whose parents had both 
passed away, told me that if her (hypothetical) lobolo was paid in cattle, she would arrange for her 
elder brother to sell all the cattle and give her the money. She definitely did not want cattle, but the 
lobolo was unequivocally hers.
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because as she put it, the ‘people here don’t have money to pay for anything’. Like 
young adults in other rural households, she looked instead to the city as a more 
desirable site of employment and as an avenue of escape from what she regarded as 
the stifling drudgery of the village.
One further example of the assertiveness of young women was the case recounted to 
me by a bemused 39-year-old-man, Vumile Hokwana.
When I attended a ritual in Durban Village recently, my sister’s daughter 
[who is a young adult] asked me where she could get a cow to slaughter for 
a graduation party that she wanted to host. I told her that she should ask my 
father (her grandfather), as he has cattle. She asked me how much I thought 
it might cost and I said was that it is impossible for anyone [i.e. even kin] 
to get a cow for less than R1,000 these days.30 She went away and when I 
saw her later she told me that she would come down to Hamburg, ‘even 
without money’, as there are some o f her mother’s lobolo  cattle in her 
grandfather’s kraal [to which she feels she has some claim].31
Whatever their views now -  and assuming that the spread of the HIV/Aids pandemic 
can be arrested in the near future -  some (perhaps many) of these young people will 
constitute the senior generational cohort in the village in thirty or so years time. They 
are arguably more likely to have an interest then in upholding the cultural forms and 
social practices that will be meaningful to them then given their structural positions as 
heads of households, as husbands, wives, single mothers and (presumably) as rural 
residents with a stake in the local cultural economy.32 They are also likely to maintain 
rural homesteads in some shape or form, because ritual slaughter and ancestor 
veneration, which ideally take place at the rural home, will no doubt continue to be 
part of the cultural practices of many Xhosa people.
Women striking out on their own
The umzi was, first and foremost, the (residential) site on which the rituals of an 
agnatically bounded group of patrilineally related kin were conducted. This definition 
would, however, have disqualified many of the woman-headed households (except
30 This would be about half the current price of a mature cow.
31 It was unlikely that this particular line of argument would have swayed Mr. Hokwana, her 77-year 
old grandfather. However, Mr. Hokwana was likely to supply her with an animal for a token amount, 
as long as her actual request was suitably deferential.
32 This point was brought home to me one night when Patrick Gusha, my otherwise irreverent 28-year- 
old-research assistant, shook his head and lamented the young age (16 years) of a boy who was about 
to ‘go to the bush’ to be circumcised into manhood the following morning.
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those headed by widows), from being regarded as imizi. A 34-year-old single mother, 
Nomakutele, who was a resident of a newer section of Hamburg (Phola Park, see 
below) put it plainly when she told me that she went to her father’s family home in 
Hamburg to conduct rituals (her father himself had relocated to Loverstwist after he 
divorced her mother). ‘A cow that I caused to be slaughtered at my mother’s home 
would not bellow’, she told me, ‘because those [people] are not my ancestors.’
In Hamburg, over the course of the past 5-8 years, women and some socially 
marginal unmarried or separated men had set up their own households in ever- 
increasing numbers. The ‘informal’ settlement area to the west of the village, known 
as eNdlovini [lit. the place of the elephant, i.e. a place taken by force], had only 
existed since 1993. It was also only in 1999 that the small, 33-unit RDP housing 
development, (known as Phola Park, after the infamously violent township 
settlement in Gauteng Province) was completed.
What these two settlements represented, first and foremost, was a significant 
‘decompression’ of the congestion of the established homesteads in Hamburg. This 
was what everyone I spoke to about these housing developments in Hamburg told me. 
Both eNdlovini and Phola Park threw a lifeline to the many local people, especially 
single and separated women (in-migration from other villages and areas was limited), 
who were previously confined within the established village sections.33 Here, social 
tensions were reaching boiling point in overcrowded, economically insecure 
households to the extent that the post-1995 ‘transitional’ local municipal council, 
made up of local people, applied for ‘RDP’ funding to initiate a housing project that 
would address this problem. The upshot was a significant rise in households that were 
not only smaller in terms of their numbers of household members in these new 
settlements, but were also socially and economically marginal.34
Nomakutele, mentioned above, lived with her 10-year old daughter in her two- 
roomed ‘RDP’ house in Phola Park. She told me that, prior to moving to Phola Park,
33 One female ‘community leader’, who was a driving force behind getting Phola Park established, 
referred to the housing project as a ‘women’s zone’, claiming that ‘men are not there, except as lovers 
or boyfriends, but not as heads of households at all’, although this is not strictly true. In many respects, 
new settlements such as Loverstwist serve the same purpose, i.e. o f freeing women (and younger men) 
from patriarchal controls.
34 Space constraints preclude a detailed exploration of the fascinating, emerging politics of these two 
residential areas in the context of livelihoods and identity in Hamburg village, Peddie District and 
‘town’, i.e. East London and Port Elizabeth.
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they had lived with her mother in a one-roomed mud-brick house. She still visited her 
mother daily to help her with her domestic chores. She said that there was ‘no space 
to conduct imisebenzi (rituals) at her new house’ and that her mother had no house.35 
For these reasons, she said, once she got the ‘title’ for her new house, she would sell 
it and use the proceeds to build another house in the village, on her mother’s site, 
which was adjacent to her mother’s family’s site.
This phenomenon of an increasing number of (smaller) households within rural 
village communities was common in parts of Peddie District (see Ainslie 1998).36 In 
practice, while many of these households resided independently of their natal 
homesteads, they continued to have close economic, social and ritual ties with their 
natal homes. As in the example of the Ntenge family (above), it was precisely this 
mismatch, i.e. firstly that a household as a supposedly independent economic unit was 
not synonymous with a homestead as the unit for social and particularly ritual 
practice and, secondly, that a homestead might comprise a fluid number of 
(fragmented) households, that made for further intense social and material 
contestation. One issue was that, certainly in Phola Park, the sites were so small that 
there was no space to construct a cattle byre and therefore no place to keep cattle.
This meant that the houses here were unlikely to be regarded as imizi, real 
homesteads.
Unmarried (and sometimes long-widowed) women, emerging from patriarchal social 
relations in rural villages and urban settings, had different social and economic 
priorities from those of men and were less inclined to ‘waste money’, as they saw it, 
on liquor for instance. Many people, both men and women, in rural Peddie District 
claimed that women ‘hold onto’ money better than men. Indeed, although alcoholism 
also affected some women, on the whole they were more inclined than men to be 
thrifty and socially and entrepreneurially minded, quite possibly because they were 
the primary providers (if not care-givers) for their children. Where possible, many of
35 Of the 33 owners of housing units in Phola Park, only one claimed to have ritually ‘opened’ their 
new home. None of the others saw this as a priority, because they continued to have a ritual and moral 
affiliation to a homestead in the village.
36 Some of this was undoubtedly driven by the government’s use of the nuclear (or single mother 
headed) household as the unit of choice for social welfare and developmental programmes. Thus the 
delivery o f ‘RDP’ houses to individual households resulted in bigger family units breaking up in terms 
of their residential arrangements expressly to gain access to the benefits on offer.
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these women relied on formal bank accounts to hold their money. Rather than invest 
in cattle, their patterns of consumption indicated an altogether more cash-based 
approach in which they were more integrated into the market domain of the economy 
than many men and were conversant and less inclined to be suspicious of new 
‘technologies’, such as automated bank tellers and cellular telephones. On the whole, 
women also tended to display greater interest in apparently ‘feminised’ forms of 
saving and were comfortable with dealing in cash, such as rotating credit associations 
and buying clubs.37 People who hailed from villages in Peddie District, but who 
worked in the cities, were often members of burial societies (and imigalelo) there, 
contributing to the financial literacy of rural women and some older men.
As more young women turned their backs on marriage as a culturally valued and 
economically viable institution, preferring instead to set up and maintain their own 
matrifocal households, the social identities of all men, including those of married men 
as husbands and fathers, were increasingly brought under scrutiny. In this situation, 
owning even a small number of cattle and other livestock literally and legitimately 
gave particularly those men who were formally unemployed something to do, rather 
than loiter around the village and frequent the local shebeens, as cattle and their 
associated activities (ploughing, dipping, herding) could keep men relatively active. 
As elderly Mr. Hokwana told me,
We have been unemployed for a long time, this is not a new thing. What is 
different is that it was [unusual] then to find men just sitting around, doing 
nothing. Instead, [as a man] you were always busy, making a skei [yoke] 
for the oxen, weeding the garden, looking after the cattle or fixing a fence.
While the decline in agricultural activities meant that many men were not in a 
position to invest their energy so fully in pastoral pursuits, where they still held cattle, 
men were still afforded some control over the monetary resources in their household 
and how these resources were allocated towards fulfilling longer-term economic and
37 Although they were active in burial societies, I found very little evidence of participation by men in 
these clubs. I came across just two cases where men claimed to be members of imigalelo, but did not 
attend meetings and were ‘represented’ by their daughters, wives or sisters. Young men did, however, 
have their own ‘drinking clubs’, some of which were of long-standing (8 years or more) and whose 
membership corresponded roughly with village section boundaries. The members would all congregate 
on Christmas Day, according to one informant, each with an expensive bottle of brandy. They would 
all share the brandy, opening one bottle after another and socialising all day. Then they would go home 
to sleep and return the next morning to continue drinking in an effort to cure their hang-overs.
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social (including ritual) projects. Significantly, by building up a herd, rather than 
spending their always limited disposable income on girlfriends, drinking or gambling 
(which was what local women invariably accused them of doing), cattle-ownership 
connected men into locally significant cultural pathways of prestige and respect. 
There was a ‘patriarchal dividend’ (Connell 1995) at work here, since even men 
without cattle could involve themselves in the ‘work of cattle’, which included, of 
course, the ritual work of cattle. The activities associated with the ‘work of cattle’ not 
only actively excluded women, but rested on, and gave men the (albeit contested) 
cultural space to re-enact, patriarchal and hierarchical values that dictated, among 
other things, the ‘place of women’ and the ‘place of children’. It was in this very real 
sense that men worked for cattle and cattle worked for men and why the women who 
were no longer closely attached to men had much less interest in cattle.
Conclusions
Gender relations and family life in rural Peddie District were not imploding, but they 
were very tense. Social relations, including marriage, had been in flux since at least 
the 1950s, in response to broader changes in the economy and political landscape of 
the countryside (Mager 1998; Morrell 2001). I found that rural people of necessity 
continued to find ways of dealing with these changes. One of the significant ways in 
which women currently sought to deal with profound changes in the status of men 
was to be far more selective in the relationships they built and sought to sustain with 
the significant men in their lives. Some women appeared to be steadily erasing men 
out of their more feminised social milieu. Female-centred multi-generational families 
headed by women and women assuming greater control of associations and local 
organisations were indications of these changes.
Marriage and bridewealth constituted another social arena that was now subject to 
probably greater strategising on the part of young women than in the past when their 
fathers and male kin played a key role in the negotiation of bridewealth and even in 
the selection of a husband. Where the young unmarried mother was once regarded 
with disdain, this was no longer the case. Unless economic prospects for men 
improved, there were likely to be fewer male-headed households in future and fewer 
marriages that were cemented by the transfer of lobolo, whether in the form of cattle
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or cash. Jones (1996: 51) goes as far as to assert that ‘[t]he relative informality of 
marriage.. .gives rise to patterns of reckoning kinship, and means of establishing 
identity, that may depart significantly from the traditional scheme of things.. .Quite 
simply, the essence of the system has altered.’ Certainly, issues of paternity and clan 
affiliation were likely to come to the fore, as there seemed to be no slackening of the 
strict clan exogamy that characterised Xhosa marriage.
The many and varied future implications of these changes are not clear, but the 
searing gender violence that characterised the rural Eastern Cape Province was 
evidence that the patriarchal order, in the persons of younger men, was fighting a 
desperate rearguard action. This may well succeed only in further alienating men and 
women from each other. At a different level, as the household and the homestead 
drifted apart, not least through the development of new settlements of ‘matchbox’ 
houses that were not homesteads in the ritual sense, it was clear that rituals were 
significant sites of social interaction that still brought the genders and generations 
together. It is to the rituals that people in rural Peddie District conducted, in which 
cattle and the ancestors were both implicated, that we turn in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Harnessing the power of the ancestors:
Ritual practice in Peddie District
[Ritual] is less about giving voice to shared values than about opening fields of 
argument; about providing the terms and tropes, that is, through which people 
caught up in changing worlds may vex each other, question definitions of value, 
form alliances, and mobilize oppositions (Comaroff & Comaroff 1993: xxiii).
Introduction
My aim in this dissertation is to explore how cattle were practically and discursively 
enmeshed in the everyday livelihoods, accumulation strategies and domestic struggles 
of households in Peddie District. In the context of materially building the homestead 
in the otherwise asset-poor rural economy, holding cattle was a means by which rural 
people attempted to maximise their use of available physical (i.e. ecological and 
human), economic and, as I demonstrate in this chapter, cultural resources to advance 
their particular social projects.
Much of the work of rural, especially senior, men was aimed, directly and indirectly, 
at maintaining the enclaved position (or in Appadurai’s [1986] terminology, to 
(re)construct and maintain limits on the ‘commodity candidacy’) of cattle. They 
sought to retain the position of cattle as goods that were regarded as symbolically 
crucial to the ritual well-being of the homestead and the wider community. In this 
chapter, I explore how especially the rurally resident male heads of cattle-holding 
households endorsed the use and exchange of cattle for consumption in ritual 
slaughter, within defined cultural norms. I show that it was by rhetorically and 
practically linking cattle to the key local projects of ukwakh'umzi [building the home] 
and masincedisane [let us help each other], especially by emphasising the 
‘homestead-strengthening’ consumption of cattle in rituals, that senior men -  and 
married or widowed women -  sought to exercise some control over the increasingly 
differentiated, fragmented and fragile social and economic relationships at household 
and village levels (Ngwane 2003: 696; Kepe 2002b; Ntshona & Turner 2002).
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Cattle-holding in rural Peddie District reflected the ever-widening differentials in 
material wealth between households. This made the use of cattle, in one of their 
remaining substantively cultural roles, i.e. in ritual slaughter, all the more pertinent. 
As Parkin (1980: 198) has pointed out, customary ritual practices can ‘mask.. .the 
development of inequality by communicating the opposite’. The economically 
levelling aspects of Xhosa ritual, in the sense that social categories such as clan 
membership, genealogical seniority, age, gender and commensality were emphasised 
over measures of social difference and economic class (although class differences 
were not entirely ignored nor transcended), provided a foil that at least partly negated 
local wealth differentials.
In the first section of this chapter, I review the varied nature of ritual practice in the 
Eastern Cape and in Peddie District specifically.1 In particular, I review McAllister’s 
distinction between what he calls ancestor or kinship rituals on the one hand, and 
beer drinks on the other hand, in the context of Peddie District. The ancestor rituals 
that McAllister studied on the Willowvale coast of the former Transkei laid stress on 
atemporal, patrilineal kinship ties, whereas beer drinks emphasised territorial 
relations and co-operation between households. McAllister argued that this contrast 
was particularly strong because of the context of extensive inter-household economic 
co-operation, such as the ploughing companies and work parties that characterised 
this area of the rural Eastern Cape (McAllister 1997,2001).
In the second section, I examine the rituals that were conducted in Hamburg and 
Loverstwist during my period of fieldwork. I consider which rituals were most 
frequently performed and why this should be so. In the interests of brevity, I have 
moved the ‘thick descriptions’ of funeral rituals and of the ulwaluko [male initiation] 
ritual to Appendix Eight. I have also had to move the section that deals with the 
financial costs associated with conducting different rituals to Appendix Eight.2
1 McAllister (1980: 211) provides a useful explanation of what may be subsumed under the term ‘ritual 
practice’ among Xhosa-speakers in the rural Eastern Cape (see also Bell 1997).
In this section o f Appendix Eight, I examine the timing of major and smaller rituals, and show that, 
where possible, many households made use o f the holiday periods to conduct ancestor rituals, when the 
villages were swollen by the return of town-based people. This was also the time when many of those 
employed got their ‘Christmas bonus’, which they used to cover the costs of the hosting rituals 
(Ngwane 2003). The timing maximised the material redistributive effects and delivered ‘social’ gains 
in prestige that were associated with hosting ritual events.
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In the final section of this chapter, I explore the extent to which ritual practice in the 
rural Eastern Cape opened up social spaces for people to negotiate and contest local 
meanings that were dislocated (or indeed, became more entrenched inter- 
generationally) through the contingencies of long-term and long-distance migrancy, 
residential fluidity and urban-rural straddling (see McAllister 1980: 249-250; Ngwane 
2003). I briefly consider the mechanisms which existed in all villages to distribute the 
relatively high costs associated with hosting rituals across local social networks.
These mechanisms included local burial societies and buying clubs, that were mostly 
the preserve of women. These groups played an important role in building and 
maintaining relations between homesteads and wider kin in rural areas. In the case of 
better-resourced and better-educated households, these societies and clubs tended to 
straddle rural and urban areas, and constituted an important economic and social 
bridge between the rural village and the town (Bank 2002b; cf. Boissevain 1984).
While rituals underscored the position of the host homestead within the networks of 
kinship, reciprocity and social affiliation or social distance in the village, hosting a 
ritual was a finely balanced social performance that had to be carefully orchestrated 
to achieve its effects (see De Wet 1995b; cf. Hughes-Freeland & Crain 1998b; Crain 
1998).
I conclude the chapter by restating the need to see cattle-holding in the reserve areas 
not as some residual activity that will disappear with further ‘market integration’, but 
in the context of the contemporary livelihood options, the social projects and the 
ritual practices which people in Peddie District and elsewhere in the Eastern Cape 
continued to invest with meaning in the present.
Ritual in the Eastern Cape: spatial variations on a theme
To analyse ritual practice in Peddie District, I take as my starting point McAllister’s 
distinction between ancestor rituals and beer-drinks among Xhosa-speaking people 
(McAllister 1997). Based on more than 25 years of (intermittent) fieldwork 
conducted in the agriculturally active Shixini area of Willowvale District in the 
former Transkei, McAllister (2001: 183) argued that the ancestor rituals, significant 
elements of which were played out in the cattle byre of each umzi, were based on clan
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and kinship ties. He claimed that these rituals ‘ha[d] little relevance for the nature of 
everyday social interaction... [and had] a relatively atemporal and formal character’ 
(see also McAllister 1997). Unlike beer drinks, these ancestor rituals had a fairly 
fixed structure in which oratory and a predetermined spatial sequence featured 
prominently so as to
stress genealogical order, the unity of the kin group and the relationship 
between living and dead, and [had] a timeless quality, largely unrelated to 
the actual process of everyday life, which [was] based on territorial relations 
and co-operation between neighbours (McAllister 2001: 183).
McAllister (1997: 282) also suggested that the oratory at these rituals not only 
‘communicates information about the ritual, but also about values and norms, group 
boundaries, hierarchies [including gender hierarchies] and social distance, and 
degrees of inclusion and exclusion’. These rituals were concerned more with 
normative structural relationships and tended to exclude, or at least clearly delineate, 
non-kin who may nonetheless be important to the host homestead in everyday 
situations.
In contrast, beer drinks ‘differ[ed] from ancestor rituals... [especially with regard to] 
the active role of neighbours and local territorial groups’ in the ritual.3 It was these 
non-kin participants, McAllister argued, who were more important than kin and 
clanspeople in overcoming the practical problems of everyday rural life in Shixini, 
and this was what made beer drinks so interesting. He suggested that, in sharp 
contrast to ancestor rituals, beer drinks were fora for discussing community affairs, 
and as manifestations of the local community in action, they allowed for the 
expression of important social principles, including ‘locality, neighbourliness, co­
operation, sharing and the interdependence of homesteads’ (McAllister 1997: 299, 
303).
Why should this apparently sharp structural disjuncture between ancestor rituals and 
beer drinks have existed in people’s ritual practice in Shixini? McAllister argued that 
it had to do with the important change, since about the 1920s, in the ways in which 
the maintenance of local economic activity in Shixini had come to depend less on
3 McAllister’s doctoral thesis dealt in considerable detail with Xhosa beer drinks and their oratory (see 
McAllister 1986).
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kinship and more on co-operative labour and the pooling of resources between 
neighbouring homesteads. It was the break-up of what were previously larger 
homesteads, coupled to the increase in labour migration, that made individual 
homesteads more dependent on others, especially on their immediate neighbours, for 
their economic survival (McAllister 1997: 296; Manona 1999).
McAllister quotes Salzman (1978) in pointing out that ‘culture always contains 
contradictions and alternatives, including organisational alternatives to currently 
operating forms, which may be activated as conditions change’, in order to explain 
what he saw as a more generalised transition from ancestor rituals to beer drinks that 
followed from a shift from kinship to neighbourhood and a sense of community as 
‘the major organising principle’ (McAllister 1997: 305-6).4
When applied to the Peddie data, however, McAllister’s binary distinction between 
ancestor rituals (stressing the kin group) and beer drinks (emphasising the more 
economically significant, everyday relations based on neighbourhood) seems to work 
less well.5 Firstly, in relation to agrarian production, there appeared to be far less 
agrarian-based co-operation and interdependence between homesteads in rural Peddie 
District than McAllister found in Shixini. This related to the steady decline in 
agricultural activity, especially in field cultivation, in Peddie District since the 1950s 
and particularly since the mid-1970s. In fact, because of population pressure, the 
widespread landlessness among households and the degradation of arable lands, these 
lands, although underutilised, remained paradoxically highly contested in many 
villages in Peddie District (see Ainslie 1998; Mzozoyana 1995b).
In this regard, Hamburg was anomalous, partly because Hamburg previously had its 
own municipality and (some) households were allocated two-hectare plots of land, 
which were large enough to be subdivided for residential and arable purposes. In
4 Similarly, Bell (1997: 255) points out that ‘...[R]arely does a society have only one style or one 
worldview. Usually there are several different cosmological orders more or less integrated with each 
other but capable of tense differentiation and mutual opposition. Different parts of society -  social 
classes, economic strata, or ethnic groups -  may hold different perspectives on ritual, or the same 
subgroup may have different attitudes on different occasions (See also Moore 1986: 195ff).
5 Xhosa-speakers make a distinction between amasiko [pi. customs] -  which include umsebenzi [lit. 
work or ritual] directed at the ancestors -  and imithetho [pi. social rules of behaviour, laws] that are not 
necessarily religious, and which include social practices such as ukuhlonipa [to use the language and 
behaviour o f avoidance and respect].
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consequence, as many as 39% of the 254 homesteads in Hamburg village ploughed 
and planted their arable ‘allotments’ (often equivalent in size to a home garden) to 
maize, other fieldcrops (oats, legumes, etc.) and vegetables during the 2000/01 
season. However, only a small number of these homesteads did so by participating in 
ploughing companies and other co-operative work parties. Some of these people, and 
others, also had small allotments in the Hamburg Community Garden where, 
although the Garden formed a contiguous enclosed area, they worked their allotments 
on an individual basis. Thus even in Hamburg, with its higher levels of agrarian 
activity, the tasks relating to cultivation were individualised and commoditised. Few 
homesteads practised forms of non-monetised exchange of factors of production, 
specifically isahlulo [share-cropping]. The majority of households paid to have their 
fields ploughed by ox or tractor-drawn plough. Where no money changed hands for 
ploughing and planting services, it was usually because the ploughing team included 
animals from that particular homestead’s byre and/or the labour of male members of 
the households in question. Most people also paid for weeding services that were 
provided by women who, while they often worked in groups, were paid a daily rate 
on an individual basis.6
In Loverstwist, people’s access to the potentially arable land (much of it still covered 
with thombush and rocks) adjacent to the village was disputed with the neighbouring 
village of Tuku A. This meant that most of the homesteads in the village were 
reluctant to incur the capital outlay necessary to get arable land under crops. Where 
field cultivation did occur, informants made it clear that each household was expected 
to meet its own labour needs, or employ other people to help with production-related 
tasks. Labour was thus commoditised and no work-parties or co-operative ploughing 
teams were in evidence during the fieldwork period in Loverstwist.
As in Mooiplaas near East London, the emphasis in agrarian production in rural 
Peddie District has shifted in two respects (see Bank & Qambata 1999). Firstly, a 
shift had taken place to household autonomy, although not household self- 
sufficiency, in terms of engagement in productive activities. Most cultivation
6 There was some variation on providing them with meals (morning ‘tea’ and lunch) during the day, 
but several informants claimed that they had ended this practice as it was easily abused by workers 
who spent an inordinate amount of time eating and chatting rather than working.
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occurred in the more private space of people’s home-gardens, some of which were 
only just big enough to warrant ploughing with oxen or by tractor (cf. Bank 2002b: 
637). Secondly, a more significant shift occurred in which most rural homesteads 
moved from being sites of productive agrarian activity to sites of consumption 
(Ainslie 1998; Ngwane 2003: 699). These two factors taken together meant that the 
beer drinks that were so vividly described by McAllister as an integral part of co­
operative agrarian activities in Shixini were virtually non-existent in Peddie District 
at the time of my fieldwork.
A second significant difference when compared to Shixini, and allied to the decline in 
field-scale agricultural activity, was the fact that in Peddie District there was an 
earlier decline in the participation of men in classic long-distance migrant labour 
practices. This meant that men as household heads were either resident in the village 
or were relatively close at hand, being residents of towns and cities in the region. 
Unlike the many men (and women) in Shixini who continued to be employed as long­
distance migrants in distant mines and urban centres, and who were thus still plugged 
into the migrant labour system, town-based Peddie people were less inclined to enter 
into formal arrangements with their neighbours and kinsmen to keep an eye on their 
homesteads, arable lands and livestock. This more local habitation, coupled to their 
considerable post-1994 reliance on the social welfare economy and the substantial 
out-migration by younger people to regional towns and cities, all fostered an 
emphasis on economic independence and autonomy at the household level, with 
negative implications for ‘everyday’ mutual assistance and reciprocity between 
households.
For village-based homesteads, there were powerful economic, cultural and social 
reasons for seeking to keep town-based household and lineage members involved in 
the affairs of the rural umzi. Ironically, the need for access to reliable information 
about employment in the less predictable unspecialised7 regional economy was 
actually greater for Peddie residents than it was for the long-distance migrants of 
Shixini, who could presumably rely on labour recruiters and especially their closer- 
knit ‘home-boy’ networks to keep them informed of potential employment
7 In the sense that one was not a mine-worker or an industrial worker but was reduced to the status of a 
general labourer, who was easily replaced.
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opportunities in highly specific sectors of the economy, mainly on the mines and in 
industries.
Thirdly, it was worth noting that even within Peddie District there were notable 
differences in this regard. Hamburg -  like Shixini -  had a relatively stable population 
in terms of the proportion of lineages who had lived there and intermarried over at the 
past 50-60 years, albeit with in-migration of displaced farmworker families.8 
Loverstwist, by contrast, consisted of households which had all moved into the 
village in the past 10-15 years from various localities, although mostly from 
previously white-owned farms in this particular part of Peddie District. Many of the 
people I interviewed in Loverstwist admitted to having moved there to escape the 
‘family problems’ they had experienced in their home villages or farms. This meant 
that the social ties, including ties of marriage, between households in Loverstwist 
were not as long-standing nor as overlapping as those in Hamburg.9 The consistently 
larger number of beer drinks hosted in Loverstwist, compared to Hamburg (see 
below), may be seen as a way of, on the one hand, seeking to ensure ancestral 
sanction and support and, on the other hand, of emphasising and encouraging the 
desirable social characteristics of good neighbourliness and reciprocal assistance 
between households and lineages. In other words, precisely the values that, in a post­
agrarian, dislocated community, could no longer be taken for granted, were the ones 
being enacted.
Fourthly, and as portrayed in the preceding chapters, economic downturn had had a 
differential impact on households in the villages of Peddie District. On the one hand, 
it had widened socio-economic differences between households in the villages and
8 For the current generation of young people getting married, it was clear that the more educated and 
employed were marrying people from outside Hamburg, while the less educated, where they were 
getting married at all, continued to marry locally. Although I did not examine this issue in detail, it 
seemed that intermarriage tended, at least in the past, to fall within discrete village sections.
9 This was reflected in the series of violent confrontations that rocked the village of Loverstwist in 
1996-1997, when four elderly women, accused of being witches responsible for the suspicious death of 
a ‘healthy’ young woman, were severely beaten by a group of (mostly) young men in the community 
and held hostage in a hut. They were finally persuaded, through the intercession of the police, to 
release the women. Witchcraft remained a serious concern for many people in the village, with the 
wealthiest man in the village having had his house burnt to the ground by lightning just prior to my 
period of fieldwork in the village. In 1999, dissatisfaction with the then village leadership led to the 
burning of four homes and the subsequent violent eviction of the leadership for the alleged theft of 
community funds, corruption and nepotism. These and other, similar episodes, although by no means 
unheard of in other villages, earned Loverstwist a degree of notoriety in Peddie District (cf. Comaroff 
& Comaroff 1999; Ashforth 1998).
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put further pressure on the household economic independence that was a feature of 
people’s livelihoods in rural Peddie District. This generated social tensions as poorer 
households applied moral pressure on wealthier households to assist them materially, 
principally by invoking the masincedisane norm. In Hamburg, these socio-economic 
cleavages appeared to be more marked10 than in Loverstwist, and this found 
expression in the relatively higher number of slaughter rituals -  which on an 
individual basis had a higher redistributive effect than beer drinks -  conducted by 
wealthier households in Hamburg. Not that beer drinks were unimportant in respect
of supplementing people’s diets. In both villages, there were a number of poorer-------
people for whom survival from week to week was partly dependent on attending 
every beer drink held in the village, where they consumed significant amounts of 
nutritious mqombothi [home-brewed sorghum beer] and might be fortunate enough to 
be served a hearty meal.
Fifthly, although part of a long-standing pattern, the rise in the economic 
independence especially of younger, better-educated women since the 1980s, and that 
of elderly, women pensioners since the mid-1990s, threw gender and generational 
relations in the household and village, already troubled, into further disarray (cf. 
Mager 1992,1999; Ngwane 2003). This gave rise to tensions and disruptions in 
normative relations between differently situated people that were played out socially 
and economically and which required some form of public expression.
Given these different pressures on household and inter-household relations, it seems 
to me that current ritual practice in rural Peddie District, while rooted in older, more 
normative, cultural and ritual forms, needs to be conceptualised somewhat differently 
to ritual practice in Shixini. Unlike Shixini, where ritual served to re-affirm existing 
social relations that were in daily ‘use’, in places like Hamburg and Loverstwist, the 
need existed for regular opportunities to enact social relations between kin and 
between neighbours and other villagers, resident and absent from the village, that 
would build reciprocity and trust between imizi [homesteads]. Socially, ancestor 
rituals, beer drinks and other ceremonies in both villages were about making use of,
10 Mostly, I venture, because the community of Hamburg had been established much longer, giving 
homesteads with better-educated members ample time to accumulate resources, and thereby to 
compound the economic advantages they had over other, less upwardly-mobile households, with 
farmworker families grouped in the latter.
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and in the process building and re-affirming, bonds of kinship, neighbourliness and 
reciprocity. But, unlike Shixini, it was the relative absence of other, overlapping 
relationships predicated on everyday co-operative, agrarian production and a 
residentially stable rural population that marked rituals as different in places like rural 
Peddie District. Here again, unlike in Shixini, different rituals were themselves 
harnessed to do the work of instructing a specially constituted population, that was 
ordinarily dislocated and fragmented, how they should act towards each other. Rituals 
also did the work of defining and redefining kinship, clanship, neighbourliness, in 
short, community, in relation to the past, the present and the future.
There is a further twist to this notion of ‘ritual as work party’. As slaughter rituals 
became more elaborate and costly, it became necessary to engage other households in 
the preparations thereof. Both the costs and the labour required to host what many rural 
people regarded as important slaughter rituals were increasingly difficult for individual 
homesteads to manage alone. In the village context, this made the actual work of 
hosting rituals a necessarily co-operative undertaking by local and even town-based 
people, most of them women, who were assembled for the task of successfully planning 
and doing all the preparations for the ritual.
Stated differently, my contention is that, on the one hand, the very activities and 
processes involved in planning, organising and co-operating to successfully host a 
wide range of rituals -  including ancestor rituals -  were a key site for exploring and 
negotiating the moral and material relations and tensions within and between the 
diasporic homesteads in villages like Loverstwist and Hamburg (Ngwane 2003; 
Ngwenya 2002).111 contend that in rural Peddie District it was precisely the hosting 
of rituals, rather than co-operative agricultural production, that became the 
quintessential ‘co-operative’ work that people constituting dispersed rural and urban 
households shared.12
11 Three other important sites were community meetings (including school meetings) and 
(denominational) church services and oomanyano (women’s prayer groups), all of which generally 
involved, through processes of voluntary exclusion, only certain categories o f people in the village.
12 In this way, rituals may be considered a ‘bridging arrangement’ between rural and urban, such as 
‘cash down’ bridewealth payments among the Pedi of Sekhukhuneland, that Sansom (1981: 98) 
suggests were key to ‘communally contrived, communally recognised and communally backed 
guarantees of proper performance in the face of the tyranny of distanced separation’.
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The frequent roping in of local kinswomen and neighbours from poorer households to 
help with the preparations for a ritual played an important role in both recognising 
and subverting economic (and class) distinctions between individuals and households. 
By enlisting the unpaid help of neighbours, it could be said that wealthier host imizi 
were exploiting their labour in pursuit of conspicuous consumption to the benefit of 
the host umzi. However, such co-operation also provided valuable opportunities for 
women not only to work together both intensively and on a relatively equal footing, 
but also afforded them opportunities, through their conversations and interactions 
over the course of several days, to exchange information, to discuss local problems 
and to mull over the stories and scandals that had come to light in other villages or in 
‘town’. In this way, they actively built common locally-informed understandings of 
social practice, while strengthening networks of mutual support across the real 
cleavages of socio-economic difference, both within the village and between town 
and village-based women. Thus ritual ‘work parties’ served as important sites of 
sociality by providing the space, especially for women, to socialise and to work 
together (cf. Hughes-Freeland & Crain 1998b: 6).
The presence and participation of other villagers at a ritual was no a small matter 
either. McAllister’s (2001: 178-180) informants pointed out that ‘it is pleasing to the 
ancestors for their descendants to ‘build’ the homestead in the economic sense, and it 
is clear that this would not be possible without relationships with [other] people.’ 
Critically, other villagers were implicated in many of the ritual practices of each 
homestead in the village. Important to the success of the ritual were the contributions 
of alcohol and money from extended family members, imigalelo [rotating credit 
clubs] and, in the case of funerals, from burial societies.
A key principle with regard to the role of other villagers during rituals was that of 
ukuzimasa [to participate] and ukungqina [to witness], which means to endorse and 
legitimise the ritual by attending the ritual event, as well as by consuming some of the 
drink and food on offer. It involved listening to the host’s explanation of what event 
had given rise to this ritual and giving a formal response to this explanation. This 
response was given by the most senior man present who was not related to the host 
umzi. Finally, it involved the commensality of every adult in the village being 
welcome to drink the home-brewed beer and brandy, and to eat the meat and other
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food that was provided, in ways that were normatively ordered by conventions of 
gender and generational difference.
Through their attendance and participation, non-kin local people thus contributed to 
‘building the homestead’ by recognising the host homestead (and its ancestors) as one 
of their own, legitimising its activities and paying witness to its ritual and moral 
projects (cf. Wilson et al. 1952: 206). For this reason, neighbours and other villagers 
were not expressly invited to a ritual. They were simply expected to attend. The 
offerings of mqombothi [sorghum beer] and meat, besides their ritual purpose, were a 
means of encouraging attendance by other people who were not involved in the work 
of organising and hosting the ritual. It was the attendance by large numbers of other 
people, especially members o f ‘respectable’ local families and town-based people, 
that provided the ‘noise’ of many people socialising. This ‘noise’ was an indication of 
the status of the host umzi and showed the ancestors that the host homestead was 
being built by the entire village. By contrast, the clearest sign of a socially marginal 
homestead was the small number of people, and the virtual absence of non-kin people 
at the ‘open’ rituals (as opposed to ‘family’ rituals) they conducted.13
Ritual practice in Peddie District
The contemporary salience of ritual practice as people’s central means of 
communicating with their patrilineal ancestors was everywhere apparent in rural 
Peddie District. The actual, often brief, communication with the ancestors in the byre 
could only be performed by the most senior man of the host agnatic cluster or if he 
was not available, by a next-most appropriate available senior man. Every homestead 
thus had one designated senior man who ideally officiated at all their rituals. A stand- 
in should be another senior agnatic relative but might also be simply a senior 
clansman, who was taken as a fictive lineage member on the basis of his clan 
affiliation to the host homestead (cf. Wilson et al. 1952: 64).
The reason why ancestor rituals were of particular analytical importance for my 
purposes was that they involved the use of cattle in re-enacting and contesting social 
values and cultural norms through the expression of an idealised ‘Xhosa’ identity. It
13 Some rituals, such as imbeleko [introducing a child to the ancestors], were regarded as family rituals 
and were usually only attended by close kin relatives.
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was in ancestor rituals that the social authority of men was re-affirmed. It was also at 
these times that the roles of different categories of people (men, women, young and 
old, Christians and non-Christians) were most clearly delineated in relation to each 
other and any aberrations most clearly noticeable.
Schapera’s observation, made some 70 years ago in respect of ancestor beliefs in 
Southern Africa, was that
[Ancestral spirits] were not regarded as omnipotent, but they took an active 
interest in the affairs o f  their own family and tribe, and without their 
guidance and help the living could not hope to flourish. They were held 
above all to be the guardians o f the existing social order, the custodians o f  
tradition, and, since to inaugurate new ways was a sure method o f  estranging 
and alienating them, they were a strong force for conservatism (Schapera 
1934: 30).
To a considerable extent, notwithstanding the inroads made by nearly two centuries 
of Christian missionary work, this situation still pertained in rural Peddie District (see 
Mtuze 2003: 25,52). Many rural people, both men and women, relied on a range of 
rituals to genuinely pursue supernatural sanction from their patrilineal ancestors for 
the activities of their umzi and its members (Mtuze 2003: 50-51, 57; cf. Moore, S.F. 
1996). By ‘genuinely’ I mean that their actions must be taken at face value and 
cannot be regarded as the products of a deliberate ideological mystification of 
everyday life and its ambiguities on the part of one section of rural Xhosa society 
over other sections (cf. Davis 1992). Nevertheless, of course, power was exercised 
here, particularly in the taking up of normative gender and generational roles, the 
positioning in space of different social categories of people and the allocations of 
meat, brandy and mqombothi to these different categories, during the hosting of a 
ritual event. Since each slaughter ritual must be sanctioned by the ancestors, which 
was signalled by the bellowing of the sacrificial beast just before it was killed, every 
ritual provided a potentially dramatic arena for social contestation. The ever-present 
threat that the beast would not bellow, because the ancestors were unhappy about 
something or someone’s behaviour, would stop the ritual in its tracks. This threat 
provided the space for certain categories of people to attempt to dominate others 
through selectively updated yet culturally potent interpretations and re-enactments of 
‘traditional’ ritual practice (cf. McAllister 1980: 248).
231
Indeed, rituals were used and thought of in what appear to be rather instrumental 
ways by many of the rural people I interviewed. This pragmatism worked at various 
levels. Firstly, the widely held belief in the active interest and intervention in one’s 
life of the ancestors or, in the case of many Christians, both of the Christian deity and 
the ancestors, was put forward as the fundamental reason for conducting rituals. My 
informants emphasised the express need to host rituals at the rural umzi as a means of 
ensuring supernatural support for building the home in a material and moral sense. 
Building the home was achieved, on the one hand, by appeasing the ancestors (the 
living-dead) who, from beyond the grave, continued to have expectations of the 
living. These expectations were made known when particular ancestors appeared in 
the dreams of living members of the umzi. In these dreams, the ancestor expressed his 
or her displeasure at the fact that a particular ritual had not been conducted or simply 
indicated that he or she was ‘thirsty’ for mqombothi. This obliged the members of the 
umzi to spread the word, to muster their resources, to organise and finally to conduct 
the required ritual, which might be a simple and relatively inexpensive beer drink or a 
costly gift of an ox to a deceased grandfather.
Moreover, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, building the home in a 
resource-poor rural environment requires the continued flow and investment of 
material resources, people and information from town to rural villages. The sprucing- 
up of the homestead (additional building, renovating and painting) prior to a ritual 
was a clear expression of this investment. Building the home also required 
maintaining relationships between kin and wider social networks between town and 
country, thereby ensuring that one’s rituals were well-attended.
Thirdly, in the context of the village, building the home required engaging one’s 
neighbours in co-operative projects. This was because Xhosa people say that ‘Akukho 
siko elinakho kuqhubeka abantu bengekho' [there have to be people present to 
perform a custom, i.e. ritual].14 These days, such projects placed an emphasis on the 
display, sharing and highly repetitive consumption of the same, specified material 
resources. As recurring consumption events, rituals fulfilled this role well. The shared 
consumption of the meat of slaughtered animals, the preparation and sharing of other
14 This is as true today as when it was noted by Mills in Wilson et al. (1952: 206).
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foodstuffs and the consumption of home-brewed beer and brandy all facilitated the 
commensality and co-operation that were required to lubricate social relations in the 
village context.
During the course of my fieldwork, it became clear that a significant number of 
homesteads in Hamburg and Loverstwist were involved in conducting or materially 
supporting a wide range of rituals in their respective villages and beyond. Many of 
these rituals exhibited a dominant Christian character, but some indicated the 
continued relevance of ancestor veneration (Mtuze 2003: 84; cf. Pauw 1974: 433,436- 
7).15 The only households that seldom conducted rituals -  other than funerals -  were 
those in the ‘very poor’ category.16
The rituals that people performed included the slaughter rituals that marked rites of 
passage or stages in the life-cycle of individuals, and beer-drinks through which 
people communicated with their ancestors, marked transitions in their life-cycles, or 
‘just socialised’ with their neighbours.17 Other ‘feasts’ and ceremonies, such as 
weddings, graduation parties and the unveiling of tombstones, were generally the 
preserve of a far smaller group of wealthier households. Here, the norm was to 
slaughter a cow or ox (and sometimes one or more sheep), but without making 
explicit any ritual communication with the patrilineal ancestors. While they were not 
strictly ancestor rituals, these ceremonies nevertheless followed much the same
151 am not concerned here with this interesting aspect of rituals, namely to analyse the extent to which 
they may best be seen as Christian, ‘traditional’ (a distinction that is analogous with the so-called ‘Red 
vs. School’ division) or hybidised forms of these two (cf. Mtuze 2003; Mayer & Mayer 1971; Gitywa 
1976: 141ff; Mafeje 1963; Wilson et al 1952: 129ff,197). Pauw (1974: 437-8) discusses the 
complementarity, or at least, the lack of conceptual conflict, that existed between Christian and 
‘traditional’ religious/ritual practices. Because of space constraints, I acknowledge but am also not able 
to explore the distinctions that exist between nominally Mfengu and Xhosa ways of conducting rituals 
(but see Raum & De Jager 1972).
16 See the Daily Dispatch article of 6 September 2003, 'Poor families spending a fortune on lavish 
funerals The article details the ‘enormous pressure’ that families faced ‘to give their loved ones a 
decent send-off...Two new studies revealed that low income families were splurging an average of 
three-and-a-half times their total monthly incomes on funerals’. The Sunday Times o f 31 August 2003 
quoted one Port Elizabeth undertaker as saying, ‘In years past, you would never see bereaved families 
hiring tents and stoves and portable toilets at their private homes -  this is a new trend which is an 
enormous financial burden’.
17 Hammond-Tooke (1985: 55) introduces a distinction between the ‘invocation’ and ‘supplication’ of 
the ancestors that occurs in different rituals. ‘Invocation’, he suggests, refers to those situations where 
people merely call ‘on the ancestors to be present’, while ‘supplication’ refers to those rituals in which 
the ‘troubling’ ancestor is referred to by name, the reasons for the ritual are explained, and the 
ancestral spirits are informed that ‘such-and-such is being done to put things right’. Neither of these 
categories deals with the phenomenon of beer-drinks as mostly social occasions.
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pattern, in terms of a gendered and generational mobilisation and division of labour 
during the preparatory performative and consumption phases of the ritual.
It is worth noting that not all rituals required that cattle specifically be slaughtered in 
order to communicate with the ancestors. In fact, some rituals, such as imbeleko 
[introducing a child to the ancestors] or ukojisa [see below] required the slaughter of 
a goat, rather than a cow or ox, with or without the consumption of mqombothi 
[home-brewed sorghum beer] and brandy.
The ancestors were believed to reside in the byre, more specifically in the area 
directly across from the entrance and at the gate of the byre. Thus where a ritual was 
directed at the ancestors, the byre itself was the key site for conducting the ritual. 
However, only men and patrilineally related women of the host umzi were permitted 
to enter the byre during the invocation of the ancestors. In the course of conducting 
an ancestor ritual, the officiating senior man would pour a tot of brandy and some 
mqombothi on the ground inside the byre, ceremonially sharing them with the 
ancestors. Sometimes the animal was ritually slaughtered in the byre in a prescribed 
manner, on the afternoon prior to the ‘main day’ of the ritual event. Often, it was 
slaughtered on the morning of the ritual. It was tied by a leather thong to the ixhanti 
[the post in the middle of the byre], where it was introduced to the ancestors before 
being thrown onto its left side by several young men of the agnatic cluster. The 
animal was ritually prodded and then, if it bellowed, killed by the intlabi using the 
umkhonto wekhaya [the spear of the home]. The intlabi was the male head of the host 
umzi or his especially designated patrilineal relative. The animal was killed by having 
its spinal cord severed by the insertion of the spear or a large knife in the neck.
Young men had the task of gathering up the blood from the wound in a big enamel 
bowl to be mixed with fat, cooked and consumed later by the men and boys present. 
The young men also assisted with skinning the animal and, using axes and knives, 
carved up the carcass in the prescribed manner. If slaughtered the day before (as was 
the norm), the meat from the animal was stored overnight in the ritual rontawu (or 
great hut) of the homestead, where the ancestors might partake of it (see Hammond- 
Tooke 1974c: 333; McAllister 1980). The following day, most of the meat of the 
slaughtered animal was boiled and specific parts of the animal were apportioned in 
culturally prescribed ways (which might differ from clan to clan) to patrilineal kin,
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senior men, senior women, and younger men and women (cf. Gitywa 1976: 179).
This apportionment was overseen by a senior man known as the injoli who ensured 
that each designated social category, and village section where relevant, was 
adequately catered for. At the women’s cooking area behind the main house, the 
host’s wife or someone designated by her played the role of injoli for the women.
Some commentators have argued that, given the economic constraints many people 
face, goats were ‘replacing cattle’ as the key means of communicating with the 
ancestors (Steyn 1988: 379; William Beinart, personal communication).18 However, 
my informants were clear that certain ancestor rituals required the slaughter of an ox 
or cow, with little room for substitution in this regard (cf. McAllister 2001: 45). In 
fact, the cost of buying the ox or cow that was required for a slaughter ritual was one 
of the main reasons that people gave for not being in a position to conduct certain 
rituals. In other words, they would rather risk the displeasure of their ancestors at the 
undue delay in conducting these rituals than use a ritually less efficacious animal (for 
example, a goat) that would also risk undermining the status of their umzi in the 
village (Wilson et al. 1952: 197). Since, in many of the cases of rituals I recorded, the 
most common reason given for slaughtering an animal was ‘to feed the people 
present’ rather than to ritually slaughter the appropriate animal for the ancestors, 
slaughtering an ox or a cow rather than one or more goats or sheep was more efficient 
and, since it cost more to buy, also conferred more status on the host umzi.
None of the above should be taken to suggest that ritual slaughter among Xhosa- 
speaking rural people was timeless and unchanging since, as I have argued above, it 
clearly was not (Wilson 1978). Indeed, ritual hybridisation and innovation, as well as 
contingent adjustments, were all in evidence here (Mtuze 2003: 88ff). McAllister 
(1997: 306) argued that in Shixini a number of ancestor rituals that formerly involved
18 See Soga (1932: 241) with regard to ritual slaughter in the celebration of marriages: ‘With poorer 
individuals there is less display and extravagance; sheep and goats take the place of slaughter cattle in 
the festivities.’ Elsewhere, however, Soga (1932: 158) mentions that, in the case of an ill person, ‘the 
spirits will not be satisfied until the particular animal [whether cow, goat or sheep] originally 
mentioned [by the diviner] has been offered as a sacrifice’; see also Soga (1932: 250). Brown (1971:
180) suggested that goats are considered by Xhosa-speakers to be less efficacious in placating the 
ancestral spirits than cattle. Btihrmann (1984: 83) noted that during the initiation of Xhosa diviners, to 
have a goat instead of a cow slaughtered during the final godusa [taking home] ritual was regarded as 
‘slightly inferior and to be "godusa-ed by the bok [goat]" implies some kind of stigma’. (See also 
Btihrmann 1984: 88; Hunter 1936: 71).
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ritual slaughter have been replaced by beer drinks, just as beer appeared, during much 
earlier times, to have replaced milk as a ritual beverage.19 McAllister’s fascinating 
study of the change from the umhlinzeko [ox slaughter] ritual which had been 
replaced by the umsindleko beerdrink in Shixini in the context of ritually 
reincorporating a migrant worker into his home community is an excellent example 
of this change in ritual practice over time (McAllister 1981,1985).20
Several of my informants indicated that, as long as the ancestors were told, during the 
ukungxengxeza part21 of a ritual, about the reasons why a goat instead of an ox or a 
cow was being slaughtered, then they (the ancestors) would not object to the use of a 
goat. Similarly, if an appropriate animal was not available in the byre of the 
homestead, an animal would have to be purchased for the purposes of ritual slaughter. 
On such occasions it was enough for the purchased animal to spend one night in the 
byre and for the officiating man to simply explain to the ancestors that there was no 
suitable animal in the byre, and that this required the family to purchase the animal 
that was about to be slaughtered, and to indicate where this animal, which he should 
know the name of (alternatively, it must be given a name), comes from. In this way, 
the actual performance of normative ritual practices was adapted to what was 
affordable and manageable at the current time.
Furthermore, most rural people readily accepted that different clans and families had 
slightly different ritual practices and ways of conducting what was a common set of 
rituals. There was no textbook which listed the precise procedures that should be 
followed during the conducting of rituals. Rather, older people (especially older men) 
were the repositories of knowledge about how the family rituals should be conducted. 
Each agnatic cluster had a senior man who was usually called upon to officiate at the
19 McAllister (2001: 149) refers to religious ‘events held as a substitute for a ritual killing of an ox or 
goat, such as when beer is brewed to ‘make known the homestead’ (ukwazisa’mzi).’
20 In respect to the dynamic nature of rituals in the Ciskei reserves of the early 1970s, Gitywa (1976: 
141) pointed out that ‘[p]assing through the various standards at the primary school level is marked by 
the killing of a chicken; the passing of Standard Sue calls for the slaughtering of a sheep or a goat. In 
both instances, the affair is a closed one, concerning only the members of the immediate family. 
Success at the Junior or Senior Certificate level [also involves] the slaughter of a sheep or goat. The 
attainment of a university degree is an important achievement for which a beast is slaughtered as soon 
as possible after graduation.’ As Bell (1997: 256) suggests, what people do ritually and regard as 
tradition is ‘usually a rather new synthesis of custom and accommodation.’
21 Literally, to say sorry; this was the part of the ritual when a speech was made in the byre to explain 
to the ancestors the reason(s) why the ritual was being conducted.
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rituals conducted by the homesteads in this cluster. This man, and other senior 
patrilineally related men and women, were often concerned that the ritual procedures 
of this particular agnatic cluster were followed as closely as possible.22 Where the 
actual practices of necessity deviated from this norm, most people expressed 
confidence that their ancestors, who experienced similar contingencies (for example 
cash shortfalls) during their lifetimes, would understand and empathise with their 
predicament. Indeed, this was confirmed, I was told, by the bellowing of the ox or 
cow before it was slaughtered, which indicated that the ancestors were satisfied with 
the proceedings and, in particular, with the explanation provided to them in the byre 
for why the ritual was being conducted.
The most important of the ancestor rituals, from the point of view of my informants 
(both men and women) in Loverstwist and Hamburg, were mortuary rituals. Besides 
the actual funeral, the two main mortuary rituals that involved the ancestors were 
ukukhapa [to accompany] and ukubuyisa [to bring home]. Both of these related to the 
death of the male -  and only the male -  homestead head and were generally not 
openly conducted by Christian families.23
The ukukhapa ritual specifically required the slaughter of an ox on the day of the 
funeral to accompany the spirit of the homestead head, while the ukubuyisa ritual, 
which followed roughly one year later, also required slaughtering an ox. The 
ukubuyisa ritual was meant to bring home the spirit of the deceased to reside in the 
byre of the umzi and to preside over the fortunes of the homestead (see Hammond- 
Tooke 1974c: 328).24 Both involved the home-brewing of mqombothi and the 
consumption of brandy.
22 Wilson (1978: 158) notes that ‘[A]mong Xhosa-speakers generally, enormous stress was laid on 
following traditional custom in every detail in rituals directed to the shades [ancestors]. Variations 
between lineages were acknowledged... But the efficacy of the ritual was held to depend upon 
following precisely the traditional form, for the shades themselves watched over and prized traditional 
custom.’
23 Mtuze (2003: 64) notes that ‘when the missionaries went further to condemn and excommunicate 
any of their members for performing certain rituals, such as ukukhapa... and ukubuyisa..., they dealt a 
death blow to the very essence of African life and religion. The rituals are a sine qua non for harmony, 
order and peaceful coexistence between the living-dead and the living.’ Raum and De Jager (1972: 
176ff) point out, however, that the majority of their informants were performing both these rituals in 
the mid-1960s.
24 This was the normative procedure which did not always play itself out, even in the non-Christian 
imizi. There were two main reasons for this. Firstly, many people had insufficient funds to cover the 
costs of slaughtering two beasts and thus of hosting a ritual of this nature. This caused the ritual to be
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A third important ritual during which a beast was slaughtered was the ukupha [to 
give] ritual, where an ox or cow was slaughtered as a ‘gift’ to a deceased father or 
grandfather. A variation of this was the ukupha umama inkobe [to give mother a gift of 
maize], which some informants suggested may include the slaughter of a cow, but more 
typically involved only the brewing of mqombothi and the consumption of brandy.
Other ‘piacular’ rituals that involved propiating the ancestors in times of distress 
might also require the slaughtering of a cow or ox, although substitution with a goat, 
as directed by an igqira [diviner], was more common here. These rituals were often 
done at the behest of amagqirha [diviners] who had been consulted in connection 
with a specific problem (which often presents with physical symptoms and 
afflictions) experienced by a member or members of the household (Hirst 1997). In 
several cases, particularly among wealthier Christian families, cattle (and sheep) were 
slaughtered at funerals, graduation parties and weddings to ‘feed people’, i.e. without 
an express invocation of the ancestors. This bore testimony to the ways in which 
people ostensibly continued to follow their customary practices, i.e. they ritually 
slaughtered cattle to mark changes in status and the like, but used different idioms to 
rationalise these practices to themselves and others (cf. Raum & De Jager 1972: 183). 
I now turn to examine rituals in Hamburg in more detail.
Conducting rituals in Hamburg
More than 103 separate rituals and ceremonies were held in Hamburg village during 
the 12-month-period November 2000 to October 2001.25 These rituals and ceremonial 
functions ranged from only brewing mqombothi [home-brewed sorghum beer] to the 
slaughter of an animal, the provision of mqombothi, brandy and other food. Certain 
rituals had the appearance of discrete occasions, but were linked to other rituals that 
had been conducted before and still other rituals that were scheduled to follow. The 
rituals conducted in Hamburg included 28 different types of ritual (or distinct phases 
of a ‘multi-stage’ ritual), with the most commonly held ancestor rituals centred on the 
complex of mortuary rites, including imingcwabo [funerals], and the ukukhapa and
delayed, sometimes for several years or even longer. Secondly, the households that were headed by 
unmarried women did not conform to the patrilineal model since they did not have a male household 
head who became an ancestor upon death.
25 Hamburg had 245 occupied households at the time. Since part o f these data relied on the 
recollections of my informants, it is likely that a few rituals were not recorded.
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ukubuyisa ancestor rituals (see Mtuze 2003: 25). Other rituals that were part of this 
complex were ukutshayelela inkundla [to sweep the courtyard] ritual, 
ukunxiba/ukukulula izila [to wear/remove mourning], and ukucitha impahla [to 
disperse the clothes of the deceased]. These various rituals associated with mortuary 
rites took place on 29 different occasions during the 12-month period.
Other frequently conducted rituals included the complex of rituals associated with 
ulwaluko [male initiation rites], including umngcamo [preparation], umshwamo or 
ukojisa [partaking of the special portion of meat, in this case, from a goat slaughtered 
for the initiate after seven days spent in seclusion] and umgidi [celebration to mark 
the return of the ‘new men’]. Wherever material circumstances allowed for it, these 
rituals involved the slaughter of cattle and/or goats (20 cases). Hosting a ritual called 
mqombothi/intselo [beer for the ancestors] occurred on 16 different occasions while 
the imbeleko [introducing a child to the ancestors] rituals, which also involved the 
slaughter of a goat, took place on eight separate occasions.
As mentioned above, imbeleko [introducing a child to the ancestors] was a ‘family 
ritual’ that only involved the agnatic (and sometimes affinal) kin and not the whole 
community. Other rituals, which usually involved only the brewing of mqombothi and 
the consumption of brandy, included ukuphuma [to come out, to graduate], which 
informed the wider community about a particular person’s change in social status, 
ukwazisa [to make known] a new home to the ancestors and community, ukuvula ’ mzi 
[to open a new home], umtshato and umendo [wedding ceremonies] and ukucitha 
iintsimbi [to cast aside the beads of an ancestor who was a diviner].26
In 43 cases out of the 103 rituals I recorded, the ritual consisted only of the provision 
of mqombothi and brandy (and generally some bottled ‘SAB’ [South African 
Breweries] lager as well). In other words, around 42% of all the rituals did not 
involve the slaughter of an animal. Table 8.1 provides a list of the rituals that people
26 One example of the ukucitha iintsimbi ritual in Hamburg involved the ritual slaughter of a goat for 
ukutshayalela [to sweep the courtyard] and the subsequent slaughter of a cow, as required by the 
officiating amagqirha [diviners], while in another, somewhat different case, known as ukuvasa 
iintsimbi, the affected homestead (in which the widowed household head was herself an igqirha) was 
only required to make mqombothi and also supplied bottled beer and gin.
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conducted where they only brewed mqombothi and the reasons for performing these 
rituals.
Table 8.1. Reasons for conducting beer drinks in Hamburg (n=43).
Name/Reason for ritual No. of rituals %
Intselo (beer for the ancestors or for living relatives) 16 37
Ulwaluko (beer relating to the male initiation ritual) 7 16
Ukukulula izila (beer to ‘release mourning’ after funeral) 5 12
Ukuphuma (beer for changing one’s social status) 4 9
Ukuzazisa/ukuvula ’mzi (beer for a new home) 4 9
Ukuvasa izitya (beer to commence/end a slaughter ritual) 2 5
Other 5 12
TOTAL 43 100
The fact that a broad range of households, wealthy and poorer ones, younger and 
older, as well as those whose members professed to be Christian of one 
denomination27 or another, conducted beer drinks and/or ancestor slaughter rituals for 
various reasons during this period indicated the extent to which rituals remained a 
part of contemporary Xhosa lifestyles in the rural Eastern Cape. However, not every 
household conducted a ritual during the course of the year in question. In fact, since 
some rituals commonly take place in succession, in a number of instances it was the 
same subset of households that were responsible for organising a particular sequence 
of rituals that were explicitly linked to their own preceding ritual.28 Except for rituals 
relating to male initiation where different homesteads may share the cost, venue and 
the preparation of food and beer, rituals were always conducted by specific 
homesteads and lineages rather than jointly between discrete and unrelated 
homesteads. In this sense, agnatic clusters and homesteads ‘do their own ritual thing’, 
although, as noted above, unrelated women may be roped in to assist with the 
preparation of food and mqombothi.
Because of my interest in the contemporary role of cattle in the lifestyles of ‘rural’ 
Xhosa-speakers, I considered both the main rituals that regularly involved the ritual
27 There were many churches represented in Hamburg; prominent among these were the Methodist, 
African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E), Bantu Church of Christ, Seventh Day Adventist and a number 
of other ‘African independent’ churches.
28 Given the cost of rituals, there was a correlation between the frequency with which a homestead 
hosted rituals and their economic standing.
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slaughter of cattle, and other occasions at which cattle were slaughtered non-ritually.29 
I remind the reader that the descriptions of two funerals and a male initiation ritual, 
which are not essential to my argument here, have been been moved to Appendix 
Eight.30
People in rural Peddie District, as elsewhere in rural South Africa, placed great 
emphasis on mortuary rituals, whether these were done in terms of Christian burials or 
more ‘traditional’ Xhosa burial rites, or commonly as a hybrid of these two forms. 
Funerals were important social occasions and people attended from far and wide. The 
funeral of an elderly person from a well-known family might be attended by several 
hundred people and involve considerable expense for the bereaved family. This has 
given rise to an industry in which funeral policies and membership of local burial 
societies, that provided financial support to the bereaved household, featured 
prominently in the livelihood decisions and social activities of many households.
There was a widespread preference for burying deceased family members -  except 
married women -  in their home villages wherever this was possible and practicable, 
even if they had spent most of their adult lives living away from the village. The village 
was where their ancestors were believed to reside, specifically in the byre of their home 
umzi, and this was where their cultural roots were. This practice made funerals an 
especially important element in the transfer of building materials, foodstuffs and money 
from towns to the countryside and gave cause for the movement of large numbers of 
people between town and countryside every weekend.
Of the 29 rituals conducted in Hamburg at which at least one cow or ox was 
slaughtered during the 12-month period in question, 14 (or 48%) involved mortuary 
rituals. Nine of the 14 mortuary rituals were funerals, comprising a Christian service, 
with a cow or ox slaughtered on the pretext of ‘feeding the mourners’ present. On two 
separate occasions, two cows were slaughtered for this purpose, such were the
29 Over a weekend in April 2001, Mr. Somana, the leader of a Zionist church, hosted members of his 
church for a conference in Hamburg. Somana slaughtered a cow to feed the visitors who came from as 
far as Port Elizabeth over the course of the weekend.
30 There were other rituals conducted in Hamburg which included slaughtering a cow or ox. These 
included ukuvula umzi (on two separate occasions), ukupha [to give the ancestors a gift], ukuphuma, 
ukucitha iintsimbi and a wedding (at which two cattle were slaughtered). In May 2001, the Madyongo 
household slaughtered their inkomo yekhaya [the cow of the home], because it had become too old, in 
a ritual known as ukugugisa.
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numbers of people who attended the funeral. Seven of the nine funerals held over the 
period recorded were to bury elderly women and only two were for men (one of these 
was a man in his early forties). The remaining five rituals that involved slaughtering 
an ox comprised the ancestor rituals, ukukhapa (two occasions) and ukubuyisa (three 
occasions), which were hosted by widows for their deceased husbands.
Rituals in Loverstwist
My fieldwork in Loverstwist was limited to a three-month period, from September to 
November 2000.1 was only able to record rituals conducted in Loverstwist for the 
eight-month period April to November 2001, with the longest part of this period 
served only by the recollections of my informants about the rituals that they had 
performed during this period. This record thus represents a partial account of the 
rituals conducted there during the calendar year, as many of the slaughter rituals -  
except those associated with funerals (as these obviously occur at random) -  take 
place during the Easter holiday period in March and also during December, when 
male circumcision and other rituals take centre stage.
With the help of a research assistant, Sakhumzi Skina, I was able to record a total of 
50 rituals that were held in the village during the eight-month period. These included 
a number of beer drinks and slaughter rituals. Given that there were 134 occupied 
homesteads at the time, this suggests that roughly one-third (37%) of the homesteads 
in the village conducted a ritual during this time. In Hamburg, the equivalent 
proportion of homesteads conducting rituals during a twelve-month period was 43%.
In all, 26 different kinds of ritual were conducted. Twenty-three rituals (46% of the 
total) involved the ritual slaughter of one or more animals. As with Hamburg, the 
mortuary rituals were among the most expensive and elaborate of the rituals 
performed in the village. There were seven funerals during this time. The other 
mortuary rituals performed included three ukucela ityixva [to ask for salt] rituals, one 
ukukulula izila [to release the mourners] ritual and one ukubuyisa ritual.
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The logic of rituals
It was particularly in the course of planning and performing rituals that contested 
social constructs were mobilized in socially and culturally charged effort to 
‘naturalise certain patterns of social divisions over other possible ones’ (Ngwane 
2003: 684; cf. Robins 1997). This was because rituals provided an especially potent 
context for different people to act ‘experimentally’ to either re-enact normative 
traditional practices or to contest or subvert the contemporary relevance or 
authenticity of these practices (Comaroff & Comaroff 1993: xxx; Moore 1986). In 
Peddie District too, the range of rituals that people performed variously provide rural 
residents with opportunities to contest social hierarchies, to display socio-economic 
differences and to test, rework or even transform local power (including intra­
household) relations.
Hosting a ritual, especially one which explicitly invoked the ancestors, acted as a 
rallying call for the extended patrilineally related kin group. Family members, no 
matter how geographically dispersed, ignored this call to assist and to participate at 
their peril. Performing a ritual allowed for assessments of where the often dispersed 
members of this ‘agnatic cluster’ currently stood in relation to each other, socially 
and economically. In the process, social constructs that were mobilised during ritual 
practice included notions about the nature of the ‘family’, ‘tradition’ and ‘home’, and 
associated expectations of appropriate behaviour and support on the part of the 
individuals or groups that were variously delineated by these constructs (Ngwane 
2003).
Indeed, many of the rituals in Loverstwist and Hamburg seemed to be about the 
constant striving of individuals and households (and their close kin) to make sense of, 
to regularise or to improve their social and economic situation in a time of seemingly 
growing uncertainty. This they attempted to do through their invocation of their 
ancestors, in their stylized communication with their resident and dispersed kin-group 
and their fellow-villagers, and their specific manipulations of space during ritual 
formalities (McAllister 1997: 293ff; Kuckertz 1997; Bank 2002b: 645). Not 
surprisingly, perhaps, two main fault-lines of these processes of ‘regularisation 
through ritual’ that I discerned were those of gender and generation.
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I found that strict adherence to a gender division of labour in the preparation and 
performance of rituals remained common in both Hamburg and Loverstwist. 
Moreover, a consistent regulation of space during all rituals, in the sense of a policing 
of which people were occupying what spaces, was a feature of this ‘enactment of 
power’. In this regard, Moore (1986: 89) has pointed out that ‘spatial 
representations.. .are active instruments in the production and reproduction of the 
social order.’ Differentiation in terms of occupation of spaces during rituals in rural 
Peddie District was done on the basis of kinship, affiliation to the homestead 
conducting the ritual, age and gender (cf. McAllister 1997). Senior men, for instance, 
consistently dominated all the speeches given during rituals. Speakers always stood to 
address those present, while everyone else in the byre or rontawu was supposed to be 
seated. Where a man who was not the oldest non-kin man rose to respond to a speech, 
he would be admonished and told to sit down. I was told that young men may not sit 
near or drink with their fathers at rituals. The youngest man present had to surrender 
his seat immediately when an older man entered the byre or beer drink venue, or find 
himself berated by the other men present. All other men younger than the person 
entering had to shuffle along to make available an appropriate place, gauged in terms of 
his position in the age-ranking system, to the newcomer. In the cattle byre, members of 
the agnatic cluster hosting the ritual and their fellow clansmen sat to the right of the 
byre entrance while other men sat to the left. At an indoor beer drink, men were always 
seated on the right and the women on the left, as seen facing into the rontawu.
The same principle applied to the seating arrangements of women which also 
followed generational seniority, although women often sat on their mats on the floor. 
Women were not allowed into the byre during a ritual, except if they were ‘daughters’ 
of the host family. No amankazana [unmarried mothers] were supposed to attend a 
beer drink, unless they were older women (younger amankazana did attend, of 
course, but were expected to stay out of view). I was told that women were not 
allowed to stay indoors once the meat had been cooked and served at a slaughter 
ritual. Instead, they had to congregate outside in the courtyard, where they would eat 
their food.
Young boys of around 14-15 years of age could enter the byre during a slaughter 
ritual to claim the tail of an ox or cow, and to cook bits of meat over the open flames
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of the fire. But they had to hover there as unobtrusively as possible, or risk being 
chased out by older men, especially if the byre was full of men. They would be 
summoned by older men and given a piece of meat. The division of brandy, 
mqombothi and beer, as well as meat, was done on the basis of age and gender. 
Amaxhego [old men] got the biggest share of the available brandy and mqombothi. In 
general, abafazi [women] were treated as an undifferentiated group in the first 
instance, when these allocations were made. Senior women would then oversee the 
allocations among the different age categories of women present.
But slippages in this ‘ritualised enactment of power’ were also apparent. Young men 
would often move to a different room or flat on the same property, away from the 
attentions of their fathers and senior kinsmen, to consume their share of the 
mqombothi, brandy and bottled beer. By removing themselves from the site of the 
ritual, they were also circumventing the scrutiny of their every move by the senior men.
On a few occasions, I noticed that unmarried girls were allocated a bottle or two of 
brandy or gin to share among themselves. They were required to consume this share 
discreetly, behind the main house and without inconveniencing the women working 
or drawing undue attention from any of the men. The reason that they were given 
some alcohol, I was told, was that they might refuse to attend rituals if their requests 
for alcohol were ignored.
Imigalelo [rotating credit] clubs, that were virtually the exclusive preserve of women, 
were prominent during particular phases of the some rituals. Furthermore, my data on 
the rituals conducted in both villages indicate that younger employed women were 
instigating many rituals by, for example, dreaming of their ancestors who claimed to 
be thirsty, or by organising a beer drink to thank their ancestors for assisting them in 
finding employment. Once their families had agreed to host a ritual, these women 
would often take the lead in the preparations and purchases for and the hosting of the 
subsequent rituals (especially beer drinks, but also slaughter rituals). They only 
deferred to a male relative to satisfy the requirement that a senior man should conduct 
the ancestral invocation and communicate with the people assembled for the ritual. 
Bank (2002b: 648), working in Mooiplaas Location near East London, has argued 
that, by taking the lead in ritual and custom, ‘[Xhosa] women are seeking to
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authenticate their new-found material power by embedding it in a deeper set of 
meanings, values and activities that increasingly locate [these women] at the social 
centre of the community’.
Conclusion
To conclude I suggest that, in spite (or perhaps because) of widening socio-economic 
differences and economic uncertainty both within the village and between town and 
country, rural people’s commitment to conducting a wide range of rituals (including 
beer drinks) appeared to be virtually unassailable for the foreseeable future. This was 
so even where certain categories of household did not have the appropriate livestock 
necessary for slaughter rituals, or where they experienced financial difficulties in 
purchasing a beast for ritual purposes within the culturally appropriate time-frames. 
The centrality of ritual was no less real in cases where, for religious reasons, 
homesteads with a predominantly Christian identity claimed to be slaughtering a 
beast ‘just to feed the people’ and not for reasons of ancestor veneration.
Town-based umzi members were by no means reluctant participants in village-centred 
ritual practice. Many continued to identify strongly with their umzi and to value 
highly their association with their home village as a whole. This was demonstrated 
through their visits and their material contributions to their rural homes. The hosting 
of rituals in rural ‘home’ villages thus emerged as an important and potent 
mechanism for ensuring these flows of resources and maintaining the relationships 
between widely dispersed people.
My own data lead me to qualify Bank’s finding on the growing role of women in 
ritual in two important ways. It is clear that his argument best applies to some women, 
and in relation to certain aspects and types of ritual practice. My first concern is that 
we should not lump all women together, as this would downplay or ignore important 
social differences that exist between women, such as age, marital status, kinship 
affiliation in relation to the ritual at hand, their place of residence (rural or urban) or 
social standing in other ways. Similarly, economic standing, centred on educational and 
employment status, and religious affiliation, were important in plotting the different roles 
that women were able to take up in the context of ritual and social life more generally. A
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weakness of Bank’s portrayal of social and ritual change in Mooiplaas is its failure to 
clearly delineate and assess the different trajectories of change and upward mobility 
between women.
My second concern is that we should continue to make analytical distinctions between 
the wide variety of ritual practices of rural Xhosa-speaking people. McAllister has 
attempted to show the relevance of this approach to understanding the changes that have 
occurred over time in the way different rituals were conducted in Shixini (McAllister 
1980,1997).31 This type of analysis is only possible with long-term fieldwork in the same 
locality. Making analytical distinctions, informed by the perspectives and insights of a 
range of informants, between different rituals, may allow us to establish the extent to 
which continuities characterise the performance of certain rituals. It would also allow us 
to better understand how changes in gender relations may affect the precise nature and 
frequency of particular types of rituals.
I have explored the interwoven nature of cattle-holding, male (patriarchal) identity and 
rural livelihoods in the context of ritual practices at the homestead and village level. 
Precisely because the slaughter of cattle was not an everyday occurrence, it was able to 
sustain its iconic status at the core of this interwoven relationship. The ritual slaughter of 
cattle was intimately tied up with bolstering the symbolic role and prestige of senior men 
as presiders over the economic and ritual destiny of the rural umzi. In the context of 
rituals, senior men served, on the one hand, as the key intermediaries of ritual power 
between the living and their ancestors and, on the other hand, as the guardians and 
providers of cattle for slaughter.
31 Moreover, rural people have different names for what are very similar rituals, or similar names for 
rituals that differ in substance or form. These may be rooted in ‘ethnic’ (Xhosa/Mfengu), clan and even 
religious affiliation differences.
CHAPTER NINE
Conclusions
People farm for sentimental reasons. Widows keep cattle to remember their 
husbands. Men do so to be recognised as a man in the community, because it is 
part of being African people, part of living in a village in a rural setting... [T]hey 
persevere.. .because it is part of who they are, what they know, and what they 
think is expected of them to do -  Mr. Siza Manjezi, Peddie farmer.
I began this dissertation by outlining the decades-old juxtaposition of the agriculture 
in the former reserve areas as traditional (i.e. non-market) versus the more efficient 
modem orientation of commercial farming enterprises. Mainstream agricultural 
economists and others argued (and continue to argue) that the woes of communal land 
tenure, epitomised by gross overstocking and overgrazing, have exacted a heavy, 
probably irreversible, toll on the natural environment. The wealth of rural people was 
said to be tied up irrationally and inefficiently in their vast numbers of cattle, which 
came to be viewed as ‘stranded assets’ that needed to be liberated through the 
penetration of the market, through better education and through the provision of 
information about alternative savings mechanisms.
The fundamental weakness of this argument, as Bundy (1988), Wolpe (1972), 
Molteno (1977) and others pointed out decades ago, was its failure to recognise that 
the former reserve areas were not separate from the ‘main’ economy, but integrally 
linked, even functional, to it. The absence of economic opportunities for upward 
mobility for the majority of rural black people, and the oppressive restrictions placed 
on their mobility and choices of residence, were what tied them to the reserves and to 
supposedly ‘traditional’ modes of livelihood, such as cattle-holding. These Marxist- 
inspired refutations of dualism were useful for the attention they drew to the fact that 
the reserve economy was unequivocally ‘articulated’ with the wider economy. 
However, because they eschewed a ‘cultural’ explanation of what was going on in the 
reserves, they proved insufficient on three counts.
Firstly, they did not address the question of why people in the reserves chose to invest 
in cattle (and other livestock) per se, rather than in other assets in the rural sphere. In 
this sense, they failed to adequately contextualise where cattle-holding had come
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from and how cattle fitted into rural people’s socio-political and cultural milieux (see 
Ainslie 2002c; Peires 1981).
Secondly, they failed to explain why, even when, from the early 1970s, the ‘self- 
governing’ and later ‘independent’ bantustans presented at least a minority of people 
with greater freedom of mobility and uneven yet undeniable opportunities for upward 
mobility and ‘economic integration’into the cash economy, cattle have remained an 
attractive investment in the former reserve areas. In fact, cattle numbers in the Eastern 
Cape continued to rise through the 1990s and by 2004 they had reached their highest 
level since the late 1920s (Beinart 1992; Agri-News 2004).
Thirdly, the refutations of the ‘two economies’ position ignored the reality that the 
bantustans, however repugnant their very existence was to many people, were more 
than merely economically functional to capital. In fact, the reserves and (now former) 
bantustans were and have continued to be places where ‘ordinary people’ carried on 
with their social and cultural practices as best they could. Beinart (1994: 207) argues 
-  and my analysis of the Ciskei leads me to concur with his view -  that the homelands 
were ‘not merely a social and environmental disaster zone. Things happened there and 
[some]1 people bought into the system.’ He goes on to argue that the bantustans ‘need 
to be understood as phenomena in their own right and for the influence they had on 
South Africa as a whole.’
In his essay on the ‘anthropology of economy’, Gudeman (2001) argues that for the 
Kekchi Maya of southern Belize self-sufficiency in com [maize] production provides 
an assurance against economic uncertainty, plays a role in ritual and identity and 
constitutes a ‘badge of household position and village membership’. Maize 
production thereby connects the household and the community, outside the market.
By contrast, the rice that is produced by the Kekchi as a cash crop fulfils few if any of 
these functions, yet allows for the accumulation of cash (Gudeman 2001: 44-45).
The situation I encountered in rural Peddie District was analogous to this description 
of the Kekchi ‘cultural economy’ in southern Belize. Cattle-holding provided many 
rural people in Peddie District with a bulwark against economic hardship, in the sense
1 This is my qualification. (See also Palmer 1997b: 319).
249
that not only did cattle provide utility goods for household consumption and for 
sharing, they also increased in number and value and were thus an effective and 
trusted means of saving ‘slippery’ cash. This was also why so many of my informants 
told me that ‘cattle are the bank of the Xhosa’. Moreover, cattle played a significant 
role in ritual practice and thus people’s social and cultural sense of who they were, 
where they had come from and where they stood in relation to other people and other 
homesteads, both in the village and in ‘town’.
For people in rural Peddie District, holding cattle was a thoroughly modem practice 
by which they attempted to adapt and maximise their use of: (i) the available physical 
resources, i.e. the ‘free’ grazing and water resources on the commons; (ii) the 
economic resources, i.e. the state-subsidised dipping and inoculation programmes, 
and the household labour available to them; and (iii) the cultural resources, i.e. the 
patriarchal values, practices such as bridewealth, norms of accumulation and sharing, 
and ritual practices. This they did to advance their particular social projects, within 
the limited range of options open to them.2 As many observers have noted, 
investments in cattle were unique in providing a food security safety net both through 
the consumption and sharing of amasi [sour milk] and meat and through their uses 
(draught, manuring) in arable production.
In Chapter Three, I examined the political-economic and social impacts of successive 
government programmes on rural people’s cattle-holdings. Attempts by the state over 
several decades to intervene in the rural sector were driven by different, sometimes 
incompatible and even contradictory, political impulses. Official concerns about 
environmental degradation and the inability of the reserves to support the vast 
numbers of economically superfluous (black) residents and their livestock 
precipitated the implementation of Betterment Planning. Although a central element 
of Betterment Planning was the reduction of livestock numbers in the reserve areas, 
bitter opposition by rural people meant that this component had to be abandoned. The 
Nationalist government did not wish to destroy the semblance of a reserve economy 
as it moved towards the consolidation of ‘grand apartheid’. The overcrowding, 
landlessness and pressure on grazing resources that characterised the reserve areas of
2 For this dissertation, I reviewed some of the historical and cultural antecedents for the continued 
salience of cattle holding, but this chapter has been omitted in the interests of brevity.
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Peddie District from the early 1960s typified the situation in most other Ciskeian 
reserves. This predicament was closely connected to, and indeed flowed from, the 
changes in white farming which led to the mass eviction of labour tenants in adjacent 
areas of the central Eastern Cape.
The creation of the Ciskei bantustan introduced new agrarian development 
programmes and modified several older ones in the reserve areas. The development 
of ‘border industries’ meant that rural people could retain more regular contact with 
their village homesteads. My analysis centred on agrarian changes in Peddie District, 
particularly the departure of white farmers and the equivocal impact of the Ciskei 
National Ranch on village cattle production practices. I reviewed agricultural 
developments in the post-1994 Eastern Cape Province and found many of these to be 
path-dependent in their dualist and technocratic approach to the ‘development’ of this 
sector.
My examination of ‘rural’ livelihoods in Chapter Four revealed the increasing level 
of dependence, in respect of the dominant source of livelihood in many households, 
on social welfare disbursements and on casual work, stylised as ‘jobbing’ by my 
informants. I questioned the validity of the emphasis in the livelihoods literature on 
the substantial ‘diversification’ that is said increasingly to characterise rural people’s 
livelihoods as they become ‘unplugged’ from the wider economy. I showed how 
Hamburg and Loverstwist differed in this respect, with Hamburg’s bigger pool of 
salaried people feeding into a more robust ‘informal’ economy than was the case in 
Loverstwist. I noted that, while diversification into ‘informal’ livelihoods -  often 
centred on the extractive use of natural resources -  was critical for some people and 
supplementary for many others in Peddie District, questions needed to be asked about 
the capacity of these forms of livelihood to support any but a fraction of the 
households in rural Peddie District for any length of time.
I found that two cultural idioms were particularly important in understanding rural 
people’s accumulation strategies. These were ukwakh ’umzi [building the homestead] 
and masincedisane [let us help each other]. Where, on the one hand, gender and 
generational contestation was heightened within the umzi, and on the other hand, very 
poor and comparatively far better-off households lived cheek-by-jowl in the village
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context, the push and pull of these two cultural idioms intermittently revealed and 
covered up widening cracks in the social order. This situation presented 
comparatively wealthier households, vis-a-vis their impoverished neighbours who 
were ekeing out a precarious hand-to-mouth existence, with the dilemma of how best 
to protect their wealth and consolidate their economic position, without being 
regarded as indifferent to the desperate plight of their neighbours. To be seen as 
uncaring and aloof was to risk arousing jealously in others that could invite anti­
social acts (including witchcraft) against one’s umzi. Strategies of sharing and of 
redistribution in rural Peddie District took explicit and constant cognisance of these 
threats.
I noted that in the light of changes in the wider economy and the employment 
opportunities on offer, the overall chances of upward mobility for the many 
comparatively poorly educated rural people seemed remote. Moreover, their options 
for investment and saving in what I call ‘socially meaningful assets’ in the villages of 
Peddie District remained rather limited. I suggest that in rural areas like Peddie 
District, notwithstanding periods of drought and some threat of stocktheft, cattle 
constituted one of a rather limited range of assets that offered people high 
‘convertibility’ over time. This convertibility included the ready (if culturally and 
socially circumscribed) exchange of cattle for cash to sustain the household 
economically, but equally the conversion of cash into cattle and thence into social and 
prestige dividends in the moral economy of the village, to sustain the homestead 
socially and ritually.
In Chapter Five, I pointed to the important distinction between holding and owning 
cattle for understanding the nuances of this sector. In examining who exactly held 
cattle in the villages of Peddie District, I reviewed the available data and noted both 
its paucity and unreliability. I provided data from the three different synchronic 
surveys I conducted to show that cattle in rural Peddie District were concentrated in 
the hands of senior men. Where women held cattle, it was as widows. I estimated that 
28% of the households in former reserve areas of Peddie District held cattle. As many 
as 53% of these households held six or fewer cattle. I showed that, on the whole, the 
heads of cattle-holding households were poorly educated, but that they were not very 
different from the overall educational profile for their age groups in rural Peddie
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District. I found exchanges of cattle in lobolo transactions to be minimal, so that 
while lobolo was negotiated in cattle the actual exchange usually consisted of cash. I 
found that the availability of household labour seriously affected the cost of keeping 
cattle. I pointed out that cattle served both to lock scarce resources in the rural sphere 
and to build local social networks, but also to help ensure a flow of more resources to 
the rural homestead from town, through remitted contributions towards the purchases 
of acaricides, the occasional purchase of a heifer or ox, payment of the labour needed 
for herding and of the costs of hosting ritual slaughter events.
I argued that, to understand why some households held cattle while other, seemingly 
similar households did not, we must examine the structure of differently situated rural 
households and the biographies of individual members of these households. In 
Chapter Six, I thus explored the symbolic and discursive centrality of cattle in the 
essentially patriarchal ukwakh'umzi project for male-headed households. It emerged 
that the decision to invest in cattle per se was not an all-or-nothing cultural imperative 
(despite the sensibilities of my senior male informants), but was a choice that was 
made and then continually contested in mostly male-headed, but also widow-headed, 
rural households. I showed that cattle-holding continued to be significant for those 
categories of household and especially men who pursued localised versions of the 
ubudoda [manhood] norm. This norm positioned men as 'intsika yekhaya' [the pillar 
of the home] as breadwinner and provider, and as having a high degree of control 
over the economic affairs of the umzi. It was by rhetorically linking cattle-holding to 
the key local projects of ukwakh'umzi [building the home] and masincedisane [let us 
help each other], especially by emphasising the 'homestead strengthening' 
consumption of cattle in rituals, that senior men and some senior women -  as well as 
certain categories of younger men who held cattle -  sought to exercise some control 
over the 'terms and tropes' of increasingly differentiated social and economic 
relationships at household and village levels. Cattle, far more than money in the bank 
or renting a satellite dish, allowed rural people to engage with each other socially and 
economically.
Thus much of the work of rural, especially senior, men was directed towards policing 
the special place (or in Appadurai's [1986] terminology, maintaining limits on the 
‘commodity candidacy’) of cattle as goods that they argued were symbolically crucial
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to the material and the ritual well-being of the homestead and the wider community. 
For their part, younger men were trading on this ‘patriarchal dividend’ in the ways in 
which they sought to perpetuate the social and cultural prerogatives of men, whether 
they held cattle or not.
In Chapter Seven, I explored the position of younger, especially unmarried, women 
vis-a-vis cattle holding and the ubudoda norm. In increasing numbers, women in rural 
Peddie District were prepared to ‘go it alone’ without men, either by shunning 
marriage altogether or through divorce or estrangement. They found the means to 
head their households, secure their livelihoods (however meagre) and tried to educate 
their children. Women socialised mainly with other women in church groups, 
transacted with each other in rotating credit associations or burial societies and 
generally ‘built the homestead’ in broad adherence with Xhosa cultural norms, but in 
the absence of a male household head.
Some of this was an outcome of their frustration with heightened levels of domestic 
violence to which they were subjected as the taken-for-granted patriarchal dominance 
in the household and village ebbed away from men. Another reason for their 
preference related to the improved independent access to personal income and state- 
provided pensions and grants on the part of senior women. Of course, there was also a 
category of households headed by often poorly educated women that eked out an 
economically miserable existence without any reliable source of income. It was very 
apparent that, overall, single women showed least interest in the cattle economy. I 
explored case-studies in which women were embroiled in struggles over ‘the cattle of 
inheritance’. These struggles revolved around the contested rights of men to dispose 
of the cattle, especially those that had come into the umzi herd as ikhazi [the cattle 
transferred during bridewealth exchange], as they saw fit.
I showed how changes in the strategic negotiation of bridewealth and marriage were 
highly suggestive of the increasing social prominence of employed younger women. I 
also explored what the ‘decompression’ of larger homesteads into the tiny formal 
housing estates like Phola Park in Hamburg village and less formally in places like 
Loverstwist entailed socially, economically and ritually.
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In Chapter Eight, I explored how the senior male heads of cattle-holding households 
endorsed the use and exchange of cattle for consumption in ritual slaughter, as long as 
such consumption took place within patriarchally informed cultural norms. These 
norms differed somewhat between those who were Christians and those who openly 
venerated their ancestors, but overall it was clear that rituals, both those that involved 
slaughtering cattle and others which did not such as beer drinks or Christian funerals, 
were recognised by all rural people, men and women, as significant social events. I 
contended that conducting rituals was crucial both for building community in rural 
Peddie District and for ensuring the critical flow of resources between town and the 
countryside.
Because, as I mentioned above, cattle-holding featured in the ever-widening 
differentials in material wealth that were so conspicuous between households in rural 
villages, the use of cattle in ritual slaughter was especially pertinent. The 
(economically) levelling nature of Xhosa ritual, in the sense that social categories 
such as clanship, genealogical seniority, age, gender and commensality were 
emphasised over measures of social difference and economic class (although class 
differences were not entirely ignored nor transcended), provided spaces to 
temporarily underplay if not negate local wealth differentials. By slaughtering cattle 
in specific rituals, people provided an important means of sharing and redistributing 
wealth among households in the village and further afield. The imizi hosting slaughter 
rituals made a sizeable contribution to the caloric and specifically protein intake of 
poorer people in the village, through the distribution of meat, other food and drink, 
especially traditional beer and alcohol.
It is precisely at those times when the relationships that exist between people were 
threatened by, for instance, economic changes (for example, the contraction of the 
formal labour market) -  which were linked to differentiation and divergence of social 
relationships (for example, in marriage) and cultural interests -  that new cultural 
ambiguities were introduced and contestations of value between people living in 
close-knit communities might be anticipated. But as Ferguson (1985: 668) has noted, 
‘such conflict is not a sign of disintegration or crisis [rather] it is part of the process of 
maintaining and re-creating “tradition”, and “tradition” is never simply a residue of
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the past. If the cultural rules governing livestock keeping .. .persist, it is because they 
are made to persist; continuity as much as change must be created and fought for.’
As the unemployment crisis in post-apartheid South Africa widens, rural poverty 
deepens and government support for, among other things, livestock production by 
way of the dipping and vaccination programmes in the African reserve areas wavers, 
wealth differentials take on increased moral significance in the rural countryside. This 
brings the cultural imperative of masincedisane into sharper focus.
My analysis shows that, in the absence of radically improved opportunities for 
educational advancement and skills acquisition, cattle-holding by rural Xhosa- 
speakers is unlikely to fade away. At the same time, however, I do not doubt that 
animal husbandry skills (and the tacit, practical familiarity that many rural people 
have with cattle) were being lost in the many families that did not hold cattle and that, 
for reasons relating to Bourdieu's (1990) notion of practice, these skills were unlikely 
to be relearned by the younger generation in future.
However, I argue that the cultural ideal of cattle-ownership continues to constitute an 
important element of rural Xhosa identity and sociality. Many rural men and women 
regard holding cattle, which they know have considerable value in cash terms in the 
context of rural poverty, as one of the signal achievements of a successful homestead. 
A byre filled with cattle (and manure) constitutes both the surest evidence of the 
orderly co-operation within the homestead that leads to good fortune and the means, 
through ritual slaughter, by which the vital blessings of the ancestors are sought and 
secured.
While many observers have been able to discern a long-term trend in declining 
agrarian production across the communal reserve areas of the Eastern Cape, I think 
that it may be more fruitful to view investments, particularly in cattle, at the village 
and household level, as being more cyclical in nature. Annual rainfall and the quality 
and quantity of grazing resources play an obvious role in these cycles, as do changes 
in the political economy. Economic upturn in the regional urban centres increases 
people’s capacity to invest in their rural homes and in a range of agricultural 
practices, notably cattle-holding. Conversely, as unemployment rises and people’s
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levels of livelihood insecurity increases, they may be expected to liquidate or even 
abandon agrarian projects of accumulation, for example investments in cattle or 
field/garden production. In fact, I found that the current conjuncture, in which the 
social welfare disbursements and ‘jobbing’ led to greater livelihood contestation and 
insecurity over the longer term, converting the irregular income streams into cattle 
was an attractive option for various rural imizi in their efforts to buffer future 
livelihood uncertainty.
What I have argued for (amongst other things) in this dissertation is renewed 
recognition of the connectedness of the ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ economies. Initiatives that 
seek to bring about improvements in ‘rural’ livelihoods must take seriously the full 
house of cultural practices and spatial connections that shape people’s social and 
economic interactions. Furthermore, the agency of rural people and the various values 
they attribute to what they are doing should become our analytical starting point.
It would seem that more and more of the population of the Eastern Cape, both rural 
and urban, are likely to find themselves in the interstices of the market economy in 
the years ahead. This is especially so as changes in the macro-economy and labour 
market put a premium on the very formal education and skills that many rural people 
lack. It is thus to alternative more local forms of saving and accumulation, and 
particularly to those that provide people and households with opportunities to secure 
their livelihoods while still engaging with each other in socially and culturally 
meaningful ways, that many rural people are likely to turn in future. Where these 
promise a measure of economic and social autonomy at the household level in the 
face of the inexorable penetration of the market, they might well be worthy of 
external support rather than censure.
I conclude by restating the question with which I commenced this dissertation. What, 
in the year 2001, accounts for the continued interest in cattle on the part of many of 
the rural people living in the former bantustan reserve areas of the Eastern Cape? I 
hope that by bringing together in my analysis aspects of political economy, of 
household-level livelihoods, of the social (gender, generational, class) and the 
cultural (especially ritual) components of what cattle-holding in Peddie District 
entails, I have gone some way towards answering this question.
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LIFE HISTORIES AND OTHER INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED DURING 
FIELDWORK1
Hamburg Village
1. Dyido, Funeka, 2 May 2001
2. Gqwaka, Aron, 18 February 2001
3. Gqwaka, Nonyameko, 25 February 2001
4. Gusha, Nontembeko, 17 June 2001
5. Gusha, Patrick, 9 May 2001
6. Gusha, Zilindile, 4 July 2001
7. Hobana, Thembisile, 14 June 2001
8. Hobana, Vukile, 8 May 2001
9. Jakavula, Laduma, 10 June 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha)
10. Lugalo, Nozibele, 3 May 2001
11. Lugalo, Thembalethu, 22 August 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha)
12. Mahonono, Ngqani, 30 March 2001
13. Makhubalo, Busani, 15 June 2001
14. Mangwane, Lusiba, 16 April 2001
15. Mangwane, Zamuxolo, 30 August 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha)
16. Manjezi, Siphiwo, 31 August 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha)
17. Mapikela, Khunjulwa, 26 February 2001
18. Mapuma, Mathemba, 31 August 2000, 17 February 2001, 24 March 2001,
19. Mapuma, Phumla, 4 May 2001
20. Matshotyana, Monica, 3 June 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha)
21. Mdunyelwa, Fezeka, 30 April 2001, 1 May 2001
22. Mei, Mrs., 10 August 2001
23. Mtshonisi, Zimasile, 24 May 2001
24. Mva, Norah, 18 June 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha)
25. Mziwakhe Mangcangaza, 6 June 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha)
26. Ndindwa, Bulelwa, 17 January 2001
27. Ndongeni, Mvuyiseko, 17 August 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha)
28. Ndongeni, Wandisile, 23 August 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha)
29. Ngcwembe, Stanford, 15 February 2001
30. Nkosinathi Ndlondlo, 2 May 2001
31. Noludumo Beja, 30 April 2001
32. Nomathemba Myataza,17 May 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha)
33. Nothemba Myataza, 25 May 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha)
34. Noweyitile Ngoxo, 1 May 2001
35. Noyise Mtshonisi, 2 May 2001
36. Nxadi, Noma, 30 March 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha), 1 May 2001
37. Nxadi, Lindikhaya, 28 May 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha)
38. Nxadi, Fakati, 12 March 2001
39. Paliso, Ndyebo, 27 February 2001, 28 May 2001, 30 June 2001
40. Paliso, Susan, 1 April 2001
41. Peyi, Mzwabantu, 8 June 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha)
1 The interviews conducted by Patrick Gusha in Hamburg and Sonwabo Mase in Loverstwist were done 
with the aid of a semi-structured interview schedule, and were aimed at eliciting basic biographical and 
household demographic data.
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42. Peyi, Thumani, 9 June 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha)
43. Potwana, Noncedo, 12 June 2001
44. Rasi, Dickson, 21 June 2001
45. Rasi, Henderson Galelekile, 2 May 2001
46. Ratya, Zithulile 31 March 2001, 13 June 2001
47. Roro Ndlondlo, 4 June 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha)
48. Schutz Kolisi, 24 May 2001
49. Siziwe Mavis Makhubalo, 4 May 2001
50. Solwandle, Thulile, 23 August 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha)
51. Soyana, Armstrong, 19 June 2001 (interviewed by Patrick Gusha)
52. Steeman, Gloria and Bert, 8 February 2001
53. Tshobingane, John, 9 May 2001
54. Yona, Zukiswa, 8 May 2001
55. Zibi, Nowanele, 25 January 2001, 27 January 2001
Loverstwist village
56. Bhadu, Phindile,30 October 2001
57. Bhadu, Phike, 13 September 2001
58. Bhani, MamVundla, 14 September 2001
59. Booi, MamNkabane, 12 September 2001
60. Cekiso, MamTshoyane, 14 September 2001
61. Dingela, Helele Kelly, 3 September 2001
62. Dingela, Sakhiwo, 6 November 2001 (interviewed by Sonwabo Mase)
63. Dyeshana, Mr. 11 November 2001 (interviewed by Sonwabo Mase)
64. Gedze, Qeke, 12 November 2001 (interviewed by Sonwabo Mase)
65. Goniwe, Lungile, September 2001
66. Goniwe, Vukile, 12 November 2001 (interviewed by Sonwabo Mase)
67. Halana, Mr. 12 November 2001 (interviewed by Sonwabo Mase)
68. Hlekani, Jacob, 8 October 2001, (interviewed by Sonwabo Mase)
69. Mabuyane, Mrs., 9 November 2001, (interviewed by Sonwabo Mase)
70. Malmani, Mr. 30 October 2001
71. Mbondi, Vikiwe, 8 October 2001 (interviewed by Sonwabo Mase)
72. Mdunyelwa, Tsibisile, 14 November 2001 (interviewed by Sonwabo Mase)
73. Mgaba, Kholisile, 20 October 2001 (interviewed by Sonwabo Mase)
74. Nontsele, Kutu,12 September 2001
75. Nqamrha, Fanayi, 8 October 2001 (interviewed by Sonwabo Mase)
76. Nyathi, Mbhele, 12 November 2001 (interviewed by Sonwabo Mase)
77. Nxadi, Mzoli, 26 October 2001
78. Nxomani, Thamsanqa, 12 September 2001
79. Nxomani, Noncedile, 12 September 2001
80. Peyi, MamZangwa, 11 October 2001
81. Potwana, MamTshoyane, 11 October 2001
82. Seti, Mr., 11 November 2001 (interviewed by Sonwabo Mase)
83. Sikani, Thembisile, 20 November 2001
84. Sikani, Noamen, 10 November 2001 (interviewed by Sonwabo Mase)
85. Spaji, Mrs. 10 November 2001 (interviewed by Sonwabo Mase)
86. Tom, Nomteki, 12 September 2001
87. Welem, MaDzana, 9 November 2001 (interviewed by Sonwabo Mase)
88. Yali, Josephine, September 2001
89. Yali, Xolile, 6 November 2001 (interviewed by Sonwabo Mase)
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Miscellaneous Interviews In Peddie District
90. Bomela, Mr. Peddie South commercial farmer, 19 November 2001
91. Cockcroft, Dave & Liesenberg, Johan. Cattle speculators, Grahamstown, 2 November 
2001
92. Hundleby, Jim. Former Regional Manager, Ciskei Nat. Ranch, retired in Stutterheim, 19 
July 2001
93. Manjezi, Siza. Peddie South commercial farmer, 15 September 1999,16 May 2001
94. Manjezi, Zukile. Agric. Extension officer, Peddie, 14 November 2001
95. Mapuma, Shepherd. Peddie South commercial farmer, 7 November 2001
96. Moodie, Derick. Shop-keeper, Wesley, 31 October 2001
97. Rogers, Elaine. Former trading store owners, Wesley, 31 October 2001
98. Snyman, Christo. Former manager, Ciskei Nat. Ranch.,Wesley Village, 15 April 2001
99. Webber, Russell. Farmer and speculator, Bira, 28 November 2000, 9 March 2001
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APPENDIX ONE: 
Studying ‘rural’ livelihoods
Defining the sociological unit of analysis
The challenges of studying what is in reality a range of different, highly fluid social 
structures grouped under the concept of ‘household’ are now well rehearsed (see 
Ardington & Lund 1996; Moore 1994; Guyer & Peters 1987; Netting et al. 1984; 
Berry 1986). For the former bantustan areas of South Africa, Spiegel (1990) and 
others (Niehaus 1994; Sharp 1994; De Wet & Holbrook 1997) have emphasised the 
significant fluidity or ‘permeability’ which characterises rural and urban households 
with regard to their structure and composition, patterns of residence, consumption, 
reproduction, the contribution of individual members to the sustenance of the 
household and the distribution of earnings.
This wide range of variation in the nature of the household, which is itself a 
significant topic of enquiry, seriously undermines its value as a unit of analysis 
(Spiegel 1990: 261). Moreover, the assumption that the household is a basic unit of 
social relations tends to mask socio-economic and power differences and contestation 
within the domestic unit that are rooted in gender, age and generational differences, 
as well as in differences in educational status and earning power (May 1996). Moore 
(1994: 87) has drawn our attention to the ‘emergence of a view of the household 
‘... [as] a locus of competing interests, rights, obligations and resources, where 
household members are often involved in bargaining, negotiation and possibly even 
conflict [with each other].’ Similarly, Ngwane (2003: 688) argues that ‘in places such
as Cancele [in the former Transkei], the household merely existed as a site of
struggle over an imagined form’ and should be ‘recast as a field of discourse rather 
than a natural category’. I found much in rural Peddie District to support this view of 
the household. There is, in fact, no isiXhosa term that equates with ‘household’. Indlu 
refers literally to a house, while ikhaya [home] is similar to umzi [homestead] and has 
connotations that relate to a person’s birthplace or adopted home, and his/her sense of 
belonging to that place and that particular community of people (Mayer & Mayer 
1971 [1961]).
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What exactly is an umzi? An umzi, at least as the term was used in Peddie District, 
comprised an often fluid set of co-operating individuals, who were not all resident in 
the same place for most of the year. These individuals shared, or were at least morally 
bound by, certain short and longer-term goals with respect to the social reproduction 
and materal well-being of their particular homestead. Membership of a rural umzi 
conferred certain rights and obligations on individuals, depending on their age, 
gender, place of residence and employment status. For women, an important 
consideration was their marital status. Crucially, an umzi always had an internally 
recognised head (called umninimzi), who could be either a man or a woman (if a 
woman, then usually a widow). The exact authority attached to such ‘headship’, in 
the sense of both the arena and the modes through which this authority was exercised, 
could well be contested. One example was in situations where a man had been 
unemployed for a long time and the umzi was supported by his wife, son or daughter.
An umzi was rooted (sometimes serially) in a definite physical place, not least 
because the patrilineal ancestors, who were expected to preside over the fortunes of 
the umzi and its members, must be kept informed, mainly by means of ritual 
practices, about the exact location of the umzi. Rituals to this end, notably the 
ukuvula ’mzi [to open the home] ritual, were conducted in the cattle kraal [byre] of the 
umzi, presided over by the most senior man of that particular agnatic cluster.1 
Although some people moved their imizi from place to place over time (see Ainslie 
1998), this ritual dimension of what constituted an umzi was probably its defining 
feature in that, by imbuing a residential space with multi-layered meanings of 
belonging and social identity, it provided a potent sense of permanence and continuity 
(Ainslie 1998: 14). It was for this reason that McAllister (2001: 116-122,190) argues 
that the umzi can best be conceptualised as a ‘composite entity’ in which the 
‘homestead as productive unit is inseparable from the social [and moral] relationships 
that constitute it’.
In the context of high population mobility, this powerful sense of belonging was 
especially important for the town-based dispersed members of the umzi (Ainslie 
1998: 14; cf. Baber 1996: 282). However, it is another implication of this moral/ritual
1 Raum and De Jager (1972: 185) refer to this ritual as ‘ukwazisa, [lit. to inform or make known, i.e. 
the dedication of the homestead to the ancestors]’.
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dimension of an umzi that is important in the context of ‘rural’ livelihoods and the 
substitution of assets. The sense of belonging that an umzi afforded to members of the 
agnatic cluster acted as a constraint on the sale of dwellings and residential sites in 
rural Peddie District.2 The examples of creeping commoditisation in land that I came 
across in Loverstwist and Hamburg consisted of some people selling their houses and 
residential lands because they planned to move permanently away from the area.
Such sales were rationalised, in the few instances where I was able to discuss the 
matter with the departing owners, as ‘this place is not our umzi because we never 
opened it [ritually] and so selling it is not an issue in the family’ or ‘we will open our 
new umzi in Village X to inform our ancestors that we have moved there’.
In physical terms, an umzi usually comprised a yard, which was often fenced, 
incorporating one or more buildings, often including a rontawu [a round ‘hut’, which 
was usually constructed with building blocks and mortar] that was required for 
conducting rituals. An umzi also comprised a cattle kraal [byre], irrespective of 
whether the umzi owned cattle or other livestock, although ideally the byre should 
contain fresh manure. Each umzi ideally had a garden and possibly an adjacent or 
nearby arable field, although, given high indices of landlessness, many imizi no 
longer had access to arable land.
Thus a key difference between a household as generally conceptualised and this 
definition of a homestead or umzi was that an umzi implied a defined ‘home’ space 
and both a moral and an economic project, which all played a role in delineating 
membership of the umzi (Fay 2003; De Wet & Holbrook 1997: 255). The moral 
injunctions of such membership were generally clear. Those who had a conjugal or 
genealogical relation (such as son or daughter) to the head of the umzi, but failed to 
make, within their means, a real contribution to ‘building the umzi\ were seen as 
undermining the umzi in a moral sense and may over time have placed their umzi 
membership, and the rights that this entailed, in jeopardy (McAllister 1985: 123).
2 Of course, another, arguably more serious constraint was that the majority of rural people did not 
have legal title to their residential sites. In consequence, there was no legal market in land, residential 
or arable, in the former bantustan reserves. In fact, some people in Hamburg had title to their four 
hectare plots of land, but even here sales of land were not common, since the homestead was not a 
mere commodity to be sold at the whim of any of the living members of the umzi.
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Conversely, fictive kin who were materially and morally committed to building the 
umzi were generally considered to be full members of that umzi.
It is important, however, not to lose sight of the fact that the umzi as described was an 
historical construct within the predominantly patriarchal structure of rural Eastern 
Cape Xhosa society. As such, it continued to adapt in response to changes in the wider 
political economy, including the decline of migrant labour and changing gender 
relations, amongst other things (Beinart 1992; McAllister 1992; Bank 2002b).
Identifying and measuring livelihoods
There are certain areas, such as Keiskammahoek and Qwaqwa, where a great deal of 
anthropological and other social research has been conducted in specific localities. 
However, one legacy of South Africa’s policies of segregation and apartheid is that 
many of the effects of economic changes experienced since the late 1970s in the rural, 
especially bantustan, hinterland remain under-researched and weakly conceptualised 
in theoretical terms (Baber 1996: 269; Weiner et al. 1997: 45-46; May et al 2000:
20). Despite increased research interest in land reform and rural poverty during the 
initial post-1994 period, and the ‘snapshot’ insights into the workings of the rural 
economy that have been provided by various large quantitative surveys, such as 
Statistics South Africa’s October Household Surveys and the two post-apartheid 
national censuses (conducted in 1996 and 2001), large gaps remain in our 
understanding specifically of the diverse ways in which people construct their 
livelihoods in the rural reserves (Murray 2000, 2002; Scoones & Wolmer 2003).
Apart from the practical issues of access and trust that inevitably affect all detailed 
enquiries into rural people’s livelihoods, research into rural livelihoods has 
encountered a range of methodological problems relating to measurement (Ardington 
& Lund 1996; Murray 2002). The first of these problems is the difficulty of 
adequately quantifying total household income (Ferguson 1992: 56).3 This follows, 
in part, from the dispersed nature of the household where variable remittances in cash
3 See Ellis (2000: 15) who argues that ‘a particular composition of activities and associated income 
flows represent [sic] the main, visible, outcome of the process by which a livelihood is constructed. 
Summarising this in income terms merely brings livelihood diversity into sharper focus; it is not meant 
to suggest that the underlying social processes are made to disappear or are regarded as unimportant 
for policy purposes.’
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and in kind are often important sources of livelihood, but are frequently difficult to 
quantify accurately, even with longer-term fieldwork among a small sample of 
households (see Campbell et al. 2002: 14-15). Secondly, the diversification of 
livelihoods, some of which are opportunistic, seasonal and/or temporary, makes 
accounting difficult and contributes to problems of measurement. Thirdly, the 
undervaluation of self-provisioning through agriculture and natural resource 
harvesting, often as a result of a focus on ‘dominant’ cash-based income sources, may 
seriously affect the characterisation of livelihoods (see May 1996: 19, ftnote 29; 
Shackleton et al. 2000). Fourthly, the constant dynamic interplay between changing 
household structure and labour availability and the piecing together of livelihoods 
tends to render any aggregation of synchronic findings (such as through developing a 
typology of livelihoods) arbitrary and increasingly inaccurate over the medium to 
long term.
One strategy has been to concentrate on quantifying expenditure rather than income, 
on the premise that, on the whole, expenditure tends to be more visible. However, this 
is not always the case and, given the dispersed nature of the umzi, this is likely to 
suffer from many of the same difficulties of measurement. A further problem 
encountered in measuring livelihoods is that comparison and generalisation based on 
findings from specific study sites continue to be hampered by non-standardised 
definitions and the different array and grouping of livelihoods generated by 
researchers working in different areas (Bryceson 2002: 730).
A fairly common strategy adopted by researchers in livelihoods and poverty studies is 
to inductively develop a descriptive typology of households, in which households that 
share certain demographic or ‘dominant income’ characteristics (or both) are grouped 
together until all the households in the sample or given population have been 
accounted for (Aliber 2003: 477; Kepe 2002a: 88ff). This approach may, however, 
suffer from the same shortcomings as one-off surveys when users implicitly 
extrapolate from a synchronic view of the households in question, without dealing 
adequately with how and why the various household types change over time. The 
typical household typology approach almost inevitably runs the risk of portraying a 
static picture of what is, in fact, a rather dynamic reality (see May et al. 2000). At 
first glance, the characterisation of household-level poverty that has been popularised
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in the ‘food security’ literature seems somewhat more sophisticated (see Maxwell 
2001: 18).4 The three categories identified in this literature are: (i) enduring 
households, that are able to maintain food security on a continuous basis; (ii) resilient 
households, that suffer stresses and shocks but recover quickly; (iii) and fragile (or 
vulnerable) households, that become increasingly insecure in response to shocks.
However, I found myself spending an inordinate amount of time trying to decide 
which categories the households in my livelihood sample fell into and then feeling 
uneasy about some of these decisions. Although this categorisation attempts to 
introduce a processual dimension into understanding poverty (using ‘food-security’ as 
the index in this case), it is firstly its non-disaggregated use of ‘the household’ as unit 
of analysis which limits its usefulness. This is because it is unclear how the approach 
deals with changes in household form that are induced by changes in livelihood. 
Secondly, this categorisation of households (enduring, resilient and vulnerable) 
assumes that longitudinal data on particular households are available, when most 
often such data are not. This throws the analyst back on (what should be tentative) 
generalisation and extrapolation over time and across different households. Thirdly, 
the connection between the three categories, specifically in terms of explaining how 
and why particular households either move ‘up’ (i.e. become ‘enduring’) or slip 
‘down’ (into a state of greater vulnerability), remains poorly developed.
The limited basket of rural livelihoods
My survey of recent livelihood studies indicated the recurrence of a particular range 
of livelihoods throughout (former) bantustan areas of rural South Africa. Baber 
(1996: 297), for example, listed ten sources of income in his detailed study of rural 
livelihoods in two former bantustan villages in the (then) Northern Province.5 Yet in 
both villages, a small number of livelihoods constituted the basket of key livelihoods 
in particular households. In his first site, Mamone village, 75% of livelihoods were 
comprised of remittances, ‘pensions and transfers’, as well as ‘informal wages and
4 What attracted me to this conceptualisation is that it forces the analyst to take a longer perspective of 
both the viability of the household as a ‘productive and reproductive unit’ and of poverty, deprivation 
and indeed wealth as experienced by individual households over time (see Maxwell 2001: 20). As 
Broch-Due and Anderson (1999: 9) note, ‘[v]iews of poverty and wealth very much depend upon 
where you stand’ (see Murray [2002] for more on understanding poverty in relational terms).
5 What Baber appears to omit (which may be negligible in his study, but this seems unlikely), is the 
contribution of natural resource harvesting to household incomes.
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activities’. In his other research site, the village of Rantlekane, 93% of household 
income was made up of these categories of livelihoods (Baber 1996: 297).
For rural households in the higher-rainfall province of KwaZulu-Natal, May (1996: 
19ff) identified nine ‘livelihood packages’. To constitute these ‘packages’ households 
variously combine: (a) wage labour (in either the formal or informal market), (b) 
agricultural and non-farm petty commodity production, (c) pensions and other state 
transfers and (d) remittances from elsewhere. Livelihood diversification appeared to 
be greater here, because, of the nine ‘livelihood packages’ that May identifies, all but 
the ‘marginalised’ category of households combined more than two sources of 
income. In fact, five of the nine categories combine four or five sources of income, 
suggesting considerable livelihood diversification. However, it was only one of 
May’s categories (comprising close to 25% of the rural households in KwaZulu- 
Natal), which exhibited what I term significant diversification. I define as significant 
a situation where the single biggest household income source contributes no more 
than one-third of overall household income, in cash terms, rather than any other 
measure, such as labour expended (May 1996: 21-23).
Refining the key concepts used in the livelihoods literature
The above discussion indicates how murky the debate on livelihood diversification 
can become. Unfortunately, some of the terms that are central to the analysis of rural 
livelihoods are employed somewhat loosely in the literature. I have already alluded to 
my definition of significant livelihood diversification. ‘Livelihood adaptation’ is 
arguably the central concept which needs to be unpacked more carefully if the 
livelihood debate is to progress to issues that are more substantive than definitional. 
Adaptation has been defined as ‘the continuous process of changes in livelihoods 
which either enhance existing security or wealth or try to reduce vulnerability and 
poverty’ (Ellis 2000: 63).
By this definition, livelihood adaptation may include the diversification of 
livelihoods, but the process may also involve other strategies, such as seeking new 
ways to sustain the existing livelihood portfolio, which may include no diversification 
of livelihoods per se. The well-documented process of intensification in arable
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production in coastal areas of the former Transkei and Ciskei bantustans, through the 
steady abandonment of cultivation in distant arable lands in favour of enlarged and 
more intensively cultivated home gardens, is an example of a livelihood adaptation to 
changes in the availability of labour and other inputs, but it does not involve 
livelihood diversification (Andrew 1992; Beinart 1998; cf. Tiffen et al. 1994).
Specialisation is another form of adaptation, which may involve shedding less 
productive livelihoods in order to concentrate solely on more promising ones 
(Bryceson 2002: 737). At times, specialisation occurs between members of the same 
household, with one member perhaps opting to become a migrant worker and another 
member choosing to remain in the village and to specialise in natural resource 
harvesting for sale. Insofar as the dispersed livelihood specialists remain members of 
the same household, livelihood diversification can be said to have taken place.
Ellis suggests, erroneously I think, that deliberately changing the size of the resident 
household group to reduce the dependency ratio in response to income deficits is an 
example of livelihood diversification (cf. Ellis 2000: 59). Unless the people released in 
this manner go on to generate a new livelihood for the household, this strategy is 
actually another form of adaptation -  for which I suggest the term dependency 
contraction -  one which was particularly common in the Eastern Cape, where 
especially children were regularly dispersed to other villages and towns.
Livelihood substitution involves, to my understanding, another form of adaptation in 
respect of strategies that can be adopted to reshape a household’s repertoire of 
livelihoods. This process entails the substitution of one type of livelihood for another, 
either temporarily (for instance, seasonally) or more permanently. The man retrenched 
from an urban job who buys a tractor and starts to plough for people in the village for a 
fee has merely substituted one livelihood strategy for another. Elis sources of livelihood 
(and, by extension, of the household to which he belongs) have not increased, nor have 
they become more diverse. The net effect at the household level is not a more diverse 
range of livelihoods, but an outcome in which the household livelihood diversity index 
remains constant (Ellis 2000:15,238). These may seem to be simple points to make, but 
the discussion points to the necessity of investigating the existence o f‘livelihood
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diversification’ rather more thoroughly than appears to be the case in much of the 
literature.
Lastly, diversification in rural livelihoods has been defined as ‘the process by which [the 
members of particular] households construct an increasingly diverse portfolio of activities 
and assets in order to survive and to improve their standard of living’ (Ellis 2000: 15)
[my parenthesis]. Note that this definition includes an appraisal based on the phrase 
‘increasingly diverse portfolio’, which is not relationally nor temporally defined. The key 
issue here, I suggest, is that agreement should be reached that the notion of livelihood 
diversification relates to, and should be measured at, the household level, not in 
aggregate, i.e. across households, villages or rural areas in general. Practitioners and 
writers should agree that an assessment of whether the livelihoods of people in a 
particular village or area constitute an example of ‘multiple livelihoods’ must rest on the 
extent of significant diversity in the livelihoods in evidence at the household level, not at 
the more nebulous ‘community’ or village level. By this measure, many rural villages in 
the Eastern Cape evinced livelihood strategies that were not diversified to any marked 
extent (see discussion below). With my use of these concepts clarified, I turn now to what 
the new orthodoxy on ‘rural livelihoods’ in the Eastern Cape encompasses.
Debating the nature of ‘rural’ livelihoods in the Eastern Cape
Cousins (1996,1999) and others (Shackleton et al. 2001; Lahiff 2003; Scoones & 
Wolmer 2003) have argued that livelihoods in rural South Africa are characterised by 
the considerable diversity of strategies that people follow and may best be 
characterised as ‘multiple livelihoods’. With their interest in pressing for a particular 
kind of (broadly ‘pro-poor’, see James [2000: 144]) agrarian reform, these analysts 
are at pains to stress the critical importance of a land-based safety net to the 
livelihoods of rural people, notwithstanding the low returns to agriculture that have 
historically been recorded for households in many rural areas of South Africa.
There is no gainsaying the important contribution of natural (including agrarian) 
resources to the majority of households, even in densely populated rural areas like 
Peddie District. The contribution of natural resources for the purposes of self­
provisioning was, of course, part of the ‘rural dividend’, through the savings in cash
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that this provisioning entailed. This is the ‘hidden harvest’ that recent observers have 
been keen to have policy-makers sit up and take cognisance of (see Scoones 1990; 
Cousins 1999; Campbell et al. 2002). Indeed, natural resource use contributes both to 
people’s overall repertoire of livelihood strategies as well as to their local sense of 
identity and well-being as rural people. Commonly used natural resources in rural 
Peddie included firewood, water, grazing resources, edible fruits and vegetables, 
wood which is variously used as building materials and for fencing, medicinal plants, 
wild game (bushmeat) and so on (Ainslie et al. 1997; see also Cocks & Wiersum 
[2003: 45-46] for a comprehensive list of resources used in rural Peddie District).
It was not my intention to attempt in my data-collection or analysis of livelihoods in 
rural Peddie District to duplicate or refine these approaches of ‘counting cow-pats’ 
i.e. painstakingly trying to place a value on natural resource use. I acknowledge that 
virtually every household in both the villages I worked in used at least one, but often 
several, of the natural resources listed above for the purposes of self-provisioning and 
thus benefited by foregoing the need to purchase these resources or their substitutes 
for cash. But it seems to me that Cousins goes too far when he argues that the benefits 
derived from communal rangelands, including such services as ‘food security, 
nutrition, income, medicine, fertiliser, fuel, building material, spiritual health and 
aesthetic satisfaction,.. .may help to explain why more people do not leave the 
apparently ‘impoverished’ rural areas to seek their fortunes in the towns and cities’ 
(Cousins 1999: 300).6 To suggest that it is their access to natural resources that keeps 
people economically buoyant and keen to remain in rural areas is either to misread the 
substantial evidence to the contrary (Maree & De Vos 1975: 21-22; Manona 1999; 
Wilson & Mamphele [eds.] 1989; Breslin et al. 1997) or to conflate choice and 
necessity in people’s decisions about their place(s) of residence and their livelihood 
strategies. Indeed, this conflation is something that appears to confound analyses of
6 This may be a throwaway remark, as anyone who has conducted research in the former bantustans 
knows that the poverty experienced by the rural majority is both chronic and pervasive. In Shackleton, 
Shackleton and Cousins (2000: 3), there is greater acknowledgement o f the pervasiveness and depth of 
poverty in rural South Africa. Clearly, the contribution of natural resources to rural people’s survival 
(‘as a safety net of final resort’) is important, but it is necessary to delineate the specific areas where 
this applies strongly, as Shackleton etal. (2001: 583) do with, ‘...the degree o f [natural resource] use 
may vary considerably from region to region based on a number of factors including resource 
availability, accessibility, institutional controls, population densities, employment levels, income 
levels, availability of alternatives, and personal and cultural preferences’.
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rural livelihoods, particularly those that are aimed at poverty reduction and I thus deal 
with it briefly below.
Although Ellis (2000: 56) points out the practical difficulties of making a clear 
distinction between choice and necessity in respect of livelihoods (elsewhere he refers 
to this distinction as the difference between ‘risk management’ and ‘coping 
strategies’ respectively [Ellis 1998]), I think there is some validity in insisting on the 
distinction, as it helps to highlight both the particular historical legacy and the 
contemporary structural constraints that rural people were (and are) confronted with 
in constructing their livelihoods.
Moreover, distinguishing between short-term, opportunistic and supplementary 
livelihood strategies and longer-term significant livelihoods is critical when trying to 
make broader statements about trends and longer-term changes in rural livelihoods 
(see Bryceson 2002: 731). Indeed, we should not lose sight of what Englund (2002: 
149) argues for Malawi in a different context, namely that ‘...for the poor,
[apparently creative, voluntarist livelihood diversification] strategies may rather 
imply a desperate experimentation with different possibilities under ‘abject’ 
economic conditions’ (cf. Campbell et al. 2002: 131). The point is that we need to 
recognise both the potential for and the extent of longer-term capital investment (i.e. 
in terms of cash and human labour) in a particular livelihood strategy, in order to 
differentiate adequately between significant and opportunistic livelihoods. In other 
words, high-capital/long-horizon (what I call ‘high commitment’) savings and 
investment livelihoods (such as in cattle or extensive arable production, or in 
secondary and post-secondary education for that matter), can and should usefully be 
differentiated from low-capital/short-horizon (or Tow commitment’) natural resource 
harvesting livelihoods. If the goal of livelihoods analyses is poverty reduction, then 
this distinction is especially important for uncovering viable modes of longer-term 
accumulation through the adoption of particular livelihood strategies.
In relation to the relative significance of various livelihood strategies, there was 
variation from area to area, within areas and especially between households (see
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Leibbrandt & Sperber 1997: 11 Iff).7 Critically, though, this variation in livelihood 
options hinged on any one of a number of potential local contingencies, for example, 
the presence of an irrigation scheme or timber-processing factory in the area (as in 
Manona [1999]), or a particular history of ‘involuntary’ resettlement (as in De Wet 
[1995a]) and not as a result of the apparently generic range of natural resource-based 
livelihoods from which different households constructed their own combination of 
livelihoods. De Wet (1995b: 57) provides a list of some of the factors that may 
contribute to differentiation at the level of village or household livelihoods. These 
historically contingent and locally specific factors include:
■ the local economic significance o f migrant remittances
■ differential access to pensions
■ differential access to [and use of] arable land and livestock
■ the role o f  the domestic cycle in household survival and accumulation strategies
■ the length o f  residence in an area
■ the extent o f access to political and bureaucratic power and patronage
■ differential investments (past and current) in education
Over and above these factors, periods of domestic hardship, that generally track 
overall economic downturn and industrial lay-offs, follow upon the death of a key 
breadwinner or come about as the result of prolonged drought, are examples of 
change that obviously have considerable, often long-term, impacts on rural people’s 
livelihood strategies (see Campbell et al. 2002: 115).
Further complexity is introduced at the household level, as a result of high population 
mobility and social dislocation, including marital breakdown and through dependency 
contraction strategies, by the changing availability of labour needed for the execution 
of livelihood-related tasks. This is especially the case since these tasks remained 
largely gender-specific in nature (see McAllister 2001: 127; Hajdu 2003: 19; cf. Potts 
2000: 817). Because of the widespread persistence of a gender division of labour, the 
relationship between the changing size and composition of a household and its
7 Nevertheless, it is my experience that there are significant and telling commonalities in the social, 
economic and of course, cultural particularities of people’s lived experiences in adjacent districts of the 
former Ciskei, such as Alice (formerly Victoria East), Keiskammahoek and Peddie, that make 
comparison and informed extrapolation valid and valuable.
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livelihood portfolio over time remains a crucial element of this analysis. This is not 
something that survey-type data collection is well-suited to assess in particular 
situations (Ardington & Lund 1996: 52; Manona 1999; Murray 2002).
Any attempt to analyse ‘rural’ livelihoods must thus remain sensitive to the dynamic 
interplay between household forms (i.e. household size and composition, see Preston- 
Whyte [1974: 182ff]) and livelihoods (cf. Scoones 1990; Scoones et al. 1996). By 
delineating the various structural and other differences between households, a 
typology of households can be suggestive about the options available to different 
types of households in terms of constructing their livelihoods.
Another factor which should be taken into account in a characterisation of households 
is the earning power (and associated domestic authority) of the household head.8 
Where the household head, whether male or female, had a secure income over time, 
he or she was often in a far stronger position to direct the accumulation strategies of 
the homestead. Over the longer term, these decisions would inevitably have an impact 
on the education and formal skills levels attained by household members and thus on 
their chances of finding employment, which would in turn influence the consequent 
form of the household. Poorly educated children were more likely to remain 
residentially attached to and economically dependent on their natal homesteads well 
into their adulthood than were better educated children, especially given the fall-back 
position provided by social welfare ‘safety net’ disbursements to the older generation.
To reiterate, I argue that a typical household typology approach, based on survey- 
derived data, inevitably has limited explanatory power regarding the longer-term 
social and economic processes of accumulation and exclusion. It cannot tell us much 
about how these processes are mediated and contested, both within and between 
households. Rather, in order to learn something about why particular types of 
household opt for particular livelihood options and not others, we need constantly to 
be mindful of the whole context of social factors and cultural constructs, including
8 M0ller and Ferreira randomly selected households that had at least one member aged 55 years and 
over in their sample of of 374 ‘rural black households’ in the Eastern Cape (Moller & Ferreira 2003: 
52).They point out that nearly 87% of these ‘older’ rural households in their Eastern Cape sample 
indicated that all the household income was pooled and that the ‘person in the household with most say 
on how money was spent’ was the head (75% of the responses) and the spouse of the household head 
(19% of the responses).
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moral sanctions against certain types of behaviours, specific activities that may have 
had their provenance as acts of political and economic resistance to apartheid 
hegemony, practices that have a religious and ritual bent, norms of accumulation, 
sharing and exchange and different lifestyle orientations. We also need to be mindful 
that all of these are underlain by contingent and structural factors, such as differential 
access to land and other assets, and the fact that many households straddle the rural- 
urban divide in terms of the residential location and livelihoods of their members.
Take, for example, the significant shift that is said to have taken place from cattle to 
pigs as the main type of livestock held since the 1980s in Ngxingxolo village in peri­
urban Mooiplaas (outside East London), to which Bank and Qambata (1999: 94) draw 
our attention (quoted in Bryceson 2002: 728). This shift was related, they argue, to 
the increased commoditisation of livestock production, especially of the livestock that 
was regarded as ‘women’s animals’, such as pigs and chickens, which were 
frequently and easily sold, both locally and in the city. The shift to women’s animals, 
Bank and Qambata suggest, was connected to changes in gender relations, and 
specifically to the increase in female-headed households. Female-headed households, 
often with their livelihood status enhanced by recently increased access to social 
welfare grants, were asserting their preference for types of livestock that were 
relatively unfettered by cultural restrictions, so that the care, slaughter and sale of 
pigs and chickens were least likely to attract any interference from men on these 
grounds. These were also animals that were easily kept adjacent to the homestead 
and, given the sometimes limited command that these women had over the labour of 
other members in their households, were thus better suited to the daily routines and 
labour constraints of these households.
But this situation, however persuasively argued and pervasive it appeared to be in the 
context of peri-urban Mooiplaas, might not play out in other rural areas. In deeper 
rural areas situated further from urban markets, where the potential for women to 
market their produce was curtailed by limited knowledge of the market, high 
transport and other input costs and the difficulties that many rural women 
experienced in enforcing payment for produce sold on credit, the situation may be 
different. Here, a shift to the more intensive production and commoditisation of
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‘women’s animals’, especially where it is driven by ill-fated government-sponsored 
‘piggery and poultry’ projects, may not be as financially rewarding nor as obvious.
To summarise, I argue that most of the evidence backs the contention that, while at 
the aggregate level the potential range of rural livelihood strategies in rural villages 
was wide, the actual extent of livelihood diversification within households was often 
not remarkable (see Kepe 2002a; Fraser et al. 2003; McAllister 2001: 32-36; Manona 
1999). The households that were most diversified in terms of their livelihoods were 
those that combined up to three different livelihood strategies. In fact, the majority of 
households tended to rely on one or two livelihood strategies, generally with some 
productive and/or extractive use of natural resources.
I suggest that this was related to the relatively small number of economically active 
household members resident in the village, given the dispersion of work-seeking umzi 
members, so that labour constraints increasingly, yet somewhat counter-intuitively, 
posed a challenge to intra-household livelihood diversification (Shackleton et al.
2001: 593). Further, much of the livelihood diversification that was in evidence in 
rural villages seemed to occur at the intersection of the ‘formal sector’ (characterised 
by the salaries and wages earned by employed people) with the localised, extractive 
and consumption use of natural resources (as shown in Chapter Four).
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APPENDIX TWO: 
The ‘cultural politics’ of securing livelihoods in rural 
Peddie District
The two case-studies that follow demonstrate how fraught people’s attempts to secure 
their livelihoods can be in the context of economically depressed rural Peddie District. 
The first case-study deals with a young man’s frustration at being unable to make a 
contribution to the ukwakh ’umzi project. The second case-study details the example of 
a household that stood accused of disregarding the masincedisane project between 
homesteads in Village X.
The case of Zolile Mthi, micro-entrepreneur
Zolile is a 28-year-old man who lives in Hamburg. He lives at home with his 
widowed and pensioner mother, his 3 5-year-old, mentally ill brother and his 
16-year-old ‘sister’ (actually his sister’s daughter). Zolile completed his 
schooling in 1993 (with university entrance) and applied to study further at a 
local university. He heard nothing from the university regarding his 
application and, apparently lacking the confidence to make further enquiries in 
this regard, he has watched his chances of gaining entry to any tertiary 
institution fade with every passing year since then.
In 1999, Zolile went to Port Elizabeth, where he stayed with his sister and her 
husband, who works as a gardener, in KwaZakhele township. Zolile spent his 
days going door-to-door in Port Elizabeth, in search of a job. Eventually his 
search for a job became more passive. He would wait at a particular factory 
gate from 6h00 to lOhOO with many other men, hoping for someone to come 
past and recruit some of them as ‘casuals’. On a particularly lucky day, and 
one that he could distinctly recall, he got four hours of work, from 14h00 to 
18h00, that paid R42,00. But breaks like this were few and far between. He 
found it trying to live with his sister, her husband and their children and he 
found township life to be dirty and stifling.
Despondent, he returned to Hamburg and immersed himself in his Seventh 
Day Adventist church activities. This soon included leading youth groups in
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Hamburg and the neighbouring villages. Under pressure to contribute 
materially to his home, he decided to set himself up in a tiny business of 
buying paraffin and reselling it in the village. Although most of the houses in 
the village are electrified, many people use paraffin and firewood to cook 
with, because electricity is regarded as too expensive to use for cooking 
purposes.
Zolile travelled to Peddie Town two or three times a month, each time he 
would buy two 20-litre containers of paraffin. Each container cost R51,00 at 
the time and the round trip R17,00. He decanted the paraffin into smaller 
bottles which he resold at R3,20 per bottle, which was only slightly cheaper 
than the local shop in Hamburg. In this way, he made a gross profit of R25,00 
per container and after subtracting the cost of the bottles he was left with a 
profit of just over R11,00. This miniscule amount, he argues, was enough to 
buy at least a bag of sugar, tea or a 2.5 kg bag of maize meal for his home 
from each consignment of paraffin. His plan was to branch out into other 
products in time and he looked to his elderly neighbour, Mr. Mkhaya, who 
was well-disposed towards him, as a likely source of future finance to expand 
his business once it was ‘known in the village’.
In this way, Zolile felt he was making a contribution to his home under 
difficult circumstances. Also, by keeping himself busy he was building his 
family’s home in the broader sense, as idleness among young men is seen by 
older people -  and especially by women - as a major source of social 
delinquency in the village. To this end, he also established a vegetable garden 
alongside their house which he cultivated enthusiastically. The jeers of other 
young men at the sight of him working in his garden did not deter him and 
several older people made a point of passing by his garden, wanting to buy his 
carrots and other vegetables and encouraging his efforts.
Even with this evidence of his initiative, Zolile felt that he was under constant 
and unrealistic pressure from his mother to contribute more to the home, 
because her old-age pension was supporting the whole family. After I had 
been in Hamburg for a few months, Zolile told me that he had closed down his 
paraffin business. When I asked why, he explained that because of the tiny 
margins that he was operating with he had been very careful with his money. 
This probably means that he had also been quite secretive about the actual
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profit he was turning. Not aware of the rather fine line that his business was 
treading in terms of cash-flow, his mother interpreted his caginess about his 
finances as evidence of an attempt on his part to hold back some of his profits 
for himself, and she began to simply take some of his paraffin when her own 
supply was exhausted, without telling or paying him for it. Almost 
immediately, he did not have enough money to make the trip to town to buy 
paraffin and his business collapsed. He told me that he felt betrayed by his 
mother as he felt that his efforts had been directed at helping her and now she 
had left him open to ridicule from other men and women and even youngsters 
who would see him as someone who could not make a success of ‘even a 
paraffin business’.
The weight of cultural expectations II: masincedisane
For various reasons, the household of Ma’am Gitywa had gone it alone with respect to 
its livelihood strategies, specifically its cattle herd accumulation strategies. By this I 
mean that, comparatively speaking, this wealthy household did not develop what could 
be expected to be a strong social network or cross-cutting ties of economic reciprocity 
in the village. In fact, as this Gitywa household prospered over time, they appeared to 
have largely side-stepped the pressures to share and to help others, at least as required 
by the masincedisane norm.
The case of Ma’am Gitywa’s prospering household
Ma’am1 Gitywa is a widow with four adult children, two daughters and two 
sons. Having completed 12 years of schooling herself, she is a teacher in the 
neighbouring village. I interviewed her son, Mandla, several times and came to 
know him well. He is her third-bom child and her eldest son. Mandla’s father, 
who was also a teacher, died in 1971. At the time, the young family (Mandla 
was 18 months old) was living on the farm of Mandla’s father’s father in 
another village. This village, also in Peddie District, is some 25 kms away 
from their current home.
During his lifetime, Mr. Gitywa had been a keen and successful farmer and it 
is said that at the time of his death he had accumulated about 50 cattle, over
1 Pronounced ‘mam’ as in ‘am’ , this is a term of respect, reserved for woman teachers over a certain 
age. They are addressed as such by virtually everyone in the village and beyond, except people of 
similar educational status and age.
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100 sheep and some 50 goats, as well as three motorcars and a tractor. In the 
1950s or 1960s, he had bought arable land in the fertile village of X. His wife 
took possession of this land upon his death. Earlier on, Ma’am Gitywa’s 
similarly well-to-do parents had bought a site for her in the same village. In 
1975, after conflict with her father-in-law, and as a young widow, Ma’am 
Gitywa left her late husband’s home and moved to Village X. Her father-in- 
law allowed her to take only four cattle and, since none of the extended family 
at Xesi knew how to drive, she was also allowed to take the tractor and the 
three motorcars.
Although her husband had owned land in Village X, she decided to avoid 
further conflict with the Gitywa family and proceeded to build her house on 
her own site in the village. She and her children spent several difficult years 
living in two leaky, corrugated iron buildings. Only as recently as 1984 could 
they afford to start building the rather more substantial brick-and-mortar house 
that they currently occupy. Although there are other Gitywa lineages in 
Village X, Ma’am Gitywa is not close to any of these distant affines, although 
some of them are said to have helped her when she first arrived there.
In 1985, after the terrible drought that started in 1982-83, the herd that Ma’am 
Gitywa had started building was reduced to a single heifer. From there, 
though, the cattle kept by this household began to increase steadily. By 1994, 
there were 14 cattle in their byre. This was also when Mandla had finished his 
junior degree (a Bachelor of Agricultural Science) and decided that, since he 
knew more than anyone else in the household about animal husbandry, he 
would take charge of the cattle. In the seven years since then, he has lost only 
three calves and has sold more than 12 animals. Over the same period, the 
family has also slaughtered three of their animals. During 2000, they bought 
two cattle for the first time, otherwise their herd has grown entirely as a result 
of natural increase and in 2001, after selling five cattle, it numbered a 
substantial 28 animals.
Mandla’s success in cattle husbandry, based on his formal agricultural training 
and knowledge of commercial cattle production principles, not to mention his 
passion for it, has not been without controversy. Symptomatic of the tension 
that his remarkable success in building this herd has caused in the village is his 
use of the village dip-tank. During my fieldwork period, the all-male dipping
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committee in the village was rather unhappy with him, ostensibly because he 
stayed clear of their local dipping programme, which is managed by senior 
men in the village.
Dipping takes place every Tuesday morning, whether the liquid acaricide in 
the tank has been replenished or not. But since Mandla is away at work in the 
town of Komgha [some 120 kms away] during the week, he prefers to use the 
dipping facilities over the weekend when he returns to the village. This means, 
however, that his use of the facilities is not supervised by the senior men in the 
village. In fact, he does not even dip his cattle there, but merely uses the cattle 
‘race’ to restrain his cattle while he sprays them with his own acaricide and 
injects them against diseases with vaccinations that he has bought in town for 
his private use on his own herd. He tends to be dismissive of the ‘old illiterate 
man’ who is the dipping foreman in the village and the ‘troublesome’ dipping 
committee, and correctly argues that the often weak acaricide formula in the 
dip-tank is likely to create ‘super-ticks’ that are resistant to the commonly 
available acaricides. He regards the older men’s knowledge and management 
of the tick problem in the area as seriously lacking and has thus instituted his 
own tick-control regime. They, on the other hand, accuse him of damaging the 
cattle race. They have placed a chain across the entrance of the cattle race in an 
effort to prevent his unauthorised use of the facility. Mandla is adamant that, 
as a member of this village and ‘a tax-payer’, he is fully entitled to use the 
facility at the only time he is able to, i.e. at weekends. I attended a meeting of 
the cattle-owning men at the dip-tank where the main topic of discussion was 
how to deal with Mandla’s perceived recalcitrance. The dipping committee 
had already reported the matter to the local police, but they declined to take 
action against Mandla.
However, some men had taken a different approach. After Mandla had let a 
cow which had shown signs of recovery from an illness out of his byre to 
graze, some men in the village came across the animal etafeni [on the plateau 
grazing lands]. They proceeded to slaughter it and consume the meat. This is 
usually widely regarded as a serious anti-social action which poses a threat to 
the investments of all cattle-owning households. Mandla knew who the 
culprits were and reported the matter to the police. However the culprits were 
all out on ‘free bail by the following Monday’ and the case has since been 
‘buried’ by the local police department. This caused Mandla to reason to me
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that the ‘legal system in this country is a joke these days’.
Why, in this case, did these men so completely disregard the normative rules of the 
game, i.e. that as men of the same village it is virtually inconceivable that they would 
steal and consume cattle from each other’s herds? Mandla’s explanation was that his 
family had never been accepted by the established lineages in the village. He told me 
that they had always been made to feel like unwelcome guests by some people in the 
village. My sense was that Ma’am Gitywa’s marked success in building her home 
from her inauspicious beginnings as a newly arrived young widow with four children 
had powerfully challenged the locally dominant patriarchal order. That she had 
undertaken the ukwakh ’umzi project on her own, without being socially (and certainly 
not economically, given her professional status) under the wing of any senior (male) 
kinsman in the village, was troubling to the male bearers of this dominant order. 
Moreover, that her material success, especially latterly, had included building a 
significant herd of cattle, a quintessential part of the ukwakh *umzi project, simply 
reinforced this and was irksome to many of the senior men who had failed to match 
this increase in their herd sizes over the same period with their less advanced 
husbandry techniques. Her neighbours saw Ma’am Gitywa as the household head who 
continued to oversee this burgeoning success, and they discounted the role of Mandla 
and his scientific knowledge of cattle production. The senior men in the village in 
particular simply regarded him as a youth, and an upstart at that.
For their part, the Gitywa household could have helped their cause by, for instance, 
adopting a strategy of actively cultivating relationships with the households that wield 
power in the village. This could involve, for instance, seeking to marry their daughters 
or sons into any of these established families. Nor had they developed strong local 
networks of support with other homesteads along the lines of masincedisane. Ma’am 
Gitywa was known not to suffer fools gladly and, because of her educated status, cut a 
somewhat aloof if respected figure in the village. For instance, when the men sent by 
the dipping committee arrived at their homestead to instruct Mandla and his mother to 
desist from using the dip-tank facilities, Mandla was away but Ma’am told them in no 
uncertain terms to go away and not to bother her again with such nonsense.
The fact that her intelligent and assertive young son, Mandla, was also well-educated
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(he obtained his Master of Science degree in 2001) and was successfully employed, 
also proved problematic in the context of the village. The success of this young man 
gave rise to jealousies among both the less fortunate people and the similarly well-off 
people whose children had been far less successful than Mandla at securing 
employment.
My sense, however, was that people in these villages did not automatically despise the 
success of others, as long as they feel that those who were successful in finding 
employment actively and unremittingly made efforts to help others around them in the 
idiom of masincedisane. Enormous pressure was brought to bear on people like 
Mandla to seek out employment opportunities for other youngsters in the village, to the 
extent that people employed in urban-based jobs were known to actively avoid 
returning to their home villages, knowing full well that they lacked the means to secure 
employment in government service for their fellow village youth. Given the chronic 
uncertainty that surrounded employment and thus livelihoods for rural people these 
days, this continued to be particularly fraught terrain for social relations in the village.
The interpretations given by my informants of what I have suggested was the affront 
that the actions of Ma’am and Mandla Gitywa presented to the masincedisane norm 
were rather instructive. Several villagers that I asked about this case commented on the 
fact that, unlike other owners of big cattle herds in the village, who shared their excess 
amasi [sour milk] with boys from poor families, Ma’am Gitywa sold the excess milk 
she received from the eight cows which were currently in milch in their byre. The milk 
that went unsold, it was said, was fed to her pigs. In light of the levels of food 
deprivation that several households in the village experienced on a daily basis, this was 
regarded by many people as particularly anti-social behaviour. Such behaviour, several 
informants told me, constituted an unconscionable act of privatising an important 
social resource in the village, namely cattle and their products.2
It was also telling that, as Mandla only returned home at weekends, his mother hired a 
man to herd their animals. However, this man was not from the village and was not
2 It was widely acknowledged, however, that it was ritually unsafe for milk and more specifically 
amasi [sour milk] to be shared with people who were not patrilineally related to the household head 
whose cattle have produced the milk. This related to ideas about kinship taboos. In this light, the 
feeding of excess milk to pigs was not that uncommon in Peddie District.
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even Xhosa-speaking. It was said that he was from another country and resided 
illegally in South Africa. He had since struck up a relationship with Mandla’s sister 
and they had taken to living in a shack on a site separate from the Gitywa homestead. 
They were, however, supported by Mandla and his mother in exchange for the daily 
animal husbandry duties which this man provided. So here too, the family failed, quite 
probably because they could not trust many of the local men, to provide opportunities 
for unemployed men in the village to earn an income by assisting with the herding, 
milking or dipping of their cattle.
This situation was still further exacerbated by the fact that Mandla owned a tractor and 
ploughed his own fields. Of independent means in this regard, he thus had no need to 
employ a ploughing team that might be assembled from his own and various other 
herds around the village. Where he was requested by other people to plough their 
fields, he was not always in a position to do so, as ploughing his own fields took 
precedence. Where he did perform this task for others, he entered into competition 
with other ploughing teams that used cattle to plough, often for a cash payment.
Even owning and selling pigs in the village took on ‘class’ overtones for the Gitywa 
family. Mandla complained about the struggle involved in securing payment from 
people who took pork on credit, which ‘makes it a pain to sell pork in the village’. For 
this reason, it was better to sell on a strictly cash basis only, at the expense of 
excluding many of the poorer homesteads in the village. Predictably, this also carried a 
social cost for this Gitywa household.
The actions of the men who slaughtered and consumed the Gitywas’ cow and the 
essentially trumped-up charges of the damage supposedly caused by Mandla to the dip- 
tank and adjacent facilities constituted clumsy yet, at the same time, explicit attempts by 
the wider community of Village X to re-assert some moral authority over the errant 
Gitywa household. In particular, it constituted an attempt to ‘re-socialise’ the Gitywa 
herd, which was currently the fourth biggest and one of the most productive herds in 
terms of milk production and increase in the village. Furthermore, Mandla’s 
disrespectful attitude towards the senior men in the village upset several influential men. 
To curb these perceived excesses, the larger community of Village X resorted to an 
even more serious sanction, that of limited involvement in the rituals of the Gitywa
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homestead. The ritual slaughter events conducted by Ma’am Gitywa’s homestead often 
took place at her deceased husband’s home at Xesi, some distance from Village X. As 
a result, apart from immediate family members, they tended in the main to be poorly 
attended affairs. Indeed, by performing many of their rituals at a distance from the 
village, the Gitywa household forewent another culturally potent opportunity to build 
prestige and their social network among their fellow-villagers in Village X. On one 
occasion, I witnessed several senior men, who were coming from a beer drink hosted 
by a neighbour of the Gitywa homestead. These men walked straight past the beer 
drink taking place at the Gitywa homestead, without so much as acknowledging the 
(mostly) young men sitting close to the byre in the yard of this homestead. The reason 
for the Gitywa beer drink? They were thanking their ancestors for the six heifers from 
a total of eight calves bom that summer. Since the senior men had recently spent long 
hours deliberating Mandla’s cheekiness around the dip-tank episode, they were not 
about to ukuzimasa [participate in] his ritual through their presence, nor would they be 
interested in celebrating his family’s good fortune of getting so many new-bom 
heifers.
This case illustrates the extent to which other villagers seek to bring considerable 
pressure to bear on people who Tost the plot’ and sought to opt out of the normative 
masincedisane relationships. The case-study of the Gitywa household, and that of 
Zolile Mthi, are but two examples of the daily livelihood struggles that went on within 
and between households in rural Peddie District. In economically difficult times, 
constructing ‘rural’ livelihoods was fraught with jealousies and unrealistic expectations 
regarding what better-resourced relatives were able to, and thus should, provide. The 
resentment and frustration that were built up by these day-to-day stmggles over time 
could and at times did lead to instances of domestic violence and accusations of 
witchcraft.
313
APPENDIX THREE: 
Livelihoods in the ‘informal sector’ engaged in by 
sampled households in Loverstwist and Hamburg
Table 1. ’Informal sector’ livelihoods in Loverstwist (n=30) and Hamburg 
(n=60).
LIVELIHOOD ACTIVITY LOVERSTWIST HAMBURG
Tractor/truck driver 3 cases Nil
Domestic worker 2 cases 6 cases
Run an isirhoxo (shop) 3 cases 1 case
Transport people/goods around 1 case Nil
Cattle herdsman 1 case Nil
Abalone project Nil 8 cases
Oyster project Nil 2 cases
Labour at the hotel/village Nil 2 cases
Builder or builder's labourer Nil 3 cases
Gardener/W atchman Nil 2 cases
Collect firewood for sale Nil 4 cases
‘Jobbing’ for ESKOM Nil 2 cases
‘Jobbing’ for TELKOM Nil 1 case
Plough for people Nil 6 cases
Do other people's laundry Nil 1 case
Repair windows Nil 1 case
Sell marijuana ('dagga'j Nil 1 case
Sewing/crochet work Nil 2 cases
Brickmaking Nil 1 case
Waitress in the local hotel Nil 1 case
Decorate pots with shells for sale Nil 1 case
Shop attendant Nil 1 case
Slaughter pigs to sell pork Nil 1 case
General H/hold helper/messenger Nil 1 case
Harvest medicinal plants for sale Nil 1 case
TOTAL 10 cases 47 cases
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APPENDIX FOUR: 
The ‘rands and cents’ of livelihoods in 
Loverstwist and Hamburg ca.2001
In 2001, an old-age pension was worth R540,00 per month. Later during the year, it 
increased to R570,00 per month. The child support grant was R100,00 per month.
An estimated 70% of the potential labour force in Peddie District was unemployed. 
This helps to explain why about 91% of the households in the district earned Rl,500 
per month or less, while only 9% earned more than Rl,500 per month -  the price of 
one heifer in 2001 (Ngqushwa IDP 2002). Monde (2003) found that the mean 
monthly household incomes in the two villages she studied were R747 and Rl,071 
respectively. She also found that the ‘ultra-poor’ households in the two villages spent 
75% of their monthly income on buying food. At the same time, Moller and Ferreira 
(2003: 52) note that their sample of 374 'rural black households in the Eastern Cape' 
had a mean total monthly household income of R965. This probably mirrored the 
overall situation in Hamburg and Loverstwist, although both villages had a number of 
households that had no income whatsoever.
Mrs. Makiso paid R220,00 for the household’s field to be ploughed by tractor.
The hire purchase instalments of the Mnqosini household amounted to R820,00 per 
month. The newly-installed, glass-fibre pit latrine cost them R595,00.
A heifer bought from neighbouring white farmers cost between Rl,200 and Rl,800 
during 2001. A full-grown ox fetched between R2,200 and R3,000 at the stock sale. In 
March 2001, a sheep bought in the town of Berlin cost R400,00. A young goat ewe, 
where one could be found for sale, cost around R400,00 in the villages of Peddie 
District.
In Hamburg, people working on the roads rehabilitation project got paid a daily wage 
of R43,00, making R860,00 for a month’s work. The 3 women and one man working 
on the water piping project in Loverstwist in November 2001, each received R56/day, 
or about R600 per fortnight.
At the height of the abalone harvesting, men in Hamburg were earning R1,500 per 
week.
School fees at St. Charles Sojola SSS is R50,00 per learner per year.
Bra Majay got R5,00 for each broom he made. Bawo ’ uCirha fixed people’s three- 
legged pots for R10,00 a time. MaTshezi sold her seashell-decorated pots for R50,00- 
R80,00 each.
Between 1997 and 1999, Themba Natazo handed over R400 a month to his mother 
and sisters as a contribution to household expenditure.
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Damages for impregnating a girl of R500,00 was paid in Hamburg. The P.E.-based 
father of Nonzukiso Mongemali’s child contributed R150,00 a month towards the 
child’s upbringing.
One young woman who owned a shebeen in Phola Park informed me that her business 
usually cleared R700,00 a month, which was about the same as the three other 
shebeens in close by. A bottle of Viceroy brandy, which was popular for presenting to 
hosts at rituals, cost R40,00.
Mthozamile Raduma owned 56 head of cattle in 2001. At an average value of Rl,800 
per animal, this meant that he had just over R100,000 ‘on the hoof, which was a very 
considerable amount of money in the context of rural Peddie District.
In October 2001, it cost R40,00 return to travel by taxi from Loverstwist to East 
London and it cost R14.00 return to Peddie from Loverstwist (add R10,00 from 
Hamburg). Concrete building blocks sold in the village cost R2.60 each.
In Loverstwist, Mrs. H. Mgaba (whose husband was away working on the mines) paid 
the elderly man, Reni Gedze, R100/month to look after the Mgaba cattle (Mr. Gedze 
was of pensionable age, but not in receipt of a pension).
Cattle holders in Hamburg objected to each umzi having to pay R20,00 towards the 
cost of purchasing dip, when some of them had 2 or 3 cattle and others had 20 or 
more cattle.
The value of the total herd of cattle in the reserve areas of Peddie District in 1998 was 
estimated at R40 million, or just over R655 per capita.
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APPENDIX FIVE: 
Some herd structure and production indices for 
Loverstwist and Hamburg
Table 1. Some production indices for cattle-holdings in Loverstwist (n=47) and 
Hamburg (n=101) for the calendar year 2000.1
PRODUCTION INDEX L’TWIST % OF TOTAL HAMBURG % OF TOTAL
Total herd size 266 (270) 1,037(1,048)
H/holds with cattle 47 - 101 -
Average holdings 5,7 10,4
Bulls in overall herd 14 5 34 3,3
Oxen in overall herd 59 22 293 28
Heifers in overall herd 109 41 396 38
Cows >4yrs 52 20 186 18
Male followers 11 4 73 7
Female followers 21 8 55 5
All calves bom in 2000 66 315
Calves 3 mnths+ but not all 
weaned 53 294
Cattle bought 1 27
Cattle sold 15 23
Cattle exchanged 3 3
Lost to disease 28 57
Lost to stocktheft 3 3 (2 rec)
I One senior man in Hamburg supplied information on only half of his herd. Information on the other
II animals that he held was thus not available to me and are consequently not factored into this table. 
Similarly, in Loverstwist the household with the biggest herd in the village refused to participate in the 
herd survey. The household with the second biggest herd had sent four cattle to a neighbouring village 
and they are not accounted for here either.
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APPENDIX SIX: 
Locations of absent household members in 2001
Table 1. Locations of the absent members of sampled households in Loverstwist 
and Hamburg in 2001 (though not necessarily employed there)
Location 
(total people)
LT no 
cattle (21 
H/holds)
LT with 
cattle
(9 H/holds)
H’burg no 
cattle (31 
H/holds)
H’burg with 
cattle (29 
H/holds)
Johannesburg (9) 6 3 - -
Cape Town (21) 2 - 12 7
Durban (5) - 1 - 4
Port Elizabeth (34) 2 3 11 18
East London (34) 9 10 8 7
E.Cape town (20) 4 1 3 12
Peddie District (15) 3 3 3 6
TOTAL (138) 26 21 37 54
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APPENDIX SEVEN: 
Changes in the rural cultural economy? A biographical 
approach to cattle husbandry by younger men
...[W]e know too little about these processes [of material and social 
differentiation within bantustan populations over the past twenty or thirty 
years] because most research to date has focused on the obvious fact of the 
generalisation of marginality and impoverishment amongst the masses in 
the bantustans. There is urgent need to understand not merely the dominant 
trend towards general impoverishment, but also its unevenness (Sharp 1994:
72-3)
Introduction
In this Appendix, I use the biographical case-study method to examine the 
‘unevenness’ of economic and social difference between people in rural Peddie 
District and to explore the cultural politics that arose from these differences. As in 
Chapter Six, I use cattle-owning men and the households they headed as my primary 
point of reference.
The significant socio-economic differentiation between households in the villages of 
Peddie District was structurally mediated. The economic fate of households headed by 
senior men (aged 65 years and over), for instance, was virtually sealed by the time 
they retired to the village. They had either accumulated sufficient bovine and cash 
resources and instilled in (at least some of) their children the importance of the 
ukwakh ’ umzi ideology, or they had not. There was not a great deal that could be 
achieved once they were back in the village to radically change this economic 
trajectory or the social (i.e. intra-household and intra-village) and cultural spaces 
(especially relating to gender practices and ritual observances) that they inhabited and 
over which they exercised a measure of influence.
What emerged from my detailed interviews with cohorts of younger men was the 
considerable extent to which socio-economic differentiation can be linked to the varied 
life experiences and different cultural politics of successive generations of individual 
adult men and women. It emerged, for example, that, while some men had quite 
consciously stuck to one or two jobs through their working lives, other men had
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moved between jobs with greater frequency. Their more intermittent periods of work 
were punctuated by at-times longer periods of unemployment and this uneven 
employment record showed up in their projects of homestead consolidation. Of course, 
other factors such as educational levels in the household, a spouse’s employment history 
and the relative success of adult children in securing employment, as well as how the 
household had weathered misfortune, also had a significant bearing on these projects of 
consolidation.1
My interviews threw up numerous examples of men in the younger age cohorts of less 
than 53 years who appeared (and were said by others) to have achieved greater 
economic success than more senior men. In a rural social context in which senior men 
had historically dominated social interaction between people and households, this 
phenomenon had a real impact on the everyday relations between different generations 
of men. It also affected the relations between men and women in rural households.
Not that any of this was particularly new, however. This situation had played out 
repeatedly and with intermittently stronger effects, over much of the twentieth century 
as changes in the macro-economy and political landscape dampened or accelerated 
urban-based employment opportunities, with a knock-on effect for the fortunes of rural 
households (see Murray 1981a; Sharp 1994; Mager 1992). Moreover, the observable 
pattern, which was most pronounced before the post-1992 increase in value of old-age 
pensions, was one of deteriorating household economic security for many older people 
in rural areas, particularly for those whose children had failed to secure regular 
employment and were thus not contributing reliably to their homes (Manona 1980a; 
Jones 1996). Nor had this situation improved markedly for the large percentage of 
households over the past decade, although higher rainfall had contributed to increased 
wealth in cattle in these rural villages and modes of dominant livelihoods have shifted.
Male household heads aged 53 to 64 years: Holding the line in difficult times
Although the situation varied from case to case, the age cohort 53 to 64 years for male 
household heads included men who had held onto the same jobs since the late 1970s.
1 As Sharp (1994: 77) points out, creating and maintaining stability or a secure base within the rural 
housestead, tended to generate larger flows of remitted wage income from migrant workers who chose 
to remain attached to such households, thereby compounding their opportunities for successful 
accumulation (see Krttger 1998).
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Often, these were jobs that they secured in towns and cities in the province. Local 
municipalities were one particularly reliable, if scarce, source of long-term (up to 20 
and even 30 years) employment. This extended length of employment, albeit at low 
yet reliable levels of remuneration, had allowed these households to achieve an at 
times notable degree of incremental economic accumulation over this period (De Wet 
1995b).2
To be sure, structural and political change in the form of juggernauts such as apartheid 
government-led betterment planning schemes or the economically devastating forced 
removals and resettlements derailed the domestic arrangements and the accumulation 
projects of many households in the former reserves (see Deliwe 1997; De Wet 1995a). 
Households that managed to avoid the worst effects of these incursions were often able 
to secure for themselves a relatively comfortable position in the social and economic 
milieu of the village. By the late 1970s, the expansion of the Ciskei bantustan civil 
service opened up more opportunities for the men (and women) who had the necessary 
minimum educational qualifications (Peires 1992; De Wet & Holbrook 1997). For 
those households with members who were fortunate enough to be employed in steady, 
often unionised,3 wage-employment, the increase in real wages since the mid-1980s 
further substantially improved their economic position, deepening economic and social 
cleavages between them and other villagers (Couglan 1997: 157; De Wet &
Leibbrandt 1991).
However, the South African economy underwent major structural changes during the 
1990s and ‘jobs for life’ effectively became a thing of the past. Many of these men 
now found themselves in an untenable position in respect of their future work 
prospects. On the whole, most of the men in the 53-64 years age category who were 
resident in Hamburg and Loverstwist had already experienced retrenchment and were 
reliant on remittances, on local part-time jobs and on their cattle herds. A few more 
fortunate individuals were rapidly nearing the end of their careers as regularly 
employed workers. They were having to look to rural possibilities of securing their
2 Sharp (1994: 76) points out that all the case studies conducted in Qwaqwa in the 1980s pointed to the 
‘critical importance of a source of income that was reliable [i.e. dependable and regular] over time.
The presence or absence of such an income was the major cause o f inequality amongst closer 
settlement households [and it] had long-term implications.’
3 Although unions were not permitted in the former Ciskei, they grew steadily in centres like East 
London and Port Elizabeth in the 1980s (Southall 1997).
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livelihood in future. This would involve investing their savings and any retirement 
pay-outs that might be due to them in rural income-generating schemes of one sort or 
another.
My data show that it was indeed the period between the termination of their last formal 
job and the time when the male household head qualified for an old-age pension at age 
65 years that could be a rather economically lean and socially trying one for the male 
household heads in this age cohort. This was when their particular patriarchal 
accumulation project was belatedly most vulnerable. Obviously, most of the older 
people I encountered in the villages of Peddie District had made a decision to continue 
investing resources in a rural homestead and were not likely, at this stage of their lives, 
to seriously contemplate moving and settling permanently in towns and cities 
elsewhere. Indeed, Bank (1997b: 21) speculates that most of those who left the rural 
areas for urban centres (including the mushrooming informal settlements adjacent to 
small towns) after the repeal of ‘influx control’ legislation in 1986, had already done 
so by 1995. He suggests that, for a number of reasons, rural-to-urban migration within 
the province had slowed down by this time.4
In the section that follows, I present the personal narratives of Madoda Bikitsha and 
Mziwakhe Daliso as representative of men in this 53 to 64-year-old age cohort.
Neither of these men managed to secure the elusive long-term job, and had instead 
held down several jobs over the course of their employed lives. I reflect on their 
particular circumstances and situate their narratives in the broader social projects of 
rural men, specifically the ukwakh ’umzi [building the homestead] project.
4 He suggests, however, that ‘since the early 1990s, rural migrants [have been] bypassing East London 
for Cape Town and Gauteng’ in search of better economic prospects. My data from Peddie District 
seem not to support this. A new wave of farmworker dismissals in the late 1990s, saw many small 
towns swamped by new arrivals, many of whom brought their livestock to town with them.
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The case of Madoda Bikitsha (about 58 years old), Loverstwist, the head of a 
household with 12 cattle.
I bought my first cow in 1962, but it was [my contribution to] my father’s kraal. In 
1978, my father passed away and his cattle fell to me. Since then, I have [always] had 
cattle, but some have died and others I have sold. I keep cattle because cattle are the 
bank of the amaXhosa. Cattle are also the medicine of the Xhosa man. I sell cattle if 
there is a circumcision that will happen [in my household or extended family] or 
when we are hungry and have no food. I do not have a bank account, because I am 
not working. If I was working, I would open an account. It is wise to have both cattle 
and a bank account. As it is, it is better [for me] to have cattle in the kraal because if 
you keep your money in the bank and you are not working, after a while you will 
have drawn all your money and they will close your account. If you don’t keep 
putting money into the bank, this is what they do.
As a cattle-owner, I am respected by other people. Another thing that can 
get you respect from others is age. If you are old, you have to be respected 
[by those younger than you]. Another thing is the state you’re in: if you 
are disciplined [in respect of your general behaviour and specifically 
alcohol consumption], people will respect you for that...
[Turning to] my sons, they respect the cattle [I have] here very well. It 
will be just a matter of work. If they can find work, the cattle will be here 
forever. I look after my cattle myself as I do not work now. I milk two 
cows and get about three litres of milk a day. My milk and sour milk are 
for consumption by my relatives only and not for other people [unless] 
they eat it here and wash the bowl here. If I sell a cow, I try to buy another 
one to replace it. My wife and I first discuss selling cattle, we don’t just 
sell them. I may sell one animal to save others, to buy dip and other 
medicines, but the remaining money I will keep [separate]. I may also sell 
one animal to buy [fodder] during drought.
I can use my cattle to pay lobolo [bridewealth] for my son, but he has to 
pay my cattle back bit by bit, like one animal per year, until he has 
finished paying them all back to me.
323
For both male and female household heads in this age category, Madoda’s relatively 
precarious livelihood position was not exceptional. He had a Sub-standard B 
education (2 years of formal schooling). He and his wife also had four children. At 
the time of the interview he was without work and his prospects of finding regular 
employment again were not good. He was still seven years away from receipt of an 
old age pension. Not surprisingly, he was carefully managing his household’s herd of 
cattle to strengthen his financial position, while also keeping on the look-out for any 
employment opportunities.
But Madoda could testify to the fact that building one’s herd was subject to social 
pressures, as well as domestic demands for food and clothing. The year prior to our 
interview, Madoda’s sister had died. As the eldest son of their natal umzi [home], and 
by virtue of inheriting his father’s herd, Madoda was the guardian and chief 
benefactor of his siblings and their children. For his sister’s funeral, Madoda had 
provided the cow to be slaughtered from his own byre. This responsibility of 
providing the animal to slaughter at her funeral would have been her husband’s, had 
he been alive, but in his absence Madoda was obliged to step in.
A key challenge for men in Madoda’s position, then, was to ensure that the younger 
members of their households had the best possible chance of finding employment. 
This was something that men like Madoda, with their often limited knowledge of the 
‘new economy’, tried to ensure by paying for their children’s tertiary education, often 
by selling cattle at the stocksale to do so. There were numerous examples of them 
paying the costs of their children’s enrollment into fly-by-night ‘computer colleges’ 
in town in the hope that this would enable them to find jobs more easily. Success 
stories that resulted from taking this route were extremely rare -  particularly as 
employers took basic computer proficiency for granted, no matter how many years of 
‘computer studies’ or glossy certificates from a ‘computer college’ were produced by 
job-seekers. But that did not dissuade desperate poorly educated rural youth who had 
little hope of gaining admission to the formal tertiary sector (universities and 
technikons) from following this route.
Shouldering the costs of a formal post-secondary education was only part of the 
challenge for men like Madoda and their wives. Should their offspring find
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employment, they also needed to be reminded of two things that had been drummed 
into them from an early age. Firstly, they needed to be mindful, given their new­
found employed status, that they were morally obliged to remit cash home to support 
their parents and younger siblings. This was relatively simple, as employment 
everywhere became increasingly casualised and people’s distrust of the market 
domain was reinforced by the misfortune and embarassment of regular retrenchment 
and dismissal. Secondly, they needed to be persuaded that it was in their interests to 
convert some of the money they earned into cattle for the long-term benefit of the 
homestead. As we will see in the case-studies that follow, investing in cattle was 
more palatable to first-born sons than to younger sons and daughters.
The potency of the whole notion of making a contribution to building the home was 
tested afresh in every situation of this nature. Once their sons and daughters, in their 
twenties or early thirties, had moved away from home to set up their own 
homesteads, the moral imperative for them to build the natal home was obviously 
weakened. With some exceptions, the principle of primogeniture still applied to the 
inheritance of livestock, but it was increasingly being tested by other siblings, 
including adult, unmarried or separated daughters who might have made considerable 
cash and in-kind contributions to the homestead over time.
The looming old-age pensions threshold was frequently uppermost in this age 
cohort’s economic strategizing, but the timing of retrenchments, dismissals and even 
retirement were to all intents and purposes beyond their control. In the rural villages 
of Peddie District and elsewhere, there were many examples of impoverished 
households headed by men and women in this age cohort who were retrenched, or 
who failed to get the timing of their retirement from formal employment right, 
insofar as they had any control over this in the shrinking job market. By this I mean 
that their retirement should coincide with the time when their offspring had managed 
to secure employment and had begun to remit funds home on a regular basis.
As I suggest above, another challenge for men in Madoda’s position related to their 
ability to selectively fend off demands on their herd originating from relatives who 
needed to conduct rituals, and particularly funerals. They had to deal with these 
requests with great skill and diplomacy, as these emotionally fraught times were
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potentially rich sources of misunderstanding and acrimony. Where support in terms 
of supplying beasts for slaughter was unavoidable, the preferred option was to seek to 
exchange an animal (for example, giving an ox or old cow suitable for slaughter in 
exchange for a heifer) with the bereaved party, so that the reproductive capacity of 
their own herd was not compromised.
Alternatively, they might feel obliged by the masincedisane [let us help each other] 
norm to sell some of their animals to more distant kinsmen or fellow villagers at 
roughly market-related prices, with the hope that they would subsequently be able to 
replace the animal sold by buying in another animal. At worst, as in Madoda’s case, 
they would be expected to step in and simply provide, free of charge, the animal 
required for slaughter. The alternative, for Madoda, was to save his cattle but risk the 
social stigma of having fellow villagers comment not only on the poverty of his 
deceased sister’s family, but also on his stinginess, which was a grave insult in the 
social milieu of the village. My point here is not to stress how much Madoda’s life 
was complicated by holding cattle.5 On the contrary, cattle were an important 
resource that constitute the wherewithal through which men like Madoda engage 
socially with other people and households in the village. Exchanges, loans and even 
sales of cattle were important instruments of associational village life, helping to 
build and sustain relationships between people and households, both within the 
village on the one hand, and between village residents and their kin who were away 
in the cities on the other hand.
Another man in the same predicament as Madoda was Mziwakhe Daliso, aged 54 
years, of Hamburg. When I interviewed him, he owned three cattle. Mziwakhe was 
related to several respected families in the village, and could frequently be found in 
the company of the more senior men in the village, discussing community matters. 
Although not particularly well educated, he was astute and worldly-wise and he 
served on several village committees, including the Governing Body of the local 
secondary school and the Hamburg Development Forum. As an active church-going 
man of sober habits, he was held in high regard by many other men and women of his 
age and older in the village.
5 Sansom (1981: 104) suggests that the stokfel (rotating credit association) member -  much as the cattle 
holder in Peddie District -  ‘complicates his life precisely so that he can bemuse those who appeal to 
him on moral grounds’.
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Mziwakhe Daliso (54 years of age) of Hamburg village
I am Mziwakhe Daliso. My father was bom in 1910 in Hamburg. His 
father had come from Engcobo in the Transkei. We are Dlamini [clan].
My grandfather arrived in Hamburg in 1901 and took a wife from the 
Nxadi family. Their three sons lived at their father’s umzi [home] and then 
the first-born, Bhuti, moved to eNtilini [a nearby settlement]. Later Thizo, 
the other brother, moved to the [main] village in Hamburg.
My mother was also from Hamburg. She was the sister of the father of 
Strongman Ngoba. She was chosen as a wife for my father by his father. 
They were married in about 1932. My mother was much younger than my 
father. He had worked in Cape Town all his life and then returned to 
Hamburg. My mother never worked and always stayed in Hamburg. I am 
the first-born of my father’s four children. [We were] two sons and two 
daughters.
I was bom in 1947.1 left school in 1965. In 1 966 ,1 stayed at home [at 
first] and then in 1967 ,1 started working in the gold mines at Springs for 
two years. Then I changed to Doomfontein mine. In 1970 ,1 came home 
and stayed at home. In 1971,1 went to work in a Germiston coal factory 
for two years. Then I came back home. I was buying cattle during this 
time. The first ox I bought was from Mr. Ngqula in Hamburg. I wasn’t a 
Christian then, so I bought an ox in case my father died, so I would be 
able to slaughter it. In 1975 ,1 went to work on Virginia gold mine. I 
worked there between 1975 and 1980. In 1976 ,1 went to the bush [to be 
circumcised] aged 29 years, which was very old, hey? In 1977 I was 
married. I was supposed to go to the bush in about 1969, but the dances 
were too good, and I had too many girlfriends there...
My father selected my Mosotho [Sesotho-speaking] wife in Mdantsane. 
Her parents and family were in East London. At the time my wife was 
being chosen for me, I was working in Johannesburg, in the gold mine 
called Deal Kraal in Carletonville and living in a hostel. I was sending 
money to my father. [My negotiators -  including my father and Mr. 
Mkhaya -  learned that] my wife’s father wanted nine cattle, with each 
cow worth R600 at the time. They said that they would have to check with
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me, as I was away at the time. I decided to pay in cash as finding cattle 
here, there and everywhere would be difficult. In 1977, four cattle were 
paid by my father and Mr. Mkhaya. Then in 19791 paid the five 
remaining cattle in a second payment.
At the time, I would come home once every 12 months. When I came 
home after paying the full lobolo, my father simply said to me, ‘there is 
your wife’, and pointed to some young girls. I was 30 and my wife was 19 
years old when we were married.
In 1981,1 stopped working at the gold mine. Since then, in the period 
1981 to 1995,1 worked in East London and [mostly] lived with my family 
in Mdantsane. For 1981-1988,1 worked for Van Zummeren Contractors 
and in the last three years, I was a foreman there. In 1988, the firm closed 
down and I came back to Hamburg, leaving my wife and children in 
Mdantsane.
In 1992 to 1995,1 worked in East London, at Alford Radio and T.V. We 
worked on everything...car radios, televisions and air-conditioners. In
1995,1 came home to Hamburg [with my family] again and I have stayed 
here since then. I now have a job as the night watchman at the Hamburg 
Hotel. I work two nights a week (Sunday and Monday) and I have 
recently started to work on Saturday nights as well. It doesn’t pay [much], 
but it is something.
I have another house, besides this one in Hamburg, in Mdantsane, which I 
bought during the time that we lived there. I have someone living there, 
but not paying rent, just looking after my things that are still in the house.
I have six children, four sons and two daughters. The first two were bom 
before I was married, and the last four are from my wife. I want my 
children to share my property when I die, including my house in 
Mdantsane. I don’t like the way our fathers left their things to one son 
only, making other children move out and look after themselves.
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In terms of securing his livelihood, Mziwakhe Daliso’s problem, like that of Madoda, 
was a structural one. At the relatively young age of 53 years and with four children 
still attending school, he was without regular work and had no reliable income. This 
in spite of the skills and experience he built up over the years of employment in 
various contexts. His wife was also unemployed. Instead, they had to be satisfied 
with the unreliable and poorly paid jobs on offer around the village. The part-time 
security job he had negotiated at the Hamburg Hotel just before our first interview in 
February 2001 was one of these. At the time of our second interview, in May of the 
same year, the hotel in Hamburg had closed down and he had found part-time work 
as a security guard at the local restaurant. Later in the same year, he was one of a few 
men from Hamburg fortunate to be employed by Telkom, the telecommunications 
parastatal company. The team was employed on a short-term contract to refurbish the 
telephone lines that run along the main coastal road between Port Elizabeth and East 
London. The job was due to last only four months, but paid relatively well.
Partly because of his long absence from the village, Mziwakhe had not built up a herd 
of cattle. Since returning to Hamburg with his family, he had spent his money and 
time building a new ‘American’-style house. This rectangular house with a 
distinctively pitched corrugated-iron roof, was the latest fashion in house 
constmction in Peddie District and elsewhere in the Eastern Cape (see Fay 2003).
The upshot of this commitment was that Mziwakhe only had three cattle in his byre. 
With his three young sons at school, he did much of whatever animal husbandry 
work was required himself. He was intent on building up his herd and proved eager, 
on several occasions, to tap my limited knowledge of cattle production, requesting 
that I should try to muster whatever outside institutional resources I could to support 
local cattle production efforts.
If the cases of the two cattle-owners, Madoda Bikitsha and Mziwakhe Daliso, look 
relatively bleak, they were nevertheless starkly in contrast with the truly desperate 
predicament of Bra MaJay, one of many men in rural Peddie District who did not own 
cattle.
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Life on the edge: The case of Bra MaJay Mati, 54 years old
My father, Jack, was bom at Xesi [Ngcabasa village]. Our clan is Mpinga. 
He worked on a pineapple farm in Peddie District on the farm of De 
Klerk. I was born on the farm across the Mtana River [adjacent to 
Hamburg] where my parents had moved to. I was bom in 1947, the third 
child in the family. The farm had a dairy in which my father worked. My 
father had 8 cattle [of his own] on the farm. I had six brothers and twin 
sisters. One sister now lives at eNtilini [close to Hamburg] and the other 
one in East London. Three of my brothers are in Port Elizabeth and 
another in East London. Two of my brothers have died. The one died in 
1974 and the other one, who was living here with me, in November 1999.
We moved to Hamburg in 1966, when the farmer sold everything and told 
my father to ‘hamba, ndiyathengisa ifama ’ [leave, I’m selling the farm]. 
My father and mother arrived here with nine children and eight cattle. I 
was not educated, because the farmer wanted us to herd his calves and 
milk the cows. All of us are uneducated (with no schooling at all) except 
the twins, who got as far as Std.3 (five years of schooling) here in 
Hamburg Primary, as they were still small when we arrived here.
In Hamburg, my father got a job building stone walls at the hotel. My 
mother didn’t work, but stayed at home. All the boys were working. Some 
helped on the stone walls at the hotel, some worked at the old shop owned 
by a white man.
On 26 June 1970,1 went to the bush to be circumcised. After four months, 
on 18 October 1970,1 came out and my father slaughtered a cow. Then in 
1971 I went to the mines at Dannhauser in Natal. I went there for 6 
months, and then came home in 1972.1 returned to the mines in 1973. 
Then I came home and worked in East London, working for Murray and 
Stewart for 4 months. Then I went to work for Fisant Construction in East 
London. In 1974,1 came home [to Hamburg] and worked for Strongman 
Ngqula making building blocks as a casual [labourer] and getting very 
little money. I did this until 1977. During the late 1970s to 1990s, I have 
not worked, except for jobs like the water installation project [1999], and 
odd jobs around the village.
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On 24 June 1979, my mother died. My father died in 1996. When we 
arrived here, my father’s cattle increased to 14, then they died in the 
drought. By 1985, only 5 were left. Some of these cattle were slaughtered, 
[for example] for my mother’s funeral, for imigidi [celebrations, 
especially those held after a young man comes back from circumcision] 
and so on. All the remaining cattle died in 1994, after the drought of that 
time. Some of my brothers bought cattle, but these cattle also died in the 
drought. The three brothers who live in P.E. all work on the chokka 
[squid] fishing boats at sea. They don’t come home much and they don’t 
send money home to me at all. They all came home for the funeral of our 
brother in 1999. Also the brother of my father came from KwaHoyi 
[village] for the funeral.
I cook for myself at home. I have no wife. I left my ‘wife’ and 3 children, 
including twins, in Ladysmith in KwaZulu/Natal. She married another 
man afterwards. Women aren’t interested in men who don’t work, they 
say, “what will we eat?” Before, my sisters would send me food, but they 
are suffering now [too] and don’t send me anything. My brother in East 
London [Mdantsane] is jobbing and cannot help either. When will I start 
to get my pension? [In 11 years’ time, I tell him...].
We haven’t done the ukukhapa [to accompany the spirit of the dead man] 
ritual for our father yet. There is no money to buy a cow, but this ritual is 
very necessary. We need to slaughter a cow or a goat for my mother also, 
to piwa inkobe [a gift of maize for a deceased woman] for her.
I couldn’t get a job on the current roads upgrading project in Hamburg, 
because they said that I had been employed on the water project before. I 
don’t want to, and cannot go anyway, to Port Elizabeth or East London to 
look for work, because I have to look after the khaya [home] here.
Interviewer: do you think you will buy cattle sometime?
BM: Yes, when I get my pension I will get some.
Interviewer: Why?
BM: It is necessary that there are cattle at home, even for doing rituals 
that are not yet done.
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Bra MaJay, at the age of 54 years, was in spectacularly bad shape. A small-framed 
man, MaJay’s appearance was of someone at least ten years older. More drunk than 
sober, he admitted that he had a problem in this regard, saying that he used to have a 
white (pale) skin, like his mother, but that utywala [beer] had caused his skin to 
blacken. MaJay lived alone and, contrary to what he said during our interview, he did 
not cook for himself, but ate his meals at the home of Mr. Mkhaya (my host in 
Hamburg).
Mr. Mkhaya paid him to carry water for his vegetable garden, clean out his chicken 
run and run errands around the village for him. His payment seemed to consist mostly 
of his getting good meals at the Mkhaya homestead on the days when he actually 
reported for work. He also received occasional small amounts of money from the 
‘Xhosa’ brooms which he made and sold for R5-00, which was roughly the price of 
one bottle of beer. In making brooms for sale, he fell below the norm of what was 
expected of a Xhosa man, as this task was usually viewed as ‘women’s work’.
On a number of occasions during my fieldwork, MaJay absconded after being sent to 
buy sugar or similar at the local shop. He would be tracked down to the liquor-store 
or a shebeen in the village, and make his way back to the Mkhaya residence to be 
admonished and sometimes even beaten with a stick by old Mr. Mkhaya. This was 
unusual, as beating was something that was done quite rarely these days, and then 
only to uncircumcised boys.
A man with no local kin network and few close friends, MaJay was nevertheless 
jovial and quick-witted (when sober) and was a mine of information on local 
genealogies, as he knew literally everyone, even the young children in the village. 
This was probably because he could always to be found at beer-drinks and rituals 
around the village, where such information was shared and discussed in casual 
conversation.
Critically though, MaJay did not ‘zimele’ [stand alone as a man]. He existed in the 
shadow of his patron, Mr. Mkhaya. With Bra MaJay, Mr. Mkhaya’s young 
grandchildren and their friends would virtually abandon any sign of the respect 
towards an older man that was de rigueur in this rural context. Nor did any of the
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adults around them scold them for their teasing of MaJay, their shouting after him and 
their playing practical jokes on him. Even the name by which he was known suggests 
informality. The ‘Bra’ was derived from the tsotsi-taal [the ‘hip’ slang originally the 
preserve of township gangsters] for ‘brother’. In the case of MaJay, this appellation 
replaced the more formal and respectful ‘bhutV by which all men expected to be 
addressed, specifically where the speaker was a child, a woman or a man younger 
than themselves. To all intents, his behaviour did not meet rural villagers’ 
expectations of a Xhosa man and, while he was tolerated and included, he enjoyed 
little respect from other people in the village.
He, like everyone else, was supposed to uphold the reputation of his patrilineal 
homestead in the village. This was done, in the first instance, by keeping the physical 
structure in good repair, as far as resources allow. The reputation of the homestead 
was further enhanced by the actions and social standing of its resident and non­
resident members.
Villagers pointed out that the Mati homestead was in a particularly dilapidated state. 
The homestead was perched uncomfortably on the edge of someone else’s otherwise 
vacant residential site, right alongside the dusty village ‘street’. Since the household 
had no livestock, MaJay did not bother to maintain a byre adjacent to the unfenced 
dwellings. The mud-and-sapling dwellings were a mode of construction that denoted 
the low economic status of the household among Xhosa-speakers (Cocks & Wiersum 
2003: 50). This social stigma could, however, be partially overcome through careful 
maintenance and incremental renovation, such as plastering and white-washing or 
painting over mud walls. Although all buildings that made up people’s homesteads 
needed regular maintenance, the dwellings that comprised the Mati homestead were 
collapsing because of a lack of maintenance on MaJay’s part. Latterly, this process 
of decay had been hastened by MaJay himself who took to selling off sections of 
corrugated iron roofing from one outbuilding to survive and to feed his drinking 
habit. His brothers were effectively amatshipa [people who had left the village and 
played little or no role in building their home]. Most of them lived the hard life of 
fishermen socially remote from the village home, while his sisters were not in a 
position to help him with the upkeep of the home. Rather than building the 
homestead, MaJay was literally drinking the umzi [home] out of existence.
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Abject as his existence seemed, however, MaJay was not alone in failing to live up to 
the Xhosa ideal of a husband and father’s role as that of intsika yekhaya [the pillar of 
the home]. In this respect, the predicament of someone like Manene in Loverstwist 
was similarly bleak.
Manene, a man without cattle
I have been unemployed for 18 years. During this time, and even now, I 
have been supported by my wife. There were cattle in my [natal] home, 
but these cattle died in 1949.1 had some cattle [of my own], but my cattle 
also died. I have never owned a goat. My cattle died because of drought 
and disease. I don’t have a bank account but I did have one before. I used 
all the money that was there. I do not work now. I am interested in buying 
cattle, but the problem is that I do not work.
I don’t have a field. I mean, to have a field you need to have some money 
in the pocket. I do have a garden in my [homestead] site. I cultivate this 
garden using a hoe. I [recently] planted mealies [maize] and they are 
growing nicely. I don’t put manure on the garden. If I need manure for 
making mqombothi [traditional beer], I go around the grazing camp and 
collect the dry manure and crush it to make manure. This is because I 
don’t have cattle. I do have a relative in the village who can give me 
manure but it can be very complicated [to follow this route] because of 
family problems. If I want to conduct umsebenzi [a ritual], I have to go 
out to the stocksale or buy cattle [from] anywhere so that I can conduct 
the work.
To be respected in the community you have to be a cattle-owner, [hence] I 
don’t get respect. Even when you talk, people will not pay attention to 
you at all. [Another way] you can get respect, in Xhosa culture.. .depends 
on your age. All those younger must respect you, [and] you must respect 
those older in return.
I don’t think my son will buy cattle because young children these days are 
not controllable at all, and I can’t see him owning cattle. If I look at the 
young men of my village, I don’t see them possessing cattle [in future].
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I need to have goats because goats are very important. There are many 
imisebenzi [rituals] you can do with goats. I can also do many things with 
cattle like traditional work and selling [some of them] to make money.
The kraal with cattle is a moving bank. If I compare the bank and the 
kraal, I think the kraal is the better thing, because if you have money in 
the bank, you can withdraw it anytime, but having cattle in the kraal, you 
can’t just sell [them] without very important reasons. You can also pay 
lobola [bridewealth] with these cattle. A Xhosa home needs cattle to be 
recognised in our culture.
Manene made tiny amounts of money by fashioning walking sticks from the wood 
that he cut in the forest. He sold these sticks to other men in Loverstwist and the 
neighbouring villages. He lived alone, as his wife was employed as a domestic 
worker in another village and his children lived with an elderly neighbour of his. This 
neighbour was a widowed pensioner, and his children helped her with domestic 
chores in exchange for food.
Manene had the ceremonial job of injoli at ritual beer-drinks, which involved 
overseeing the adequate and timely distribution of the beer, brandy and meat among 
the different gender and generational categories of people in the village who were 
present at every ritual occasion. I picked up murmurs among some residents that 
Manene’s hands were ‘too dirty for this job’-  a literal reference to his increasingly 
unkempt state and his low status in the village -  and that the community would soon 
have to choose some other man to do the work of injoli. Given that people came from 
far and wide, including from cities and neighbouring villages, to the many ritual 
functions in the village, this sentiment was also a small but telling expression of 
class-based sensitivities about the image that the village projected to outsiders. 
Manene was clearly slipping below the threshold of what was regarded as ‘poor but 
decent’ by village standards. His public role at ritual events, where he might actually 
handle meat, was of growing concern to more health and class-conscious people who 
felt that Manene’s physical appearance might constitute a health-risk and threaten to 
embarrass the village in general (see Gitywa 1976: 156).
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The condensed personal narratives of MaJay and Manene describe men who were in 
many ways on the margins of everyday social life in their respective villages. Dealt a 
dismal hand at birth, their personal antecedents were, however, not dramatically 
different from those of many other men in rural Peddie District. If there was a 
common element to their predicaments, it was that their natal homesteads were 
displaced from elsewhere with few resources, something which immediately put their 
weak social networks and brittle livelihoods under considerable strain (cf. Sharp and 
Spiegel 1985). The real tragedy was that theirs were by no means exceptional cases. 
In every village in Peddie there were several men in this age category who were from 
families that were not necessarily marginal in the sense of having been evicted from 
elsewhere. These were the men who had, at least since the early 1980s, been living 
out this dire combination of long-term unemployment, ever-weakening kin and social 
networks, alcoholism and a hand-to-mouth existence (see Beinart 1994 on the 
extemalisation of poverty to the bantustans; Sagner 2000)..
Since they did not hold cattle, and were generally regarded as too unreliable to herd 
the animals of other homesteads, the interest of destitute men like MaJay and Manene 
in cattle generally only extended to the salvage or ritual slaughter of other people’s 
animals, the latter because it was usually accompanied by the brewing of beer and 
consumption of brandy and meat.
These were the men that many women in the villages referred to as ‘useless’ and with 
whom women tried by whatever means to minimise their social interaction. Because 
of their poor social standing, amadoda [circumcised men] like Manene and MaJay 
undermined the dominant patriarchal order still prevalent in rural villages across 
Peddie District (Bank 2002a; Connell 1995; Minnaar 2003: 18-22). This was because 
the dominant masculinity rested on constructions of men as breadwinners and 
providers in their households and as the arbiters of moral authority in the home and 
the community. Men like MaJay and Manene were evidence of the failure of this 
dominant masculinity in the face of structural constraints which had seriously limited 
the possibility of many rural men to take up the role of intsika yekhaya [the pillar of 
the home]. Their predicament also put a serious strain on the practice of 
masincedisane [let us help each other], as they were unreliable in passing on 
whatever help they received from other households to their struggling dependents,
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where they still had dependents. Moreover, they were unlikely to ever be in a 
situation where they could reciprocate the material assistance that had been provided 
to them.
Pointedly, both MaJay and Manene spoke of the need for men to own cattle, as if, in 
their personal cases, this would have lifted them out of their predicament and earned 
them the respect afforded to other men of their generation. Manene also referred to 
goats, echoing a common sentiment about the usefulness of goat production as a 
‘stepping stone’ to cattle-ownership. Both men also made mention, however, of the risk 
involved in owning cattle and the fact that the cattle at their homes had long since died.
Finding their feet? Household heads aged 41 to 52 years
Because they did not qualify for old-age pensions and in the context of rural job 
scarcity, the married male household heads in this age cohort were mostly away from 
their rural homes, earning their livelihoods in the urban job market (see Ainslie et al. 
1997). In many instances, the household heads who were away in the towns were 
semi-permanent residents in urban areas, at least until retirement age or until they 
lost their jobs.
Household heads in this age category who were employed were likely to have the 
highest incomes of all the cattle-owning households. This was because they were 
likely to have been employed for the first time during the post-1985 period that was 
characterised by political upheaval, greater labour activism (in urban South Africa), 
improvements in secondary education and on-the-job skills training. These all 
translated into higher wages for the semi-skilled and unskilled workers fortunate 
enough to be employed. They were also likely to have benefited from expanded work 
opportunities in the Ciskeian bantustan bureaucracy of the 1980s.
Despite this, they had relatively little disposable income to invest in cattle. This was 
usually because other pressing expenses, including feeding, clothing and educating 
their children, and possibly the cost of caring for young grandchildren, made serious 
demands on their income. The substantial building and furnishing costs involved in 
establishing their homesteads were also prominent items of expenditure during this
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period. There was thus a formidable list of consumer goods with which cattle 
purchases and the costs of animal husbandry had to compete.
In addition, certain household expenses, particularly education expenses for their 
children, might be offset by the sale of cattle. This also resulted in lower stock 
numbers. Despite these obstacles in the way of their attempts to invest in cattle, 
there were some individuals in this age category who proved remarkably adept at 
meeting their myriad domestic obligations and still managing to build up their cattle 
herds. These people were among the most successful cattle farmers in rural Peddie 
District.
Khayalethu Mapayi, at 47 years of age, held 77 cattle, which constituted the biggest 
herd in Hamburg village and one of the biggest herds in the reserve areas of Peddie 
District. Although it is rather long, I present his interesting and colourful case-study 
of just how materially, if not always socially, successful his single-minded approach 
to accumulation through cattle-farming and agrarian production has been.
Too successful? Khayalethu Mapayi, the 47-year-old ‘stay-at-home’ cattle king 
of Hamburg6
My father was Sandi Mapayi. We are Dlamini [clan members]. My father 
was bom near King William’s Town in about 1922. He came to Hamburg 
with his parents in about 1940. In 1958, our family was removed [by the 
government] from the area now occupied by the Nature Conservation 
housing in Hamburg. My father married Nokundla Mabangeli from 
Hamburg, paying eight head of cattle to the Mabangeli family. Neither my 
mother nor father ever went to school. My father worked on the railways 
in Port Elizabeth. Before this, he had worked in Johannesburg. My father 
liked cattle but he [only] had between 10 and 20 [at various times]. His 
father [my grandfather] had many cattle. My father was not interested in 
ploughing. He died in 1998 at an age of close to 80 years. He had no cattle 
of his own when he died. (I learned later that Khayalethu’s father had 
been forced to sell his cattle to pay off the debts that Khayalethu had 
incurred while in Port Elizabeth, which would not have endeared
6 See the description in Sansom (1981: 104-5) of the phenomenon of ‘stay-at-homes’ in 
Sekhukhuneland, which sounds remarkably similar to Khayalethu’s case.
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Khayalethu to his brothers).
We were eight children, one has passed away. Two siblings live in Port 
Elizabeth, one works as a gardener in Grahamstown, the last-born is in 
Johannesburg and there are three of us in Hamburg. I was bom in 1954.1 
am the fourth-bom child and the second-last of my father’s sons. I am 
ujongekhaya [the one who must stay and look after the home].
I passed Std.6 [8 years of schooling] here at Hamburg Primary in 1971. In
1973.1 started working at Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery in Port Elizabeth 
when I was 19 years old. In the same year, I bought three heifers. Two 
were from my brother and one was from the Ndlondlos. In 1976,1 left that 
job and went to work at Shatterprufe Safety Glass in Port Elizabeth. In
1982.1 left that job and came back to Hamburg to start herding my cattle. 
By then, the cattle here had increased to 18 and they were under my 
father, but owned by me and my brothers. In the drought [of 1982-84], 
fifteen of these cattle died. I had two cattle left and my brother had one. 
My younger brother was too small to herd the cattle.
I went to the bush [to be circumcised] in 1977 here in Hamburg and I 
married in 1980.1 started ploughing with the remaining three oxen and 
three oxen from my father’s brother in 1983.1 had bought a car in Port 
Elizabeth, which I sold for scrap. I bought five she-goats and one ram 
with the money. In 1985,1 exchanged the three oxen with an umlungu 
[white man] from Wilsonia in East London. I got 2 heifers and 2 tollies 
[bull-calves or weaners] and a cow with a calf. A heifer and bull-calf went 
to my brother and I took the other four animals (cow with calf, heifer and 
tollie). I used to plough for myself and for other people. They would ask 
me to train and bopha [yoke] their animals to prevent them from 
wandering into Maqhubeni [the formerly ‘white’ residential area of 
Hamburg] where stray cattle were impounded. In the first year, I 
harvested lots of sorghum and mealies. This is where I put my energy in 
those years. I didn’t want to see anyone hungry at my home.
When I paid lobolo there were not many cattle to be had, so we paid with 
cash. I paid seven cattle, valued at R800 each. My first wife has since left 
me. She was from Bodiam [a neighbouring village]. Our children are
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Vuyolomzi, my first-born son, who is 20 years old, and Siyabonga, my 
second son, who is with his mother in Bodiam. I got married again in 
1985. We have two children, 10 and 9 years old respectively. The children 
assist me with the cattle and goats. I also have a girlfriend in Bell [village] 
and we have three sons, two of whom are here helping me, while the 
smallest one is with his mother’s family. (Another informant subsequently 
told me that Khayalethu also has a girlfriend on the other side of 
Hamburg).
In the 1980s, I would plough an acre of land for only R6. People in 
Hamburg hired my services. I saved the money I earned until I had about 
R200. Then I decided to loan money out to the workers at the 
municipality [i.e. he ran a money-lending business]. I bought a black cow 
from the Mapunga family with income from this business in May... Two 
months later, the cow had a calf, meaning it was pregnant when I bought 
it. When the calf was bigger, I changed it for 2 tollies at Tuku village.
That black cow is the one that increased my cattle, and its first heifer. 
They have calves every year, without fail.
I don’t employ anyone to look after my stock, I look after them very well 
myself, especially the calves. Even [back] then, I would do it all myself. 
The cattle aren’t kraaled everyday, because they graze on the vacant farm 
near the Mtana River. I would wake up early and fetch some to bopha 
them [to plough] and then take them back out to graze after ploughing.
Old man Matya used to have an ox-wagon. I used my oxen [and his 
wagon] to collect shingle [from the beach in Hamburg] and sell it and 
Matya and I would split the profits. I bought two tollies from Somandla 
and exchanged them with Mzimela at Tuku village for 4 tollies when they 
were older.
After a while, I decided to go it alone with the shingle and I would make 
Rl,500 per fortnight. It was easy to buy cattle, because they were not so 
expensive, only about R500-600 [each]. I would buy people’s young 
calves and young oxen for low prices and bopha [yoke] them for 
ploughing. My herd was increasing all the time. In 1995,1 had 12 oxen, 
and I started to buy cows, not heifers. I sold six oxen to Dr. Macenge [a
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Port Elizabeth-based medical doctor who owns the farm adjacent to 
Hamburg] and bought six young oxen from him for R600 each. I also 
bought my first bull from him for R500. Later I bought eight heifers from 
Macenge at R1,000 each, a total of R8,000.
Interviewer: Do you favour exchanges over sales of cattle?
Khayalethu: We want livestock not money. The money [from the sale of 
one animal] won’t buy two head. Those who want money must go sell 
that one beast. [At] that time, I was not smoking or drinking, [so] the only 
money I spent was on food. If I have money, even now, all I want to do is 
to buy stock. When my wife asks for money, I have to go and sell an 
animal.
I exchanged [cattle] with the black farmers who replaced the white 
farmers [who left the area when Peddie District became part of the 
Ciskei]. They [black farmers] didn’t want money, they wanted big oxen to 
sell at the stocksales. In the 1970s, people wanted to [ex]change their 
oxen, not sell them. The whole of Hamburg was ploughed then. In the 
1980s, there was a stokvel [stocksale] of sorts at Gcinisa. They would 
exchange big oxen and give people two calves. It was part of the Ciskei 
government at that time.
Interviewer: If there’s a drought, what will you do with all these cattle? 
Khayalethu: The place where my cattle are is a good place. The grass 
won’t be depleted easily. In [the drought of] 1991,1 bought bags of germ- 
meal and licks for my cattle. I also inject my cattle with vitamin A to 
maintain their weight during drought. I buy medicine at Border Vet or at 
Umtiza in Peddie, for botulism, blackwater, footrot. I sometimes use 
Xhosa medicines, but only sometimes. When I want to buy medicine, I 
sell some tollies, maybe 3-6, or some big oxen.
I look after my calves well. I inject, inoculate and deworm them. I won’t 
sell milk, as that would mean that the calves don’t get enough milk. I 
don’t mind that some money could come in that way. I just make sure that 
everyone in the family has enough amasi [sour milk].
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People from Hamburg are jealous. They say I have stolen Macenge’s 
cattle. The police took four cows and an ox from me. I sent the human 
rights lawyers my receipts, but the servant on Macenge’s farm who sold 
the cattle to me had disappeared by that time. I left it, as my cattle will 
increase by themselves again. (I was reliably informed that Khayalethu 
did in fact end up in court and got a suspended sentence for stock-theft on 
this occasion). On another occasion, Khayalethu had, I was told, used 
amayeza [medicine] to cheat old man Jack Mapunga out of his ten cattle. 
Other informants questioned why, if they were all his cattle, the animals 
in Khayalethu’s kraal had a number of different brand-markings. I put this 
question to him.
Khayalethu: I have my own brand now. During the time of [the apartheid] 
pass laws, I used my father’s sister’s husband’s surname, i.e. Headman 
Bonisani Pisayo, and this is still the name in my I.D. book. I would like to 
change my HBP brand, and also change from using my father’s brand of 
SM on my cattle.
Interviewer: Do you sell to the women buyers from Mdantsane, who sell 
meat in the meatmarket there?
Khayalethu: I sell tollies [male weaners], but the women buyers from 
Mdantsane want big cattle, not tollies, so I don’t sell to them. I do sell at 
the stokvel [stocksale]. In December last year, I drove seven tollies, each 1 
year 7 months old, to the stokvel. I got
Rl,600 each, which is a good way to get a decent price, i.e. to sell them as 
a batch, so that the price evens out. In January this year, I sold two old 
cows at Loverstwist [stocksale], and got Rl,120 and Rl,400 for them. I 
have 29 goats and I use them as a stepladder to buy cattle. I only sell the 
rams. I don’t like to sell the ewes. [Actually] it’s a long time since I sold a 
goat.
Interviewer: Do you keep other people’s cattle here, maybe those of your 
brothers?
Khayalethu: No, all these cattle are mine, my brothers have their own 
places and their own cattle. (This does not square with what Khayalethu 
told us later during a detailed survey of his herd, which showed he held a 
number of cattle owned by other villagers, mostly widows).
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Interviewer: Are you a member of a church here?
Khayalethu: I don’t go to church. I perform amasiko yesiXhosa [Xhosa 
rituals] instead. This year I am sending two of my sons to the bush to 
become men.
Interviewer: Who are the people you socialise with in the village?
Khayalethu: My friend is Mr. Mzukisi Mthoba, whom I see on a 
daily/weekly basis. I only see other people when I plough, as my day 
consists of getting up and taking the cattle out to graze. On a monthly 
basis, I see my brother [who is] in Port Elizabeth who comes back here at 
month-end. My wife’s mother and family might come during the course 
of a month. Once a year, I see Wandisile, who is my father’s older 
brother’s son, who comes from East London. My brothers, sisters and 
their partners come here during December, with their children.
Khayalethu’s phenomenal success in accumulating his herd of nearly 80 animals was 
not without controversy. Many people in Hamburg were convinced that he was a 
cattle-rustler and that his brushes with the law were not without substance. Several 
senior men told me unequivocally that some of the cattle in Khayalethu’s herd were 
stolen and that he was a stock-thief. I witnessed one instance of a visit by the police 
to Khayalethu’s kraal after the neighbouring farmer, Macenge, had reported some of 
his cattle missing, but a search of Khayalethu’s kraal failed to turn up any of these 
cattle. Indeed, Hamburg itself was known across the district as the ‘stock-theft 
capital of Peddie’, with villagers further west convinced that their cattle were driven 
along the beach to Hamburg and thence across the Keiskamma River to be sold for 
good profits to the back-yard and taxi-rank meat-sellers of East London and 
Mdantsane. However, I found precious little evidence of this during the period that I 
conducted fieldwork in Hamburg. My stay in the village did, however, coincide with 
a period of highly lucrative, mostly illegal, abalone extraction from the sea by 
residents of Hamburg, which may have resulted in a temporary lull in local cattle- 
rustling activities that outsiders were so adamant characterised the area.
No matter what his detractors might wish to ascribe his success to, Khayalethu stood 
out as the most successful Hamburg cattle-farmer. Having said that, my research 
shows that virtually every village in the former reserves of the Eastern Cape had one
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or more ‘Khayalethu’ of its own. These were men who owned considerable herds of 
cattle and substantial flocks of goats and sheep, often dwarfing the other herds and 
flocks in the village in terms of numbers. They played a ‘big man’ role that, although 
it was contested in the affairs of the village, saw them acting in many ways, and 
mostly on their own terms, as a sturdy patriarchal bulwark to various pressures for 
social and agrarian change. The steady march of their material success deepened 
socio-economic cleavages and their status appeared to fuel resentments that need to 
be carefully managed within the context of rural social and political change.
Khayalethu himself put his runaway success down to the careful husbandry of his 
calves and his astute exchanging and selling of unproductive animals. He also had no 
direct labour costs, as he and his sons did all the herding and animal husbandry 
themselves. Since the unemployment rate for unskilled workers was high, the 
opportunity cost he incurred by foregoing a wage was low.
Khayalethu used his own oxen to plough both his own field and, for payment, the 
fields of other people. He ploughed with the help of his friend Mthoba. This provided 
him with some cash income and ensured that his cattle helped -  and, significantly, 
were seen to be helping -  other people in the village. He agreed that his success had 
bred jealousy in the village, and it was not difficult to see why. When his herd of 77 
animals was driven through the village to the dip-tank, it kicked up a good deal of 
dust in the faces of many stockless and struggling families. Also, while he was 
clearly excited to tell me that he had bought a two-year-old, registered Brahman-type 
bull for R4,000 from a white farmer at Kidd’s Beach [near East London], this sort of 
expenditure might well have been irksome to other villagers.
In addition, it seemed that some people remembered with a biblical resentment his 
days as umatshonisi [moneylender] and felt that his herd had been built ‘on their 
backs’ through the high interest that they paid to borrow money from him during the 
very tough economic times experienced especially during the early 1980s. Others 
apparently resented the fact that adverse circumstances forced them to exchange 
young heifers with Khayalethu, especially when these same heifers went on to bear 
many calves in his kraal. In fact, this was the one reason given to me by a number of 
men for why they disliked selling cattle in the village. It would, of course, only have
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applied to heifers and fertile cows, which people were reluctant to sell to under any 
circumstances anyway.
A fascinating perspective on this case-study was the observation by Khayalethu that 
his family would, in an earlier time, have been regarded as ‘Red’, by virtue of the 
values he espoused, some of which find expression in their lifestyle choices.
Practices such as keeping cattle, living a simple, agrarian-oriented if not agrarian- 
based lifestyle, ploughing one’s field every year, a certain style of dress and 
demeanour and, as far as possible, shunning ostentatious consumerism were taken as 
contemporary evidence of these choices.
What was fascinating and ironic about this particular case was that Khayalethu has 
managed to claw his way back from a more ‘proletarian’ status to a peasant state of 
‘Redness’ by feeding off the consumerism around him. He achieved this state firstly 
by collecting shingle for sale to people wanting to build modem rectangular houses 
with bricks, mortar and iron, rather than with the more ‘traditional’ round huts, that 
were constmcted with mud and thatching-grass. Secondly, his achievement of 
‘Redness’ came through his diversification into the money-lending business, which 
allowed him to charge employed people interest on loans and to accumulate cash to 
invest in cattle. Thirdly, his remarkably successful consolidation of his cattle 
operation rested on his astute business sense in actively trading in cattle (including 
with white speculators), something that was regarded as anathema to rural Xhosa and 
particularly ‘Red’ values. Note, however, that his trading generally took the more 
socially acceptable form of exchanges of cattle rather than cash sales and often 
stressed the idiom of masincedisane [let us help each other].
In other ways, Khayalethu rated highly in local people’s estimations. He set fair 
prices for the cattle and goats that he sold to fellow villagers and thus tended to 
dominate, or at least play a role in, many local sales (and exchanges). He was also 
known for his generosity with his plentiful supply of amasi [sour milk], allowing his 
sons’ many young friends, several of them from impoverished homes, to consume 
unlimited amounts of amasi at his homestead on virtually a daily basis.
More typical of this age category than Khayalethu, at least in terms of the number of
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cattle he owned and his general livelihood prospects, was Dickson Masi, also of 
Hamburg and from a similar agrarian-oriented background.
Crazy about cattle: Dickson Masi (44 years old)
My name is Mhleshe Dickson Masi (Nonzaba clan). I was bom in 1957 in 
Hamburg. I grew up in Hamburg. My family had cattle when I was 
growing up and they still have cattle now. I was given one heifer from my 
home, because I used to look after the cattle there from when I was very 
little and people could see [that] I did this well. From there, I bought more 
cattle when I worked [on a contract] for Telkom. I had even bought cattle 
before this, when we were jobbing [i.e. temporarily employed] here, 
planting trees in the forest. In each and every job, I want to buy cattle.
While working at the forest, I earned R170/month. Cattle cost R300 for 
ithokazi [a heifer] at the time, which was in 1986. I bought one heifer at 
this time from my grandmother. The money that was left over, I saved and 
used to buy food. Later, I got a job with Telkom, and was earning R1 
600/month. I managed to buy three mathokazi with my earnings from 
here. These animals cost Rl,500 each, and I got them from Mr. Msutu at 
Wesley. I later bought three heifers from a white farmer at Kidd’s Beach 
for Rl,300, Rl,500 and Rl,500 respectively.
I don’t live with my parents, I [am married and] live apart from them 
...ndizimele [I do things for myself]. I like to buy cattle, because my 
parents taught me that cattle are the bank of Xhosa people. I don’t have a 
bank account.7
Andrew Ainslie (AA): What differences are there between money and 
cattle?
DM: With money in a bank, you can’t milk it or plough with it: it just 
stays in the bank. With cattle, there are plenty of uses, or work [that] you 
can get from cattle. You can milk them, plough with them, and you can 
sell them to get money when you need it. It’s better to keep cattle, they eat
7 After this interview, my research assistant elaborated on this: ‘Dickson really is iqaba [a ‘Red’ or 
uneducated person]’, he said, ‘because when we worked together on the Telkom project, every month 
he would get paid and he would go to the forest, dig a hole and bury his money.. .also, Dickson has a 
glass eye, after losing an eye in a stick-fight as a boy...stick-fighting is a ‘Red’ thing to do.’
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grass. Also, it is difficult to find a buyer for an animal in a hurry, so your 
savings (in cattle) are safe.
AA: Are these cattle yours or are they the cattle of your family?
DM: My cattle are only mine. They are all here with me...
AA: Do you have to consult anyone when you want to sell or exchange 
cattle?
DM: No, when I want to sell a cow, I can sell it, without contacting my 
malume [mother’s brother] here in Hamburg or other relative.8 
AA: What about the animals you were trying to exchange for heifers with 
Roland Webster [a local cattle speculator] here during the weekend?
DM: Nobody was interested in why I was going to exchange these cattle 
of mine, but I did go to my malume and explain why I am exchanging 
them.
AA: Were you just being polite, or was it a case of having to explain your 
actions?
DM: I didn’t have to ask or explain, it was just a discussion between us. 
There is no chance of his saying “no, don’t sell or exchange it.” My wife 
has a right to say this, and I did discuss this with her.
AA: Under what circumstances will you sell an animal for cash?
DM: I can sell an animal only [very emphatic] in order to get cash [as 
opposed to keeping it or exchanging it for another animal], when there is 
nothing to eat in this home of mine or if someone9 here is ill and we need 
money to pay for medicines and/or treatment. I can’t buy a fridge or a 
television by selling an animal. No, I have to work to get these things.
[His unemployed wife, who has entered their modest home, confirms that 
he will only sell to buy another heifer, not for buying any domestic items]. 
If I have 15 or 16 cattle, then I can begin to sell animals [he currently has 
12 cattle].
AA: Is having cattle the same as having a job?
DM: It’s better to keep cattle, because jobs are scarce. Also to keep cattle 
is to keep money... [but] only when I am a pensioner, will I not look for 
work again. Now, even if I have plenty of cattle, I will continue to look 
for a job. I won’t do farming full-time.
AA: What about milk, manure, other things from your cattle?
8 1 learned later from a relative of his that Dickson’s mother was a Masi and that she was unmarried 
when she gave birth to Dickson. As a result, he took on the Masi family name of his maternal kin.
9 Dickson has three children who are nine, seven and three years old respectively.
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DM: I don’t milk now, as my cows are short of teats [they have tick- 
damaged udders]. I use the cattle to plough at my home, bringing them 
together with some of the cattle there. I don’t have a field here at this 
place of mine. We use ubulongwe [fresh cattle dung] to ukusinda [smear 
on the floors of our house]. I don’t have a kraal here, I haven’t built one 
yet, so I cannot collect umgquba [manure for fertilising cultivated lands 
and gardens]. I don’t have a field to plough. I am interested in ploughing 
and Mr. Joe has offered me his field for next growing season for the first 
time. I paid Possible Peteni to brakkish [prepare] it, which they did this 
past week. He was helped by Mazizi Mkhaya. I must just give Mr. Joe 
‘something’ when I harvest there, even if only a mug [of seed], as this is 
not a sahlulo [share-cropping] arrangement.
My wife is from Loverstwist. She definitely does want to discuss with me 
what things we should buy in the home. I [also] want to build a house, but 
I can’t sell cattle to do it. [Later, as we prepare to leave], DM says: I need 
to build a proper home...I am perched on a hillside here and everyone can 
see me and my little shack, but I won’t sell cattle to do it. I would rather 
move down the hill -  towards Mtana River -  to avoid being seen by 
everyone as someone who lives in a shack. I can only build a house if I 
can get a job.
Unlike Khayalethu, who apparently made a decision to pursue rurally based agrarian 
production and cattle-centred entrepreneurship, others in this age category like 
Dickson Masi were cattle-owning men who found themselves more or less 
involuntarily in the rural areas, as a result of the changes in the nature of the work 
available to them. The impact, especially on the job security of unskilled workers 
like Dickson, was negative.
Interviews with cattle-owning men in this position revealed that they were 
reluctantly ‘eating’ into their bovine capital for ordinary household expenses, 
especially food, and were often without much hope of ever finding full-time or long­
term employment in future, not least because (as noted above) the costs associated 
with these searches, which often turned out to be futile, were themselves 
prohibitively high. Added to this was the fact that the last few years had been
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favourable in terms of increases in herd sizes in rural villages, and many of these 
men were reluctant to leave their cattle while they went to the city in search of 
employment, the sheer lack of which was confirmed by the stream of unemployed 
men moving in the opposite direction.
Starting out? Household heads aged 40 years and less
The Peddie-wide survey shows that the households in this age cohort had the second- 
highest average number of cattle per household (9,2 head) of all the age categories. 
Data from the subsequent surveys conducted in the villages of Hamburg and 
Loverstwist, while representing modest fractions10 of the total cattle-owning 
households, supported this initial finding. These data show that cattle-holding 
households headed by men in this age category (six households in Hamburg and 
three in Loverstwist), who we might expect to still be in a phase of consolidating 
their income streams and of establishing both their homesteads and their cattle herds, 
actually held among the highest average number of cattle per household in their 
villages. Why should this be the case?
To weigh up the usefulness of cattle as investments for younger men, we need to 
distinguish between several different categories of households headed by men aged 
40 years and less. Firstly, those who were married and usually (as marriage 
invariably follows from it) in steady, ‘formal’ employment, although their wives 
might be unemployed or underemployed. Secondly, married men who were formally 
employed and whose wives were similarly employed in the formal sector. Examples 
of households in this category were not common in rural Peddie, simply because 
these households tended to be urban-based. Thirdly, young men who did not have 
reliable ‘formal-sector’ jobs and thus were not married, although they might well 
have children by various girlfriends. Many of these young men still lived at their 
parental homestead, but in their own ‘flat’ or room adjacent to the main dwelling.
Two case studies will help to shed light on some of the challenges faced by 
household heads in this age category.
10 Six per cent and eight per cent respectively.
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Vuyani and Zamikhaya Sangwane
Vuyani is thirty-one years old. He is employed as a ‘public order’ 
policeman (or ‘POP’) in Grahamstown (some 130 kilometres from his 
home in Hamburg). His wife also lives in Grahamstown. He has 13 cattle 
at the family homestead in Hamburg. Five of these cattle were his 
deceased father’s and eight are his own. He now wants to buy his own 
bull to breed with his cows. He says that in time he will divide his father’s 
cattle with his younger siblings, his brother Zamikhaya and his sister, 
Ntombi. The siblings do not live with their mother, who lives elsewhere in 
the village. Vuyani and his wife do not have any children yet. He 
complained to me about the pressure that he is under because of his role 
as provider for his wife and his siblings. He is keen to see his wife attend 
the technical college in Grahamstown to upgrade her office management 
qualification and thus her employability. He is concerned about the 
training that Ntombi and Zamikhaya need in order to improve their 
qualifications that will improve their chances of finding employment.
Both of them are unemployed and thus rely on him for material support. 
Vuyani tells me that Ntombi, who is 23 years old, has expressed interest 
in getting her ‘Code 14’ [driver’s licence for a heavy duty vehicle]. He is 
prepared to assist her financially, as long as she undertakes to use the 
license to find work. With respect to his job, Vuyani is considering 
applying for a transfer closer to Hamburg, particularly given the growing 
number of cattle at home. But a move like this has several implications, 
such as forfeiting his extra (‘danger pay’) allowances and stand-by 
allowances, as ordinary duties in the South African Police Service are not 
considered to be as dangerous as service in the ‘POP’ unit.
Zamikhaya is 28 years old and is as solidly built as his older brother. He 
passed std.10 in 1998 at St.Charles Sojola, the local high school in 
Hamburg. He then went to Port Elizabeth to do a computer course for six 
months. When he failed to find work in Port Elizabeth, he returned to 
Hamburg. That was in December 1999. Since then, he has been in 
Hamburg and has become an active participant in local abalone harvesting 
activities. When his brother Vuyani bought cattle, Zamikhaya decided to
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give him R1,000 as a contribution11 towards this purchase, because he 
didn’t want his brother to do ‘everything alone while we are staying 
together’. Zamikhaya told me that ‘these cattle are not for him [Vuyani] 
or for me, they are just cattle of the home... We will only divide the 
calves, like, the first calf will be his and the second one will be for me.
But we haven’t yet talked about this, I am just guessing [that this is how 
we will do it.].. .1 don’t think that I will buy cattle [for myself] because I 
think that those ones bought for the family are enough. I might buy some 
if I move from my home and build my own house. It is my aim to build 
my own house, to get married and to have children but not more than 
two...’
Because Vuyani is away working and living in Grahamstown with his 
wife, Zamikhaya is supposed to buy food for himself and his sister,
Ntombi. To do so, he relies on small amounts of money from his brother.
More recently however, he has joined the local gold rush, i.e. the abalone 
harvesting activities that have mushroomed in coastal villages like 
Hamburg, and he is able to use the income from this source to buy 
sustenance for the home. In fact, Zamikhaya suggests to me that he is able 
to make at least Rl,500 every two weeks. He has used some of his money 
from abalone to buy himself new clothes and a cell-phone. He also bought 
a bedroom suite for himself and some things for his girlfriend, although 
he pointed out that he does not spend money on his girlfriend ‘every 
month’.
This case was interesting, mostly because it was a relatively rare example of young 
brothers working together for their mutual benefit (see Niehaus 1994 on siblings 
living together and supporting each other in Qwaqwa). Certainly, the two brothers 
seemed very close and enjoyed each other’s company, which was not always 
something that was much in evidence in the rural village context, where men seemed 
to compete with each other. Note-that even in the absence of parents who had a 
material interest in spurring them on, their professed project was that of 
ukwakh ’umzi. For his part, by buying additional cattle and placing them at the rural 
home, Vuyani had taken on the role of intsika yekhaya [the pillar of the home],
11 This R1,000 is essentially a gesture of support on the part of Zamikhaya for his brother’s project of 
building the homestead.
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something that earned him considerable prestige in the village. His bovine 
investments provided a social cover for his siblings, because the presence of cattle 
gave Zamikhaya a legitimate reason to stay on in the village. In his brother’s 
absence, Zamikhaya was responsible, as ujongekhaya [one who looks after the 
home], for the well-being of these cattle and the homestead. That said, this co­
operation between the siblings was likely to change in future, as the pressure that his 
marriage would place on Vuyani’s commitment to his siblings was likely to mount. 
Just as Ntombi was expected to marry and/or have children and move away 
(although this may not happen in practice), Zamikhaya would also be expected to 
make his own way in the foreseeable future. This would be all the more so if his 
investments began to take a noticeably self-interested turn, i.e. were not visibly 
directed towards building the home, for instance, if he were to start purchasing 
building blocks with a view to building a house of his own. On the other hand, he 
would not be keen to take this step without the security of a reliable job and regular 
income.
I located some information about this family in the records kept by the social welfare 
worker who had been active in Hamburg during the particularly bleak period of 
1986-87. These records show that in 1986 Vuyani’s parents had already been 
divorced for some years and that their father’s whereabouts were unknown. The 
children and their mother were staying with her parents where she experienced 
‘family troubles’ and expressed the wish to have her own home. The government 
social worker noted that the family’s only source of income was the R60 per month 
that Vuyani’s mother earned on the ‘CEAP’, which was the Ciskeian government’s 
poverty alleviation programme. This was at a time when the ‘Household Subsistence 
Level for a black family of six in Peddie town’ had been computed as R379,90 per 
month (see De Wet 1997: 8).
With parents who had no more than a Std.3 education (five years of schooling) and 
evidence of an emotionally difficult, and economically desperate, childhood, I began 
asking myself just how Vuyani had achieved his remarkable transition into the 
respectability of rural cattle-owning manhood?
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The answer, or at least part of it, emerged during a subsequent conversation with 
Vuyani. Vuyani was one of a number of young men from Hamburg families who 
benefited from the recruitment drive of a certain Brigadier Zatho of the Ciskeian 
bantustan police. This Zatho had his home in Hamburg and, in the late 1980s, he 
encouraged young men from the villages of Peddie South to apply to join the 
Ciskeian police force.12 This route was not without its risks, as personnel serving in 
the bantustan security forces faced ridicule by the many ANC sympathisers in the 
Eastern Cape. In the post-1994 period, however, virtually all these police and 
security force personnel were integrated into the ‘new’ South African establishment 
without any major fuss.13
When I encountered them in the village, most of the young men who benefited from 
this recruitment were married and were amongst the most economically established 
household heads of their generation in Hamburg. Many of them were already cattle- 
owners of note, like Vuyani. By comparison, other young men of their age continued 
to be unemployed and thus to lack the material resources necessary to seriously 
contemplate marriage and establishing their own homesteads.
This fortuitous break into secure employment, precipitated by a conscious decision 
made by each young man at the time, had set a significant number of young men in 
Hamburg and surrounding villages, in this critical age cohort 30-40 years, on what 
was an increasingly unattainable path of reliable employment, to domestic and social 
respectability as measured by contemporary rural Xhosa values. In the absence of a 
latter-day Brigadier Zatho, others like Possible Peteni (below) were finding this path 
virtually impossible to follow.
Thumani Possible Peteni (40 years old)
I was bom in 1961 and I grew up in Hamburg. I am the second-oldest of 
five brothers. My father owned cattle and we still have cattle at my home, 
even though both my parents have passed away. I live at my [family] 
home with my younger brother, Malusi. There are ten cattle here and they
12 Brigadier Zatho later died in a motorcar accident near Loverstwist.
13 Peires (1992) does, however, mention how one hundred and sixty Ciskei policemen, including 
generals and brigadiers, were dismissed in 1991.
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should be divided equally between us five brothers, though when [this 
will happen] I don’t know.
I had a job on the abalone [harvesting] project in Hamburg. This was 
before we applied for licenses. I would earn at least Rl,200 per fortnight 
by [illegally] collecting and selling abalone. With this money, I bought 
two heifers from Mr. Mfundi at Wesley, for which I paid Rl,200 each.
With the money I had left over, I bought groceries and paid my debts.
My reason for buying cattle is that my parents made a stipulation about 
the family cattle in their will. This is that my older brother will decide 
how to divide all these cattle and so I decided to buy my own. I don’t 
have a bank account to keep my money. [Anyway] money is like cooked 
food, because it is easy to use money for useless things and then it is 
gone. Cattle and money are different, because if you want to do umsebenzi 
[conduct a ritual], you must go and buy an animal. But if you already have 
cattle, you may have the right cattle in your herd, and then do umsebenzi.
Also, you can’t sell cattle for any reason. I can sell my cattle but I will 
contact my [older] brother first. To show respect to my brothers, I will 
consult them before selling. They might try to help me [with money] 
instead of selling an animal. I will only sell when we have a serious 
problem in my family. I will never have enough cattle [in the same way 
as] you will never have enough money.
Note that Possible was not married nor was he the household head of the Peteni 
homestead, as his older brother, who was employed in Port Elizabeth, had taken over 
this role since their parents passed away. This was a significant factor in Possible’s 
case (see below). Possible was a well-liked and capable man in the village who 
tended to be a frequent visitor at the shebeens around the village. His somewhat 
unlikely move into cattle-ownership actually made good sense, seeing that he was 
structurally unemployed and without any formal qualifications that would allow him 
to find well-paid work in future. It was also an indication that he was opting to take 
the same route as Dickson Masi (described above), that is, to diversify his 
investments in the rural economy, while his hope of finding secure, urban-based 
employment in future faded with each day spent in the village and its shebeens.
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By investing some of his windfall income from abalone harvesting in socially useful 
resources like cattle, he achieved several things at once. He laundered significant 
amounts, in local terms at least, of dubiously gained money into the village economy 
(cf. Shipton 1989: 34). Because of the relatively poor record-keeping of cattle 
numbers and patterns of ownership in the reserve areas, this was a good strategy and 
he was certainly not alone in pursuing it. He also gained valuable social standing in 
the village for having decided to invest his somewhat dubious financial gains in cattle 
which contributed to building his family homestead and indirectly, to the village 
moral economy. (As noted above, even though it was illegal, people did not regard 
abalone harvesting as bad in a moral sense, and so the money made from this activity 
was not ‘bitter’ [a la Shipton 1989] and was not seen as contaminating any goods 
subsequently bought with it).
Also, by converting some of his ‘slippery’ cash into ‘hard’ cattle, Possible sought to 
protect these resources from the relatively expensive hard-drinking lifestyle that he 
and his friends liked to maintain and which could all too quickly dissipate his money 
reserves if they were kept in cash form or banked. This conversion was also helpful 
both in pre-empting any criticism from his brothers concerning his current carefree 
lifestyle and its associated patterns of consumption, and in maintaining their interest 
in and support for his longer-term well-being. This was because buying cattle 
implicated Possible’s brothers in his overall economic well-being, as he points out. 
Should he want to sell an animal to get cash, his brothers could be expected to try to 
persuade him against this, and perhaps even offer to lend him money to ward off an 
‘emergency’ sale. Although this level of sibling involvement in his affairs might be 
overly intrusive at times, it does improve his chances of achieving greater resilience 
in his livelihood.14 In this way, his brothers would act as a real and a rhetorical 
bulwark that helped to protect that portion of his wealth which was tied up in cattle 
from predation by friends in need of cash or the demands of his girlfriends and 
creditors on his resources (cf. Sansom 1981: 104).
Also, it was Malusi, Possible’s 25-year old younger brother, and not Possible
14 In another interview, 78-year old Mr. Hokwana told me that ‘...[if] you tie up your money [in 
cattle].. .you will be afraid to go to the kraal to take a beast to sell... because you will wonder what 
your brothers will say about this. This is because inkomo asiyonto yokudlala [cattle are not for playing 
with].’
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himself, who was responsible for herding and dipping the cattle at the family home. 
Possible was able to take advantage of this arrangement by adding his two animals to 
the ten cattle already in the homestead byre, i.e. he was under no obligation to 
reimburse Malusi for any extra work that herding these cattle might have entailed, 
although he would probably do so in some token fashion.
Lastly, precisely because his parents were both deceased, Possible was more 
confident about placing his own cattle in the family byre. This was very different 
from placing one’s cattle in the family byre while one’s father and/or mother was still 
alive. Numerous examples around the village had taught men like Possible that, upon 
the death of one’s parents, securing a fair share of one’s own contribution to the 
family herd over time could be problematic when the inheritance was divided. This 
was particularly the case for someone like Possible who was not the first-born son.
This issue had clearly also exercised the mind of Possible’s younger brother, 37-year 
old Mzwabantu Peteni, who previously had secure employment at a leather- 
processing factory in Port Elizabeth. A married man, Mzwabantu moved back to 
Hamburg with his wife and 12-year-old son (his older daughter stayed on at school in 
Port Elizabeth) when he was retrenched in 1999. Once in Hamburg, local cultural 
norms dictated that, as a married man, Mzwabantu could not live indefinitely at his 
parental home, so he used his retrenchment ‘package’ to build his own house. He also 
used some of it to buy two heifers from a farmer at Wesley. He and his wife were 
unemployed when I encountered them, but made ends meet by engaging in abalone- 
harvesting. Asked about why he had opted to buy cattle, Mzwabantu first presented us 
with the ‘stock’ answer, 'if there is a umzi (home), there must be a kraal' However, 
further probing by my astute research assistant, Patrick Gusha, who was on good terms 
with the (slightly older) Peteni brothers, led him to volunteer that
My father’s cattle are [now] owned by my elder brother. I don’t want to 
force him to give me cattle. So I thought it better to buy my own cattle 
and zip my mouth.. .These cattle are owned by me and my wife and yes, I 
can sell an animal because they belong to me, but I will speak to my wife 
first.
Did investments in cattle offer a long-term alternative to paid employment? No, in 
virtually every case I came across, they did not. The success stories of men like
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Khayalethu Mapayi were exceptional. But for men in the unenviable position of 
Dickson Masi, Possible and Mzwabantu, investments in cattle gave them the 
economic breathing space to seek out other livelihoods that might include local 
contract work (‘jobbing’) or longer-term urban-based employment. As I have argued 
above, investing in cattle helped them to tap into the ‘patriarchal dividend’ (Connell 
1995: 79) that the rural politics of value in Peddie District, in which cattle were so 
centrally implicated as culturally proscribed commodities, continued to provide.
Younger men who lived ‘at home’
Besides pressures to contribute financially to their parental homesteads, many young 
men also had material responsibilities towards the children they had fathered with 
girlfriends. As long as a young man was unemployed, even the courts, to which young 
women increasingly resorted to enforce the payment of child maintenance, were 
powerless to act against him. As soon as a man found work and began to earn a wage, 
these demands on his earnings could become formidable. Having built up 
considerable debts with siblings and friends, not to mention outstanding ‘credits’ at 
shebeens and izirhoxo [small shops selling household goods], these temporarily 
employed men were also likely to be accosted by the mothers of their children, eager 
to press their entitlements to some of the newly earned wages.
Diverting some of their earnings into the purchase of cattle, that were then placed in 
the relative security of the family byre, could be an effective way of avoiding some of 
these onerous demands, while at the same time winning kudos from their parents, 
siblings, extended families and other people in the village for their contribution to 
building the home. Another strategy was to contribute money to be spent on 
conducting rituals in the home or on domestic goods (see the case-study below). 
Although it was difficult to verify this by directly questioning the people involved, it 
seemed very likely that there was an element of collusion on the part of the parents of 
young men in this situation. Rather than seeing their son’s earnings spent on 
girlfriends, who were variously described as rapacious and demanding, and on the 
children that these girlfriends claimed were his offspring, they would energetically 
support his plans to buy cattle for the family byre. This ensured that a proportion of 
his income was captured for the support of his parental home. Nevertheless, intra­
household contestation was likely to arise over how much of this incoming money
357
was spent on purchases and maintenance of cattle, particularly as the control of these 
animals would rest with the young man’s father.
This situation held true for Nkosinkhulu Ngcanga, one of several examples of this 
phenomenon who, at 28 years old, had four children by different girlfriends around 
the village. The eldest son of his parents, Nkosinkhulu had invested some of his 
earnings from contract work in cattle that were then placed in his father’s byre. As 
pointed out above, this could be an attractive strategy specifically for the eldest son, 
who stood to inherit these cattle ultimately anyway. It was far less so for his younger 
brothers and of course, virtually unthinkable for his sister, who might live to see their 
contributions to the family herd set upon by their eldest brother who claimed the 
entire inheritance, based on the practice of primogeniture. On this score, note that 
while Zamikhaya Sangwane in the case-study above was confident that his older 
brother would act fairly in the way they share out the increases in their herd, they had 
yet to cross that particular bridge.
Many young people told me that they were ‘fed up’with the idea of investing in cattle, 
which they compared with the now unfashionable handing over of one’s wages to 
one’s father (or parents) at month-end. Their stated preference was rather to invest any 
income they have more strategically in siblings or parents, including through selective 
contributions to projects of conspicuous consumption in their parental homes.
Consider the case of Patrick in this regard.
Patrick’s choices, Patrick’s dilemmas
Twenty-eight-year-old Patrick arrived back at his home in the village from 
East London a week before starting a local contract job with Telkom. That 
was in June 1997. The job lasted until July 1999. Patrick’s father, two 
sisters, Patrick’s child from a prior relationship and the premarital child o f  
his elder sister, Nomhle, all live at the family’s homestead in the village.
His 31-year-old (i.e. elder) sister, Nomhle, works at the Municipal offices 
in the village. Patrick’s mother stays in East London where she is 
employed as a domestic worker and his brother is at East London College 
doing a course on Marketing and Management.
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While employed by Telkom, Patrick was paid ‘at least’ R1 500 per month.
I asked him to recall what exactly he had spent these wages on over the 
course of the two years that he was employed. He recalled that he had 
contributed R300 towards groceries for the home each month, although he 
didn’t actually do any of the shopping himself. Instead he gave the money 
to Nomhle who, he said, demanded it of him. He opened an account at 
Sales House and bought clothes for himself, at a cost of around R250 per 
month. Opening the clothing account was not his idea, he claimed, but 
Nomhle’s, because she wanted to buy clothes for herself and other 
members of the household using his account. He also contributed towards 
the costs of his brother’s schooling, depositing R250 per month into his 
bank account. He spend some money on himself, paying visits to East 
London or Port Elizabeth, or wherever else he wanted to go and on 
‘entertainment’ at the shebeens in the village and neighbouring area. He 
spent some of his money buying some things for his girlfriend.
He claims that it did not even cross his mind to buy cattle, because his 
father already has cattle, and he saw no need to spend his money to 
increase their number. But he did help his parents to conduct various 
imisebenzi [rituals]. On one occasion, he bought a goat in Tyolumnqa [a 
village en route to East London], which cost R400. He spent a further 
R200 to buy imithombo [the ingredients to make traditional sorghum beer] 
and he gave his mother R350 to buy groceries. He also bought six bottles 
of brandy for the ritual. With the buying done, he told his parents to go 
ahead and conduct the umsebenzi that they were anxious to conduct.
Lastly, Patrick recalled that he and Nomhle decided to buy a lounge suite 
and colour T.V. for their parents’ home. He gave Nomhle R2 000 and she 
contributed some of her own money to buy these things. He claimed not to 
know how much she actually paid for them but trusts that she spent the 
money wisely as she is ‘very good with money’.15
When pushed, Patrick’s family placed themselves among the ‘educated’ section of the 
village in which I conducted my fieldwork research. The homestead had ten cattle in 
its kraal, but upon closer enquiry I found that two of these were owned by the sons of
15 Jones (1996: 166) notes that men’s expenditure on liquor cannot be underestimated. Also, men are
much more likely to enter into hire-purchase agreements...[for] items that can be ill-afforded.
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Patrick’s father’s deceased elder brother. Patrick’s father had been unemployed for 
several years. He kept busy (‘jobbing’) with painting contracts and other small jobs 
around the village. It was interesting that Patrick casually admitted that he did not 
contemplate spending any of his wages on cattle husbandry, such as purchasing 
livestock medicines, etc. for the the cattle of the homestead. Overall, however, his \
outlay indicated a strong commitment to the ukwakh ’umzi [building the homestead] 
project, but without the expected investment in cattle. Why should this be so?
Part of the explanation lies in the fact that, although Patrick’s father was still 
relatively young, he found himself among the structurally unemployed. He had 
previously spent a long period living away from his family in Port Elizabeth as 
itshipha [an absconder]. Although re-united with his wife and family, he did not 
appear to be privy to the livelihood decisions that Patrick’s sister and his mother make 
in relation to the needs of the household. Patrick has reasoned that, although he was 
the eldest son and thus he nominally stood to inherit his father’s cattle, the herd may 
be dissipated before then.
His elder sister, Nomhle, was an assertive young woman who had, for the past few 
years, used the salary she earned as an administrative assistant in the municipal offices 
in the village to support the village-based family members. This meant that she had 
considerable influence, especially when working in liaison with her mother, who was 
the other reliable breadwinner in the family, over how Patrick spent his money.16 Like 
other young women in the village, Nomhle was adamant that cattle were a poor 
investment choice.
For his part, Patrick knew that the Telkom job would be of limited duration and since 
he was very likely to be reliant on their more dependable incomes again in future -  as 
indeed he was at the time I interviewed him -  he could ill-afford to alienate his 
mother and sister by making what they would perceive to be short-sighted and selfish 
investments in cattle. To do so would be to both convert his wages into the culturally 
proscribed domain of property which was firmly (and perilously) within his father’s 
ambit of control (and that of other, more senior male relatives) and to send the wrong
16 There was a good chance that Patrick was considered for this contract job because his sister worked 
for the municipality and was able to lobby for his inclusion when the Telkom jobs were mooted. This 
would have made him doubly beholden to her.
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message to his mother and sister about his commitment to them. Indeed, Patrick told 
me that, since he helped his mother out financially while she was unemployed, he can 
‘now ask her for anything and she will try to help him’. This was less likely to be so 
automatic if he had chosen to spend his income during the time he was employed on 
buying five heifers.
But lest we infer from this case that cattle-ownership may be viewed favourably by a 
tiny minority of men, but was destined to fade away over time, consider the case of 
Zimasile Mabasela. This case recalls that of Vuyani Sangwane, and suggests that 
some men of the younger generation still valued cattle-ownership.
Zimasile Mabasela: Leaning on old familiar ways or learning new ones?
I was bom in Hamburg and I grew up here. My father didn’t have cattle 
while he was alive [in the time that] we have lived here. When he died, he 
was a tshipa [absconder who had deserted his wife and family] in 
eRhawutini [Johannesburg], and he was without cattle.
When I worked at Telkom on a contract, [for the period July 1997 to June 
1998], our pay was not less than Rl,500 a month. I bought one animal 
from Khayalethu [Mapayi] in December 1997. It was a heifer and I paid 
Rl,500 for it. I didn’t save any money, I built my home and bought my 
things, including living expenses, like food. I live with my mother, 
brother and sister here. Noyise, my other sister, lives at Phola Park [a new 
section of Hamburg village]. I help to buy groceries and whatever else 
might be needed here.
AA: Why did you decide to buy cattle?
ZM: Cattle are our bank. We save our money like this. Also, I like to keep 
cattle. I don’t have a bank account, [although] I plan to have one, but 
there are lots of money problems [here at home].
AA: What would you say are some of the differences between cattle and 
money?
ZM: Cattle increase and the price of them [also] increase [s] and so they 
are a good method of saving. Money [by contrast] is ready-made food -  
it’s easy for money to leave your pocket, to be eaten.. .This is bad. If you 
bought an animal at Rl,500 in 1997, these days it will fetch R2,000 or 
more. If you bought a cow, after a year, you have got two animals.
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AA: It seems to me that you are taking the route of the big men in the 
village, by investing in cattle, unlike some other young men who don’t 
even consider buying cattle?
ZM: Yes, this is the route of big men, to buy cattle. I grew up here, so I 
saw from my neighbours that cattle are a good thing. I also asked older 
men, like John Tshobonga, about this and I heard that cattle are a good 
thing to have, especially when you are unemployed.
AA: Are these cattle yours or do they become the property of the umzi 
[home] was placed inside the kraal1?
ZM: These cattle are mine. I am the owner, they were bought with my 
energy. But it is not part of a Xhosa future, to sell something without 
consulting your parents. Before I sell, I will speak to my mother.
AA: What will force/encourage you to sell?
ZM: I will sell if I have no money; if someone dies, to bury them, and so 
on. [I would do this] rather than have a member of my family bum [i.e. 
cremated] there [at the morgue, away from the village].
AA: How many animals would you regard as enough?
ZM: As I said, cattle are money, so there will never be enough. Even a 
millionaire wants to have more money.
AA: What about droughts? How will you act at such times?
ZM: Water is the most important thing in a drought. The last big drought 
we had was in 1983. What about diseases in our cattle? Can you advise us 
about these things [as] we don’t know about diseases?
AA: Not really, I don’t know much about them myself, but there is a book 
written in isiXhosa that deals with livestock diseases that the abalimi 
[extension officers] have. I will get it for you.
The case of Zimasile shows a young man who was motivated essentially by the 
ukwakh ’umzi ideology to buy cattle to be placed in the homestead byre.
An important part of Zimasile’s motivation was again the fact that he was the eldest 
son of the household and stood to recoup most of these cattle through inheritance 
anyway. Zimasile’s observation and experience of the limited future employment 
prospects that were available to young men in his position provided an additional 
motivation to invest in cattle that reproduced, unlike money, and that over time 
allowed one to be recognised as a Xhosa man of status in the village.
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During the course of my fieldwork period in Hamburg, Zimasile married a local girl 
whom he had impregnated. He paid lobolo [bridewealth] for her in cash. This was 
only one of three instances of bridewealth payment that I recorded in the two villages 
during my period of fieldwork. Certainly, it was increasingly difficult and thus rare 
for young men to pay lobolo. In fact, regaining access to animals that one had bought 
perhaps with the vague notion of using them to pay one’s lobolo at some future point, 
but that were placed in the parental homestead byre, can be problematic. Virtually 
every senior men I questioned on this subject was adamant that his sons had to ‘find 
their own lobolo’ and should not look to their father’s byre for assistance in this 
regard, unless they were committed to replacing the cattle promptly. This suggests just 
how strained the relations, and how low the levels of trust between the economically 
vulnerable older generation of men and younger men, had become. Again, this was by 
no means a recent phenomenon, though, and was indicative of the extent to which 
senior men have lost control of the labour and incomes of younger men.
Economically trying times might see some young men swayed into investing in cattle, 
but this was most likely to happen in cases where these young men were not directly 
answerable to more senior male kin, such as in the case of Vuyani Sangwane, the 
Peteni brothers and Zimasile.
Conclusions
For a number of reasons, cattle-holding constituted a sought-after yet unattainable 
cultural and economic good for the majority of households in rural Peddie. In reality, 
cattle-holding and production had become, on the one hand, simply one element of a 
broad and differentiated bricolage of potential livelihood options that people in rural 
Peddie cobbled together to survive. On the other hand, the continued discursive 
currency of cattle as cultural icons that were the hallmark of the successful 
(patriarchal) umzi provided a powerful model for men in particular to aspire to own at 
least some cattle.
What I have explored in this appendix was the extent to which cattle-holding served 
the interests of different age cohorts of men. Undoubtedly, considerable social 
dividends accrued to cattle-holding households and the men who headed them, but 
only as long as their herds of cattle were seen to be employed to the benefit of their
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households and to the community at large. This was partly why Khayalethu ploughed 
people’s fields with his oxen, albeit at a fee, and why young boys consumed 
considerable amounts of amasi [sour milk] at his homestead. The key implication was 
that cattle-ownership by individual homesteads was not as intrinsically socially 
embedded as senior men, whose interests were well served by owning cattle, would 
like to portray it. Rather, within the existing, increasingly contested, patriarchal 
hegemony of the rural Peddie household and village, cattle had to be properly 
deployed in particular culturally scripted ways that maximised the wider social 
dividends of investing in them.
Not surprisingly, these cultural prescriptions suited some people and were anathema 
to others. Senior men who held cattle sought constantly to reassert, at a number of 
levels, the cultural connection between investments in cattle-ownership and the 
overall ukwakh *umzi project. Senior men without cattle were more ambivalent. The 
association between cattle and ukwakh ’umzi was contested by a number of other 
categories of people, including the sons who were not omkhulu [the first-born son] in 
their homes. It was also a site of struggle for single mothers seeking material support 
from the fathers of their children, while wives and daughters might also contest this 
association by pointing to the fact that ‘cattle can die at any time’ and thus rated 
poorly in comparison to other avenues of saving and investment.
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APPENDIX EIGHT: 
Case-studies of ritual events 
and the business of rituals
The elderly wife of Mr. Mkhaya died two months after I began fieldwork in Hamburg, on 5 
December 2000. Mrs. Mkhaya had been ill for some time prior to her death. It was an 
emotionally and ritually fraught time for the family as Mr. Mkhaya’s grandson was ‘in the 
bush’, undergoing the high-risk male initiation ritual, at the time of her death.
Case One: The funeral of Mrs. Mkhaya1
In the course of the two weeks leading up to the funeral, the Mkhaya umzi was 
a hive of activity as close and extended family members began to arrive from 
Port Elizabeth, East London, Whittlesea, Dimbaza, Alice and Stutterheim.
Many close family members who arrived in the village from towns brought 
with them groceries, vegetables and cash contributions to assist the family.
One of the two itshipa [absconder] Mkhaya sons arrived from Port Elizabeth 
and helped a good deal with the various tasks allocated to men in relation to 
the funeral preparations. The other, younger, son, who was also an itshipa in 
Port Elizabeth, embarrassed the family by not returning to the village to attend 
his own mother’s funeral, something that was noticed by people in the village 
and caused a minor stir in the family during the preparations for the funeral.
Local people from Hamburg and neighbouring villages visited the bereaved 
family regularly in the period between Mrs. Mkhaya’s death and the day of the 
funeral. Other people visited mostly in small groups from particular church 
denominations, with the Sunday prior to the funeral being an especially busy 
one, with church groups (comprising up to ten people, most of them women) 
that came from Tamara (a village near King William’s Town) and from Alice.
All these visitors held prayer services with members of the Mkhaya family.
Several carloads of young men and women travelling between Port Elizabeth 
and East London during this period of bereavement leading up to the funeral
1 As I was resident in the Mkhaya homestead during my fieldwork, I had a close-up view of this 
funeral and I present the case in considerable detail.
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stopped by the Mkhaya home briefly to offer their condolences. On every 
occasion, the friends travelling with the person(s) who had come to pay their 
respects were also welcomed and fed. Several times, once introductions were 
made, people had been satisfactorily identified -  in terms of their clan 
affiliations and ‘homes’ - and news shared, these people were asked what their 
employer (for example, Telkom, Eskom or a provincial government 
department) was doing to help ‘the people of Peddie or Hamburg’. Many of 
these visitors were related to the Mkhaya family, but others were friends and 
even patients.2 Visitors during this period were always offered home-baked 
bread, biscuits and soft drinks. Friends who travelled from further afield to 
offer their condolences frequently left with bags of potatoes, beetroot or 
onions from Mr. Mkhaya’s vegetable garden.3
Prayer meetings were held nightly in the Mkhaya rontawu which, like most 
homesteads in the village, is used for hosting rituals. Given that the Mkhayas 
are Methodists, the local Methodist women’s group was the mainstay of these 
vigils, but no discrimination against groups from other churches was evident 
during vigils.4 Prayers, singing (led by women) and preaching (mostly led by 
men) lasted as long as two hours every evening. A further well-known 
division of labour was followed here, with Wednesdays being the day when 
‘the youth’ of the village arrived in numbers to console the bereaved family.
Vigils on Thursdays, customarily the day that women of various Christian 
denominations attend umanyano prayer groups, were dedicated to these 
women’s groups.
Certain women in the village, especially kin, church members and those who 
have enjoyed assistance from the Mkhaya family in the past knew that they 
were expected to help with domestic chores and would arrive daily at the 
homestead to learn how and where they could assist the family. Relatives 
(especially women affines) were sent around the village, ostensibly to borrow 
big pots and cooking utensils, from the members of the family’s social 
networks. The homesteads visited included those of kin, clansmen {Dlamini
2 Mr. Mkhaya was a well-known ixhwele [herbalist], with patients all over the Eastern Cape.
3 This was standard practice among older people in rural villages in Peddie District. Not to give a 
visitor some produce from one's field or garden was regarded as poor form indeed.
41 did, however, observe a general impatience from the members of other denominations directed at 
the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) group. These other groups made not so discrete attempts to limit the 
time and opportunities of the SDA group to preach and pray at these vigils, which created a problem 
for Mr. Mkhaya, as the leader of the SDA group was his neighbour and the families were close friends.
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clan), neighbours and friends. In this way, news about the state of the funeral 
preparations, the arrival of visitors and the problems5 that had emerged at the 
Mkhaya umzi were discussed in detail over garden fences and cups of tea 
around the village.
As the second week progressed, preparations for the funeral itself progressed 
more urgently. Among the visitors were the office-bearers and members of the 
two burial societies to which Mr. Mkhaya, a church-going Methodist, 
belonged. They came to hand over the contributions (R2,000 and Rl,500) 
from their respective societies and to pray for the family. Arrangements were 
also made to get the marquee tent that the Ocean Burial Society owns to the 
Mkhaya home for use during the funeral service. Members of the family 
travelled to Peddie and King William’s Town several times to select and 
purchase a casket, to co-ordinate matters with the undertakers and to buy 
groceries. Men, both family members and neighbours, were given the task of 
getting the homestead in order. Some put up curtain rails to hang new curtains 
in the home. The curtains were made by Mr. Mkhaya’s daughter, who had 
come from Dimbaza, where she ran a sewing business from her home. Several 
men applied themselves to putting a fresh coat of paint on all the buildings in 
the homestead and tidying and weeding the yard. Cutting the grass in the yard 
was undertaken by a fictive son of Mr. Mkhaya’s, who used a lawn-mower 
that he had brought especially for this task from his home in Berlin (near East 
London).
Mr. Daliso, who is a Dlamini clansman of Mr. Mkhaya’s, and who is closely 
associated with the family, was dispatched to a neighbouring village where it 
was learnt a cow was for sale. Daliso was to inspect and then purchase this 
cow, which would be slaughtered for the funeral. When the animal was driven 
home later by amakwedini [boys], it was deemed by Mr. Mkhaya and other 
men to be too small to feed to the number of mourners who were expected at 
the funeral. Further arrangements had to be made urgently to purchase another 
animal from the Mawe herd on the other side of the village. This was duly
One specific problem -  which even emerged during prayer vigils - was the continued absence during 
this period of Mr. Mkhaya's itshipa son. Several informants recalled the long-standing tensions 
between this son and his sister, who was very close to her deceased mother and was one of the main 
organisers and funders of the funeral. The tension with his sister had caused this son to turn his back on 
his home some years before and to stay in Humansdorp, where he was said to be working on a 'chokka' 
fishing boat. He finally arrived a week after the funeral, and stayed for the umgidi to welcome the 
ikrwala [new man] back from the bush.
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done. The first animal, purchased by Daliso, would be exchanged with 
Khayalethu Mapayi (also Dlamini clan) for a bigger one later. This second 
animal would be slaughtered to welcome the mkhwetha [initiate] back from 
the bush, three weeks after the funeral.
Other tasks included dispatching men and several boys early during the first 
week to collect firewood with an ox-drawn ‘scotch’ cart. By the time the 
funeral took place on Saturday 16 December, they had made three trips to the 
nearby forest and had been paid R50 a trip by Mr. Mkhaya.
Arrangements were made for a local church choir to sing at the funeral and 
permission sought and granted to use the chairs from the primary school on 
the day of the funeral. Preparing food for the many visitors who paid their 
respects during the week and then for the prospective mourners at the funeral 
was well-orchestrated by MaTshezi, the wife of the Mkhayas’ oldest son, This 
entailed much hard work from a large group of women, some of them the 
young wives of men in the extended Mkhaya family. Other women were 
enlisted (but not paid) from around the village to help with this task. Young 
girls in the extended Mkhaya family were constantly washing pots and dishes. 
They were also given the tasks of springcleaning the interior of each building 
of the homestead and washing all the windows. They washed all the bedding 
and were responsible for washing by hand the clothes of the many visitors 
who stayed at the umzi during this period.
On Thursday (two days before the funeral), there was need to hire a pick-up 
truck to collect all the groceries bought at a wholesaler in King William’s 
Town. The Mkhayas’ daughter wanted to drive to Whittlesea where she is 
employed as a nurse to buy three sheep for the funeral (a four-hour round trip). 
Her reason was that sheep are much cheaper there than around East London. 
The vehicle that was hired broke down and they were finally forced to buy the 
sheep at Berlin (near East London) on the morning of the funeral, two of 
which were slaughtered before the funeral commenced. The third sheep was to 
be slaughtered for the family’s ibhokwe yamanzi [the goat of water] ritual the 
morning after the funeral, when the family would be ritually cleansed. This 
daughter, who took the lead in organising her mother’s funeral, ensured that 
the funeral programmes were printed and that the polystyrene containers and
368
plastic cutlery in which to serve food to the mourners at the funeral were 
purchased.
Early on Friday morning, around fifteen (mostly but not exclusively young) 
men of the village assembled to dig the grave for the deceased in the Hamburg 
graveyard. It was unheard of that they would not do so, I was told, and even 
hard drinkers regularly turned up for this work. I questioned why young men, 
who make virtually no contribution unless they were paid, to homestead and 
village projects, should be so reliable in this regard. The response was that it 
was because they fear that, if they did not participate in this task that was 
specifically that of abafana [young men] every time, others might stay away 
when their family had a funeral and a grave-digging team was required. 
Nevertheless, some young men opted out of the grave-digging and instead 
assembled at the Mkhaya home to collect and set up the marquee tent in time 
for the funeral the following day.
On the Friday afternoon before the funeral, the second cow deemed suitable to 
feed the mourners was slaughtered by about ten young men. This was done 
outside the byre, indicating that it was not a ritual slaughter, and no activities 
associated with the ancestors took place. The iziphakathi [innards] were 
roasted over an open flame and eaten by the men present, with the older men 
present being offered the liver.
Later on Friday, the evening vigil was opened with a prayer for family 
members which lasted for about a hour from 21h00 to 22h00. Then the 
umlindo [the funeral vigil] commenced. It was attended by maybe 40 or 50 
people, mostly women, and held in the homestead’s rontawu [round, one- 
roomed house used for beerdrinks and other rituals, also referred to as the 
‘great hut’]. The umlindo lasted right through the night, with singing, 
preaching and praying. Around 5h00 on Saturday morning, people began 
returning to their homes to wash and prepare for the funeral itself.
Around 8h30, the undertaker arrived with the body of the deceased which was 
inspected by the men in the family and then ceremonially welcomed with a 
prayer service. Thereafter, the family and close friends were given a last 
chance to see the deceased in state. This welcoming service was closed with 
another prayer.
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Two educated young people were seated near the entrance to the Mkhaya 
homestead, where they welcomed mourners and kept a record of all people 
who, upon arrival at the funeral, made cash contributions towards the costs of 
the funeral. This record would allow the Mkhaya family to acknowledge these 
contributions and to reciprocate when the opportunity arose to do so in future.
The employees of the ‘funeral parlour’ [undertaker] from Peddie town 
meanwhile busied themselves with getting the sound system set up. This 
included an amplifier, speaker system and a lapel microphone. It was around 
lOhOO when the funeral service began. A prominent educated man in the 
village6 played the role of Master of Ceremonies. A local Bantu Church of 
Christ preacher was given the first opportunity to speak. He was followed by a 
man who read the obituary. The whole service was punctuated regularly by 
hymns led by the choir, but which most of the congregation joined in singing 
heartily. Then other speakers (men and women) told those present about the 
life of the deceased. Her visibly distraught brother briefly told the mourners 
who she was (family name and clan-name) and where she had grown up.
Others spoke about what sort of person she had been and what contribution 
she made to the community.
One senior man, a neighbour of the Mkhaya family, spoke about what a good 
wife and mother Mrs. Mkhaya had been. This was clear, he said, in the way 
that, even when Mr. Mkhaya was away, his wife could always be found at 
home, doing the washing or ironing the clothes. This meant that she was 
always ready to welcome visitors of which this household had many (since 
Mr. Mkhaya is a well-known ixhwele [herbalist]). Also, he said, after she had 
collected her pension or did her shopping in the village, she could always be 
observed going straight home and not standing around gossiping with other 
women. His speech seemed to divide the mourners into two camps. Many of 
the villagers, both men and women, nodded approvingly as he spoke. What he 
said was, however, greeted with gasps, hisses and loud murmurs of 
disapproval from several of the well-heeled young women who had arrived in 
Hamburg from East London, Port Elizabeth and other towns to attend the 
funeral. Familiar with the ‘modem’ discourse of women’s rights and equality 
between the sexes, these young women found his speech patronising and
Villagers gauged the standing of the bereaved family on these occasions by the status o f the men and 
women (kin and non-kin) who officiated and spoke at their funerals.
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further confirmation of why, at least from their perspective, rural areas remain 
outmoded backwaters where patriarchal values still applied.
Two further speakers gave detailed and moving accounts of Mrs. Mkhaya’s 
illness and subsequent death. A nursing sister from the hospital in Peddie 
where Mrs. Mkhaya had died was one of those who spoke about how she bore 
her final illness with great dignity and without ever complaining. A young 
male relative was given the responsibility of reading out the messages on the 
wreaths, most of which were from close family. An especially moving tribute 
came in the form of a card from the initiate who had just returned from the 
‘bush’, who was the grandson of the deceased Mrs. Mkhaya.
Mr. Mkhaya’s good friend, the elderly Mr. Macwembe (the oldest man in 
Hamburg) was given several opportunities to speak, one of which was as a 
leader of the Ocean Burial Society. The representatives of the other two local 
burial societies, as well as the undertaker himself, who was from Peddie town, 
were also given a chance to speak. All of them explained in some detail to the 
mourners present how their society worked and how much they paid out to 
bereaved members, and so on, causing Mr. Macwembe to joke about their 
respective marketing efforts. The undertaker, in particular, positioned himself 
in the camp of the ruling party (the ANC), telling the mourners how his 
company was owned by black people with the sole purpose of serving and 
‘uplifting’ black people. This long-winded harangue also brought several 
impatient sighs and sotto voce comments from the mourners.
At this point, with the speeches and formalities out of the way, the invited 
minister had still not arrived to deliver his sermon. To fill this gap, Mr. Daliso 
was called upon to thank all the people who had helped to organise the 
funeral. By the time he had finished doing so, the invited minister, in this case 
the Methodist minister from the Peddie circuit, had arrived. He proceeded to 
give a rather long and colourful sermon, which many people appreciated.
Then the choir burst into song yet again while the coffin was placed inside the 
hearse. The congregation moved by car and by foot down to the graveyard, 
which was about a kilometre by road from the Mkhaya residence. Here the 
service continued, led by the Methodist minister and other male preachers. 
Finally, Mrs. Mkhaya was laid to rest, in a grave that had a magnificent view
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over the Keiskamma River estuary. Once the family and others had placed 
handfuls of soil in the grave, all the men present (except the senior and 
bereaved men) sprang into action, taking turns to shovel the soil that closed 
the grave. Thereafter, people returned to the Mkhaya umzi where they washed 
their hands at the entrance to the yard and then received a cup of juice and a 
slice or two of bread.
Polystyrene hampers of food, which included meat from the slaughtered cow, 
rice and vegetables were distributed by young women, starting with the 
immediate family, the dignitaries and the senior men present. They also 
distributed bottled soft drinks to everyone present. Overall, the mood was 
sombre. There was plenty of meat and many people requested second and 
even third servings of meat. Soon after eating, ordinary villagers began to 
leave. Many Hamburg people departed without taking their leave of the 
family. Visitors from further afield stayed on, chatting to local people and to 
members of the extended family. Some members of the extended family, 
especially younger adults, were clearly meeting each other for the first time or 
after long periods of not having seen each other. They exchanged news, eyed 
and commented on each other’s hairstyles, dress-style and fashion accessories, 
compared notes on the people they knew who were employed in government 
positions, and exchanged cell-phone numbers.
The funeral had been an emotionally draining and physically exhausting 
period for the Mkhaya household. Many had contributed their labour to 
ensuring that the funeral was carried on without any embarassment to the 
family. Several members of the family had made considerable financial 
contributions. The fictive ‘son’ from Berlin had contributed R1,000 in cash. 
The one umgalelo club to which Mr. Mkhaya belonged had contributed 20 
cases of soft drinks. An ‘aunt’ from East London had contributed ‘all the 
vegetables’ used to feed people after the funeral. Mr. Mkhaya’s daughter 
spent R6,900 buying various things, mostly consumables, for the funeral. With 
her father, she paid a further R5,300 towards the casket and an additional 
amount for services rendered by the ‘funeral parlour’ in Peddie town. The 
funeral was later reliably estimated to have cost close to R15,000.
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This case-study illustrates the extent to which funerals were major social occasions that 
were hosted by the bereaved household, but which implicated and drew on a vast 
network of extended family, local clansmen and women, female affines, as well as 
local and town-based extended social networks. Rural funerals had become a focus for 
considerable material transfers between town and country. Funerals also provided 
occasions for the circulation of money and other resources within rural villages, along 
socially defined pathways. Funerals of the kind and scale hosted by the Mkhaya family 
entailed considerable financial outlay by the family concerned. This outlay was partly 
offset by their membership of local burial societies and other co-operative and savings 
clubs in the village. In the case described above, however, a significant proportion of 
the money spent actually went towards paying for the services of the undertaker in 
Peddie town and towards the purchase of groceries at a ‘discount store’ in King 
William’s Town.
The case-study also points to the contingent nature of ritual practice and the slaughter 
of animals. The Mkhaya household were Methodists and, while they slaughtered a cow 
and two sheep for the funeral, this was with the express aim of feeding the mourners, 
and not for ritual purposes. The slaughter of an animal which was previously regarded 
as a cultural requirement at the burial of the male household head, in line with the 
ukukhapa ritual, has now been widened to include the funerals of both men and 
women. Since people expected to be fed in a certain way at the funerals hosted by all 
but the poorest homesteads, and complained amongst themselves when the catering 
(especially the provision of meat) did not meet their expectations, it was very common 
for well-to-do families to slaughter for these occasions.
Case Two: Mrs. Mapunga lays her husband to rest
In November 2000, Mrs. Mapunga’s husband died and the family organised a 
substantial funeral to bury him. The Mapungas are Methodists, and one o f  the 
well-respected ‘old families’ in Hamburg. They arranged to purchase a cow 
for the funeral from Mrs. Lubushe (a widow in Hamburg) for R2,000. The 
funeral service followed the format that is typical o f  the funerals o f  relatively 
well-off families in rural Peddie District, with many o f the same elements as 
the Mkhaya funeral described above. Mr. Mapunga was duly laid to rest on
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Saturday afternoon, after a service led by a Methodist minister from another 
village in Peddie District, who is related to the Mapunga family. After the 
burial, mourners were fed and given bottled soft drinks at the homestead of the 
bereaved family and then many of them went to their homes.
What is interesting about this case (although not unusual, I was informed) is 
that the Mapunga family had bought a second animal, an ox from Msondeli 
Ngcanga in Hamburg for R2,500. This animal was to be ritually slaughtered in 
the byre on the Sunday morning directly following the funeral. For this ritual, 
the Mapunga men, their kinsmen and the Mapunga sons and daughters were in 
the byre to witness the same Methodist minister speaking to their ancestors.7 
He informed them that this ox was being slaughtered to send Mr. Mapunga to 
meet them (i.e. ukukhapa) and that the family would bring him back when 
they got the chance to do so. Thereafter, the animal was ritually slaughtered by 
the men in the family and the meat was cooked. People were fed and then, 
especially those who had travelled from afar, started to leave almost 
immediately to travel back to their homes. The Mapunga family spent 
R13,900 on laying their father to rest in this manner. Mrs. Mapunga provided 
the names of twelve women, including oomolokazana [‘daughters-in-law’ or 
affines] of the extended family, whose labour was central to the success of the 
work. Three of these female affines travelled from Mgwalana village, about 40 
kilometres from Hamburg, to assist the bereaved family.
Rituals seldom took place as once-off events, but were often connected to each other 
and to the larger schema of homestead religious, moral and social practice. There was 
apparently an increasingly experimental and selective turn with regard to the 
conducting of some of these rituals, which several of my informants commented on. 
People suggested that some of the rituals that were conducted these days, such as 
intonjane [female initiation], although not ‘new’ as such, were localised phenomena, in 
that people in particular areas or villages had started to conduct them again after a long 
absence.
7 See Mtuze (2003: 80) for other examples of this phenomenon.
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The hosting of the important ukubuyisa [to return home]8 ritual during which an ox was 
slaughtered was always preceded, I was told, by the preparatory ukutshayelela inkundla 
[to sweep the courtyard] ritual. Ukutshayelela involved slaughtering a goat and brewing 
beer to signal to the ancestors, the agnatic kin group and to the community at large that 
the ukubuyisa ritual (at which an ox will be slaughtered) was to follow soon after, 
usually within days. Important rituals such as ukubuyisa were often followed some 
months later by a beerdrink called ukuvasa izitya [to wash the dishes]. One 
consequence of this sequential nature of rituals was that poorer households struggle to 
conduct the whole sequence of rituals within the appropriate time-ffames and relied 
heavily on their social networks for assistance in conducting the sequence of connected 
rituals.
The ulwaluko ritual9
The ulwaluko [male initiation] ritual complex remained an essential ritual that must be 
conducted by all homesteads with sons. To fail to do so would be to subject the family, 
and the individual in particular, to ridicule in the village and beyond. During the 
ulwaluko ritual, boys between the ages of 17 and 25 years were first circumcised and 
then made to live in a secluded area away from the village for a period of three to six 
weeks. The period may sometimes be longer, but was adjusted to suit the contingencies 
and demands of schooling and work commitments (cf. Mayer & Mayer 1971: 13, 
Gitywa 1976). After the seclusion period, the initiates were welcomed back into the 
community as men. The ritual was the most significant marker of ubudoda [manhood], 
since it separated uncircumcised boys from the realm of men. It also provided the basis 
for the Xhosa male age-ranking system. This ranking system was reckoned on the time 
a man was circumcised rather than his chronological age, so that a chronologically 
older man who was circumcised later was expected to use the term bhuti [older brother] 
when addressing a younger man (Gitywa 1976; Ngxamngxa 1971).
Ideally, and generally in practice in Hamburg and Loverstwist, the ulwaluko ritual was 
preceded by the imbeleko ritual, which was performed to introduce an infant or young
8 Also known as the ukuguqula [to turn around] ritual (Hammond-Tooke 1974b: 352), this ritual was 
especially important for non-Christians but was also practised by households whose members were 
predominantly Christian (Mtuze 2003: 84-86).
The most detailed description of the ulwaluko ritual is still that of Wilson et al. (1952: 199-220).
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child to the ancestors (Soga 1932; Mtuze 2003: 64). Seven of the 29 cattle 
slaughterings (or 24%) that were recorded in Hamburg village took place to mark either 
the beginning or the end stage of the ulwaluko ritual.10 Wherever possible, households 
would incur considerable expense in meeting the cultural and social expectations of the 
ulwaluko ritual complex. Given the potential for medical complications and 
bewitchment, this ritual was fraught with (natural and supernatural) uncertainty that 
needed to be managed by investments in ritual activities so as to ensure a smooth 
passage for the vulnerable initiate (see Van Vuuren & De Jongh 1999; Gitywa 1976).
The slaughtering of a beast to celebrate the return of the ikrwala [litunripe fruit, a new 
man] was not regarded by all as isiko [Xhosa custom]. In fact, there was significant 
variation in exactly how the ritual was conducted. At some homesteads, the umngcamo 
ritual was held the day before the boy was circumcised and went into seclusion. A goat 
or a beast may be slaughtered for this ritual. In other cases, no beast was slaughtered 
and the main slaughter ritual took place once the new man emerged safely from the 
bush. In such cases, an umguyo [dance] will be held on the night before circumcision. I 
do not attempt to analyse the nature of the variation in such practices (but see Raum & 
De Jager [1972:139], who suggest that non-Christian households conduct an umguyo). 
In Hamburg, especially among church-goers, the beast was frequently slaughtered 
outside the byre and by any young men from the village, not only by agnatic kinsmen 
of the homestead. However, among some Church members, including members of the 
Wesleyan Methodist church, the umngcamo ritual that formed part of the ulwaluko 
process involved the ritual slaughter of a cow in the byre.11
The entire ulwaluko ritual ideally took place in a village context and the sons of town- 
based families were frequently sent to the rural homes of trusted kinspeople to be 
circumcised and initiated into manhood. The ulwaluko ritual was a celebration of 
Xhosa manhood par excellence. Undergoing circumcision furnished men with 
‘recognised status, the privilege of marriage, independence from [their] parents, new 
responsibilities, an ethnic (that is Xhosa) identity.. .a circumcised person becomes 
trusted, desirable and respected’ (Van Vuuren & de Jongh 1999: 144). Uncircumcised
10 Twenty rituals related to ulwaluko involved the slaughter of either a goat or cow (often both, but for 
different phases of the ritual). Eight of the rituals connected to ulwaluko did not involve the slaughter
of either a cow or a goat.
11 Gitywa (1976: 179ff) notes that the umngcamo ritual involves the ritual slaughter of a goat.
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‘men’ are not men at all, but remained boys, no matter how old they were. They may 
not speak at public gatherings and they would almost certainly not find a Xhosa woman 
willing to marry them (Ramphele 2000: 112-113).
Women, including close kin of the initiates, were excluded from virtually the entire 
ritual and the initiates were forbidden to have any contact with women during their 
period of seclusion, which lasted from three to eight weeks. Instead, the circumcision 
itself was performed by a male surgeon, or ingcibi, and the initiates were subsequently 
cared for by ikhankatha [a male nurse or guardian], who was entrusted by the family 
with the task of ensuring their son’s speedy recovery. While secluded in the bush, the 
initiates were assisted by amaqalathi [young boys], who brought them food and 
firewood. The initiates were instructed to run away if they should see a woman during 
their seclusion, as women were regarded as being umlaza [ritually impure] and thus as 
a danger to them during this time.
After seven or eight days of seclusion, the umshwamo or ukojisa ritual was performed 
at the seclusion lodge. It involved the ritual slaughter of a goat, which was to secure the 
blessings of the ancestors, to ensure that the wound heals well. This ritual also released 
the initiate from his food taboos, which were implemented from the moment of 
circumcision and included only boiled mealies, pumpkins and melons and little or no 
water. The initiate was first made to eat the intsonyama [the front foreleg of the goat] 
alone, i.e the ukushwama [the ritual tasting], after which other men attending the ritual 
ate the rest of the meat. In Hamburg, mqombothi and brandy were also consumed as 
part of this ritual, which involved only men. I found that initiates whose families were 
unable to afford to slaughter a goat for ukojisa were included in the ritual conducted by 
the family of an initiate who was in seclusion nearby.
For the purposes of my analysis, it was the ukuyala [ritual admonition] to which the 
amakrwala [new men] were subjected to upon their return to the village after the period 
of seclusion, that is especially revealing. Senior men from the village were invited to 
address the initiates. They converged on the respective byres of the father or other 
senior patrilineal relative of the initiates. Upon being collected by a group of men from 
the village, the amakrwala were taken down to a nearby river to be washed. The 
ibhuma [seclusion huts or lodges] were set alight and destroyed by fire as soon as the
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initiates had departed. The initiates were then led into the byre, surrounded by the 
group of men who shielded them from the view of the many women who had gathered 
to ululate and welcome them home. They were told to sit motionless to the right of the 
byre entrance and towards the back of the byre, which was close to where the ancestors 
are said to reside. Here, the penis of each initiate was subjected to a careful and public 
inspection by the senior men present, to see that the circumcision wound had healed 
properly. Then each initiate was stripped of his blanket, made to stand naked in the 
byre - though still shielded from the prying eyes of women - and ritually anointed with 
butter. Thereafter, the assembled men, in order of age seniority, proceed to admonish 
them on how they were expected to behave as Xhosa men (cf. Gitywa 1976: 208).
Their faces were then decorated with imbola [red ochre], a task that was usually 
performed by a young girl, who was often a sister or other patrilineal relative. Only 
then did the initiates proceed indoors where they were welcomed by their female 
relatives and neighbours, who gave them small gifts to celebrate their safe return and 
their new status.
The quotations below are from a particular case of returning initiates that I witnessed in 
Hamburg.12 The initiate was admonished by various men present in the byre. The first 
person to address the initiate was his paternal grandfather, who also smeared butter on 
the initiate.
When a person comes from the bush, he is smeared with the fat o f a cow  
[i.e. butter] over his whole body. It is necessary that you buy a cow which 
means, with the very first wage that you earn. That is why we smear the fat 
o f a cow all over you ... We use butter because we have a strong belief in 
cattle. One thing that we like is that a man must have cattle.. .Now my 
child, as I smear you with this fat, I want this fat to bring you luck and 
blessings. When you work over there, the first thing you must buy is a cow.
Start with cattle. After you have bought a cow, you can then think about 
buying other things, but you must start by buying a cow. With these words I 
am saying, I pray and ask God to keep you safe.. .These are the words o f  the 
elderly people o f the amaZizi [clan]. Let me pause now, I say thank you. I 
won’t talk a lot, about the words I have spoken here to this boy while I have
12 This was the return of Mandla, the grandson of my host, Mr. Mkhaya, from the bush. He returned on
14 December 2000, just days before his grandmother's funeral. Because the homestead was in 
mourning, the umgidi [celebration of his safe return] was postponed until 6 January 2001.
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completed smearing him. Now, maZizi [clansmen, including ancestors], let 
me thank the old people, the big men, who have come to talk to this boy to 
show this child the things that can give him guidance to protect him from 
bad influences.
Lisolomzi Sangwane, who was a neighbour of the Mkhaya family but not a kinsmen of 
the initiate, then stood up and addressed the initiate thus:
Sanangile [an old fashioned way of addressing an initiate]...dear friends, 
here is R2.1 heard this old man say that you will buy a cow, yes.. .cattle 
should be here in the kraal. I understand this to be the truth. Now I am 
trying to assist with this thing.. .yes, I am trying to assist with this cow that 
you are aiming to buy by collecting this money. Yes friends, I am at this 
point now. You see now, the thing that you asked for, that you wanted, that 
is what you have received. What you said, namely to go to the bush and 
become a man. You see now that manhood starts like this: when you came 
from over here [seclusion], a house was built for you [by us]. This thing 
tells you that a man does not stay in the forest, he stays in a house.13 A man 
leaves the kraal and goes into a house [i.e. circumcision lodge]. Before now, 
he left the kraal to go to the ihlati [forest], then he came back and now he is 
in the kraal again. This kraal, then, shows that where there are people, there 
will always be a kraal. A house [too] will never disappear where there is a 
person, because a person lives in a house, not in the forest. All these things 
have been done here to you and you have seen them. Here, there are cattle, 
do you see the manure? What has made it? Cattle. Cattle now, what this old 
man [has] said to you, is that the first thing is the cow. The cow is the bank 
of the Xhosa people. Us, we live like this, we live with cattle. When we 
were bom, there was manure... here it is, it is here today too.14 You stand 
[live] on it and it must be like that in your manhood [i.e. adult life]. There 
are many things that hold people, and the children of people, back, many 
things.. .you must not commit them. There are many things out there that 
you are going to meet, but you should not commit them. If you do, you will 
throw away all the things that have been said here. And this manure will
13 See Mayer and Mayer (1990: 37) where these oppositions and others are discussed in relation to 
Xhosa male circumcision.
14 On similar speeches dating from 50 years earlier, expressing remarkably similar sentiments about 
'buying cattle' and 'making manure in the cattle kraal' to build their homes, see Wilson et al. (1952: 
217-219).
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disappear if you enter into the things that are out there.. .You must take care 
of this old man [pointing to the initiate’s grandfather], you look after him 
and don’t you ever forget this old man.. .Help then, my friend, you will 
never try something that will disappoint.. .No, let me sit...
Mr. Daliso, a close clansman (Dlamini) of the family, had similar words to say to the 
initiate:
My son, you must listen to the advice of your grandfather... You must not 
disgrace us in this village of Hamburg, don’t disgrace this place where you 
have learned. It is said, when they speak, that this is a child of Mkhaya’s.
You must protect your surname.. .Here it is, the R2, my son [places a R2 
coin on the ground]... A person who gets money must formulate an idea 
about how to save it. Because people who do not save money end up.. .This 
thing [the gifts of money you receive] enables that thing [the cow you will 
buy] to be realised. ... You have good luck, Mandla. You see that there are 
cattle here.. .A man, when he starts, will work for that cow that was spoken 
about. It comes out [starts] there...[then] he will buy corrugated iron to build 
his own flat.. .this is a good start towards being successful.. .All these things 
that you have heard here today, you should put around your neck like a 
necklace... You [must] not go to the beach15, because you are an initiate.
You do not go to the hotel, you must not go anywhere in a group of initiates 
like goats. You must stay at home and look after the brushwood of the kraal 
and look after the whole [homestead]...
Similar words were spoken more briefly and less convincingly by the initiate’s paternal 
uncle, perhaps because he was unemployed and struggling financially to support his 
large family.
Yes.. .1 will just explain like this. Initiate, these people who have spoken 
here, they have not spoken nonsense. Maybe none of them has got out on 
the side [gone astray] in their own lives, everyone of them continues to go 
straight [on the correct path].. .The umkhwetha's house... [has been left
15 Hamburg was on the coast and young people from the village sometimes went to the beach to drink 
and to socialise away from the eyes of their elders. A number of alcohol-related assaults and stabbings 
only reinforced the ambivalence of older people towards this venue.
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behind]. Now, you must work within the rules of this house.. .You are going 
to see again sometime.. .that it is necessary that when you think of a plan, 
you start to build yourself. Build a flat fit for yourself, buy things like a bed 
and zincs [corrugated iron]. Then you will see again, maybe you will live 
with a... wife. But first you will suffer, you must work and collect money to 
buy a thing [then] you will have your own house.. .To make a noise is not 
necessary in some places, in other places, it is necessary to ask a person 
older than you [for advice]. We don’t criticise older people. I stop there.
Thereafter, Mr. Mkhaya thanked the assembled young men who had helped with 
various aspects of getting the initiate home safely, giving them R50 to share. He also 
thanked other men present for assisting with funeral preparations around the homestead 
and gave this group R50 as well. This was probably done because, as a teetotaller, Mr. 
Mkhaya did not supply brandy for the men to drink on this occasion. He also thanked 
and paid the inkhankatha [ritual nurse] R100 for his services. Then he asked Mr.
Daliso, his classificatory son, to announce the news that the umgidi [party] would take 
place at a later date, as the homestead was in mourning. A container of marewu [a non­
alcoholic, fermented drink] and tea, soft drinks and irostile [roasted bread] were served 
to the men. The young men, however, dispersed soon thereafter, heading for the ‘bottle- 
store’ to buy brandy with the money they had received from Mr. Mkhaya. From the 
byre, the initiate proceeded to the main Mkhaya house, where he was welcomed by his 
mother and other women relatives in an uncharacteristically subdued fashion. He 
received small gifts from them and would remain indoors for the rest of the day, 
receiving his friends.
What these quotations indicate is the extent to which, certainly for the two older men, 
cattle ‘in their key symbolizing capacity.. .objectivize and naturalize an overarching 
order of social arrangements’ (Comaroff 1985: 72). The injunction by the older men to 
the ikrwala that he was to buy cattle reinforces the dominant masculine idiom of the 
man as breadwinner. It speaks of their desire to socialise and economically orientate the 
more individualistic ambitions of this and other young men. In this sense, it seems to 
me, the instruction to the initiate to invest in cattle is ‘really about’ securing his 
acceptance of the (patriarchal) values and responsibilities of helping to build his natal 
homestead and thus the rural village. However, what comes through in the two
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addresses of the younger men to the initiate is their decreasing faith in this patriarchal 
cattle economy and the moral economy it stood for. The two younger men, neither of 
them successful cattle-owners, spoke not of only buying cattle to build his 
grandfather’s homestead. Perhaps basing their speeches on their own painful 
experiences of trying to make ends meet, they spoke more of the initiate building his 
own flat, buying a bed and other possessions and then marrying. They also spoke about 
the social behaviour and deportment expected of a young man, directing him to spend 
his time working around the house, rather than frequenting the hotel or wandering 
around the village with other young (and idle) men, which could result in socially 
disruptive behaviour and disgrace for his home.
The business of performing rituals
As I have suggested, the timing and organising of rituals hinted at their crucial role in 
creatively engaging town-based, diasporic household members in contributing 
financially to the hosting of rituals and to attending rituals held in rural villages. This 
task seemed more urgent for people in Hamburg than in Loverstwist, as the local 
formal job market imploded16 and more of Hamburg’s somewhat better-educated 
younger generation threatened to splinter off and set up more or less independent 
homes in towns.
Given that people in Loverstwist had been living there for less than 20 years, were less 
well-equipped in terms of educational levels and thus employment prospects, and that 
many were still steeped in the very real day-to-day material challenges of building their 
homesteads, this village seemed to have less of a problem in this regard. Paradoxically, 
compared to Hamburg, Loverstwist was far better connected, in terms of daily 
vehicular access, to Peddie town, and to the urban centres of East London, King 
William’s Town and Port Elizabeth, than Hamburg was.
Despite these differences, in both villages the co-operative project of ukwakh ’umzi 
involved mobilising the co-ordinated efforts of both village and town-based members
16 My fieldwork coincided with a strong drive to close the Hamburg Police Station and transfer the 
local policemen to other stations. Also, Hamburg Municipality ceased to exist in 2000, when it was 
formally incorporated into Ngqushwa Municipality, which has offices in Peddie town. This placed the 
future of several relatively well-paid local jobs in jeopardy.
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of each homestead. By harnessing the powerful and integrative sanction of ritual, this 
was the end that many rural people at least sought to promote and achieve (cf. Peoples 
1987; Crain 1998: 146ff).
With the exception of Bigalke (1969) and Steyn (1982 and 1988), the literature on the 
aggregate numbers of cattle that were slaughtered for ritual purposes in the reserve 
areas of the former Ciskei is surprisingly thin.17 In Ainslie (2002b), I point out that this 
was a serious lacuna in our understanding of the production and consumption of cattle 
in the former reserve areas of the Eastern Cape. It is not, however, that the important 
role of ritual slaughter in the consumption and exchange of cattle and small stock has 
gone unnoticed. Indeed, white farmers have for generations been making a useful 
income by supplying this market. What is of concern is that, although it was 
acknowledged as important, there has been no attempt to systematically document the 
extent of this ritual consumption of cattle and small stock. Bigalke (1969), for instance, 
recorded 58 ritual slaughters in ‘the area of one Ndlambe headman’ in the Tyolumnqa 
area over a two-year period. This number, he acknowledged, represented only a small 
portion of the rituals that had actually taken place in the area. He went on to note that 
‘few weekends passed without some ceremonial being held in each village’ (Bigalke 
1969: 104-5, quoted in Hammond-Tooke 1974c: 353).
Steyn (1982) found that in the period September 1979 to September 1980 40 cattle 
were slaughtered in the Amatola Basin, an area some 60 kms north-west of Peddie 
District. He estimated that this figure represented approximately six per cent of the total 
cattle population of the area at the time. Thirty-two of these cattle were slaughtered for 
‘tribal ceremonies’ (i.e. ritual slaughter). The other eight cattle were slaughtered for 
private consumption and, although this is somewhat unusual, Steyn found that some of 
the meat was sold locally.
When Steyn conducted research in Peddie District at the height of the severe drought in 
the early-to-mid 1980s, he noted that in Nyaniso village only two oxen were
17 While he acknowledged that 'the considered importance o f livestock in the life of Ciskei farmers', 
and a desire to investigate certain socio-economic variables which may be detrimentally affecting the 
level of agricultural production', Fraser (1991: 228,230) did not conduct any in-depth analysis of the 
number of cattle slaughtered for ritual purposes, except to note that '18 of the 20 cattle slaughtered [in 
Roxeni and Majwareni villages in Alice district, presumably during the calendar year of 1985] were for 
customary reasons' (Fraser 1991: 115).
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slaughtered in 1983/4, five in 1984/5 and five in 1985/6. In his second fieldwork site, 
the village of Lujiko, only one ox was slaughtered in 1985/6 (Steyn 1988: 378). An 
average of just over 11 goats and 8 sheep were slaughtered in Nyaniso over the three- 
year period, while nearly 15 goats and 9 sheep were ritually slaughtered in Lujiko over 
the same period (Steyn 1988: 404,427). Steyn acknowledges, however, that because of 
the high stock mortalities due to drought at the end of 1983, ‘meat became so 
plentiful.. .that many animal carcasses were not even consumed or skinned’ (Steyn 
1988: 371). The depletion of people’s herds during this time would certainly have acted 
as a serious disincentive to the ritual slaughter of animals, as people would have been 
intent on holding onto their remaining animals.
The data I collected in Hamburg indicate that a total of 99 animals, comprising 33 
cattle, 48 goats and 18 sheep, were slaughtered by 51 homesteads in Hamburg while 
performing 58 different rituals.18 Of the 33 cattle slaughtered, 22 were purchased, as 
were at least 43 of the goats19 and all of the sheep. Twenty of the cattle slaughtered 
were purchased in the village itself and another two were bought in neighbouring 
villages. The remaining nine were taken from the byre of the homestead concerned.
The total amount spent on purchasing cattle for the purposes of slaughter was R43,186, 
at an average price of R 1,963 per animal. What is of considerable interest here is that it 
was not the cattle-owning homesteads that were doing all the ritual slaughtering. In 
fact, only one-third of the cattle slaughtered were taken from the byre of the host 
homestead. This points to the cultural-religious significance of ritual slaughter for most 
homesteads, even where they did not have cattle or small stock of their own. It also 
indicates an active relatively specialised local economy in cattle and goat production, in 
which the imperatives of slaughter rituals acted as an important mechanism for both 
repatriating resources back into the village from people in town and for circulating cash 
in the village itself.
The average price paid for a goat was R416, making a total of R17,888 spent on buying 
goats and for a sheep R414, so that a total of R7,452 was spent on purchasing sheep for 
ritual slaughter. In total, the homesteads in Hamburg that purchased animals for the
18 It could be argued that more people were in a position to conduct slaughter rituals because of the 
higher rainfall that had resulted in growth in their herds. However, the fact that the majority of people 
had to purchase the animals needed to slaughter would seem to negate this argument.
19 My data is incomplete on whether the five remaining goats were actually bought or not.
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purpose of slaughtering them during the twelve months for which data were collected 
expended over R68,526 in doing so. Of course, the purchase of the animal to be 
slaughtered was by no means the only expense incurred in conducting a ritual, 
particularly where the ritual in question was a funeral. As I point out above, 
considerable quantities of food and drinks needed to be purchased at this time, and 
money was also spent on sprucing up the homestead prior to a funeral or other 
important ritual event. I suggest that a conservative estimate of the total cost of hosting 
a slaughter ritual would be between two and three times the amount paid out for the 
animal to be slaughtered. Expenditure on funerals especially was often far more than 
this proportion. This would bring the expenditure on rituals involving the slaughter of 
an animal in Hamburg for the period in question to between R137,000 and R206,000. 
This was a significant amount of money, especially when collected and spent by only 
51 households.
In contrast, the 43 beerdrinks in Hamburg during this time cost R24,295, with the 
average beerdrink in Hamburg village costing R565. However, this amount was 
inflated by the extra expenses incurred by a few homesteads in buying clothing and 
providing other necessary possessions for ‘new men’, i.e. those young men who had 
just emerged from male initiation. One homestead paid out R3,614 to host a beerdrink 
that included buying such items unclear for their ikrwala [lit. unripe fruit]. The least 
spent on a beerdrink in Hamburg during this period was a mere R118.
In Loverstwist, during the eight-month period for which I have data, a total of 30 
animals, comprising nine cattle, 19 goats and 2 sheep, was ritually slaughtered. 
Although not an equivalent record of rituals involving animal slaughter over the full 
12-month period, it is striking that people in Loverstwist clearly preferred to use cattle 
from their own byres for the purposes of ritual slaughter. Of the nine cattle slaughtered, 
six were taken from the byre of the homestead performing the ritual and one animal 
was exchanged. Only two cattle were purchased for the purposes of conducting a ritual. 
Sixty-three per cent of the animals slaughtered were goats, whereas in Hamburg they 
only comprised 48 per cent of all the animals slaughtered. Proportionally fewer sheep 
were slaughtered in Loverstwist (6% of animals slaughtered) than in Hamburg (18%).
It is difficult to reach definitive conclusions regarding the differences in ritual practice 
between the two villages since the Loverstwist data are incomplete, but it is clear that
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rituals in Loverstwist involved a smaller cash outlay, comparatively fewer slaughter 
rituals and more beerdrinks.
Rituals were performed as and when households could afford them, though most were 
held during the holiday periods of December, Easter weekend (March-April) and the 
period May-June-July (Ngwane 2003: 690ff; Ntshona and Turner 2002; cf. McAllister 
2001) when generally large numbers of people have returned to the village for the 
holidays, often with the express purpose of ‘being around’ to participate in their own 
and other people’s rituals. Funerals were obviously exceptions to this pattern as these 
generally took place within two weeks of a person’s death. Beer drinks, although they 
generally entailed appreciably less organisation and expenditure than more elaborate 
slaughter rituals, were similarly concentrated in these holiday periods but also tended to 
occur throughout the year. My data show that beerdrinks in Hamburg occurred most 
frequently in December (13 beerdrinks), followed by smaller peaks in November (7), 
March (7) and June (7), with May (6) and July (6) also favoured times for the hosting 
of beerdrinks.20
OA
The complete picture in this regard is: Nov (7), Dec (13), Jan (2), Feb (3), Mar (7), Apr (3), May (5), 
Jun (7), Jul (6), Aug (3), Sep (1) and Oct (2). I have not included the corresponding data from 
Loverstwist as they do not constitute a full 12-month period.
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